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THE  EEPUBLIC 


O'-V 


PLATO  AND  ARISTOTLE 


The 

Dialogues  of  Plato 

Translated  into  English  with  Analyses  and  Introductions 

BY 

B,  JOWETT,  M.  A. 

Master  of  Balliol  College 

Regius  Professor  of  Greek  in  the  University  of  Oxford 


VOLUME  11 


THE  REPUBLIC 


BIGELOW,  BROWN  & CO.,  Inc. 
•NEW  YORK 


Copyright,  1914,  hy 

Hearst’s  International  Library  Co.,  Inc. 


/'?7f 

y. 

' 

THE  REPUBLIC 

4 

BOOK  I 

PERSONS  OF  THE  DIALOGUE 

^ocRATES,  who  is  the  narrator.  Cephalus. 

r Glaucon.  Thrasymachus. 

^Adeimantus.  Cleitophon. 

POLEMARCHUS. 

A nd  others  who  are  mute  auditors. 

The  scene  is  laid  in  the  house  of  Cephalus  at  the  Piraeus;  and  the  whole 
dialogue  is  narrated  by  Socrates  the  day  after  it  actually  took  place  to 
Timaeus,  Hermocrates,  Critias,  and  a nameless  person,  who  are  intro- 
duced in  the  Timaeus. 

I WENT  down  yesterday  to  the  Piraeus  with  Glau- 
con  the  son  of  Ariston,  that  I might  offer  up  my 
prayers  to  the  goddess ; ^ and  also  because  I wanted 
to  see  in  what  manner  they  would  celebrate  the  fes- 
tival, which  was  a new  thing.  I was  delighted  with 
the  procession  of  the  inhabitants;  but  that  of  the 
Thracians  was  equally,  if  not  more,  beautiful.  When 
we  had  finished  our  prayers  and  viewed  the  spectacle, 
we  turned  in  the  direction  of  the  city;  and  at  that 
instant  Polemarchus  the  son  of  Cephalus  chanced  to 
catch  sight  of  us  from  a distance  as  we  were  starting 
on  our  way  home,  and  told  his  servant  to  run  and  bid 
us  wait  for  him.  The  servant  took  hold  of  me  by  the 
cloak  behind,  and  said:  Polemarchus  desires  you  to 
wait. 

1 Bendis,  the  Thracian  Artemis. 


1 


2 


THE  REPUBLIC 


I turned  round,  and  asked  him  where  his  master 
was. 

There  he  is,  said  the  youth,  coming  after  you,  if 
you  will  only  wait. 

Certainly  we  will,  said  Glaucon;  and  in  a few 
minutes  Polemarchus  appeared,  and  with  him  Adei- 
mantus,  Glaucon’s  brother,  Niceratus  the  son  of  Ni- 
cias,  and  several  others  who  had  been  at  the  proces- 
sion. 

Polemarchus  said  to  me : I perceive,  Socrates,  that 
you  and  your  companion  are  already  on  your  way 
to  the  city. 

You  are  not  far  wrong,  I said. 

But  do  you  see,  he  rejoined,  how  many  we  are? 

Of  course. 

And  are  you  stronger  than  all  these?  for  if  not, 
you  will  have  to  remain  where  you  are. 

May  there  not  be  the  alternative,  I said,  that  we 
may  persuade  you  to  let  us  go? 

But  can  you  persuade  us,  if  we  refuse  to  listen  to 
you?  he  said. 

Certainly  not,  replied  Glaucon. 

Then  we  are  not  going  to  listen;  of  that  you  may 
be  assured. 

Adeimantus  added:  Has  no  one  told  you  of  the 
torch-race  on  horseback  in  honor  of  the  goddess  which 
will  take  place  in  the  evening? 

With  horses!  I replied:  That  is  a novelty.  Will 
horsemen  carry  torches  and  pass  them  one  to  another 
during  the  race? 

Yes,  said  Polemarchus,  and  not  only  so,  but  a fes- 
tival will  be  celebrated  at  night,  which  you  certainly 
ought  to  see.  Let  us  rise  soon  after  supper  and  see 
this  festival ; there  will  be  a gathering  of  young  men, 
and  we  will  have  a good  talk.  Stay  then,  and  do  not 
be  perverse. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


3 


Glaucon  said:  I suppose,  since  you  insist,  that  we 
must. 

Very  good,  I replied. 

Accordingly  we  went  with  Polemarchus  to  his 
house;  and  there  we  found  his  brothers  Lysias  and 
Euthydemus,  and  with  them  Thrasymachus  the  Chal- 
cedonian,  Charmantides  the  Paeanian,  and  Cleitophon 
the  son  of  Aristonymus.  There  too  was  Cephalus  the 
father  of  Polemarchus,  whom  I had  not  seen  for  a 
long  time,  and  I thought  him  very  much  aged.  He 
was  seated  on  a cushioned  chair,  and  had  a garland 
on  his  head,  for  he  had  been  sacrificing  in  the  court; 
and  there  were  some  other  chairs  in  the  room  arranged 
in  a semicircle,  upon  which  we  sat  down  by  him.  He 
saluted  me  eagerly,  and  then  he  said : — 

You  don’t  come  to  see  me,  Socrates,  as  often  as  you 
ought : If  I were  still  able  to  go  and  see  you  I would 
not  ask  you  to  come  to  me.  But  at  my  age  I can 
hardly  get  to  the  city,  and  therefore  you  should  come 
oftener  to  the  Piraeus.  For  let  me  tell  you,  that  the 
more  the  pleasures  of  the  body  fade  away,  the  greater ) 
to  me  is  the  pleasure  and  charm  of  conversation.  Do 
not  then  deny  my  request,  but  make  our  house  your 
resort  and  keep  company  with  these  young  men;  we 
are  old  friends,  and  you  will  be  quite  at  home  with  us. 

I replied:  There  is  nothing  which  for  my  part  I 
like  better,  Cephalus,  than  conversing  with  aged  men ; 
for  I regard  them  as  travellers  who  have  gone  a jour- 
ney which  I too  may  have  to  go,  and  of  whom  I ought 
to  inquire,  whether  the  way  is  smooth  and  easy,  or 
rugged  and  difficult.  And  this  is  a question  which 
I should  like  to  ask  of  you  who  have  arrived  at  that 
time  which  the  poets  call  the  “ threshold  of  old  age  ” 
— Is  life  harder  towards  the  end,  or  what  report  do 
you  give  of  it? 

I will  tell  you,  Socrates,  he  said,  what  my  own  feel- 


4 


THE  REPUBLIC 


ing  is.  Men  of  my  age  floek  together;  we  are  birds  of 
a feather,  as  the  old  proverb  says ; and  at  our  meetings 
the  tale  of  my  acquaintanee  commonly  is  — I can  not 
eat,  I can  not  drink ; the  pleasures  of  youth  and  love 
are  fled  away:  there  was  a good  time  once,  but  now 
that  is  gone,  and  life  is  no  longer  life.  Some  complain 
of  the  slights  which  are  put  upon  them  by  relations, 
and  they  will  tell  you  sadly  of  how  many  evils  their 
old  age  is  the  cause.  But  to  me,  Socrates,  these  com- 
plainers  seem  to  blame  that  which  is  not  really  in 
fault.  For  if  old  age  were  the  cause,  I too  being  old, 
and  every  other  old  man,  would  have  felt  as  they  do. 
But  this  is  not  my  own  experience,  nor  that  of  others 
whom  I have  known.  How  well  I remember  the  aged 
poet  Sophocles,  when  in  answer  to  the  question.  How 
does  love  suit  with  age,  Sophocles,  — are  you  still  the 
man  you  were?  Peace,  he  replied ; most  gladly  have 
I escaped  the  thing  of  which  you  speak;  I feel  as  if 
I had  escaped  from  a mad  and  furious  master.  His 
words  have  often  occurred  to  my  mind  since,  and  they 
seem  as  good  to  me  now  as  at  the  time  when  he  uttered 
them.  For  certainly  old  age  has  a great  sense  of  calm 
and  freedom ; when  the  passions  relax  their  hold,  then, 
as  Sophocles  says,  we  are  freed  from  the  grasp  not  of 
one  mad  master  only,  but  of  many.  The  truth  is, 
Socrates,  that  these  regrets,  and  also  the  complaints 
about  relations,  are  to  be  attributed  to  the  same  cause, 
which  is  not  old  age,  but  men’s  characters  and  tem- 
pers; for  he  who  is  of  a calm  and  happy  nature  will 
hardly  feel  the  pressure  of  age,  but  to  him  who  is  of 
an  opposite  disposition  youth  and  age  are  equally  a 
burden. 

I listened  in  admiration,  and  wanting  to  draw  him 
out,  that  he  might  go  on  — Yes,  Cephalus,  I said; 
but  I rather  suspect  that  people  in  general  are  not 
convinced  by  you  when  you  speak  thus;  they  think 


THE  REPUBLIC 


5 


that  old  age  sits  lightly  upon  you,  not  because  of  your 
happy  disposition,  but  because  you  are  rich,  and 
wealth  is  w'ell  known  to  be  a great  comforter. 

You  are  right,  he  replied;  they  are  not  convinced: 
and  there  is  something  in  what  they  say;  not,  how- 
ever, so  much  as  they  imagine.  I might  answer  them 
as  Themistocles  answered  the  Seriphian  who  was 
abusing  him  and  saying  that  he  was  famous,  not  for 
his  own  merits  but  because  he  was  an  Athenian:  “ If 
you  had  been  a native  of  my  country  or  I of  yours, 
neither  of  us  would  have  been  famous.”  And  to 
those  who  are  not  rich  and  are  impatient  of  old  age, 
the  same  reply  may  be  made;  for  to  the  good  poor 
man  old  age  can  not  be  a light  burden,  nor  can  a bad 
rich  man  ever  have  peace  with  himself. 

May  I ask,  Cephalus,  whether  your  fortune  was  for  / 
the  most  part  inherited  or  acquired  by  you?  / 

Acquired!  Socrates;  do  you  want  to  know  how^ 
much  I acquired?  In  the  art  of  making  money  I 
have  been  midway  between  my  father  and  grand- 
father: for  my  grandfather,  whose  name  I bear, 
doubled  and  trebled  the  value  of  his  patrimony,  that 
which  he  inherited  being  much  what  I possess  now; 
but  my  father  Lysanias  reduced  the  property  below 
what  it  is  at  present : and  I shall  be  satisfied  if  I leave 
to  these  my  sons  not  less  but  a little  more  than  I re- 
ceived. 

That  was  why  I asked  you  the  question,  I replied, 
because  I see  that  you  are  indifferent  about  money, 
which  is  a characteristic  rather  of  those  who  have  in- 
herited their  fortunes  than  of  those  who  have  acquired 
them;  the  makers  of  fortunes  have  a second  love  of 
money  as  a creation  of  their  own,  resembling  the  affec- 
tion of  authors  for  their  own  poems,  or  of  parents  for 
their  children,  besides  that  natural  love  of  it  for  the 
sake  of  use  and  profit  which  is  common  to  them  and 


6 


THE  REPUBLIC 


all  men.  And  hence  they  are  very  bad  company,  for 
they  can  talk  about  nothing  but  the  praises  of  wealth. 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

Yes,  that  is  very  true,  but  may  I ask  another  ques- 
tion?— What  do  you  consider  to  be  the  greatest 
blessing  which  you  have  reaped  from  your  wealth? 

One,  he  said,  of  which  I could  not  expect  easily  to 
convince  others.  For  let  me  tell  you,  Socrates,  that 
when  a man  thinks  himself  to  be  near  death,  fears  and 
cares  enter  into  his  mind  which  he  never  had  before; 
the  tales  of  a world  below  and  the  punishment  which 
is  exacted  there  of  deeds  done  here  were  once  a laugh- 
ing matter  to  him,  but  now  he  is  tormented  with  the 
thought  that  they  may  be  true:  either  from  the  weak- 
ness of  age,  or  because  he  is  now  drawing  nearer  to 
that  other  place,  he  has  a clearer  view  of  these  things ; 
suspicions  and  alarms  crowd  thickly  upon  him,  and 
he  begins  to  reflect  and  consider  what  wrongs  he  has 
done  to  others.  And  when  he  finds  that  the  sum  of 
his  transgressions  is  great  he  will  many  a time  like  a 
child  start  up  in  his  sleep  for  fear,  and  he  is  filled 
with  dark  forebodings.  But  to  him  who  is  conscious 
of  no  sin,  sweet  hope,  as  Pindar  charmingly  says,  is 
the  kind  nurse  of  his  age : 

“ Hope/’  he  says,  “ cherishes  the  soul  of  him  who  lives  in 
justice  and  holiness,  and  is  the  nurse  of  his  age  and  the  com- 
panion of  his  journey;  — hope  which  is  mightiest  to  sway  the 
restless  soul  of  man.” 

How  admirable  are  his  words ! And  the  great 
blessings  of  riches,  I do  not  say  to  every  man,  but  to  a 
good  man,  is,  that  he  has  had  no  occasion  to  deceive  or 
to  defraud  others,  either  intentionally  or  unintention- 
ally ; and  when  he  departs  to  the  world  below  he  is  not 
in  any  apprehension  about  offerings  due  to  the  gods 
or  debts  which  he  owes  to  men.  Now  to  this  peace  of 


THE  REPUBLIC 


7 


mind  the  possession  of  wealth  greatly  contributes; 
and  therefore  I say,  that,  setting  one  thing  against 
another,  of  the  many  advantages  which  wealth  has 
to  give,  to  a man  of  sense  this  is  in  my  opinion  the 
greatest. 

Well  said,  Cephalus,  I replied;  but  as  concern- 
ing justice,  what  is  it?  — to  speak  the  truth  and  to 
pay  your  debts  — no  more  than  this?  And  even  to 
this  are  there  not  exceptions?  Suppose  that  a friend 
when  in  his  right  mind  has  deposited  arms  with  me 
and  he  asks  for  them  when  he  is  not  in  his  right  mind, 
ought  I to  give  them  back  to  him?  No  one  would 
say  that  I ought  or  that  I should  be  right  in  doing 
so,  any  more  than  they  would  Say  that  I ought  always 
to  speak  the  truth  to  one  who  is  in  his  condition. 

You  are  quite  right,  he  replied. 

But  then,  I said,  speaking  the  truth  and  paying 
your  debts  is  not  a correct  definition  of  justice. 

Quite  correct,  Socrates,  if  Simonides  is  to  be  be- 
lieved, said  Polemarchus  interposing. 

I fear,  said  Cephalus,  that  I must  go  now,  for  I 
have  to  look  after  the  sacrifices,  and  I hand  over  the 
argument  to  Polemarchus  and  the  company.  ^ 

Is  not  Polemarchus  your  heir?  I said. 

To  be  sure,  he  answered,  and  went  away  laughing 
to  the  sacrifices. 

Tell  me  then,  O thou  heir  of  the  argument,  what 
did  Simonides  say,  and  according  to  you  truly  say, 
about  justice? 

He  said  that  the  repayment  of  a debt  is  just, 
and  in  saying  so  he  appears  to  me  to  be  right. 

I should  be  sorry  to  doubt  the  word  of  such  a wise 
and  inspired  man,  but  his  meaning,  though  probably 
clear  to  you,  is  the  reverse  of  clear  to  me.  For  he  cer- 
tainly does  not  mean,  as  we  were  just  now  saying, 
that  I ought  to  return  a deposit  of  arms  or  of  any- 


s 


THE  REPUBLIC 


thing  else  to  one  who  asks  for  it  when  he  is  not  in  his 
right  senses ; and  yet  a deposit  can  not  be  denied  to  be 
a debt. 

True. 

Then  when  the  person  who  asks  me  is  not  in  his 
right  mind  I am  by  no  means  to  make  the  return? 

Certainly  not. 

When  Simonides  said  that  the  repayment  of  a 
debt  was  justice,  he  did  not  mean  to  include  that  case? 

Certainly  not;  for  he  thinks  that  a friend  ought 
always  to  do  good  to  a friend  and  never  evil. 

You  mean  that  the  return  of  a deposit  of  gold  which 
is  to  the  injury  of  the  receiver,  if  the  two  parties  are 
friends,  is  not  the  repayment  of  a debt,  — that  is 
what  you  would  imagine  him  to  say? 

Yes. 

And  are  enemies  also  to  receive  what  we  owe  to 
them? 

To  be  sure,  he  said,  they  are  to  receive  what  we  owe 
them,  and  an  enemy,  as  I take  it,  owes  to  an  enemy 
that  which  is  due  or  proper  to  him  — that  is  to  say, 
evil. 

Simonides,  then,  after  the  manner  of  poets,  would 
seem  to  have  spoken  darkly  of  the  nature  of  justice; 
for  he  really  meant  to  say  that  justice  is  the  giving 
to  each  man  what  is  proper  to  him,  and  this  he  termed 
a debt. 

That  must  have  been  his  meaning,  he  said. 

By  heaven ! I replied ; and  if  we  asked  him  what  due 
or  proper  thing  is  given  by  medicine,  and  to  whom, 
what  answer  do  you  think  that  he  would  make  to  us? 

He  would  surely  reply  that  medicine  gives  drugs 
and  meat  and  drink  to  human  bodies. 

And  what  due  or  proper  thing  is  given  by  cookery, 
and  to  what? 

Seasoning  to  food.  , 


THE  REPUBLIC 


9 


And  what  is  that  which  justice  gives,  and  to  whom? 

If,  Socrates,  we  are  to  be  guided  at  all  by  the  anal- 
ogy of  the  preceding  instances,  then  justice  is  the  art 
which  gives  good  to  friends  and  evil  to  enemies. 

That  is  his  meaning  then? 

I think  so. 

And  who  is  best  able  to  do  good  to  his  friends  and 
evil  to  his  enemies  in  time  of  sickness? 

The  physician. 

Or  when  they  are  on  a voyage,  amid  the  perils  of 
the  sea? 

The  pilot. 

And  in  what  sort  of  actions  or  with  a view  to  what 
result  is  the  just  man  most  able  to  do  harm  to  his 
enemy  and  good  to  his  friend? 

In  going  to  war  against  the  one  and  in  making 
alliances  with  the  other. 

But  when  a man  is  well,  my  dear  Polemarchus, 
there  is  no  need  of  a physician? 

No. 

And  he  who  is  not  on  a voyage  has  no  need  of  a 
pilot? 

No. 

Then  in  time  of  peace  justice  will  be  of  no  use? 

I am  very  far  from  thinking  so. 

You  think  that  justice  may  be  of  use  in  peace  as 
well  as  in  war? 

Yes. 

Like  husbandry  for  the  acquisition  of  corn? 

Yes. 

Or  like  shoemaking  for  the  acquisition  of  shoes,  — 
that  is  what  you  mean? 

Yes. 

And  what  similar  use  or  power  of  acquisition  has 
justice  in  time  of  peace? 

In  contracts,  Socrates,  justice  is  of  use. 


10 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  by  contracts  you  mean  partnerships? 

Exactly. 

But  is  the  just  man  or  the  skilful  player  a more 
useful  and  better  partner  at  a game  of  draughts? 

The  skilful  player. 

And  in  the  laying  of  bricks  and  stones  is  the  just 
man  a more  useful  or  better  partner  than  the  builder? 

Quite  the  reverse. 

Then  in  what  sort  of  partnership  is  the  just  man  a 
better  partner  than  the  harp-player,  as  in  playing 
the  harp  the  harp-player  is  certainly  a better  partner 
than  the  just  man? 

In  a money  partnership. 

Yes,  Polemarchus,  but  surely  not  in  the  use  of 
money;  for  you  do  not  want  a just  man  to  be  your 
counsellor  in  the  purchase  or  sale  of  a horse;  a man 
who  is  knowing  about  horses  would  be  better  for 
that,  would  he  not? 

Certainly. 

And  when  you  want  to  buy  a ship,  the  shipwright 
or  the  pilot  would  be  better? 

True. 

Then  what  is  that  joint  use  of  silver  or  gold  in 
which  the  just  man  is  to  he  preferred? 

When  you  want  a deposit  to  he  kept  safely. 

You  mean  when  money  is  not  wanted,  but  allowed 
to  lie? 

Precisely. 

That  is  to  say,  justice  is  useful  when  money  is  use- 
less? 

That  is  the  inference. 

And  when  you  want  to  keep  a pruning-hook  safe, 
then  justice  is  useful  to  the  individual  and  to  the 
state ; but  when  you  want  to  use  it,  then  the  art  of  the 
vine-dresser? 

Clearly. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


11 


And  when  you  want  to  keep  a shield  or  a lyre,  and 
not  to  use  them,  you  would  say  that  justice  is  useful; 
but  when  you  want  to  use  them,  then  the  art  of  the 
soldier  or  of  the  musician? 

Certainly. 

And  so  of  all  other  things;  — justice  is  useful 
when  they  are  useless,  and  useless  when  they  are  use- 
ful? 

That  is  the  inference. 

Then  justice  is  not  good  for  much.  But  let  us  con- 
sider this  further  point:  Is  not  he  who  can  best  strike 
a blow  in  a boxing  match  or  in  any  kind  of  fighting 
best  able  to  ward  off  a blow? 

Certainly. 

And  he  who  is  most  skilful  in  preventing  or  esca- 
ping ^ from  a disease  is  best  able  to  create  one  ? 

True. 

And  he  is  the  best  guard  of  a camp  who  is  best  able 
to  steal  a march  upon  the  enemy? 

Certainly. 

Then  he  who  is  a good  keeper  of  anything  is  also  a 
good  thief? 

That,  I suppose,  is  to  be  inferred. 

Then  if  the  just  man  is  good  at  keeping  money,  he 
is  good  at  stealing  it? 

That  is  implied  in  the  argument. 

Then  after  all  the  just  man  has  turned  out  to  be  a 
thief.  And  this  is  a lesson  which  I suspect  you  must 
have  learned  out  of  Homer;  for  he,  speaking  of 
Autolycus,  the  maternal  grandfather  of  Odysseus, 
who  is  a favorite  of  his,  affirms  that 

He  was  excellent  above  all  men  in  theft  and  perjury. 

And  so,  you  and  Homer  and  Simonides  are  agreed 
that  justice  is  an  art  of  theft;  to  be  practised  however 

^ Reading  (pvXd^aaOai  Kal  \a6eiv,  oCros, 


12 


THE  REPUBLIC 


“ for  the  good  of  friends  and  for  the  harm  of  ene- 
mies,” — that  was  what  you  were  saying? 

No,  eertainly  not  that,  although  I do  not  now  know 
what  I did  say ; but  I still  stand  by  the  latter  words. 

Well,  there  is  another  question:  By  friends  and 
enemies  do  we  mean  those  who  are  so  really,  or  only 
in  seeming? 

Surely,  he  said,  a man  may  be  expected  to  love 
those  whom  he  thinks  good,  and  to  hate  those  whom 
he  thinks  evil. 

Yes,  but  do  not  persons  often  err  about  good  and 
evil:  many  who  are  not  good  seem  to  be  so,  and  con- 
versely? 

That  is  true. 

Then  to  them  the  good  will  be  enemies  and  the  evil 
will  he  their  friends? 

Time. 

And  in  that  case  they  will  be  right  in  doing  good  to 
the  evil  and  evil  to  the  good? 

Clearly. 

But  the  good  are  just  and  would  not  do  an  in- 
justice? 

True. 

Then  according  to  your  argument  it  is  just  to  in- 
jure those  who  do  no  wrong? 

Nay,  Socrates;  the  doctrine  is  immoral. 

Then  I suppose  that  we  ought  to  do  good  to  the  just 
and  harm  to  the  unjust? 

I like  that  better. 

But  see  the  consequence : — Many  a man  who  is 
ignorant  of  human  nature  has  friends  who  are  bad 
friends,  and  in  that  case  he  ought  to  do  harm  to  them; 
and  he  has  good  enemies  whom  he  ought  to  benefit; 
but,  if  so,  we  shall  be  saying  the  very  opposite  of  that 
which  we  affirmed  to  be  the  meaning  of  Simonides. 

Very  true,  he  said;  and  I thinlc  that  we  had  better 


THE  REPUBLIC 


13 


correct  an  error  into  which  we  seem  to  have  fallen  in 
the  use  of  the  words  “ friend  ” and  “ enemy.” 

What  was  the  error,  Polemarchus?  I asked. 

We  assumed  that  he  is  a friend  who  seems  to  be  or 
who  is  thought  good. 

And  how  is  the  error  to  be  corrected? 

We  should  rather  say  that  he  is  a friend  who  is, 
as  well  as  seems,  good;  and  that  he  who  seems  only, 
and  is  not  good,  only  seems  to  be  and  is  not  a friend ; 
and  of  an  enemy  the  same  may  be  said. 

You  would  argue  that  the  good  are  our  friends 
and  the  bad  our  enemies? 

Yes. 

And  instead  of  saying  simply  as  we  did  at  first, 
that  it  is  just  to  do  good  to  our  friends  and  harm  to 
our  enemies,  we  should  further  say:  It  is  just  to  do 
good  to  our  friends  when  they  are  good  and  harm  to 
our  enemies  when  they  are  evil? 

Yes,  that  appears  to  me  to  be  the  truth. 

But  ought  the  just  to  injure  any  one  at  all? 

Undoubtedly  he  ought  to  injure  those  who  are  both 
wicked  and  his  enemies. 

When  horses  are  injured,  are  they  improved  or 
deteriorated? 

The  latter. 

Deteriorated,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  good  qualities  of 
horses,  not  of  dogs? 

Yes,  of  horses. 

And  dogs  are  deteriorated  in  the  good  qualities  of 
dogs,  and  not  of  horses? 

Of  course. 

And  will  not  men  who  are  injured  be  deteriorated 
in  that  which  is  the  proper  virtue  of  man? 

Certainly. 

And  that  human  virtue  is  justice? 

To  be  sure. 


14  THE  REPUBLIC 

Then  men  who  are  injured  are  of  necessity  made 
unjust? 

That  is  the  result. 

But  can  the  musician  by  his  art  make  men  unmu- 
sical? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  the  horseman  by  his  art  make  them  bad  horse- 
men? 

Impossible. 

And  can  the  just  by  justice  make  men  unjust,  or 
speaking  generally,  can  the  good  by  virtue  make 
them  bad  ? 

Assuredly  not. 

Any  more  than  heat  can  produce  cold? 

It  cannot. 

Or  drought  moisture? 

Clearly  not. 

Nor  can  the  good  harm  any  one? 

, Impossible. 

* And  the  just  is  the  good? 

Certainly. 

Then  to  injure  a friend  or  any  one  else  is  not  the 
act  of  a just  man,  but  of  the  opposite,  who  is  the  un- 
just? 

I think  that  what  you  say  is  quite  true,  Socrates. 

Then  if  a man  says  that  justice  consists  in  the  re- 
payment of  debts,  and  that  good  is  the  debt  which  a 
just  man  owes  to  his  friends,  and  evil  the  debt  which 
he  owes  to  his  enemies,  — to  say  this  is  not  wise;  for 
it  is  not  true,  if,  as  has  been  clearly  shown,  the  injur- 
ling  of  another  can  be  in  no  case  just. 

I agree  with  you,  said  Polemarchus. 

Then  you  and  I are  prepared  to  take  up  arms 
against  any  one  who  attribute  such  a saying  to 
Simonides  or  Bias  or  Pittacus,  or  any  other  wise  man 
or  seer? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


15 


I am  quite  ready  to  do  battle  at  your  side,  he  said. 

Shall  I tell  you  whose  I believe  the  saying  to  be? 

Whose? 

I beheve  that  Periander  or  Perdiccas  or  Xerxes 
or  Ismenias  the  Theban,  or  some  other  rich  and 
mighty  man,  who  had  a great  opinion  of  his  own 
power,  was  the  first  to  say  that  justice  is  “ doing 
good  to  your  friends  and  harm  to  your  enemies.” 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Yes,  I said;  but  if  this  definition  of  justice  also 
breaks  down,  what  other  can  be  offered? 

Several  times  in  the  course  of  the  discussion  Thrasy- 
machus  had  made  an  attempt  to  get  the  argument 
into  his  own  hands,  and  had  been  put  down  by  the 
rest  of  the  company,  who  wanted  to  hear  the  end. 
But  when  Polemarchus  and  I had  done  speaking 
and  there  was  a pause,  he  could  no  longer  hold  his 
peace;  and,  gathering  himself  up,  he  came  at  us  like 
a wild  beast,  seeking  to  devour  us.  We  were  quite 
panic-stricken  at  the  sight  of  him. 

He  roared  out  to  the  whole  company:  What  folly, 
Socrates,  has  taken  possession  of  you  all?  And  why, 
silly  billies,  do  you  knock  under  to  one  another?  I 
say  that  if  you  want  really  to  know  what  justice  is, 
you  should  not  only  ask  but  answer,  and  you  should 
not  seek  honor  to  yourself  from  the  refutation  of  an 
opponent,  but  have  your  own  answer;  for  there  is 
many  a one  who  can  ask  and  can  not  answer.  And 
now  I will  not  have  you  say  that  justice  is  duty  or 
advantage  or  profit  or  gain  or  interest,  for  this  sort 
of  nonsense  will  not  do  for  me;  I must  have  clearness 
and  accuracy. 

I was  panic-stricken  at  his  words,  and  could  not 
look  at  him  without  trembling.  Indeed  I believe 
that  if  I had  not  fixed  my  eye  upon  him,  I should  have 
been  struck  dumb;  but  when  I saw  his  fury  rising,  I 


16 


THE  REPUBLIC 


looked  at  him  first,  and  was  therefore  able  to  reply  to 
him. 

Thrasymachus,  I said,  with  a quiver,  don’t  be  hard 
upon  us.  Polemarchus  and  I may  have  been  guilty 
of  a little  mistake  in  the  argument,  but  I can  assure 
you  that  the  error  was  not  intentional.  If  we  were 
seeking  for.  a piece  of  gold,  you  would  not  imagine 
that  we  were  “ knocking  under  to  one  another,”  and  so 
losing  our  chance  of  finding  it.  And  why,  when  we 
are  seeking  for  justice,  a thing  more  precious  than 
many  pieces  of  gold,  do  you  say  that  we  are  weakly 
yielding  to  one  another  and  not  doing  our  utmost  to 
get  at  the  truth?  Nay,  my  good  friend,  we  are  most 
willing  and  anxious  to  do  so,  but  the  fact  is  that  we 
can  not.  And  if  so,  you  people  who  know  all  things 
should  pity  us  and  not  be  angry  with  us. 

How  characteristic  of  Socrates!  he  replied,  with  a 
bitter  laugh ; — that’s  your  ironical  style  I Did  I not 
foresee  — have  I not  already  told  you,  that  whatever 
he  was  asked  he  would  refuse  to  answer,  and  try 
irony  or  any  other  shuffle,  in  order  that  he  might 
avoid  answering? 

You  are  a philosopher,  Thrasymachus,  I replied, 
and  well  know  that  if  you  ask  a person  what  numbers 
make  up  twelve,  taking  care  to  prohibit  him  whom 
you  ask  from  answering  twice  six,  or  three  times  four, 
or  six  times  two,  or  four  times  three,  “ for  this  sort 
of  nonsense  will  not  do  for  me,”  — then  obviously, 
if  that  is  your  way  of  putting  the  question,  no  one 
can  answer  you.  But  suppose  that  he  were  to  retort, 
“ Thrasymachus,  what  do  you  mean?  If  one  of  these 
numbers  which  you  interdict  be  the  true  answer  to  the 
question,  am  I falsely  to  say  some  other  number  which 
is  not  the  right  one?  — is  that  your  meaning?”  — 
How  would  you  answer  him? 

Just  as  if  the  two  cases  were  at  all  alike!  he  said. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


17 


Why  should  they  not  be?  I replied;  and  even  if 
they  are  not,  but  only  appear  to  be  so  to  the  person 
who  is  asked,  ought  he  not  to  say  what  he  thinks, 
whether  you  and  I forbid  him  or  not? 

I presume  then  that  you  are  going  to  make  one  of 
the  interdicted  answers? 

I dare  say  that  I may,  notwithstanding  the  danger, 
if  upon  reflection  I approve  of  any  of  them. 

But  what  if  I give  you  an  answer  about  justice 
other  and  better,  he  said,  than  any  of  these?  What 
do  you  deserve  to  have  done  to  you? 

Done  to  me!  — as  becomes  the  ignorant,  I must 
learn  from  the  wise  — that  is  what  I deserve  to  have 
done  to  me. 

What,  and  no  payment!  a pleasant  notion! 

I will  pay  when  I have  the  money,  I replied. 

But  you  have,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon:  and  you, 
Thrasymachus,  need  be  under  no  anxiety  about 
money,  for  we  will  all  make  a contribution  for  Soc- 
rates. 

Yes,  he  replied,  and  then  Socrates  will  do  as  he 
always  does  — refuse  to  answer  himself,  but  take  and 
pull  to  pieces  the  answer  of  some  one  else. 

Why,  my  good  friend,  I said,  how  can  any  one 
answer  who  knows  and  says  that  he  knows,  just  noth- 
ing ; and  who,  even  if  he  has  some  faint  notions  of  his 
own,  is  told  by  a man  of  authority  not  to  utter  them? 
The  natural  thing  is,  that  the  speaker  should  be 
some  one  like  yourself  who  professes  to  know  and 
can  tell  what  he  knows.  Will  you  then  kindly  an- 
swer, for  the  edification  of  the  company  and  of  my- 
self? 

Glaucon  and  the  rest  of  the  company  joined  in  my 
request,  and  Thrasymachus,  as  any  one  might  see,  was 
in  reality  eager  to  speak ; for  he  thought  that  he  had  an 
excellent  answer,  and  would  distinguish  himself.  But 


18 


THE  REPUBLIC 


at  first  he  affected  to  insist  on  my  answering;  at 
length  he  consented  to  begin.  Behold,  he  said,  the 
wisdom  of  Socrates;  he  refuses  to  teach  himself,  and 
goes  about  learning  of  others,  to  whom  he  never  even 
says  Thank  you. 

That  I learn  of  others,  I replied,  is  quite  true;  but 
that  I am  imgrateful  I wholly  deny.  Money  I have 
none,  and  therefore  I pay  in  praise,  which  is  all  I 
have ; and  how  ready  I am  to  praise  any  one  who  ap- 
pears to  me  to  speak  well  you  will  very  soon  find  out 
when  you  answer;  for  I expect  that  you  will  answer 
well. 

Listen,  then,  he  said;  I proclaim  that  justice  is  noth- 
ing else  than  the  interest  of  the  stronger.  And  now 
why  do  you  not  praise  me?  But  of  course  you  won’t. 

Let  me  first  understand  you,  I replied.  Justice, 
as  you  say,  is  the  interest  of  the  stronger.  What, 
Thrasymachus,  is  the  meaning  of  this?  You  can  not 
mean  to  say  that  because  Polydamas,  the  pancratiast, 
is  stronger  than  we  are,  and  finds  the  eating  of  beef 
conducive  to  his  bodily  strength,  that  to  eat  beef  is 
therefore  equally  for  our  good  who  are  weaker  than 
he  is,  and  right  and  just  for  us? 

That’s  abominable  of  you,  Socrates;  you  take  the 
words  in  the  sense  which  is  most  damaging  to  the 
argument. 

Not  at  all,  my  good  sir,  I said;  I am  trying  to  un- 
derstand them;  and  I wish  that  you  would  be  a little 
clearer. 

Well,  he  said,  have  you  never  heard  that  forms  of 
government  differ ; there  are  tyrannies,  and  there  are 
democracies,  and  there  are  aristocracies? 

Yes,  I know. 

And  the  government  is  the  ruling  power  in  each 
state? 

Certainly. 


19 


THE  REPUBLIC 

And  the  different  forms  of  government  make  laws 
democratical,  aristocratical,  tyrannical,  with  a view 
to  their  several  interests;  and  these  laws,  which  are 
made  by  them  for  their  own  interests,  are  the  justice 
which  they  dehver  to  their  subjects,  and  him  who 
transgresses  them  they  punish  as  a breaker  of  the 
law,  and  unjust.  And  that  is  what  I mean  when  I 
say  that  in  all  states  there  is  the  same  principle  of 
justice,  which  is  the  interest  of  the  government;  and 
as  the  government  must  be  supposed  to  have  power, 
the  only  reasonable  conclusion  is,  that  everywhere 
there  is  one  principle  of  justice,  which  is  the  interest 
of  the  stronger. 

Now  I understand  you,  I said;  and  whether  you 
are  right  or  not  I will  try  to  discover.  But  let  me 
remark,  that  in  defining  justice  you  have  yourself 
used  the  word  “ interest  ” which  you  forbade  me 
to  use.  It  is  true,  however,  that  in  your  definition 
the  words  “ of  the  stronger  ” are  added. 

A small  addition,  you  must  allow,  he  said. 

Great  or  small,  never  mind  about  that:  we  must 
first  inquire  whether  what  you  are  saying  is  the  truth. 
Now  we  are  both  agreed  that  justice  is  interest  of 
some  sort,  but  you  go  on  to  say  “ of  the  stronger;  ” 
about  this  addition  I am  not  so  sure,  and  must  there- 
fore consider  further. 

Proceed. 

I will;  and  first  tell  me.  Do  you  admit  that  it  is  just 
for  subjects  to  obey  their  rulers? 

I do. 

But  are  the  rulers  of  states  absolutely  infallible, 
or  are  they  sometimes  liable  to  err? 

To  be  sure,  he  replied,  they  are  liable  to  err. 

Then  in  making  their  laws  they  may  sometimes 
make  them  rightly,  and  sometimes  not? 

True, 


20 


THE  REPUBLIC 


When  they  make  them  rightly,  they  make  them 
agreeably  to  their  interest;  when  they  are  mistaken, 
contrary  to  their  interest;  you  admit  that? 

Yes. 

And  the  laws  which  they  make  must  be  obeyed  by 
their  subjects,  — and  that  is  what  you  call  justice? 

Doubtless. 

Then  justice,  according  to  your  argument,  is  not 
only  obedience  to  the  interest  of  the  stronger  but  the 
reverse? 

What  is  that  you  are  saying?  he  asked. 

I am  only  repeating  what  you  are  saying,  I be- 
lieve. But  let  us  consider:  Have  we  not  admitted 
that  the  rulers  may  be  mistaken  about  their  own  in- 
terest in  what  they  command,  and  also  that  to  obey 
them  is  justice?  Has  not  that  been  admitted? 

Yes. 

Then  you  must  also  have  acknowledged  justice  not 
to  be  for  the  interest  of  the  stronger,  when  the  rulers 
unintentionally  command  things  to  be  done  which  are 
to  their  own  injury.  For  if,  as  you  say,  justice  is 
the  obedience  which  the  subject  renders  to  their  com- 
mands, in  that  case,  O wisest  of  men,  is  there  any 
escape  from  the  conclusion  that  the  weaker  are  com- 
manded to  do,  not  what  is  for  the  interest,  but  what 
is  for  the  injury  of  the  stronger? 

Nothing  can  be  clearer,  Socrates,  said  Polemar- 
chus. 

Yes,  said  Cleitophon,  interposing,  if  you  are  al- 
lowed to  be  his  witness. 

But  there  is  no  need  of  any  witness,  said  Polemar- 
chus,  for  Thrasymachus  himself  acknowledges  that 
rulers  may  sometimes  command  what  is  not  for  their 
own  interest,  and  that  for  subjects  to  obey  them  is 
justice. 

Yes,  Polemarchus,  — Thrasymachus  said  that  for 


THE  REPUBLIC  21 

subjects  to  do  what  was  commanded  by  their  rulers  is 
just. 

Yes,  Cleitophon,  but  he  also  said  that  justice  is  the 
interest  of  the  stronger,  and,  while  admitting  both 
these  propositions,  he  further  acknowledged  that  the 
stronger  may  command  the  weaker  who  are  his  sub- 
jects to  do  what  is  not  for  his  own  interest;  whence 
follows  that  justice  is  the  injury  quite  as  much  as  the 
interest  of  the  stronger. 

But,  said  Cleitophon,  he  meant  by  the  interest  of 
the  stronger  what  the  stronger  thought  to  be  his  in- 
terest,— this  was  what  the  weaker  had  to  do;  and 
this  was  affirmed  by  him  to  be  justice. 

Those  were  not  his  words,  rejoined  Polemarchus. 

Never  mind,  I replied,  if  he  now  says  that  they  are, 
let  us  accept  his  statement.  Tell  me,  Thrasymachus, 
I said,  did  you  mean  by  justiee  what  the  stronger 
thought  to  be  his  interest,  whether  really  so  or  not? 

Certainly  not,  he  said.  Do  you  suppose  that  I call 
him  who  is  mistaken  the  stronger  at  the  time  when  he 
is  mistaken? 

Yes,  I said,  my  impression  was  that  you  did  so, 
when  you  admitted  that  the  ruler  was  not  infallible 
but  might  be  sometimes  mistaken. 

You  argue  like  an  informer,  Socrates.  Do  you 
mean,  for  example,  that  he  who  is  mistaken  about  the 
sick  is  a physician  in  that  he  is  mistaken?  or  that  he 
who  errs  in  arithmetic  or  grammar  is  an  arithmetician 
or  grammarian  at  the  time  when  he  is  making  the 
mistake,  in  respect  of  the  mistake?  True,  we  say 
that  the  physician  or  arithmetician  or  grammarian 
has  made  a mistake,  but  this  is  only  a way  of  speak- 
ing; for  the  fact  is  that  neither  the  grammarian  nor 
any  other  person  of  skill  ever  makes  a mistake  in  so 
far  as  he  is  what  his  name  implies;  they  none  of  them 
err  unless  their  skill  fails  them,  and  then  they  cease 


22 


THE  REPUBLIC 


to  be  skilled  artists.  No  artist  or  sage  or  ruler  errs  at 
the  time  when  he  is  what  his  name  implies ; though  he 
is  commonly  said  to  err,  and  I adopted  the  common 
mode  of  speaking.  But  to  be  perfectly  accurate,  since 
you  are  such  a lover  of  accuracy,  we  should  say  that 
the  ruler,  in  so  far  as  he  is  ruler,  is  unerring,  and, 
being  unerring,  always  commands  that  which  is  for 
his  own  interest;  and  the  subject  is  required  to  exe- 
cute his  commands;  and  therefore,  as  I said  at  first 
and  now  repeat,  justice  is  the  interest  of  the  stronger. 

Indeed,  Thrasymachus,  and  do  I really  appear  to 
you  to  argue  like  an  informer? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

And  do  you  suppose  that  I ask  these  questions  with 
any  design  of  injuring  you  in  the  argument? 

Nay,  he  replied,  “suppose”  is  not  the  word  — I 
know  it;  but  you  will  be  found  out,  and  by  sheer  force 
of  argument  you  will  never  prevail. 

I shall  not  make  the  attempt,  my  dear  man^  but  to 
avoid  any  misunderstanding  occurring  between  us  in 
future,  let  me  ask,  in  what  sense  do  you  speak  of  a 
ruler  or  stronger  whose  interest,  as  you  were  saying, 
he  being  the  superior,  it  is  just  that  the  inferior  should 
execute  — is  he  a ruler  in  the  popular  or  in  the  strict 


sense  of  the  term? 


In  the  strictest  of  all  senses,  he  said.  And  now 


bheat  and  play  the  informer  if  you  can;  I ask  no 
quarter  at  your  hands.  But  you  never  will  be  able, 
never. 

And  do  you  imagine,  T said,  that  I am  such  a mad- 
man as  to  try  and  cheat  Thrasymachus?  I might  as 
well  shave  a lion. 

Why,  he  said,  you  made  the  attempt  a minute  ago, 
and  you  failed. 

Enough,  I said,  of  these  civilities.  It  will  be  better 
that  I should  ask  you  a question:  Is  the  physician, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


23 


taken  in  that  strict  sense  of  which  you  are  speaking, 
a healer  of  the  sick  or  a maker  of  money?  And 
remember  that  I am  now  speaking  of  the  true  physi- 
cian. 

A healer  of  the  sick,  he  replied. 

And  the  pilot  — that  is  to  say,  the  true  pilot  — is 
he  a captain  of  sailors  or  a mere  sailor? 

A captain  of  sailors. 

The  circumstance  that  he  sails  in  the  ship  is  not  to 
be  taken  into  account;  neither  is  he  to  be  called  a 
sailor ; the  name  pilot  by  which  he  is  distinguished  has 
nothing  to  do  with  sailing,  but  is  significant  of  his 
skill  and  of  his  authority  over  the  sailors. 

(Very  true,  he  said. 

Now,  I said,  every  art  has  an  interest? 

Certainly. 

For  W'hich  the  art  has  to  consider  and  provide? 

Yes,  that  is  the  aim  of  art. 

And  the  interest  of  any  art  is  the  perfection  of  it  — 
this  and  nothing  else? 

What  do  you  mean? 

I mean  what  I may  illustrate  negatir^ly  by  the 
example  of  the  body.  Suppose  you  were  to  ask  me 
whether  the  body  is  self-sufficing  or  has  wants,  I 
should  reply:  Certainly  the  body  has  wants;  for  the 
body  may  be  ill  and  require  to  be  cured,  and  has  there- 
fore interests  to  which  the  art  of  medicine  ministers; 
and  this  is  the  origin  and  intention  of  medicine,  as 
you  will  acknowledge.  Am  I not  right? 

Quite  right,  he  replied. 

But  is  the  art  of  medicine  or  any  other  art  faulty 
or  deficient  in  any  quality  in  the  same  way  that  the 
eye  may  be  deficient  in  sight  or  the  ear  fail  of  hear- 
ing, and  therefore  requires  another  art  to  provide  for 
the  interests  of  seeing  and  hearing  — has  art  in  itself, 
I say,  any  similar  liability  to  fault  or  defect,  and  does 


24 


THE  REPUBLIC 


eveiy  art  require  another  supplementary  art  to  pro- 
vide for  its  interests,  and  that  another  and  another 
without  end  ? Or  have  the  arts  to  look  only  after  their 
own  interests?  Or  have  they  no  need  either  of  them- 
selves or  of  another?  — having  no  faults  or  defects, 
they  have  no  need  to  correct  them,  either  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  their  own  art  or  of  any  other;  they  have  only 
to  consider  the  interest  of  their  subject-matter.  ^ For 
every  art  remains  pure  and  faultless  while  remaining 
true  — that  is  to  say,  while  perfect  and  unimpaired. 
Take  the  words  in  your  precise  sense,  and  tell  me 
whether  I am  not  right. 

Yes,  clearly. 

Then  medicine  does  not  consider  the  interest  of 
medicine,  but  the  interest  of  the  body? 

True,  he  said. 

Nor  does  the  art  of  horsemanship  consider  the  in- 
terests of  the  art  of  horsemanship,  but  the  interests  of 
the  horse;  neither  do  any  other  arts  care  for  them- 
selves, for  they  have  no  needs ; they  care  only  for  that 
which  is  the  subject  of  their  art? 

True,  he  said. 

But  surely,  Thrasymachus,  the  arts  are  the  superi- 
ors and  rulers  of  their  own  subjects? 

To  this  he  assented  with  a good  deal  of  reluctance. 

Then,  I said,  no  science  or  art  considers  or  enjoins 
the  interest  of  the  stronger  or  superior,  but  only  the 
interest  of  the  subject  and  weaker? 

He  made  an  attempt  to  contest  this  proposition 
also,  but  finally  acquiesced.  ^ . 

Then,  I continued,  no  physician,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a 
physician,  considers  his  own  good  in  what  he  pre- 
scribes, but  the  good  of  his  patient ; for  the  true  physi- 
f cian  is  also  a ruler  having  the  human  body  as  a sub- 
ject, and  is  not  a mere  money-maker;  that  has  been 
admitted? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


25 


Yes. 

And  the  pilot  likewise,  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term,  is  a ruler  of  sailors  and  not  a mere  sailor. 

That  has  been  admitted. 

And  such  a pilot  and  ruler  will  provide  and  pre- 
scribe for  the  interest  of  the  sailor  who  is  under  him, 
and  not  for  his  own  or  the  ruler’s  interest? 

He  gave  a reluctant  “ Yes.” 

Then,  I said,  Thrasymachus,  there  is  no  one  in  any 
rule  who,  in  so  far  as  he  is  a ruler,  considers  or  enjoins 
what  is  for  his  own  interest,  but  always  what  is  for 
the  interest  of  his  subject  or  suitable  to  his  art;  to 
that  he  looks,  and  that  alone  he  considers  in  everything 
which  he  says  and  does. 

When  we  had  got  to  this  point  in  the  argument, 
and  every  one  saw  that  the  definition  of  justice  had 
been  completely  upset,  Thrasymachus,  instead  of  re- 
plying to  me,  said : Tell  me,  Socrates,  have  you  got  a 
nurse? 

Why  do  you  ask  such  a question,  I said,  when  you 
ought  rather  to  be  answering?  , 

Because  she  leaves  you  to  snivel,  and  never  wipes  i 
your  nose:  she  has  not  even  taught  you  to  know  the  ' 
shepherd  from  the  sheep. 

What  makes  you  say  that?  I replied. 

Because  you  fancy  that  the  shepherd  or  neatherd 
fattens  or  tends  the  sheep  or  oxen  with  a view  to  their 
own  good  and  not  to  the  good  of  himself  or  his 
master;  and  you  further  imagine  that  the  rulers  of 
states,  if  they  are  true  rulers,  never  think  of  their  sub- 
jects as  sheep,  and  that  they  are  not  studying  their 
own  advantage  day  and  night.  Oh,  no;  and  so  en- 
tirely astray  are  you  in  your  ideas  about  the  just  and 
unjust  as  not  even  to  know  that  justice  and  the  just 
are  in  reality  another’s  good ; that  is  to  say,  the  inter- 
est of  the  ruler  and  stronger,  and  the  loss  of  the  sub- 


26 


THE  REPUBLIC 


ject  and  servant;  and  injustice  the  opposite;  for  the 
unjust  is  lord  over  the  truly  simple  and  just;  he  is  the 
stronger,  and  his  subjects  do  what  is  for  his  interest, 
and  minister  to  his  happiness,  which  is  very  far  from 
being  their  own.  Consider  further,  most  foolish  Soc- 
rates, that  the  just  is  always  a loser  in  comparison 
with  the  unjust.  First  of  all,  in  private  contracts; 
wherever  the  unjust  is  the  partner  of  the  just  you 
will  find  that,  when  the  partnership  is  dissolved,  the 
unjust  man  has  always  more  and  the  just  less. 
Secondly,  in  their  dealings  with  the  State : when  there 
is  an  income-tax,  the  just  man  will  pay  more  and  the 
unjust  less  on  the  same  amount  of  income;  and  when 
there  is  anything  to  be  received  the  one  gains  nothing 
and  the  other  much.  Observe  also  what  happens 
when  they  take  an  office;  there  is  the  just  man  neglect- 
ing his  affairs  and  perhaps  suffering  other  losses,  and 
getting  nothing  out  of  the  public,  because  he  is  just; 
moreover  he  is  hated  by  his  friends  and  acquaintance 
for  refusing  to  serve  them  in  unlawful  ways.  But  all 
this  is  reversed  in  the  case  of  the  unjust  man.  I am 
speaking,  as  before,  of  injustice  on  a large  scale  in 
which  the  advantage  of  the  unjust  is  most  apparent; 
^ and  my  meaning  will  be  most  clearly  seen  if  we  turn 
to  that  highest  form  of  injustice  in  which  the  criminal 
is  the  happiest  of  men,  and  the  sufferers  or  those  who 
^refuse  to  do  injustice  are  the  most  miserable  — that 
is  to  say  tyranny,  which  by  fraud  and  force  takes 
away  the  property  of  others,  not  little  by  little  but 
wholesale;  comprehending  in  one,  things  sacred  as 
well  as  profane,  private  and  public;  for  which  acts 
of  wrong,  if  he  were  detected  perpetrating  any  of 
them  singly,  he  would  be  punished  and  incur  great 
disgrace  — they  who  do  such  wrong  in  particular 
cases  are  called  robbers  of  temples,  and  man-stealers 
and  burglars  and  swindlers  and  thieves.  But  when  a 


THE  REPUBLIC 


27 


roan  besides  taking  away  the  money  of  the  citizens 
has  made  slaves  of  them,  then,  instead  of  these  names 
of  reproach,  he  is  termed  happy  and  blessed,  not  only 
by  the  citizens  but  by  all  who  hear  of  his  having 
achieved  the  consummation  of  injustice.  For  man- 
kind censure  injustice,  fearing  that  they  may  be 
victims  of  it  and  not  because  they  shrink  from  com- 
mitting it.  And  thus,  as  I have  shown,  Socrates,  in- 
justice, when  on  a sufficient  scale,  has  more  strength 
and  freedom  and  mastery  than  justice;  and,  as  I said 
at  first,  justice  is  the  interest  of  the  stronger,  whereas 
injustice  is  a man’s  own  profit  and  interest. 

Thrasymachus,  when  he  had  thus  spoken,  having, 
like  a bath-man,  deluged  our  ears  with  his  words,  had 
a mind  to  go  away.  But  the  company  would  not  let 
him;  they  insisted  that  he  should  remain  and  defend 
his  position;  and  I myself  added  my  own  humble  re- 
quest that  he  would  not  leave  us.  Thrasymachus,  I 
said  to  him,  excellent  man,  how  suggestive  are  your 
remarks!  And  are  you  going  to  run  away  before 
you  have  fairly  taught  or  learned  whether  they  are 
true  or  not?  Is  the  attempt  to  determine  the  way  of 
man’s  life  so  small  a matter  in  your  eyes  — to  deter- 
mine how  life  may  be  passed  by  each  one  of  us  to  the 
greatest  advantage? 

And  do  I differ  from  you,  he  said,  as  to  the  im- 
portance of  the  inquiry? 

You  appear  rather , I replied,  to  have  no  care  or 
thought  about  us,  Thrasymachus  — whether  we  live 
better  or  worse  from  not  knowing  what  you  say  you 
know,  is  to  you  a matter  of  indifference.  Prithee, 
friend,  do  not  keep  your  knowledge  to  yourself;  we 
are  a large  party;  and  any  benefit  which  you  confer  i 

upon  us  will  be  amply  rewarded.  For  my  own  part  I r ^ 

openly  declare  that  I am  not  convinced,  and  that  I ^ 
do  not  believe  injustice  to  be  more  gainful  than  jus- 


28 


THE  REPUBLIC 


tice,  even  if  uncontrolled  and  allowed  to  have  free 
play.  For,  granting  that  there  may  be  an  unjust  man 
who  is  able  to  commit  injustice  either  by  fraud  or 
force,  still  this  does  not  convince  me  of  the  superior 
advantage  of  injustice,  and  there  may  be  others  who 
are  in  the  same  predicament  with  myself.  Perhaps 
we  may  be  wrong;  if  so,  you  in  your  wisdom  should 
convince  us  that  we  are  mistaken  in  preferring  justice 
to  un justice. 

And  how  am  I to  convince  you,  he  said,  if  you  are 
not  already  convinced  by  what  I have  just  said;  what 
more  can  I do  for  you?  Would  you  have  me  put  the 
proof  bodily  into  your  souls? 

Heaven  forbid!  I said;  I would  only  ask  you  to  be 
consistent;  or,  if  you  change,  change  openly  and  let 
there  be  no  deception.  For  I must  remark,  Thrasy- 
machus,  if  you  will  recall  what  was  previously  said, 
that  although  you  began  by  defining  the  true  physi- 
cian in  an  exact  sense,  you  did  not  observe  a like  exact- 
ness when  speaking  of  the  shepherd;  you  thought 
that  the  shepherd  as  a shepherd  tends  the  sheep  not 
with  a view  to  their  own  good,  but  like  a mere  diner 
or  banqueter  with  a view  to  the  pleasures  of  the  table ; 
or,  again,  as  a trader  for  sale  in  the  market,  and  not 
as  a shepherd.  Yet  surely  the  art  of  the  shepherd  is 
concerned  only  with  the  good  of  his  subjects;  he  has 
only  to  provide  the  best  for  them,  since  the  perfection 
of  the  art  is  already  ensured  whenever  all  the  require- 
ments of  it  are  satisfied.  And  that  was  what  I was 
saying  just  now  about  the  ruler.  I conceived  that  the 
art  of  the  ruler,  considered  as  ruler,  whether  in  a state 
I or  in  private  life,  could  only  regard  the  good  of  his 
' flock  or  subjects;  whereas  you  seem  to  think  that  the 
( rulers  in  states,  that  is  to  say,  the  true  rulers,  like 
being  in  authority. 

Think ! Nay,  I am  sure  of  it. 


29 


THE  REPUBLIC 

Then  why  in  the  case  of  lesser  offices  do  men  never 
take  them  willingly  without  payment,  unless  under 
the  idea  that  they  govern  for  the  advantage  not  of 
themselves  but  of  others  ? Let  me  ask  you  a question : 
Are  not  the  several  arts  different,  by  reason  of  their 
each  having  a separate  function  ? And,  my  dear  illus- 
trious friend,  do  say  what  you  think,  that  we  may 
make  a little  progress. 

Yes,  that  is  the  difference,  he  replied. 

And  each  art  gives  us  a particular  good  and  not 
merely  a general  one  — medicine,  for  example,  gives 
us  health;  navigation,  safety  at  sea,  and  so  on? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  the  art  of  payment  has  the  special  function  of 
giving  pay : but  we  do  not  confuse  this  with  other  arts, 
any  more  than  the  art  of  the  pilot  is  to  be  confused 
with  the  art  of  medicine,  because  the  health  of  the 
pilot  may  be  improved  by  a sea  voyage.  You  would 
not  be  inclined  to  say,  would  you,  that  navigation  is 
the  art  of  medicine,  at  least  if  we  are  to  adopt  your  ex- 
act use  of  language? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  because  a man  is  in  good  health  when  he 
receives  pay  you  would  not  say  that  the  art  of  pay- 
ment is  medicine? 

I should  not. 

Nor  would  you  say  that  medicine  is  the  art  of 
receiving  pay  because  a man  takes  fees  when  he  is 
engaged  in  healing? 

Certainly  not. 

And  we  have  admitted,  I said,  that  the  good  of 
each  art  is  specially  confined  to  the  art? 

Yes. 

Then,  if  there  be  any  good  which  all  artists  have  in 
common,  that  is  to  be  attributed  to  something  of  which 
they  all  have  the  common  use? 


30 


THE  REPUBLIC 


True,  he  replied. 

And  when  the  artist  is  benefited  by  reeeiving  pay 
the  advantage  is  gained  by  an  additional  use  of  the  art 
of  pay,  which  is  not  the  art  professed  by  him? 

He  gave  a reluctant  assent  to  this. 

Then  the  pay  is  not  derived  by  the  several  artists 
from  their  respective  arts.  But  the  truth  is,  that  while 
the  art  of  medicine  gives  health,  and  the  art  of  the 
builder  builds  a house,  another  art  attends  them  which 
is  the  art  of  pay.  The  various  arts  may  be  doing  their 
own  business  and  benefiting  that  over  which  they 
preside,  but  would  the  artist  receive  any  benefit  from 
his  art  unless  he  were  paid  as  well? 

I suppose  not. 

But  does  he  therefore  confer  no  benefit  when  he 
works  for  nothing? 

Certainly,  he  confers  a benefit. 

Then  now,  Thrasymachus,  there  is  no  longer  any 
doubt  that  neither  arts  nor  governments  provide  for 
their  own  interests;  but,  as  we  were  before  saying, 
they  rule  and  provide  for  the  interests  of  their  sub- 
jects who  are  the  weaker  and  not  the  stronger  — to 
their  good  they  attend  and  not  to  the  good  of  the 
superior.  And  this  is  the  reason,  my  dear  Thrasy- 
machus, why,  as  I was  just  now  saying,  no  one  is  will- 
ing to  govern ; because  no  one  likes  to  take  in  hand  the 
reformation  of  evils  which  are  not  his  concern  without 
remuneration.  For,  in  the  execution  of  his  work,  and 
in  giving  his  orders  to  another,  the  true  artist  does 
not  regard  his  own  interest,  but  always  that  of  his  sub- 
jects; and  therefore  in  order  that  rulers  may  be  will- 
ing to  rule,  they  must  be  paid  in  one  of  three  modes 
of  payment,  money  or  honor,  or  a penalty  for  re- 
fusing. 

What  do  you  mean,  Socrates?  said  Glaucon.  The 
first  two  modes  of  payment  are  intelligible  enough, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


31 


but  what  the  penalty  is  I do  not  understand,  or  how 
a penalty  can  be  a payment. 

You  mean  that  you  do  not  understand  the  nature 
of  this  payment  which  to  the  best  men  is  the  great 
inducement  to  rule?  Of  course  you  know  that  ambi- 
tion and  avarice  are  held  to  be,  as  indeed  they  are,  a 
disgrace? 

Very  true. 

And  for  this  reason,  I said,  money  and  honor  have 
no  attraction  for  them;  good  men  do  not  wish  to  be 
openly  demanding  payment  for  governing  and  so  to 
get  the  name  of  hirelings,  nor  by  secretly  helping 
themselves  out  of  the  public  revenues  to  get  the  name 
of  thieves.  And  not  being  ambitious  they  do  not  care 
about  honor.  Wherefore  necessity  must  be  laid 
upon  them,  and  they  must  be  induced  to  serve  from 
the  fear  of  punishment.  And  this,  as  I imagine,  is 
the  reason  why  the  forwardness  to  take  office,  instead 
of  waiting  to  be  compelled,  has  been  deemed  dis- 
honorable. Now  the  worst  part  of  the  punishment 
is  that  he  who  refuses  to  rule  is  liable  to  be  ruled  by 
one  who  is  worse  than  himself.  And  the  fear  of  this, 
as  I conceive,  induces  the  good  to  take  office,  not  be- 
cause they  would,  but  because  they  can  not  help  — not 
under  the  idea  that  they  are  going  to  have  any  benefit 
or  enjoyment  themselves,  but  as  a necessity,  and  be- 
cause they  are  not  able  to  commit  the  task  of  ruling 
to  any  one  who  is  better  than  themselves,  or  indeed 
as  good.  For  there  is  reason  to  think  that  if  a city 
were  composed  entirely  of  good  men,  then  to  avoid 
office  would  be  as  much  an  object  of  contention  as  to 
obtain  office  is  at  present;  then  we  should  have  plain 
proof  that  the  true  ruler  is  not  meant  by  nature  to 
regard  his  own  interest,  but  that  of  his  subjects;  and 
every  one  who  knew  this  would  choose  rather  to  re- 
ceive a benefit  from  another  than  to  have  the  trouble 


32 


THE  REPUBLIC 


of  conferring  one.  So  far  am  I from  agreeing  with 
Thrasymachus  that  justice  is  the  interest  of  the 
stronger.  This  latter  question  need  not  be  further 
discussed  at  present;  but  when  Thrasymachus  says 
that  the  life  of  the  unjust  is  more  advantageous  than 
that  of  the  just,  his  new  statement  appears  to  me  to 
be  of  a far  more  serious  character.  Which  of  us  has 
I spoken  truly?  And  which  sort  of  life,  Glaucon,  do 
I you  prefer? 

I for  my  part  deem  the  life  of  the  just  to  be  the 
more  advantageous,  he  answered. 

Did  you  hear  all  the  advantages  of  the  unjust 
which  Thrasymachus  was  rehearsing? 

Yes,  I heard  him,  he  replied,  but  he  has  not  con- 
vinced me. 

Then  shall  we  try  to  find  some  way  of  convincing 
him,  if  we  can,  that  he  is  saying  what  is  not  true? 

Most  certainly,  he  replied. 

If,  I said,  he  makes  a set  speech  and  we  make  an- 
other recounting  all  the  advantages  of  being  just, 
and  he  answers  and  we  rejoin,  there  must  be  a num- 
bering and  measuring  of  the  goods  which  are  claimed 
on  either  side,  and  in  the  end  we  shall  want  judges  to 
'decide;  but  if  w’e  proceed  in  our  inquiry  as  we  lately 
did,  by  making  admissions  to  one  another,  we  shall 
unite  the  offices  of  judge  and  advocate  in  our  own 
persons. 

Very  good,  he  said. 

And  which  method  do  I understand  you  to  prefer? 
I said. 

That  which  you  propose. 

Well,  then,  Thrasymachus,  I said,  suppose  you 
begin  at  the  beginning  and  answer  me.  You  say  that 
perfect  injustice  is  more  gainful  than  perfect  justice? 

Yes,  that  is  what  I say,  and  I have  given  you  my 
reasons. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


33 


And  what  is  your  vieAV  about  them?  Would  you 
call  one  of  them  virtue  and  the  other  vice? 

Certainly. 

I suppose  that  you  would  call  justice  virtue  and 
injustice  vice? 

What  a charming  notion ! So  likely  too,  seeing  that 
I affirm  injustice  to  be  profitable  and  justice  not. 

What  else  then  would  you  say  ? 

The  opposite,  he  replied.  ^ y 

And  would  you  call  justice  vice?  , ^ 

No,  I would  rather  say  sublime  simplicity, 

Then  would  you  call  injustice  malignity? 

No;  I would  rather  say  discretion. 

And  do  the  unjust  appear  to  you  to  be  wise  and 
good? 

Yes,  he  said;  at  any  rate  those  of  them  who  are 
able  to  be  perfectly  unjust,  and  who  have  the  power 
of  subduing  states  and  nations;  but  perhaps  you 
imagine  me  to  be  talking  of  cutpurses.  Even  this 
profession  if  undetected  has  advantages,  though  they 
are  not  to  be  compared  with  those  of  which  I was  just 
now  speaking. 

I do  not  think  that  I misapprehend  your  meaning, 
Thrasymachus,  I replied;  but  still  I can  not  hear 
without  amazement  that  you  class  injustice  with  wis- 
dom and  virtue,  and  justice  with  the  opposite. 

Certainly,  I do  so  class  them. 

Now,  I said,  you  are  on  more  substantial  and  al- 
most unanswerable  ground;  for  if  the  injustice  which 
you  were  maintaining  to  be  profitable  had  been  ad- 
mitted by  you  as  by  others  to  be  vice  and  deformity, 
an  answer  might  have  been  given  to  you  on  received 
principles;  but  now  I perceive  that  you  will  call 
injustice  honorable  and  strong,  and  to  the  unjust 
you  will  attribute  all  the  qualities  which  were  at- 
tributed by  us  before  to  the  just,  seeing  that  you  do 


34 


THE  REPUBLIC 


not  hesitate  to  rank  injustice  with  wisdom  and 
virtue. 

You  have  guessed  most  infallibly,  he  replied. 

Then  I certainly  ought  not  to  shrink  from  going 
through  with  the  argument  so  long  as  I have  reason 
to  think  that  you,  Thrasymachus,  are  speaking  your 
real  mind ; for  I do  believe  that  you  are  now  in  ear- 
nest and  are  not  amusing  yourself  at  our  expense. 

I may  be  in  earnest  or  not,  but  what  is  that  to 
you?  — to  refute  the  argument  is  your  business. 

Very  true,  I said;  that  is  what  I have  to  do:  But 
will  you  be  so  good  as  answer  yet  one  more  question? 
Does  the  just  man  try  to  gain  any  advantage  over 
the  just? 

Far  otherwise ; if  he  did  he  would  not  be  the  simple 
amusing  creature  which  he  is. 

And  would  he  try  to  go  beyond  just  action? 

He  would  not. 

And  how  would  he  regard  the  attempt  to  gain  an 
advantage  over  the  unjust;  would  that  be  considered 
by  him  as  just  or  unjust? 

He  would  think  it  just,  and  would  try  to  gain  the 
advantage ; but  he  would  not  be  able. 

Whether  he  would  or  would  not  be  able,  I said,  is 
not  to  the  point.  My  question  is  only  whether  the 
just  man,  while  refusing  to  have  more  than  another 
just  man,  would  wish  and  claim  to  have  more  than  the 
unjust? 

Yes,  he  would. 

And  what  of  the  unjust  — does  he  claim  to  have 
more  than  the  just  man  and  to  do  more  than  is  just? 

Of  course,  he  said,  for  he  claims  to  have  more  than 
all  men. 

And  the  unjust  man  will  strive  and  struggle  to 
obtain  more  than  the  unjust  man  or  action,  in  order 
that  he  may  have  more  than  all? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


35 


True. 

We  may  put  the  matter  thus,  I said  — the  just  does 
not  desire  more  than  his  like  but  more  than  his  unlike, 
whereas  the  unjust  desires  more  than  both  his  like 
and  his  unlike? 

Nothing,  he  said,  can  be  better  than  that  statement. 

And  the  unjust  is  good  and  wise,  and  the  just  is 
neither? 

Good  again,  he  said. 

And  is  not  the  unjust  like  the  wise  and  good  and 
the  just  unlike  them? 

Of  course,  he  said,  he  who  is  of  a certain  nature, 
is  like  those  who  are  of  a certain  nature;  he  who  is 
not,  not. 

Each  of  them,  I said,  is  such  as  his  like  is? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

Very  good,  Thrasymachus,  I said;  and  now  to  take 
the  case  of  the  arts:  you  would  admit  that  one  man 
is  a musician  and  another  not  a musician? 

Yes. 

And  which  is  wise  and  which  is  foolish? 

Clearly  the  musician  is  wise,  and  he  who  is  not  a 
musician  is  foolish. 

And  he  is  good  in  as  far  as  he  is  wise,  and  bad  in 
as  far  as  he  is  foolish? 

Yes. 

And  you  would  say  the  same  sort  of  thing  of  the 
physician? 

Yes. 

And  do  you  think,  my  excellent  friend,  that  a mu- 
sician when  he  adjusts  the  lyre  would  desire  or  claim 
to  exceed  or  go  beyond  a musician  in  the  tightening 
and  loosening  the  strings? 

I do  not  think  that  he  would. 

But  he  would  claim  to  exceed  the  non-musician? 

Of  course. 


36 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  what  would  you  say  of  the  physician?  In 
prescribing  meats  and  drinks  would  he  wish  to  go 
beyond  another  physician  or  beyond  the  practice  of 
medicine  ? 

He  would  not. 

But  he  would  wish  to  go  beyond  the  non-physi- 
cian? 

Yes. 

And  about  knowledge  and  ignorance  in  general; 
see  whether  you  think  that  any  man  who  has  knowl- 
edge ever  would  wish  to  have  the  choice  of  saying 
or  doing  more  than  another  man  who  has  knowledge. 
Would  he  not  rather  say  or  do  the  same  as  his  like 
in  the  same  case? 

That,  I suppose,  can  hardly  be  denied. 

And  what  of  the  ignorant?  would  he  not  desire  to 
have  more  than  either  the  knowing  or  the  ignorant? 

I dare  say. 

And  the  knowing  is  wise? 

Yes. 

And  the  wise  is  good? 

True. 

Then  the  wise  and  good  will  not  desire  to  gain 
more  than  his  like,  but  more  than  his  unlike  and 
opposite? 

I suppose  so. 

Whereas  the  bad  and  ignorant  will  desire  to  gain 
more  than  both? 

Yes. 

But  did  we  not  say,  Thrasymachus,  that  the  unjust 
goes  bey»nd  both  his  like  and  unlike?  Were  not  these 
your  words  ? 

They  were. 

And  you  also  said  that  the  just  will  not  go  beyond 
his  like  but  his  unlike? 

Yes. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


37 


Then  the  just  is  like  the  wise  and  good,  and  the 
unjust  like  the  evil  and  ignorant? 

That  is  the  inferenee. 

And  each  of  them  is  such  as  his  like  is? 

That  w^as  admitted. 

Then  the  just  has  turned  out  to  be  wise  and  good 
and  the  unjust  evil  and  ignorant. 

Thrasymachus  made  all  these  admissions,  not  flu- 
ently, as  I repeat  them,  but  with  extreme  reluctance; 
it  was  a hot  summer’s  day,  and  the  perspiration 
poured  from  him  in  torrents ; and  then  I saw  what  I 
had  never  seen  before,  Thrasymachus  blushing.  As 
we  were  now  agreed  that  justice  was  virtue  and  wis- 
dom, and  injustice  vice  and  ignorance,  I proceeded 
to  another  point : 

Well,  I said,  Thrasymachus,  that  matter  is  now 
settled;  but  were  we  not  also  saying  that  injustice 
had  strength;  do  you  remember? 

Yes,  I remember,  he  said,  but  do  not  suppose  that 
I approve  of  what  you  are  saying  or  have  no  answer ; 
if  however  I were  to  answer,  you  would  be  quite  cer- 
tain to  accuse  me  of  haranguing;  therefore  either  per- 
mit me  to  have  my  say  out,  or  if  you  would  rather 
ask,  do  so,  and  I will  answer  “ Very  good,”  as  they 
say  to  story-telling  old  women,  and  will  nod  “ Yes  ” 
and  “No.” 

Certainly  not,  I said,  if  contrary  to  your  real  opin- 
ion. 

Yes,  he  said,  I will,  to  please  you,  since  you  will 
not  let  me  speak.  What  else  would  you  have? 

Nothing  in  the  world,  I said;  and  if  you  are  so  dis- 
posed I will  ask  and  you  shall  answer. 

Proceed. 

Then  I will  repeat  the  question  which  I asked  be- 
fore, in  order  that  our  examination  of  the  relative 
nature  of  justice  and  injustice  may  be  carried  on 


38 


THE  REPUBLIC 


regularly.  A statement  was  made  that  injustice  is 
stronger  and  more  powerful  than  justice,  but  now 
justice,  having  been  identified  with  wisdom  and  vir- 
tue, is  easily  shown  to  be  stronger  than  injustice,  if 
injustice  is  ignorance;  this  can  no  longer  be  ques- 
tioned by  any  one.  But  I want  to  view  the  matter, 
Thrasymachus,  in  a different  way:  You  would  not 
deny  that  a state  may  be  unjust  and  may  be  unjustly 
attempting  to  enslave  other  states,  or  may  have  al- 
ready enslaved  them,  and  may  be  holding  many  of 
them  in  subjection? 

True,  he  replied ; and  I will  add  that  the  best  and 
most  perfectly  unjust  state  will  be  most  likely  to  do 
so. 

I know,  I said,  that  such  was  your  position;  but 
what  I would  further  consider  is,  whether  this  power 
which  is  possessed  by  the  superior  state  can  exist  or 
be  exercised  without  justice  or  only  with  justice. 

If  you  are  right  in  your  view,  and  justice  is  wisdom, 
then  only  with  justice;  but  if  I am  right,  then  with- 
out justice. 

I am  delighted,  Thrasymachus,  to  see  you  not  only 
nodding  assent  and  dissent,  but  making  answers  which 
are  quite  excellent. 

That  is  out  of  civility  to  you,  he  replied. 

You  are  very  kind,  I said;  and  would  you  have 
the  goodness  also  to  inform  me,  whether  you  think 
that  a state,  or  an  army,  or  a band  of  robbers  and 
thieves,  or  any  other  gang  of  evil-doers  could  act  at 
all  if  they  injured  one  another? 

No  indeed,  he  said,  they  could  not. 

But  if  they  abstained  from  injuring  one  another, 
then  they  might  act  together  better? 

Yes. 

And  this  is  because  injustice  creates  divisions 
and  hatreds  and  fighting,  and  justice  imparts  har- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


39 


mony  and  friendship;  is  not  that  true,  Thrasyma- 
chus? 

I agree,  he  said,  because  I do  not  wish  to  quarrel 
with  you. 

How  good  of  you,  I said ; but  I should  like  to  know 
also  whether  injustice,  having  this  tendency  to  arouse 
hatred,  wherever  existing,  among  slaves  or  among 
freemen,  will  not  make  them  hate  one  another  and 
set  them  at  variance  and  render  them  incapable  of 
common  action? 

Certainly. 

And  cA^en  if  injustice  be  found  in  two  only,  will 
they  not  quarrel  and  fight,  and  become  enemies  to  one 
another  and  to  the  just? 

They  will. 

And  suppose  injustice  abiding  in  a single  person, 
would  your  wisdom  say  that  she  loses  or  that  she 
retains  her  natural  power? 

Let  us  assume  that  she  retains  her  power. 

Yet  is  not  the  power  which  injustice  exercises  of 
such  a nature  that  wherever  she  takes  up  her  abode, 
whether  in  a city,  in  an  army,  in  a family,  or  in  any 
other  body,  that  body  is,  to  begin  with,  rendered  in- 
capable of  united  action  by  reason  of  sedition  and 
distraction;  and  does  it  not  become  its  own  enemy 
and  at  variance  with  all  that  opposes  it,  and  with  the 
just?  Is  not  this  the  case? 

Yes,  certainly. 

And  is  not  injustice  equally  fatal  when  existing 
in  a single  person;  in  the  first  place  rendering  him 
incapable  of  action  because  he  is  not  at  unity  with 
himself,  and  in  the  second  place  making  him  an  enemy 
to  himself  and  the  just?  Is  not  that  true,  Thrasy- 
machus? 

Yes. 

And  O my  friend,  I said,  surely  the  gods  are  just? 


40 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Granted  that  they  are. 

But  if  so,  the  unjust  will  be  the  enemy  of  the  gods, 
and  the  just  will  be  their  friends? 

Feast  away  in  triumph,  and  take  your  fill  of  the 
argument;  I will  not  oppose  you,  lest  I should  dis- 
please the  company. 

Well  then,  proceed  with  your  answers,  and  let  me 
have  the  remainder  of  my  repast.  For  we  have 
already  shown  that  the  just  are  clearly  wiser  and 
better  and  abler  than  the  unjust,  and  that  the  unjust 
are  incapable  of  common  action;  nay  more,  that  to 
speak  as  we  did  of  men  who  are  evil  acting  at  any 
time  vigorously  together,  is  not  strietly  true,  for  if 
they  had  been  perfectly  evil,  they  would  have  laid 
hands  upon  one  another;  but  it  is  evident  that  there 
must  have  been  some  remnant  of  justice  in  them, 
which  enabled  them  to  combine ; if  there  had  not  been 
they  would  have  injured  one  another  as  well  as  their 
victims;  they  were  but  half-villains  in  their  enter- 
prises; for  had  they  been  whole  villains,  and  utterly 
unjust,  they  would  have  been  utterly  incapable  of 
action.  That,  as  I believe,  is  the  truth  of  the  matter, 
and  not  what  you  said  at  first.  But  whether  the  just 
have  a better  and  happier  life  than  the  unjust  is  a 
further  question  which  we  also  proposed  to  consider. 
I think  that  they  have,  and  for  the  reasons  which  I 
have  given ; but  still  I should  like  to  examine  further, 
for  no  light  matter  is  at  stake,  nothing  less  than  the 
rule  of  human  life. 

Proceed. 

I will  proceed  by  asking  a question:  Would  you 
not  say  that  a horse  has  some  end? 

I should. 

And  the  end  or  use  of  a horse  or  of  anything  would 
be  that  which  could  not  be  accomplished,  or  not  so 
well  accomplished,  by  any  other  thing? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


41 


I do  not  understand,  he  said. 

Let  me  explain:  Can  you  see,  except  with  the 
eye? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  hear,  except  with  the  ear? 

No. 

These  then  may  be  truly  said  to  be  the  ends  of 
these  organs? 

They  may. 

But  you  can  cut  off  a vine-branch  with  a dagger 
or  with  a chisel,  and  in  many  other  ways? 

Of  course. 

And  yet  not  so  well  as  with  a pruning-hook  made 
for  the  purpose? 

True. 

May  we  not  say  that  this  is  the  end  of  a pruning- 
hook? 

We  may. 

Then  now  I think  you  will  have  no  difficulty  in 
understanding  my  meaning  when  I asked  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  end  of  anything  would  be  that  which 
could  not  be  accomplished,  or  not  so  well  accom- 
plished, by  any  other  thing? 

I understand  your  meaning,  he  said,  and  assent. 

And  that  to  which  an  end  is  appointed  has  also  an 
excellence?  Need  I ask  again  whether  the  eye  has  an 
end? 

It  has. 

And  has  not  the  eye  an  excellence? 

Yes. 

And  the  ear  has  an  end  and  an  excellence  also? 

True. 

And  the  same  is  true  of  all  other  things ; they  have 
each  of  them  an  end  and  a special  excellence? 

That  is  so. 

Well,  and  can  the  eyes  fulfil  their  end  if  they  are 


42  THE  REPUBLIC 

wanting  in  their  own  proper  excellence  and  have  a 
defect  instead? 

How  can  they,  he  said,  if  they  are  blind  and  can 
not  see? 

You  mean  to  say,  if  they  have  lost  their  proper 
excellence,  which  is  sight,  but  I have  not  arrived  at 
that  point  yet.  I would  rather  ask  the  question  more 
generally,  and  only  inquire  whether  the  things  which 
fulfil  their  ends  fulfil  them  by  their  own  proper  excel- 
lence, and  fail  of  fulfilling  them  by  their  own  defect? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

I might  say  the  same  of  the  ears;  when  deprived 
of  their  own  proper  excellence  they  can  not  fulfil  their 
end? 

True. 

And  the  same  observation  will  apply  to  all  other 
things? 

I agree. 

I Well;  and  has  not  the  soul  an  end  which  nothing 
else  can  fulfil?  for  example,  to  superintend  and  com- 
mand and  deliberate  and  the  like.  Are  not  these  func- 
tions proper  to  the  soul,  and  can  they  rightly  be  as- 
signed to  any  other? 

To  no  other. 

And  is  not  life  to  be  reckoned  among  the  ends  of 
the  soul? 

Assuredly,  he  said. 

And  has  not  the  soul  an  excellence  also? 

Yes. 

And  can  she  or  can  she  not  fulfil  her  own  ends  when 
deprived  of  that  excellence  ? 

She  can  not. 

Then  an  evil  soul  must  necessarily  be  an  evil 
ruler  and  superintendent,  and  the  good  soul  a good 
ruler? 

Yes,  necessarily. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


43 


And  we  have  admitted  that  justice  is  the  excellence 
of  the  soul,  and  injustice  the  defect  of  the  soul? 

That  has  been  admitted. 

Then  the  just  soul  and  the  just  man  will  live  well, 
and  the  unjust  man  will  live  ill? 

That  is  what  your  argument  proves. 

And  he  who  lives  well  is  blessed  and  happy,  and  he 
who  lives  ill  the  reverse  of  happy? 

Certainly. 

Then  the  just  is  happy,  and  the  unjust  miserable? 

So  he  it. 

But  happiness  and  not  misery  is  profitable. 

Of  course. 

Then,  my  blessed  Thrasymachus,  injustice  can 
never  be  more  profitable  than  justice. 

Let  this,  Socrates,  he  said,  be  your  entertainment 
at  the  Bendidea. 

For  which  I am  indebted  to  you,  I said,  now  that 
you  have  grown  gentle  towards  me  and  have  left  off 
scolding.  Nevertheless,  I have  not  been  well  enter- 
tained; but  that  was  my  own  fault  and  not  yours. 
As  an  epicure  snatches  a taste  of  every  dish  which 
is  successively  brought  to  table,  he  not  having  allowed 
himself  time  to  enjoy  the  one  before,  so  have  I gone  < 
from  one  subject  to  another  without  having  discov- 
ered what  I sought  at  first,  the  nature  of  justice.  I ' 
left  that  inquiry  and  turned  away  to  consider  whether 
justice  is  virtue  and  wisdom  or  evil  and  folly;  and 
when  there  arose  a further  question  about  the  com- 
parative advantages  of  justice  and  injustice,  I could 
not  refrain  from  passing  on  to  that.  And  the  result 
of  the  whole  discussion  has  been  that  I know  nothing 
at  all.  For  I know  not  what  justice  is,  and  there- 
fore I am  not  likely  to  know  whether  it  is  or  is  not 
a virtue,  nor  can  I say  whether  the  just  man  is  happy 
or  unhappy. 


BOOK  II 


With  these  words  I was  thinking  that  I had  made 
an  end  of  the  discussion ; but  the  end,  in  truth,  proved 
to  be  only  a beginning.  For  Glaucon,  who  is  always 
the  most  pugnacious  of  men,  was  dissatisfied  at  Thra- 
symachus’  retirement;  he  wanted  to  have  the  battle 
out.  So  he  said  to  me:  Socrates,  do  you  wish  really 
to  persuade  us,  or  only  to  seem  to  have  persuaded 
us,  that  to  he  just  is  always  better  than  to  be  unjust? 

I should  wish  really  to  persuade  you,  I replied,  if 
I could. 

Then  you  certainly  have  not  succeeded.  Let  me 
ask  you  now:  — How  would  you  arrange  goods  — 

, are  there  not  some  which  we  welcome  for  their  own 
I sakes,  and  independently  of  their  consequences,  as, 
for  example,  harmless  pleasures  and  enjoyments, 
which  delight  us  at  the  time,  although  nothing  fol- 
. lows  from  them? 

I agree  in  thinking  that  there  is  such  a class,  I re- 
plied. 

Is  there  not  also  a second  class  of  goods,  such  as 
knowledge,  sight,  health,  which  are  desirable  not  only 
in  themselves,  but  also  for  their  results? 

Certainly,  I said. 

And  would  you  not  recognize  a third  class,  such  as 
gymnastic,  and  the  care  of  the  sick,  and  the  physi- 
cian’s art;  also  the  various  ways  of  money-making  — 
these  do  us  good  but  we  regard  them  as  disagreeable ; 
and  no  one  would  choose  them  for  their  own  sakes,  but 
only  for  the  sake  of  some  reward  or  result  which  flows 
from  them? 


44 


THE  REPUBLIC 


45 


There  is,  I said,  this  third  class  also.  But  why  do 
you  ask? 

Because  I want  to  know  in  which  of  the  three 
classes  you  would  place  justice? 

In  the  highest  class,  I replied,  — among  those 
goods  which  he  who  would  be  happy  desires  both  for 
their  own  sake  and  for  the  sake  of  their  results. 

Then  the  many  are  of  another  mind;  they  think 
that  justice  is  to  be  reckoned  in  the  troublesome  class, 
among  goods  which  are  to  be  pursued  for  the  sake  of 
rewards  and  of  reputation,  but  in  themselves  are  dis- 
agreeable and  rather  to  be  avoided. 

I know,  I said,  that  this  is  their  manner  of  thinking, 
and  that  this  was  the  thesis  which  Thrasymachus  was 
maintaining  just  now,  when  he  censured  justice  and 
praised  injustice.  But  I am  too  stupid  to  be  con- 
vinced by  him. 

I wish,  he  said,  that  you  would  hear  me  as  well  as 
him,  and  then  I shall  see  whether  you  and  I agree. 
For  Thrasymachus  seems  to  me,  like  a snake,  to  have 
been  charmed  by  your  voice  sooner  than  he  ought  to 
have  been;  but  to  my  mind  the  nature  of  justice  and 
injustice  have  not  yet  been  made  clear.  Setting  aside 
their  rewards  and  results,  I want  to  know  what  they 
are  in  themselves,  and  how  they  inwardly  work  in  the 
soul.  If  you  please,  then,  I will  revive  the  argument 
of  Thrasymachus.  And  first  I will  speak  of  the  na- 
ture and  origin  of  justice  according  to  the  common 
view  of  them.  Secondly,  I will  show  that  all  men 
who  practise  justice  do  so  against  their  will,  of  neces- 
sity, but  not  as  a good.  And  thirdly,  I will  argue  that 
there  is  reason  in  this  view,  for  the  life  of  the  unjust 
is  after  all  better  far  than  the  life  of  the  just  — if 
what  they  say  is  true,  Socrates,  since  I myself  am  not 
of  their  opinion.  But  still  I acknowdedge  that  I am 
perplexed  when  I hear  the  voices  of  Thrasymachus 


46 


THE  REPUBLIC 


and  myriads  of  others  dinning  in  my  ears;  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  I have  never  yet  heard  the  superiority 
of  justice  to  injustice  maintained  by  any  one  in  a 
satisfactory  way.  I want  to  hear  justice  praised  in 
respect  of  itself ; then  I shall  be  satisfied,  and  you  are 
the  person  from  whom  I think  that  I am  most  likely 
to  hear  this;  and  therefore  I will  praise  the  unjust 
life  to  the  utmost  of  my  power,  and  my  manner  of 
speaking  will  indicate  the  manner  in  which  I desire 
to  hear  you  too  praising  justice  and  censuring  injus- 
tice. Will  you  say  wLether  you  approve  of  my  pro- 
posal? 

Indeed  I do;  nor  can  I imagine  any  theme  about 
which  a man  of  sense  would  oftener  wish  to  con- 
verse. 

I am  delighted,  he  replied,  to  hear  you  say  so,  and 
shall  begin  by  speaking,  as  I proposed,  of  the  nature 
and  origin  of  justice. 

They  say  that  to  do  injustice  is,  by  nature,  good; 
to  suffer  injustice,  evil;  but  that  the  evil  is  greater 
than  the  good.  And  so  when  men  have  both  done  and 
suffered  injustice  and  have  had  experience  of  both, 
not  being  able  to  avoid  the  one  and  obtain  the  other, 
they  think  that  they  had  better  agree  among  them- 
selves to  have  neither;  hence  there  arise  laws  and 
I mutual  covenants;  and  that  which  is  ordained  by 
lilaw  is  termed  by  them  lawful  and  just.  This  they 
. affirm  to  be  the  origin  and  nature  of  justice;  — it 
I is  a mean  or  compromise,  between  the  best  of  all, 
which  is  to  do  injustice  and  not  he  punished,  and  the 
worst  of  all,  which  is  to  suffer  injustice  without  the 
power  of  retaliation;  and  justice,  being  at  a middle 
point  between  the  two,  is  tolerated  not  as  a good,  hut 
as  the  lesser  evil,  and  honored  by  reason  of  the  inabil- 
ity of  men  to  do  injustice.  For  no  man  who  is  worthy 
to  be  called  a man  would  ever  submit  to  such  an  agree- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


47 


ment  if  he  were  able  to  resist ; he  would  be  mad  if  he 
did.  Such  is  the  received  account,  Socrates,  of  the 
nature  and  origin  of  justice. 

Now  that  those  who  practise  justice  do  so  invol- 
untarily and  because  they  have  not  the  power  to  be 
unjust  will  best  appear  if  we  imagine  something  of 
this  kind:  having  given  both  to  the  just  and  the  un- 
just power  to  do  what  they  will,  let  us  watch  and  see 
whither  desire  will  lead  them;  then  we  shall  discover 
in  the  very  act  the  just  and  unjust  man  to  be  pro- 
ceeding along  the  same  road,  following  their  interest, 
which  all  natures  deem  to  be  their  good,  and  are  only 
diverted  into  the  path  of  justice  by  the  force  of  law. 
The  liberty  which  we  are  supposing  may  be  most 
completely  given  to  them  in  the  form  of  such  a power 
as  is  said  to  have  been  possessed  by  Gyges,  the  ances- 
tor of  Croesus  the  Lydian.^  According  to  the  tradi- 
tion, Gyges  was  a shepherd  in  the  service  of  the  king 
of  Lydia ; there  was  a great  storm,  and  an  earthquake 
made  an  opening  in  the  earth  at  the  place  where  he 
was  feeding  his  flock.  Amazed  at  the  sight,  he  de- 
scended into  the  opening,  where,  among  other  mar- 
vels, he  beheld  a hollow  brazen  horse,  having  doors, 
at  which  he  stooping  and  looking  in  saw  a dead  body 
of  stature,  as  appeared  to  him,  more  than  human,  and 
having  nothing  on  but  a gold  ring ; this  he  took  from 
the  finger  of  the  dead  and  reascended.  Now  the  shep- 
herds met  together,  according  to  custom,  that  they 
might  send  their  monthly  report  about  the  flocks  to 
the  king;  into  their  assembly  he  came  having  the 
ring  on  his  finger,  and  as  he  was  sitting  among  them 
he  chanced  to  turn  the  collet  of  the  ring  inside  his 
hand,  when  instantly  he  became  invisible  to  the  rest 
of  the  company  and  they  began  to  speak  of  him  as 
if  he  were  no  longer  present.  He  was  astonished  at 

Reading  Tj^rj  r<^  Kpol<rov  tov  AvdoO  irpoybvtp. 


48 


THE  REPUBLIC 


this,  and  again  touching  the  ring  he  turned  the  collet 
outwards  and  reappeared;  he  made  several  trials  of 
the  ring,  and  always  with  the  same  result  — when  he 
turned  the  collet  inwards  he  became  invisible,  when 
outwards  he  reappeared.  Whereupon  he  contrived 
to  be  chosen  one  of  the  messengers  who  were  sent  to 
the  court ; where  as  soon  as  he  arrived  he  seduced  the 
queen,  and  with  her  help  conspired  against  the  king 
and  slew  him,  and  took  the  kingdom.  Suppose  now 
that  there  were  two  such  magic  rings,  and  the  just 
put  on  one  of  them  and  the  unjust  the  other;  no  man 
can  be  imagined  to  be  of  such  an  iron  nature  that  he 
would  stand  fast  in  justice.  No  man  would  keep  his 
hands  off  what  was  not  his  own  when  he  could  safely 
take  what  he  liked  out  of  the  market,  or  go  into  houses 
and  lie  with  any  one  at  his  pleasure,  or  kill  or  release 
from  prison  whom  he  would,  and  in  all  respects  be  like 
a God  among  men.  Then  the  actions  of  the  just 
would  be  as  the  actions  of  the  unjust;  they  would 
both  come  at  last  to  the  same  point.  And  this  we 
may  truly  affirm  to  be  a great  proof  that  a man  is 
just,  not  willingly  or  because  he  thinks  that  justice 
is  any  good  to  him  individually,  but  of  necessity,  for 
wherever  any  one  thinks  that  he  can  safely  be  unjust, 
there  he  is  unjust.  For  all  men  believe  in  their  hearts 
that  injustice  is  far  more  profitable  to  the  individual 
than  justice,  and  he  who  argues  as  I have  been  sup^ 
posing,  will  say  that  they  are  right.  If  you  could 
imagine  any  one  obtaining  this  power  of  becoming 
invisible,  and  never  doing  any  wrong  or  touching 
what  was  another’s,  he  would  be  thought  by  the 
lookers-on  to  be  a most  wretched  idiot,  although  they 
would  praise  him  to  one  another’s  faces,  and  keep  up 
appearances  with  one  another  from  a fear  that  they 
too  might  suffer  injustice.  Enough  of  this. 

Now,  if  we  are  to  form  a real  judgment  of  the  life 


THE  REPUBLIC 


49 


of  the  just  and  unjust,  we  must  isolate  them;  there 
is  no  other  way;  and  how  is  the  isolation  to  be  ef- 
fected? I answer:  Let  the  unjust  man  be  entirely 
unjust,  and  the  just  man  entirely  just;  nothing  is  to 
be  taken  away  from  either  of  them,  and  both  are  to 
be  perfectly  furnished  for  the  work  of  their  respect- 
ive lives.  Eirst,  let  the  unjust  be  like  other  distin- 
guished masters  of  craft;  like  the  skilful  pilot  or 
physician,  who  knows  intuitively  his  own  powers  and 
keeps  within  their  limits,  and  who,  if  he  fails  at  any 
point,  is  able  to  recover  himself.  So  let  the  unjust 
make  his  unjust  attempts  in  the  right  way,  and  lie 
hidden  if  he  means  to  be  great  in  his  injustice:  (he 
who  is  found  out  is  nobody:)  for  the  highest  reach  of 
injustice  is,  to  be  deemed  just  when  you  are  not. 
Therefore  I say  that  in  the  perfectly  imjust  man  we 
must  assume  the  most  perfect  injustice;  there  is  to 
be  no  deduction,  but  we  must  allow  him,  while  doing 
the  most  unjust  acts,  to  have  acquired  the  greatest 
reputation  for  justice.  If  he  have  taken  a false  step 
he  must  be  able  to  recover  himself;  he  must  be  one 
who  can  speak  with  effect,  if  any  of  his  deeds  come  to 
light,  and  who  can  force  his  way  where  force  is  re- 
quired by  his  courage  and  strength,  and  command  of 
money  and  friends.  And  at  his  side  let  us  place  the 
just  man  in  his  nobleness  and  simplicity,  wishing,  as, 
.ZEschylus  says,  to  be  and  not  to  seem  good.  There 
must  be  no  seeming,  for  if  he  seem  to  be  just  he  will 
be  honored  and  rewarded,  and  then  we  shall  not  know 
whether  he  is  just  for  the  sake  of  justice  or  for  the 
sake  of  honors  and  rewards;  therefore,  let  him  be 
clothed  in  justice  only,  and  have  no  other  covering; 
and  he  must  be  imagined  in  a state  of  life  the  oppo- 
site of  the  former.  Let  him  be  the  best  of  men,  and 
let  him  be  thought  the  worst;  then  he  will  have  been 
put  to  the  proof;  and  we  shall  see  whether  he  will  be 


50 


THE  REPUBLIC 


aifected  by  the  fear  of  infamy  and  its  consequences. 
And  let  him  continue  thus  to  the  hour  of  death ; being 
just  and  seeming  to  be  unjust.  When  both  have 
reached  the  uttermost  extreme,  the  one  of  justice  and 
the  other  of  injustice,  let  judgment  be  given  which 
of  them  is  the  happier  of  the  two. 

Heavens!  my  dear  Glaucon,  I said,  how  energet- 
ically you  polish  them  up  for  the  decision,  first  one 
and  then  the  other,  as  if  they  were  two  statues. 

I do  my  best,  he  said.  And  now  that  we  know  what 
they  are  like  there  is  no  difficulty  in  tracing  out  the 
sort  of  life  which  awaits  either  of  them.  This  I will 
proceed  to  describe ; but  as  you  may  think  the  descrip- 
tion a little  too  coarse,  I ask  you  to  suppose,  Socrates, 
that  the  words  which  follow  are  not  mine.  — Let  me 
put  them  into  the  mouths  of  the  eulogists  of  injustice: 
They  will  tell  you  that  the  just  man  who  is  thought 
unjust  will  be  scourged,  racked,  bound  — will  have 
his  eyes  burned  out ; and,  at  last,  after  suffering  every 
kind  of  evil,  he  will  be  impaled : Then  he  will  under- 
stand that  he  ought  to  seem  only,  and  not  to  be,  just; 
the  words  of  .dEschylus  may  be  more  truly  spoken  of 
the  unjust  than  of  the  just.  For  the  unjust  is  pur- 
suing a reality ; he  does  not  live  with  a view  to  appear- 
ances — he  wants  to  be  really  unjust  and  not  to  seem 
only : — 

“ His  mind  has  a soil  deep  and  fertile. 

Out  of  whieh  spring  his  prudent  counsels.”  * 

In  the  first  place,  he  is  thought  just,  and  therefore 
bears  rule  in  the  city ; he  can  marry  whom  he  will,  and 
give  in  marriage  to  whom  he  will;  also  he  can  trade 
and  deal  where  he  likes,  and  always  to  his  own  advan- 
tage, because  he  has  no  misgivings  about  injustice; 
and  at  every  contest,  whether  in  public  or  private,  he 

1 Seven  against  Thebes,  574. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


51 


gets  the  better  of  his  antagonists,  and  gains  at  their 
expense,  and  is  rich,  and  out  of  his  gains  he  can  bene- 
fit his  friends,  and  harm  his  enemies ; moreover,  he  can 
offer  sacrifices,  and  dedicate  gifts  to  the  gods  abun- 
dantly and  magnificently,  and  can  honor  the  gods 
or  any  man  whom  he  wants  to  honor  in  a far  better 
style  than  the  just,  and  therefore  he  is  likely  to  be 
dearer  than  they  are  to  the  gods.  And  thus,  Soc- 
rates, gods  and  men  are  said  to  unite  in  making 
the  life  of  the  unjust  better  than  the  life  of  the 
just. 

I was  going  to  say  something  in  answer  to  Glaucon, 
when  Adeimantus,  his  brother,  interposed:  Socrates, 
he  said,  you  do  not  suppose  that  there  is  nothing  more 
to  be  urged? 

Why,  what  else  is  there?  I answered. 

The  strongest  point  of  all  has  not  been  even  men- 
tioned, he  replied. 

Well,  then,  according  to  the  proverb,  “ Let 
brother  help  brother  ” — if  he  fails  in  any  part  do  you 
assist  him;  although  I must  confess  that  Glaucon  has 
already  said  quite  enough  to  lay  me  in  the  dust,  and 
take  from  me  the  power  of  helping  justice. 

Nonsense,  he  replied.  But  let  me  add  something 
more:  There  is  another  side  to  Glaucon’s  argument 
about  the  praise  and  censure  of  justice  and  in- 
justice, which  is  equally  required  in  order  to  bring  out 
what  I believe  to  be  his  meaning.  Parents  and  tutors 
are  always  telling  their  sons  and  their  wards  that  they 
are  to  be  just;  but  why?  Not  for  the  sake  of  justice, 
but  for  the  sake  of  character  and  reputation;  in  the 
hope  of  obtaining  for  him  who  is  reputed  just  some 
of  those  offices,  marriages,  and  the  like  which  Glaucon 
has  enumerated  among  the  advantages  accruing  to  the 
unjust  from  the  reputation  of  justice.  More,  how- 
is  made  of  appearances  by  this  class  of  persons 


li.  .t  ILL  no. 


52 


THE  REPUBLIC 


than  by  the  others;  for  they  throw  in  the  good  opinion 
of  the  gods,  and  will  tell  you  of  a shower  of  benefits 
whieh  the  heavens,  as  they  say,  rain  upon  the  pious; 
and  this  accords  with  the  testimony  of  the  noble 
Hesiod  and  Homer,  the  first  of  whom  says,  that  the 
gods  make  the  oaks  of  the  just  — 

“To  bear  acorns  at  their  summit^  and  bees  in  the  middle; 
And  the  sheep  are  bowed  down  with  the  weight  of  their  fleeces^’'  ^ 

and  many  other  blessings  of  a like  kind  are  provided 
for  them.  And  Homer  has  a very  similar  strain;  for 
he  speaks  of  one  whose  fame  is  — 

“ As  the  fame  of  some  blameless  king  who^  like  a god, 

Maintains  justice;  to  whom  the  black  earth  brings  forth 
Wheat  and  barley,  whose  trees  are  bowed  with  fruit. 

And  his  sheep  never  fail  to  bear,  and  the  sea  gives  him  fish/*  ^ 

Still  grander  are  the  gifts  of  heaven  which  Musaeus 
and  his  son®  vouchsafe  to  the  just;  they  take  them 
down  into  the  world  below,  where  they  have  the  saints 
lying  on  couches  at  a feast,  everlastingly  drunk, 
crowned  with  garlands ; their  ideas  seem  to  be  that  an 
immortality  of  drunkenness  is  the  highest  meed  of 
virtue.  Some  extend  their  rewards  yet  further;  the 
posterity,  as  they  say,  of  the  faithful  and  just  shall 
survive  to  the  third  and  fourth  generation.  This  is 
the  style  in  which  they  praise  justice.  But  about  the 
wicked  there  is  another  strain;  they  bury  them  in  a 
slough  in  Hades,  and  make  them  carry  water  in  a 
sieve ; also  while  they  are  yet  living  they  bring  them  to 
infamy,  and  inflict  upon  them  the  punishments  which 
Glaucon  described  as  the  portion  of  the  just  who  are 
reputed  to  be  unjust;  nothing  else  does  their  inven- 
tion supply.  Such  is  their  manner  of  praising  the 
one  and  censuring  the  other. 

Once  more,  Socrates,  I will  ask  you  to  consider 

1 Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  230.  2Homer,  Od.  xix.  109.  ^^Eumolpus. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


53 


another  way  of  speaking  about  justice  and  injustice, 
which  is  not  confined  to  the  poets,  but  is  found  in 
prose  writers.  The  universal  voice  of  mankind  is 
always  declaring  that  justice  and  virtue  are  honor- 
able, but  grievous  and  toilsome;  and  that  the 
pleasures  of  vice  and  injustice  are  easy  of  attainment, 
and  are  only  censured  by  law  and  opinion.  They  say  / 
also  that  honesty  is  for  the  most  part  less  profitable/ 
than  dishonesty;  and  they  are  quite  ready  to  call 
wicked  men  happy,  and  to  honor  them  both  in  public 
and  private  when  they  are  rich  or  in  any  other  way 
influential,  while  they  despise  and  overlook  those  who 
may  be  weak  and  poor,  even  though  acknowledging^ 
them  to  be  better  than  the  others.  But  most  extraor- 
dinary of  all  is  their  mode  of  speaking  about  virtue 
and  the  gods:  they  say  that  the  gods  apportion 
calamity  and  misery  to  many  good  men,  and  good 
and  happiness  to  the  wicked.  And  mendicant  prophets 
go  to  rich  men’s  doors  and  persuade  them  that  they 
have  a power  committed  to  them  by  the  gods  of 
making  an  atonement  for  a man’s  own  or  his  an- 
cestor’s sins  by  sacrifices  or  charms,  with  rejoicings 
and  feasts;  and  they  promise  to  harm  an  enemy, 
whether  just  or  unjust,  at  a small  cost;  with  magic 
arts  and  incantations  binding  heaven,  as  they  say,  to 
execute  their  will.  And  the  poets  are  the  authorities 
to  whom  they  appeal,  now  smoothing  the  path  of  vice 
with  the  words  of  Hesiod : — 

“ Vice  may  be  had  in  abundance  without  trouble;  the  way  is 
smooth  and  her  dwelling-place  is  near.  But  before  virtue  the 
gods  have  set  toil/’  ^ 

and  a tedious  and  uphill  road:  then  citing  Homer  as 
a witness  that  the  gods  may  be  influenced  by  men ; for 
he  also  says : — 

1 Hesiod,  Works  and  Days,  287. 


54 


THE  REPUBLIC 


The  gods^  too,  may  be  turned  from  their  purpose;  and  men 
pray  to  them  and  avert  their  wrath  by  sacrifices  and  soothing 
entreaties,  and  by  libations  and  the  odor  of  fat,  when  they  have 
sinned  and  transgressed/'  ^ 

And  they  produce  a host  of  books  written  by  Musaeus 
and  Orpheus,  M^ho  were  children  of  the  Moon  and  the 
Muses  — that  is  what  they  say  — according  to  which 
they  perform  their  ritual,  and  persuade  not  only  in- 
dividuals, but  whole  cities,  that  expiations  and  atone- 
ments for  sin  may  be  made  by  sacrifices  and  amuse- 
ments which  fill  a vacant  hour,  and  are  equally  at  the 
service  of  the  living  and  the  dead ; the  latter  sort  they 
call  mysteries,  and  they  redeem  us  from  the  pains  of 
hell,  but  if  we  neglect  them  no  one  knows  what  awaits 
us. 

He  proceeded:  And  now  when  the  young  hear  all 
this  said  about  virtue  and  vice,  and  the  way  in  which 
gods  and  men  regard  them,  how  are  their  minds 
likely  to  be  affected,  my  dear  Socrates,  — those  of 
them,  I mean,  who  are  quickwitted,  and,  like  bees  on 
the  wing,  light  on  every  flower,  and  from  all  that  they 
hear  are  prone  to  draw  conclusions  as  to  what  manner 
of  persons  they  should  be  and  in  what  way  they  should 
walk  if  they  would  make  the  best  of  life?  Probably 
the  youth  will  say  to  himself  in  the  words  of  Pindar  — 

“ Can  I by  justice  or  by  crooked  ways  of  deceit  ascend  a lof- 
tier tower  which  may  be  a fortress  to  me  all  my  days  ? ” 

For  what  men  say  is  that,  if  I am  really  just  and  am 
not  also  thought  just,  profit  there  is  none,  but  the 
pain  and  loss  on  the  other  hand  are  unmistakable. 
But  if,  though  unjust,  I acquire  the  reputation  of 
justice,  a heavenly  life  is  promised  to  me.  Since  then, 
as  philosophers  prove,  appearance  tyrannizes  over 
truth  and  is  lord  of  happiness,  to  appearance  I must 

* Homer,  Iliad,  ix.  493. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


55 


devote  myself.  I will  describe  around  me  a picture 
and  shadow  of  virtue  to  be  the  vestibule  and  ex- 
terior of  my  house;  behind  I will  trail  the  subtle  and 
crafty  fox,  as  Archilochus,  greatest  of  sages, 
recommends.  But  I hear  some  one  exclaiming  that 
the  concealment  of  wickedness  is  often  difficult;  to 
which  I answer.  Nothing  great  is  easy.  Nevertheless, 
the  argument  indicates  this,  if  we  would  be  happy,  to 
be  the  path  along  which  we  should  proceed.  With 
a view  to  concealment  we  will  establish  secret  brother- 
hoods and  political  clubs.  And  there  are  professors 
of  rhetoric  who  teach  the  art  of  persuading  courts 
and  assemblies;  and  so,  partly  by  persuasion  and 
partly  by  force,  I shall  make  unlawful  gains  and  not 
be  punished.  Still  I hear  a voice  saying  that  the  gods 
can  not  be  deceived,  neither  can  they  be  compelled. 
But  what  if  there  are  no  gods?  or,  suppose  them  to 
have  no  care  of  human  things  — why  in  either  case 
should  we  mind  about  concealment?  And  even  if 
there  are  gods,  and  they  do  care  about  us,  yet  we 
know  of  them  only  from  tradition  and  the  genealogies 
of  the  poets;  and  these  are  the  very  persons  who  say 
that  they  may  be  influenced  and  turned  by  “ sacrifices 
and  soothing  entreaties  and  by  offerings.”  Let  us  be 
consistent  then,  and  believe  both  or  neither.  If  the 
poets  speak  truly,  why  then  we  had  better  be  unjust, 
and  offer  of  the  fruits  of  injustice;  for  if  we  are  just, 
although  we  may  escape  the  vengeance  of  heaven,  we 
shall  lose  the  gains  of  injustice;  hut,  if  we  are  unjust, 
we  shall  keep  the  gains,  and  by  our  sinning  and  pray- 
ing, and  praying  and  sinning,  the  gods  will  be  pro- 
pitiated, and  we  shall  not  be  punished.  “ But  there 
is  a world  below  in  which  either  we  or  our  posterity 
will  suffer  for  our  unjust  deeds.”  Yes,  my  friend, 
will  be  the  reflection,  but  there  are  mysteries  and 
atoning  deities,  and  these  have  great  power.  That 


56 


THE  REPUBLIC 


is  what  mighty  cities  declare;  and  the  children  of  the 
gods,  who  were  their  poets  and  prophets,  bear  a like 
testimony. 

On  what  principle,  then,  shall  we  any  longer  choose 
justice  rather  than  the  worst  injustice?  when,  if  we 
only  unite  the  latter  with  a deceitful  regard  to  ap- 
pearances, we  shall  fare  to  our  mind  both  with  gods 
and  men,  in  life  and  after  death,  as  the  most  numerous 
and  the  highest  authorities  tell  us.  Knowing  all  this, 
Socrates,  how  can  a man  who  has  any  superiority  of 
mind  or  person  or  rank  or  wealth,  be  willing  to  honor 
justice;  or  indeed  to  refrain  from  laughing  when  he 
hears  justice  praised?  And  even  if  there  should  be 
some  one  who  is  able  to  disprove  the  truth  of  my 
words,  and  who  is  satisfied  that  justice  is  best,  still 
he  is  not  angry  with  the  unjust,  but  is  very  ready  to 
forgive  them,  because  he  also  knows  that  men  are  not 
just  of  their  own  free  will ; unless,  per  ad  venture,  there 
be  some  one  whom  the  divinity  within  him  may  have 
inspired  with  a hatred  of  injustice,  or  who  has  attained 
knowledge  of  the  truth  — but  no  other  man.  He 
only  blames  injustice  who,  owing  to  cowardice  or  age 
or  some  weakness,  has  not  the  power  of  being  unjust. 
And  this  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  when  he  obtains 
the  power,  he  immediately  becomes  unjust  as  far  as 
he  can  be. 

The  cause  of  all  this,  Socrates,  was  indicated  by  us 
at  the  beginning  of  the  argument,  when  my  brother 
and  I told  you  how  astonished  we  were  to  find  that 
of  all  the  professing  panegyrists  of  justice  — begin- 
ning with  the  ancient  heroes  of  whom  any  memorial 
has  been  preserved  to  us,  and  ending  with  the  men 
of  our  own  time  — no  one  has  ever  blamed  injustice 
or  praised  justice  except  with  a view  to  the  glories, 
honors,  and  benefits  which  flow  from  them.  No  one 
has  ever  adequately  described  either  in  verse  or  prose 


THE  REPUBLIC 


67 


the  true  essential  nature  of  either  of  them  abiding  in 
the  soul,  and  invisible  to  any  human  or  divine  eye; 
or  shown  that  of  all  the  things  of  a man’s  soul  which 
he  has  within  him,  justice  is  the  greatest  good,  and 
injustice  the  greatest  evil.  Had  this  been  the  uni- 
versal strain,  had  you  sought  to  persuade  us  of  this 
from  our  youth  upwards,  we  should  not  have  been 
on  the  watch  to  keep  one  another  from  doing  wrong, 
but  every  one  would  have  been  his  own  watchman, 
-because  afraid,  if  he  did  wrong,  of  harboring  in  him- 
self the  greatest  of  evils.  I dare  say  that  Thrasy- 
machus  and  others  would  seriously  hold  the  language 
which  I have  been  merely  repeating,  and  words  even 
stronger  than  these  about  justice  and  injustice, 
grossly,  as  I conceive,  perverting  their  true  nature. 
But  I speak  in  this  vehement  manner,  as  I must 
frankly  confess  to  you,  because  I want  to  hear  from 
you  the  opposite  side;  and  I would  ask  you  to  show 
not  only  the  superiority  which  justice  has  over  in- 
justice, but  what  effect  they  have  on  the  possessor 
of  them  which  makes  the  one  to  be  a good  and  the 
other  an  evil  to  him.  And  please,  as  Glaucon  re- 
quested of  you,  to  exclude  reputations ; for  unless  you 
take  away  from  each  of  them  his  true  reputation  and 
add  on  the  false,  we  shall  say  that  you  do  not  praise 
justice,  but  the  appearance  of  it;  we  shall  think  that 
you  are  only  exhorting  us  to  keep  injustice  dark,  and 
that  you  really  agree  with  Thrasymachus  in  think- 
ing that  justice  is  another’s  good  and  the  interest  of 
the  stronger,  and  that  injustice  is  a man’s  own  profit 
and  interest,  though  injurious  to  the  weaker.  Now 
as  you  have  admitted  that  justice  is  one  of  that  highest 
class  of  goods  which  are  desired  indeed  for  their 
results,  but  in  a far  greater  degree  for  their  own  sakes 
— like  sight  or  hearing  or  knowledge  or  health,  or 
any  other  real  and  natural  and  not  merely  conven- 


58 


THE  REPUBLIC 


tional  good  — I would  ask  you  in  your  praise  of 
justice  to  regard  one  point  only:  I mean  the  essential 
good  and  evil  which  justice  and  injustice  work  in  the 
possessors  of  them.  Let  others  praise  justice  and 
censure  injustice,  magnifying  the  rewards  and 
honors  of  the  one  and  abusing  the  other;  that  is  a 
manner  of  arguing  which,  coming  from  them,  I am 
ready  to  tolerate,  but  from  you  who  have  spent  your 
whole  life  in  the  consideration  of  this  question,  unless 
I hear  the  contrary  from  your  own  lips,  I expect 
something  better.  And  therefore,  I say,  not  only 
prove  to  us  that  justice  is  better  than  injustice,  but 
show  what  they  either  of  them  do  to  the  possessor 
of  them,  which  makes  the  one  to  be  a good  and  the 
other  an  evil,  whether  seen  or  unseen  by  gods  and 
men. 

I had  always  admired  the  genius  of  Glaucon  and 
Adeimantus,  but  on  hearing  these  words  I was  quite 
delighted,  and  said:  Sons  of  an  illustrious  father,  that 
was  not  a bad  beginning  of  the  Elegiac  verses  which 
the  admirer  of  Glaucon  made  in  honor  of  you  after 
you  had  distinguished  yourselves  at  the  battle  of 
Megara:  — 

“ Sons  of  Ariston,”  he  sang,  “divine  offspring  of  an  illustrious 
hero.” 

The  epithet  is  very  appropriate,  for  there  is  something 
truly  divine  in  being  able  to  argue  as  you  have  done 
for  the  superiority  of  injustice,  and  remaining  uncon- 
vinced by  your  own  arguments.  And  I do  believe 
that  you  are  not  convinced  — this  I infer  from  your 
general  character,  for  had  I judged  only  from  your 
speeches  I should  have  mistrusted  you.  But  now,  the 
greater  my  confidence  in  you,  the  greater  is  my  dif- 
ficulty in  knowing  what  to  say.  For  I am  in  a strait 
between  two;  on  the  one  hand  I feel  that  I am  un- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


59 


equal  to  the  task;  and  my  inability  is  brought  home 
to  me  by  the  fact  that  you  were  not  satisfied  with  the 
answer  which  I made  to  Thrasymachus,  proving,  as  I 
thought,  the  superiority  which  justice  has  over  in- 
justice. And  yet  I can  not  refuse  to  help,  while 
breath  and  speech  remain  to  me ; I am  afraid  that 
there  would  be  an  impiety  in  being  present  when  \ 
justice  is  evil  spoken  of  and  not  lifting  up  a hand  in 
her  defence.  And  therefore  I had  best  give  such  help 
as  I can. 

Glaucon  and  the  rest  entreated  me  by  all  means 
not  to  let  the  question  drop,  but  to  proceed  in  the 
investigation.  They  wanted  to  arrive  at  the  truth, 
first,  about  the  nature  of  justice  and  injustice,  and 
secondly,  about  their  relative  advantages.  I told 
them,  what  I really  thought,  that  the  inquiry  would 
be  of  a serious  nature,  and  would  require  very  good 
eyes.  Seeing  then,  I said,  that  we  are  no  great  wits, 

I think  that  we  had  better  adopt  a method  which  I 
may  illustrate  thus ; suppose  that  a short-sighted  per- 
son had  been  asked  by  some  one  to  read  small  letters 
from  a distance ; and  it  occurred  to  some  one  else  that 
they  might  be  found  in  another  place  which  was 
larger  and  in  which  the  letters  were  larger  — if 
they  were  the  same  and  he  could  read  the  larger 
letters  first,  and  then  proceeds  to  the  lesser  — this 
would  have  been  thought  a rare  piece  of  good  for^ 
tune. 

Very  true,  said  Adeimantus;  but  how  does  the 
illustration  apply  to  our  inquiry? 

I will  tell  you,  I replied;  justice,  which  is  the  sub- 
ject of  our  inquiry,  is,  as  you  know,  sometimes  spoken 
of  as  the  virtue  of  an  individual,  and  sometimes  as  the 
virtue  of  a State. 

True,  he  replied. 

And  is  not  a State  larger  than  an  individual? 


60 


THE  REPUBLIC 


It  is. 

Then  in  the  larger  the  quantity  of  justice  is  likely 
to  be  larger  and  more  easily  discernible.  I propose 
therefore  that  we  inquire  into  the  nature  of  justice 
and  injustice,  first  as  they  appear  in  the  State,  and 
secondly  in  the  individual,  proceeding  from  the 
greater  to  the  lesser  and  comparing  them. 

That,  he  said,  is  an  excellent  proposal. 

And  if  we  imagine  the  State  in  process  of  creation, 
we  shall  see  the  justice  and  injustice  of  the  State  in 
process  of  creation  also. 

I dare  say. 

When  the  State  is  completed  there  may  be  a hope 
that  the  object  of  our  search  will  be  more  easily  dis- 
covered. 

Yes,  far  more  easily. 

But  ought  we  to  attempt  to  construct  one?  I said; 
for  to  do  so,  as  I am  inclined  to  think,  will  be  a very 
serious  task.  Reflect  therefore. 

I have  reflected,  said  Adeimantus,  and  am  anxious 
that  you  should  proceed. 

A State,  I said,  arises,  as  I conceive,  out  of  the 
needs  of  mankind;  no  one  is  self-sufficing,  but  all  of 
us  have  many  wants.  Can  any  other  origin  of  a State 
be  imagined  ? 

There  can  be  no  other. 

Then,  as  we  have  many  wants,  and  many  persons 
are  needed  to  supply  them,  one  takes  a helper  for  one 
purpose  and  another  for  another;  and  when  these 
partners  and  helpers  are  gathered  together  in  one 
habitation  the  body  of  inhabitants  is  termed  a 
State. 

True,  he  said. 

And  they  exchange  with  one  another,  and  one 
gives,  and  another  receives,  under  the  idea  that  the 
exchange  will  be  for  their  good. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


61 


Very  true. 

Then,  I said,  let  us  begin  and  create  in  idea  a State ; 
and  yet  the  true  creator  js  necessity,  who  is  the  mother 
of  our  invention. 

Of  course,  he  replied. 

Now  the  first  and  greatest  of  necessities  is  food, 
which  is  the  condition  of  life  and  existence. 

Certainly. 

The  second  is  a dwelling,  and  the  third  clothing 
and  the  like. 

True. 

And  now  let  us  see  how  our  city  will  be  able  to 
supply  this  great  demand:  We  may  suppose  that  one 
man  is  a husbandman,  another  a builder,  some  one 
else  a weaver  — shall  we  add  to  them  a shoemaker, 
or  perhaps  some  other  purveyor  to  our  bodily  wants? 

Quite  right. 

The  barest  notion  of  a State  must  include  four  or 
five  men. 

Clearly. 

And  how  will  they  proceed?  Will  each  bring  the 
result  of  his  labors  into  a common  stock?  — the  in- 
dividual husbandman,  for  example,  producing  for  four 
and  laboring  four  times  as  long  and  as  much  as  he 
need  in  the  provision  of  food  with  which  he  supplies 
others  as  well  as  himself ; or  will  he  have  nothing  to 
do  with  others  and  not  be  at  the  trouble  of  producing 
for  them,  but  provide  for  himself  alone  a fourth  of 
the  food  in  a fourth  of  the  time,  and  in  the  remaining 
three  fourths  of  his  time  be  employed  in  making  a 
house  or  a coat  or  a pair  of  shoes,  having  no  partner- 
ship with  others,  but  supplying  himself  all  his  own 
wants  ? 

Adeimantus  thought  that  he  should  aim  at  pro- 
ducing food  only  and  not  at  producing  every- 
thing. 


V 


y 


62 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Probably,  I replied,  that  would  be  the  better  way ; 
and  when  I hear  you  say  this,  I am  myself  reminded 
that  we  are  not  all  alike;  there  are  diversities  of 
natures  among  us  which  are  adapted  to  different 
occupations. 

Very  true. 

And  will  you  have  a work  better  done  when  the 
workman  has  many  occupations,  or  when  he  has  only 
one? 

When  he  has  only  one. 

Further,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  a work  is 
spoiled  when  not  done  at  the  right  time? 

No  doubt. 

For  business  is  not  disposed  to  wait  until  the  doer 
of  the  business  is  at  leisure;  but  the  doer  must  follow 
up  what  he  is  doing,  and  make  the  business  his  first 
object. 

He  must. 

And  if  so,  we  must  infer  that  all  things  are  pro- 
duced more  plentifully  and  easily  and  of  a better 
quality  when  one  man  does  one  thing  which  is  natural 
to  him,  and  does  it  at  the  right  time,  and  leaves  other 
things. 

Undoubtedly. 

Then  more  than  our  citizens  will  be  required;  for 
the  husbandman  will  not  make  his  own  plough  or 
mattock,  or  other  implements  of  agriculture,  if  they 
are  to  be  good  for  anything.  Neither  will  the  builder 
make  his  tools  — and  he  too  needs  many ; and  in  like 
manner  the  weaver  and  shoemaker. 

True. 

Then  carpenters,  and  smiths,  and  many  other 
artisans,  will  be  sharers  in  our  little  State,  which  is 
already  beginning  to  grow? 

True. 

Yet  even  if  we  add  neatherds,  shepherds,  and  other 


THE  REPUBLIC 


63 


herdsmen,  in  order  that  our  husbandmen  may  have 
oxen  to  plough  with,  and  builders  as  well  as  husband- 
men may  have  draught  cattle,  and  curriers  and 
weavers  fleeces  and  hides,  — still  our  State  will  not 
be  very  large. 

That  is  true ; yet  neither  will  it  be  a very  small  State 
which  contains  all  these. 

Then,  again,  there  is  the  situation  of  the  city  — to 
find  a place  where  nothing  need  be  imported  is  well- 
nigh  impossible. 

Impossible. 

Then  there  must  be  another  class  of  citizens  who 
will  bring  the  required  supply  from  another  city? 

There  must. 

But  if  the  trader  goes  empty-handed,  having  noth- 
ing which  they  require  who  would  supply  his  need, 
he  will  come  back  empty-handed. 

That  is  certain. 

And  therefore  what  they  produce  at  home  must  be 
not  only  enough  for  themselves,  but  such  both  in 
quantity  and  quality  as  to  accommodate  those  from 
whom  their  wants  are  supplied. 

Very  true. 

Then  more  husbandmen  and  more  artisans  will  be 
required? 

They  will. 

Not  to  mention  the  importers  and  exporters,  who 
are  called  merchants? 

Yes. 

Then  we  shall  want  merchants  ? 

We  shall. 

And  if  merchandise  is  to  be  carried  over  the  sea, 
skilful  sailors  will  also  be  needed,  and  in  considerable 
numbers? 

Yes,  in  considerable  numbers. 

Then,  again,  within  the  city,  how  will  they  ex- 


64 


THE  REPUBLIC 


change  their  productions?  To  secure  such  an  ex- 
change was,  as  you  will  remember,  one  of  our  principal 
objects  when  we  formed  them  into  a society  and  con- 
stituted a State. 

Clearly  they  will  buy  and  sell. 

Then  they  will  need  a market-place,  and  a money- 
token  for  purposes  of  exchange. 

Certainl5^ 

Suppose  now  that  a husbandman,  or  an  artisan, 
brings  some  production  to  market,  and  he  comes  at  a 
time  when  there  is  no  one  to  exchange  with  him,  — 
is  he  to  leave  his  calling  and  sit  idle  in  the  market- 
place? 

Not  at  all;  he  will  find  people  there  who,  seeing  the 
want,  undertake  the  office  of  salesmen.  In  well- 
ordered  states  they  are  commonly  those  who  are  the 
weakest  in  bodily  strength,  and  therefore  of  little  use 
for  any  other  purpose;  their  duty  is  to  be  in  the 
market,  and  to  give  money  in  exchange  for  goods  to 
those  who  desire  to  sell  and  to  take  money  from  those 
who  desire  to  buy. 

This  want,  then,  creates  a class  of  retail-traders  in 
our  State.  Is  not  “ retailer  ” the  term  which  is  applied 
to  those  who  sit  in  the  market-place  engaged  in  buy- 
ing and  selling,  while  those  who  wander  from  one 
city  to  another  are  called  merchants? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  there  is  another  class  of  servants,  who  are  in- 
tellectually hardly  on  the  level  of  companionship ; still 
they  have  plenty  of  bodily  strength  for  labor,  which 
accordingly  they  sell,  and  are  called,  if  I do  not  mis- 
take, hirelings,  hire  being  the  name  which  is  given  to 
the  price  of  their  labor. 

True. 

Then  hirelings  will  help  to  make  up  our  population? 
Yes. 


THE  REPUBLIC  65 

And  now,  Adeimantus,  is  our  State  matured  and 
perfected? 

I think  so. 

Where,  then,  is  justice,  and  where  is  injustice,  and 
in  what  part  of  the  State  did  they  spring  up  ? 

Probably  in  the  dealings  of  these  citizens  with  one  j 
another.  I can  not  imagine  that  they  are  more  likely  * 
to  be  found  anywhere  else. 

I dare  say  that  you  are  right  in  your  suggestion,  I 
said;  we  had  better  think  the  matter  out,  and  not 
shrink  from  the  inquiry. 

Let  us  then  consider,  first  of  all,  what  will  be  their 
way  of  life,  now  that  we  have  thus  established  them. 
Will  they  not  produce  corn,  and  wine,  and  clothes, 
and  shoes,  and  build  houses  for  themselves?  And 
when  they  are  housed,  they  will  work,  in  summer, 
commonly,  stripped  and  barefoot,  but  in  winter  sub- 
stantially clothed  and  shod.  They  will  feed  on  barley- 
meal  and  flour  of  wheat,  baking  and  kneading  them, 
making  noble  cakes  and  loaves;  these  they  will  serve 
up  on  a mat  of  reeds  or  on  clean  leaves,  themselves 
reclining  the  while  upon  beds  strewn  with  yew  or 
myrtle.  And  they  and  their  children  will  feast,  drink- 
ing of  the  wine  which  they  have  made,  wearing  gar- 
lands on  their  heads,  and  hymning  the  praises  of  the 
gods,  in  happy  converse  with  one  another.  And  they 
will  take  care  that  their  families  do  not  exceed  their 
means ; having  an  eye  to  poverty  or  war. 

But,  said  Glaucon,  interposing,  you  have  not  given 
them  a relish  to  their  meal. 

True,  I replied,  I had  forgotten;  of  course  they 
must  have  a relish  — salt,  and  olives,  and  cheese,  and 
they  will  boil  roots  and  herbs  such  as  country  people 
prepare;  for  a dessert  we  shall  give  them  figs,  and 
peas,  and  beans;  and  they  will  roast  myrtle-berries 
and  acorns  at  the  fire,  drinking  in  moderation.  And 


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with  such  a diet  they  may  be  expected  to  live  in  peace 
and  health  to  a good  old  age,  and  bequeath  a similar 
life  to  their  children  after  them. 

Yes,  Socrates,  he  said,  and  if  you  were  providing 
for  a city  of  pigs,  how  else  would  you  feed  the 
beasts  ? 

But  what  would  you  have,  Glaucon?  I replied. 

Why,  he  said,  you  should  give  them  the  ordinary 
conveniences  of  life.  People  who  are  to  be  com- 
fortable are  accustomed  to  lie  on  sofas,  and  dine  off 
tables,  and  they  should  have  sauces  and  sweets  in  the 
modern  style. 

Yes,  I said,  now  I understand:  the  question  which 
you  would  have  me  consider  is,  not  only  how  a State, 
but  how  a luxurious  State  is  created;  and  possibly 
, there  is  no  harm  in  this,  for  in  such  a State  we  shall  be 
/ more  likely  to  see  how  justice  and  injustice  originate. 

I In  my  opinion  the  true  and  healthy  constitution  of  the 
State  is  the  one  which  I have  described.  But  if  you 
wish  also  to  see  a State  at  fever-heat,  I have  no  objec- 
tion. For  I suspect  that  many  will  not  be  satisfied 
with  the  simpler  way  of  life.  They  will  be  for  adding 
sofas,  and  tables,  and  other  furniture;  also  dainties, 
and  perfumes,  and  incense,  and  courtesans,  and  cakes, 
all  these  not  of  one  sort  only,  but  in  every  variety ; we 
must  go  beyond  the  necessaries  of  which  I was  at  first 
speaking,  such  as  houses,  and  clothes,  and  shoes:  the 
arts  of  the  painter  and  the  embroiderer  will  have  to  be 
set  in  motion,  and  gold  and  ivory  and  all  sorts  of  ma- 
terials must  be  procured. 

True,  he  said. 

Then  we  must  enlarge  our  borders ; for  the  original 
healthy  State  is  no  longer  sufficient.  Now  will  the 
city  have  to  fill  and  swell  with  a multitude  of  callings 
which  are  not  required  by  any  natural  want;  such  as 
the  whole  tribe  of  hunters  and  actors,  of  whom  one 


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67 


large  class  have  to  do  with  forms  and  colors;  another 
will  be  the  votaries  of  music  — poets  and  their  at- 
tendant train  of  rhapsodists,  players,  dancers,  con- 
tractors; also  makers  of  divers  kinds  of  articles,  in- 
cluding women’s  dresses.  And  we  shall  want  more 
servants.  Will  not  tutors  be  also  in  request,  and 
nurses  wet  and  dry,  jtirewomen  and  barbers,  as  well  as 
confectioners  and  cooks  Uafid' swineherds,  too,  who 
were  not  needed  and  therefore  had  no  place  in  the 
former  edition  of  our  State,  hut  are  needed  now? 
They  must  not  be  forgotten:  and  there  will  be  ani- 
mals of  many  other  kinds,  if  people  eat  them. 

Certainly. 

And  living  in  this  way  we  shall  have  much  greater 
need  of  physicians  than  before? 

Much  greater. 

And  the  country  which  was  enough  to  support  the 
original  inhabitants  will  be  too  small  now,  and  not 
enough? 

Quite  true. 

Then  a slice  of  our  neighbors’  land  will  he  wanted 
by  us  for  pasture  and  tillage,  and  they  will  want  a slice 
of  ours,  if,  like  ourselves,  they  exceed  the  limit  of 
necessity,  and  give  themselves  up  to  the  unlimited  ac- 
cumulation of  wealth? 

That,  Socrates,  will  be  inevitable. 

And  so  we  shall  go  to  war,  Glaucon.  Shall  we  not? ' 

Most  certainly,  he  replied. 

Then,  without  determining  as  yet  whether  war  does 
good  or  harm,  thus  much  we  may  affirm,  that  now  we 
have  discovered  war  to  be  derived  from  causes  which 
are  also  the  causes  of  almost  all  the  evils  in  States, 
private  as  well  as  public. 

Undoubtedly. 

And  our  State  must  once  more  enlarge;  and  this 
time  the  enlargement  will  be  nothing  short  of  a whole 


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army,  which  will  have  to  go  out  and  fight  with  the  in- 
vaders for  all  that  we  have,  as  well  as  for  the  things 
and  persons  whom  we  were  describing  above. 

Why?  he  said;  are  they  not  capable  of  defending 
themselves? 

No,  I said;  not  if  we  were  right  in  the  principle 
which  was  acknowledged  by  all  of  us  when  we  were 
framing  the  State : the  principle,  as  you  will  remem- 
ber, was  that  one  man  can  not  practise  many  arts  with 
success. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

But  is  not  war  an  art? 

Certainly. 

And  an  art  requiring  as  much  attention  as  shoe- 
making? 

Quite  true. 

And  the  shoemaker  was  not  allowed  by  us  to  be  a 
husbandman,  or  a weaver,  or  a builder  — in  order  that 
we  might  have  our  shoes  well  made;  but  to  him  and 
to  every  other  worker  was  assigned  one  work  for  which 
he  was  by  nature  fitted,  and  at  that  he  was  to  continue 
working  all  his  life  long  and  at  no  other;  he  was  not 
to  let  opportunities  slip,  and  then  he  would  become  a 
good  workman.  Now  nothing  can  be  more  important 
than  that  the  work  of  a soldier  should  be  well  done. 
But  is  war  an  art  so  easily  acquired  that  a man  may 
be  a warrior  who  is  also  a husbandman,  or  shoemaker, 
or  other  artisan ; although  no  one  in  the  world  would 
be  a good  dice  or  draught  player  who  merely  took  up 
the  game  as  a recreation,  and  had  not  from  his  earliest 
years  devoted  himself  to  this  and  nothing  else?  No 
tools  will  make  a man  a skilled  workman,  or  master  of 
defence,  nor  be  of  any  use  to  him  who  has  not  learned 
how  to  handle  them,  and  has  never  bestowed  any  at- 
tention upon  them.  How  then  will  he  who  takes  up  a 
shield  or  other  implement  of  war  become  a good  fighter 


THE  REPUBLIC  60 

all  in  a day,  whether  with  heavy-armed  or  any  other 
kind  of  troops? 

Yes,  he  said,  the  tools  which  would  teach  men  their 
own  use  would  be  beyond  price. 

And  the  higher  the  duties  of  the  guardian,  I said, 
the  more  time,  and  skill,  and  art,  and  application 
will  be  needed  by  him? 

No  doubt,  he  replied. 

Will  he  not  also  require  natural  aptitude  for  his 
calling? 

Certainly. 

Then  it  will  be  our  duty  to  select,  if  we  can,  natures 
which  are  fitted  for  the  task  of  guarding  the  city? 

It  will. 

And  the  selection  will  be  no  easy  matter,  I said; 
but  we  must  be  brave  and  do  our  best. 

We  must. 

Is  not  the  noble  youth  very  like  a well-bred  dog  in 
respect  of  guarding  and  watching? 

What  do  you  mean? 

I mean  that  both  of  them  ought  to  be  quick  to  see, 
and  swift  to  overtake  the  enemy  when  they  see  him; 
and  strong  too  if,  when  they  have  caught  him,  they 
have  to  fight  with  him. 

All  these  qualities,  he  replied,  will  certainly  be  re- 
quired by  them. 

Well,  and  your  guardian  must  be  brave  if  he  is  to 
fight  well? 

Certainly. 

And  is  he  likely  to  be  brave  who  has  no  spirit, 
whether  horse  or  dog  or  any  other  animal?  Have  you 
never  observed  how  invincible  and  unconquerable  is 
spirit  and  how  the  presence  of  it  makes  the  soul  of 
any  creature  to  be  absolutely  fearless  and  indomi- 
table? 

I have. 


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Then  now'we  have  a clear  notion  of  the  bodily 
qualities  which  are  required  in  the  guardian. 

True. 

^ And  also  of  the  mental  ones ; his  soul  is  to  be  full  of 
spirit?  ^ 

, Yes. 

But  are  not  these  spirited  natures  apt  to  be  savage 
with  one  another,  and  with  everybody  else? 

A difficulty  by  no  means  easy  to  overcome,  he  re- 
plied. 

Whereas,  I said,  they  ought  to  be  dangerous  to 
their  enemies,  and  gentle  to  their  friends;  if  not,  they 
will  destroy  themselves  without  waiting  for  their 
enemies  to  destroy  them. 

True,  he  said. 

What  is  to  be  done  then?  I said;  how  shall  we  find 
a gentle  nature  which  has  also  a great  spirit,  for  the 
one  is  the  contradiction  of  the  other? 

True. 

He  will  not  be  a good  guardian  who  is  wanting  in 
either  of  these  two  qualities ; and  yet  the  combination 
of  them  appears  to  be  impossible ; and  hence  we  must 
infer  that  to  be  a good  guardian  is  impossible. 

I am  afraid  that  what  you  say  is  true,  he  replied. 

Here  feeling  perplexed  I began  to  think  over  what 
had  preceded.  — My  friend,  I said,  no  wonder  that  we 
are  in  a perplexity;  for  we  have  lost  sight  of  the  image 
which  we  had  before  us. 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

I mean  to  say  that  there  do  exist  natures  gifted 
with  those  opposite  qualities. 

And  where  do  you  find  them? 

Many  animals,  I replied,  furnish  examples  of  them; 
our  friend  the  dog  is  a very  good  one : you  know  that 
well-bred  dogs  are  perfectly  gentle  to  their  familiars 
and  acquaintances,  and  the  reverse  to  strangers. 


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71 


Yes,  I know. 

Then  there  is  nothing  impossible  or  out  of  the  order 
of  nature  in  our  finding  a guardian  who  has  a similar 
combination  of  qualities? 

Certainly  not. 

Would  not  he  who  is  fitted  to  be  a guardian,  besides 
the  spirited  nature,  need  to  have  the  qualities  of  a 
philosopher? 

I do  not  apprehend  your  meaning. 

The  trait  of  which  I am  speaking,  I replied,  may  be 
also  seen  in  the  dog,  and  is  remarkable  in  the  ani- 
mal. 

What  trait? 

Why,  a dog,  whenever  he  sees  a stranger,  is  angry; 
when  an  acquaintance,  he  welcomes  him,  although  the 
one  has  never  done  any  harm,  nor  the  other  any 
good.  Did  this  never  strike  you  as  curious? 

The  matter  never  struck  me  before;  but  I quite 
recognize  the  truth  of  your  remark. 

And  surely  this  instinct  of  the  dog  is  very  charm- 
ing ; — your  dog  is  a true  philosopher. 

Why? 

Why,  because  he  distinguishes  the  face  of  a friend 
and  of  an  enemy  only  by  the  criterion  of  knowing  and 
not  knowing.  And  must  not  an  animal  be  a lover  of 
learning  who  determines  what  he  likes  and  dislikes 
by  the  test  of  knowledge  and  ignorance? 

Most  assuredly. 

And  is  not  the  love  of  learning  the  love  of  wisdom, 
which  is  philosophy? 

They  are  the  same,  he  replied. 

And  may  we  not  say  confidently  of  man  also,  that 
he  who  is  likely  to  be  gentle  to  his  friends  and  ac- 
quaintances, must  by  nature  be  a lover  of  wisdom  and 
knowledge? 

That  we  may  safely  afiirm. 


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Then  he  who  is  to  be  a really  good  and  noble 
guardian  of  the  State  will  require  to  unite  in  himself 
philosophy  and  spirit  and  swiftness  and  strength? 

Undoubtedly. 

Then  we  have  found  the  desired  natures;  and  now 
that  we  have  found  them,  how  are  they  to  be  reared 
and  educated?  Is  not  this  an  inquiry  which  may  be 
expected  to  throw  light  on  the  greater  inquiry  which 
is  our  final  end  — How  do  justice  and  injustice  grow 
up  in  States?  for  we  do  not  want  either  to  omit  what 
is  to  the  point  or  to  draw  out  the  argument  to  an  in- 
convenient length. 

Adeimantus  thought  that  the  inquiry  would  be  of 
great  service  to  us. 

Then,  I said,  my  dear  friend,  the  task  must  not  be 
given  up,  even  if  somewhat  long. 

Certainly  not. 

Come  then,  and  let  us  pass  a leisure  hour  in  story- 
telling, and  our  story  shall  be  the  education  of  our 
heroes. 

By  all  means. 

And  what  shall  be  their  education?  Can  we  find  a 
better  than  the  traditional  sort?  — and  this  has  two 
divisions,  gymnastic  for  the  body,  and  music  for  the 
soul. 

True. 

Shall  we  begin  education  with  music,  and  go  on  to 
gymnastic  afterwards? 

By  all  means. 

And  when  you  speak  of  music,  do  you  include 
literature  or  not? 

I do. 

And  literature  may  be  either  true  or  false? 

Yes. 

And  the  young  should  be  trained  in  both  kinds,  and 
we  begin  with  the  false? 


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73 


I do  not  understand  your  meaning,  he  said. 

You  know,  I said,  that  we  begin  by  telling  childrei^ 
stories  which,  though  not  wholly  destitute  of  truth,  are 
in  the  main  fictitious ; and  these  stories  are  told  them 
when  they  are  not  of  an  age  to  learn  gymnastics.  ‘ 

Very  true. 

That  was  my  meaning  when  I said  that  we  must 
teach  music  before  gynmastics. 

Quite  right,  he  said. 

You  know  also  that  the  beginning  is  the  most  im- 
portant part  of  any  work,  especially  in  the  case  of  a 
young  and  tender  thing ; for  that  is  the  time  at  which 
the  character  is  being  formed  and  the  desired  impres- 
sion is  more  readily  taken. 

Quite  true. 

And  shall  we  just  carelessly  allow  children  to  hear 
any  casual  tales  which  may  be  devised  by  casual  per- 
sons, and  to  receive  into  their  minds  ideas  for  the  most 
part  the  very  opposite  of  those  which  we  should  wish 
them  to  have  when  they  are  grown  up? 

We  can  not. 

Then  the  first  thing  will  be  to  establish  a censorship 
of  the  writers  of  fiction,  and  let  the  censors  receive  any 
tale  of  fiction  which  is  good,  and  reject  the  bad;  an(^ 
we  will  desire  mothers  and  nurses  to  tell  their  children'^ 
the  authorized  ones  only.  Let  them  fashion  the  mind 
with  such  tales,  even  more  fondly  than  they  mould  the 
body  with  their  hands;  but  most  of  those  which  are 
now  in  use  must  be  discarded. 

Of  what  tales  are  you  speaking?  he  said. 

You  may  find  a model  of  the  lesser  in  the  greater, 
I said;  for  they  are  necessarily  of  the  same  type,  and 
there  is  the  same  spirit  in  both  of  them. 

Very  likely,  he  replied;  but  I do  not  as  yet  know 
what  you  would  term  the  greater. 

Those,  I said,  which  are  narrated  by  Homer  and 


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Hesiod,  and  the  rest  of  the  poets,  who  have  ever  been 
the  great  story-tellers  of  mankind. 

But  which  stories  do  you  mean,  he  said;  and  what 
fault  do  you  find  with  them? 

A fault  which  is  most  serious,  I said;  the  fault  of 
telling  a lie,  and,  what  is  more,  a bad  lie. 

But  when  is  this  fault  committed? 

Whenever  an  erroneous  representation  is  made  of 
the  nature  of  gods  and  heroes,  — as  when  a painter 
paints  a portrait  not  having  the  shadow  of  a likeness 
to  the  original. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  sort  of  thing  is  certainly  very 
blamable;  hut  what  are  the  stories  which  you  mean? 

First  of  all,  I said,  there  was  that  greatest  of  all  lies 
in  high  places,  which  the  poet  told  about  Uranus,  and 
which  was  a bad  lie  too,  — I mean  what  Hesiod  says 
that  LTranus  did,  and  how  Cronus  retaliated  on  him. 
The  doings  of  Cronus,  and  the  sufferings  which  in 
turn  his  son  inflicted  upon  him,  even  if  they  were  true, 
ought  certainly  not  to  be  lightly  told  to  young  and 
thoughtless  persons;  if  possible,  they  had  better  he 
buried  in  silence.  But  if  there  is  an  absolute  necessity 
for  their  mention,  a chosen  few  might  hear  them  in  a 
mystery,  and  they  should  sacrifice  not  a common 
[Eleusinian]  pig,  but  some  huge  and  unprocurable 
victim;  and  then  the  number  of  the  hearers  will  be 
very  few  indeed. 

Why,  yes,  said  he,  those  stories  are  extremely  ob- 
jectionable. 

Yes,  Adeimantus,  they  are  stories  not  to  be  re- 
peated in  our  State ; the  young  man  should  not  be  told 
that  in  committing  the  worst  of  crimes  he  is  far  from 
doing  anything  outrageous ; and  that  even  if  he  chas- 
tises his  father  when  he  does  wrong,  in  whatever  man- 
ner, he  will  only  be  following  the  example  of  the  first 
and  greatest  among  the  gods, 


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75 


I entirely  agee  with  you,  he  said;  in  my  opinion 
those  stories  are  quite  unfit  to  be  repeated. 

Neither,  if  we  mean  our  future  guardians  to  regard 
the  habit  of  quarrelling  among  themselves  as  of  all 
things  the  basest,  should  any  word  be  said  to  them 
of  the  wars  in  heaven,  and  of  the  plots  and  fightings 
of  the  gods  against  one  another,  for  they  are  not  true. 
No,  we  shall  never  mention  the  battles  of  the  giants, 
or  let  them  be  embroidered  on  garments ; and  we  shall 
be  silent  about  the  innumerable  other  quarrels  of  gods 
and  heroes  with  their  friends  and  relatives.  If  they 
would  only  believe  us  we  would  tell  them  that  quar- 
relling is  imholy,  and  that  never  up  to  this  time  has 
there  been  any  quarrel  between  citizens;  this  is  what 
old  men  and  old  women  should  begin  by  telling  chil- 
dren; and  when  they  grow  up,  the  poets  also  should 
be  told  to  compose  for  them  in  a similar  spirit.^  But 
the  narrative  of  Hephaestus  binding  Here  his  mother, 
or  how  on  another  occasion  Zeus  sent  him  flying  for 
taking  her  part  when  she  was  being  beaten,  and  all 
the  battles  of  the  gods  in  Homer  — these  tales  must 
not  be  admitted  into  our  State,  whether  they  are  sup- 
posed to  have  an  allegorical  meaning  or  not.  For  a 
young  person  can  not  judge  what  is  allegorical  and 
what  is  literal ; anything  that  he  receives  into  his  mind 
at  that  age  is  likely  to  become  indelible  and  unalter- 
able; and  therefore  it  is  most  important  that  the  tales 
which  the  young  first  hear  should  be  models  of  vir- 
tuous thoughts. 

There  you  are  right,  he  replied ; but  if  any  one  asks 
where  are  such  models  to  be  found  and  of  what  tales 
are  you  speaking  — how  shall  we  answer  him? 

I said  to  him.  You  and  I,  Adeimantus,  at  this  mo- 
ment are  not  poets,  but  founders  of  a State : now  the 
founders  of  a State  ought  to  know  the  general  forms 

1 Placing  the  comma  after  y paver ly  and  not  after  yiyvofjiiyoa. 


76 


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in  which  poets  should  cast  their  tales,  and  the  limits 
w^hich  must  be  observed  by  them,  but  to  make  the  tales 
is  not  their  business. 

Very  true,  he  said;  but  what  are  these  forms  of 
theology  which  you  mean? 

Something  of  this  kind,  I replied:  — God  is  always 
to  be  represented  as  he  truly  is,  whatever  be  the  sort 
of  poetry,  epic,  lyric  or  tragic,  in  which  the  represen- 
tation is  given. 

Right. 

And  is  he  not  truly  good?  and  must  he  not  be  rep- 
resented as  such? 

Certainly. 

And  no  good  thing  is  hurtful? 

No,  indeed. 

And  that  which  is  not  hurtful  hurts  not? 

Certainly  not. 

And  that  which  hurts  not  does  no  evil? 

No.  ^ _ 

And  can  that  which  does  no  evil  be  a cause  of  evil? 

Impossible. 

And  the  good  is  advantageous  ? 

Yes. 

And  therefore  the  cause  of  well-being? 

Yes. 

It  follows  therefore  that  the  good  is  not  the  cause  of 
all  things,  but  of  the  good  only? 

Assuredly. 

Then  God,  if  he  be  good,  is  not  the  author  of  all 
things,  as  the  many  assert,  but  he  is  the  cause  of  a few 
things  only,  and  not  of  most  things  that  occur  to  men. 
For  few  are  the  goods  of  human  life,  and  many  are 
the  evils,  and  the  good  is  to  be  attributed  to  God 
alone;  of  the  evils  the  causes  are  to  be  sought  else- 
where, and  not  in  him. 

That  appears  to  me  to  be  most  true,  he  said. 


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77 


Then  we  must  not  listen  to  Homer  or  to  any  other 
poet  who  is  guilty  of  the  folly  of  saying  that  two  casks 

Lie  at  the  threshold  of  Zeus,  full  of  lots,  one  of  good,  the 
other  of  evil  lots,’'  ^ 

and  that  he  to  whom  Zeus  gives  a mixture  of  the  two 

“ Sometimes  meets  with  evil  fortune,  at  other  times  with  good;  ” 

but  that  he  to  whom  is  given  the  cup  of  unmingled 
ill, 

“ Him  wild  hunger  drives  o’er  the  beauteous  earth.” 

And  again  — 

“ Zeus,  who  is  the  dispenser  of  good  and  evil  to  us.” 

And  if  any  one  asserts  that  the  violation  of  oaths  and 
treaties,  which  was  really  the  work  of  Pandarus,^  was 
brought  about  by  Athene  and  Zeus,  or  that  the  strife 
and  contention  of  the  gods  was  instigated  by  Themis 
and  Zeus,^  he  shall  not  have  our  approval;  neither 
will  we  allow  our  young  men  to  hear  the  words  of 
iEschylus,  that 

“ God  plants  guilt  among  men  when  he  desires  utterly  to  des- 
troy a house.” 

And  if  a poet  writes  of  the  sufferings  of  Niohe  — 
the  subject  of  the  tragedy  in  which  these  iambic  verses 
occur  — or  of  the  house  of  Pelops,  or  of  the  Trojan 
war  or  on  any  similar  theme,  either  we  must  not  per- 
mit him  to  say  that  these  are  the  works  of  God,  or  if 
they  are  of  God,  he  must  devise  some  explanation  of 
them  such  as  we  are  seeking;  he  must  say  that  God 
did  what  was  just  and  right,  and  they  were  the  better 
for  being  punished ; hut  that  those  who  are  punished 
are  miserable,  and  that  God  is  the  author  of  their 
misery  — the  poet  is  not  to  be  permitted  to  say; 

1 Iliad  xxiv.  627.  2 ii.  69:  * Ib.  xx. 


78 


THE  REPUBLIC 


though  he  may  say  that  the  wicked  are  miserable  be- 
cause they  require  to  be  punished,  and  are  benefited 
by  receiving  punishment  from  God;  but  that  God 
being  good  is  the  author  of  evil  to  any  one  is  to  be 
strenuously  denied,  and  not  to  be  said  or  sung  or 
heard  in  verse  or  prose  by  any  one  whether  old  or 
young  in  any  well-ordered  commonwealth.  Such  a 
fiction  is  suicidal,  ruinous,  impious. 

I agree  with  you,  he  replied,  and  am  ready  to  give 
my  assent  to  the  law. 

I Let  this  then  be  one  of  our  rules  and  principles 
concerning  the  gods,  to  which  our  poets  and  reciters 
! will  be  expected  to  conform,  — that  God  is  not  the 
author  of  all  things,  but  of  good  only. 

That  will  do,  he  said. 

And  what  do  you  think  of  a second  principle  ? Shall 
I ask  you  whether  God  is  a magician,  and  of  a nature 
to  appear  insidiously  now  in  one  shape,  and  now  in 
another  — sometimes  himself  changing  and  passing 
into  many  forms,  sometimes  deceiving  us  with  the 
semblance  of  such  transformations;  or  is  he  one 
and  the  same  immutably  fixed  in  his  own  proper 
image? 

I can  not  answer  you,  he  said,  without  more  thought. 

Well,  I said;  but  if  we  suppose  a change  in  any- 
thing, that  change  must  be  effected  either  by  the  thing 
itself,  or  by  some  other  thing? 

Most  certainly. 

And  things  which  are  at  their  best  are  also  least 
liable  to  be  altered  or  discomposed;  for  example, 
when  healthiest  and  strongest,  the  human  frame  is 
least  liable  to  be  affected  by  meats  and  drinks,  and 
the  plant  which  is  in  the  fullest  vigor  also  suffers 
least  from  winds  or  the  heat  of  the  sun  or  any  similar 
causes. 

Of  course. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


79 


And  will  not  the  bravest  and  wisest  soul  be  least 
confused  or  deranged  by  any  external  influence  ? 

True. 

And  the  same  principle,  as  I should  suppose,  ap- 
plies to  all  composite  things  — furniture,  houses,  gar- 
ments: when  good  and  well  made,  they  are  least  al- 
tered by  time  and  circumstances. 

Very  true. 

Then  everything  which  is  good,  whether  made  by 
art  or  nature,  or  both,  is  least  liable  to  suffer  change 
from  without? 

True. 

But  surely  God  and  the  things  of  God  are  in  every 
way  perfect? 

Of  course  they  are. 

Then  he  can  hardly  be  compelled  by  external  influ- 
ence to  take  many  shapes? 

He  can  not. 

But  may  he  not  change  and  transform  himself? 

Clearly,  he  said,  that  must  be  the  case  if  he  is 
changed  at  all. 

And  will  he  then  change  himself  for  the  better  and 
fairer,  or  for  the  worse  and  more  unsightly? 

If  he  change  at  all  he  can  only  change  for  the  worse, 
for  we  can  not  suppose  him  to  be  deficient  either  in 
virtue  or  beauty. 

Very  true,  Adeimantus;  but  then,  would  any  one, 
whether  God  or  man,  desire  to  make  himself  worse? 

Impossible. 

Then  it  is  impossible  that  God  should  ever  be  will- 
ing to  change;  being,  as  is  supposed,  the  fairest  and 
best  that  is  conceivable,  every  God  remains  absolutely 
and  forever  in  his  own  form. 

That  necessarily  follows,  he  said,  in  my  judgment. 

Then,  I said,  my  dear  friend,  let  none  of  the  poets 
tell  us  that 


80 


THE  REPUBLIC 


The  gods,  taking  the  disguise  of  strangers  from  other  lands, 
walk  up  and  down  cities  in  all  sorts  of  forms 

and  let  no  one  slander  Proteus  and  Thetis,  neither  let 
any  one,  either  in  tragedy  or  in  any  other  kind  of 
poetry,  introduce  Here  disguised  in  the  likeness  of  a 
priestess  asking  an  alms 

“ For  the  life-giving  daughters  of  Inachus  the  river  of  Argos; '' 

— let  us  have  no  more  lies  of  that  sort.  Neither  must 
we  have  mothers  under  the  influence  of  the  poets 
scaring  their  children  with  a bad  version  of  these 
myths  — telling  how  certain  gods,  as  they  say,  “ Go 
about  by  night  in  the  likeness  of  so  many  strangers 
and  in  divers  forms;  ” but  let  them  take  heed  lest  they 
make  cowards  of  their  children,  and  at  the  same  time 
speak  blasphemy  against  the  gods. 

Heaven  forbid,  he  said. 

But  although  the  gods  are  themselves  unchange- 
able, still  by  witchcraft  and  deception  they  may  make 
us  think  that  they  appear  in  various  forms? 

Perhaps,  he  replied. 

Well,  but  can  you  imagine  that  God  will  be  willing 
to  lie,  whether  in  word  or  deed,  or  to  put  forth  a phan- 
tom of  himself? 

I can  not  ^ay,  he  replied. 

Do  you  not  know,  I said,  that  the  true  lie,  if  such 
an  expression  may  be  allowed,  is  hated  of  gods  and 
men? 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

I mean  that  no  one  is  willingly  deceived  in  that 
which  is  the  truest  and  highest  part  of  himself,  or 
about  the  truest  and  highest  matters;  there,  above 
all,  he  is  most  afraid  of  a lie  having  possession  of 
him. 

Still,  he  said,  I do  not  comprehend  you. 

1 Horn.  Od.  xvii.  485. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


81 


The  reason  is,  I replied,  that  you  attribute  some 
profound  meaning  to  my  words ; but  I am  only  say- 
ing that  deception,  or  being  deceived  or  uninformed 
about  the  highest  realities  in  the  highest  part  of  them- 
selves, which  is  the  soul,  and  in  that  part  of  them  to 
have  and  to  hold  the  lie,  is  what  mankind  least  like ; — 
that,  I say,  is  what  they  utterly  detest. 

There  is  nothing  more  hateful  to  them. 

And,  as  I was  just  now  remarking,  this  ignorance 
in  the  soul  of  him  who  is  deceived  may  be  called  the 
true  lie;  for  the  lie  in  words  is  only  a kind  of  imita- 
tion and  shadowy  image  of  a previous  affection  of  the 
soul,  not  pure  unadulterated  falsehood.  Am  I not 
right? 

Perfectly  right. 

The  true  lie  is  hated  not  only  by  the  gods,  but  also 
by  men? 

Yes. 

Whereas  the  lie  in  words  is  in  certain  cases  useful 
and  not  hateful;  in  dealing  with  enemies  — that 
would  be  an  instance ; or  again,  when  those  whom  we 
call  our  friends  in  a fit  of  madness  or  illusion  are  going 
to  do  some  harm,  then  it  is  useful  and  is  a sort  of 
medicine  or  preventive;  also  in  the  tales  of  mythol- 
ogy, of  which  we  were  just  now  speaking  — because 
we  do  not  know  the  truth  about  ancient  times,  we 
make  falsehood  as  much  like  truth  as  we  can,  and  so 
turn  it  to  account. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

But  can  any  of  these  reasons  apply  to  God?  Can 
we  suppose  that  he  is  ignorant  of  antiquity,  and  there- 
fore has  recourse  to  invention? 

That  would  be  ridiculous,  he  said. 

Then  the  lying  poet  has  no  place  in  our  idea  of 
God? 

I should  say  not. 


82 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Or  perhaps  he  may  tell  a lie  because  he  is  afraid  of 
enemies  ? 

That  is  inconceivable. 

But  he  may  have  friends  who  are  senseless  or  mad? 

But  no  mad  or  senseless  person  can  be  a friend  of 
God. 

Then  no  motive  can  be  imagined  why  God  should 
lie? 

None  whatever. 

Then  the  superhuman  and  divine  is  absolutely  in- 
capable of  falsehood? 

Yes. 

Then  is  God  perfectly  simple  and  true  both  in  word 
and  deed ; ^ he  changes  not ; he  deceives  not,  either  by 
sign  or  word,  by  dream  or  waking  vision. 

Your  thoughts,  he  said,  are  the  reflection  of  my 
own. 

You  agree  with  me  then,  I said,  that  this  is  the 
second  type  or  form  in  which  we  should  write  and 
speak  about  divine  things.  The  gods  are  not  magi- 
cians who  transform  themselves,  neither  do  they  de- 
ceive mankind  in  any  way. 

I grant  that. 

Then,  although  we  are  admirers  of  Homer,  we  do 
not  admire  the  lying  dream  which  Zeus  sends  to 
Agamemnon;  neither  will  we  praise  the  verses  of 
.®schylus  in  which  Thetis  says  that  Apollo  at  her 
nuptials 

“ Was  celebrating  in  song  her  fair  progeny  whose  days  were 
to  be  long,  and  to  know  no  sickness.  And  when  he  had  spoken 
of  my  lot  as  in  all  things  blessed  of  heaven  he  raised  a note  of 
triumph  and  cheered  my  soul.  And  I thought  that  the  word  of 
Phoebus,  being  divine  and  full  of  prophecy,  would  not  fail.  And 
now  he  himself  who  uttered  the  strain,  he  who  was  present  at  the 
banquet,  and  who  said  this  — he  it  is  who  has  slain  my  son.”  * 

1 Omitting  kot4  tpavrofflat.  * From  a lost  play. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


83 


These  are  the  kind  of  sentiments  about  the  gods 
which  will  arouse  our  anger;  and  he  who  utters  them 
shall  be  refused  a chorus;  neither  shall  we  allow 
teachers  to  make  use  of  them  in  the  instruction  of  the 
young,  meaning,  as  we  do,  that  our  guardians,  as  far 
as  men  can  be,  should  be  true  worshippers  of  the  gods 
and  like  them. 

I entirely  agree,  he  said,  in  these  principles,  and 
promise  to  make  them  my  laws. 


BOOK  III 


Such  then,  I said,  are  our  principles  of  theology  — 
some  tales  are  to  be  told,  and  others  are  not  to  be  told 
to  our  disciples  from  their  youth  upwards,  if  we  mean 
them  to  honor  the  gods  and  their  parents,  and  to 
\ value  friendship  with  one  another. 

Yes;  and  I think  that  our  principles  are  right,  he 
said. 

But  if  they  are  to  be  courageous,  must  they  not 
learn  other  lessons  besides  these,  and  lessons  of  such  a 
kind  as  will  take  away  the  fear  of  death?  Can  any 
man  be  courageous  who  has  the  fear  of  death  in  him? 

Certainly  not,  he  said. 

And  can  he  be  fearless  of  death,  or  will  he  choose 
death  in  battle  rather  than  defeat  and  slavery,  who 
believes  the  world  below'  to  be  real  and  terrible? 

~ Impossible. 

Then  we  must  assume  a control  over  the  narrators 
of  this  class  of  tales  as  w'^ell  as  over  the  others,  and  beg 
them  not  simply  to  revile,  but  rather  to  commend  the 
world  below,  intimating  to  them  that  their  descrip- 
tions are  untrue,  and  will  do  harm  to  our  future 
warriors. 

That  will  be  our  duty,  he  said. 

Then,  I said,  we  shall  have  to  obliterate  many  ob- 
noxious passages,  beginning  with  the  verses, 

“ I would  rather  be  a serf  on  the  land  of  a poor  and  portion- 
less man  than  rule  over  all  the  dead  who  have  come  to  nought.”  ^ 

1 Od.  xi.  489. 

84 


THE  REPUBLIC 


85 


We  must  also  expunge  the  verse,  which  tells  us  how 
Pluto  feared, 

Lest  the  mansions  grim  and  squalid  which  the  gods  abhor 
should  be  seen  both  of  mortals  and  immortals/’  ^ 

And  again : — 

**  O heavens ! verily  in  the  house  of  Hades  there  is  soul  and 
ghostly  form  but  no  mind  at  all ! ” ^ 

Again  of  Tiresias : — 

“ [To  him  even  after  death  did  Persephone  grant  mind^]  that 
he  alone  should  be  wise;  but  the  other  souls  are  flitting  shades.”  ^ 

Again : — 

“ The  soul  flying  from  the  limbs  had  gone  to  Hades,  lament- 
ing her  fate,  leaving  manhood  and  youth.”  ^ 

Again : — 

“ And  the  soul,  with  shrilling  cry,  passed  like  smoke  beneath 
the  earth.”  ® 

And,  — 

“ As  bats  in  hollow  of  mystic  cavern,  whenever  any  of  them 
has  dropped  out  of  the  string  and  falls  from  the  rock,  fly  shrill- 
ing and  cling  to  one  another,  so  did  they  with  shrilling  cry  hold 
together  as  they  moved.”  ® 

And  we  must  beg  Homer  and  the  other  poets  not 
to  be  angry  if  we  strike  out  these  and  similar  passages, 
not  because  they  are  unpoetical,  or  unattractive  to  the 
popular  ear,  hut  because  the  greater  the  poetical 
charm  of  them,  the  less  are  they  meet  for  the  ears  of 
boys  and  men  who  are  meant  to  be  free,  and  who 
should  fear  slavery  more  than  death. 

Undoubtedly. 

Also  we  shall  have  to  reject  all  the  terrible  and 
appalling  names  which  describe  the  world  below  — 

111.  XX.  64.  211.  xxiii.  103.  ^Od.  x.  495.  ♦Il  xvi.  866. 

5Ib.  xxiii.  100.  ®Od.  xxiv.  0. 


86 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Cocytus  and  Styx,  ghosts  under  the  earth,  and  sapless 
shades,  and  any  similar  words  of  M^hich  the  very 
mention  eauses  a shudder  to  pass  through  the  inmost 
soul  of  him  who  hears  them.  I do  not  say  that  these 
horrible  stories  may  not  have  a use  of  some  kind; 
but  there  is  a danger  that  the  nerves  of  our  guardians 
may  be  rendered  too  excitable  and  effeminate  by 
them. 

There  is  a real  danger,  he  said. 

Then  we  must  have  no  more  of  them. 

True. 

^Another  and  a nobler  strain  must  be  composed  and 
sung  by  us. 

Clearly. 

And  shall  we  proceed  to  get  rid  of  the  weepings  and 
wailings  of  famous  men? 

They  will  go  with  the  rest. 

But  shall  we  be  right  in  getting  rid  of  them? 
Reflect:  our  principle  is  that  the  good  man  will  not 
consider  death  terrible  to  any  other  good  man  who  is 
his  comrade. 

Yes;  that  is  our  principle. 

And  therefore  he  will  not  sorrow  for  his  departed 
friend  as  though  he  had  suffered  anything  terrible? 

He  will  not. 

Such  an  one,  as  we  further  maintain,  is  sufficient 
for  himself  and  his  own  happiness,  and  therefore  is 
least  in  need  of  other  men. 

True,  he  said. 

And  for  this  reason  the  loss  of  a son  or  brother,  or 
the  deprivation  of  fortune,  is  to  him  of  all  men  least 
terrible. 

Assuredly. 

And  therefore  he  will  be  least  likely  to  lament,  and 
will  bear  with  the  greatest  equanimity  any  misfortune 
of  this  sort  which  may  befall  him. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


87 


Yes,  he  will  feel  such  a misfortune  far  less  than 
another. 

Then  we  shall  be  right  in  getting  rid  of  the  lamen- 
tations of  famous  men,  and  making  them  over  to 
women  (and  not  even  to  women  who  are  good  for 
anything) , or  to  men  of  a baser  sort,  that  those  who 
are  being  educated  by  us  to  be  the  defenders  of  their 
country  may  scorn  to  do  the  like. 

That  will  be  very  right. 

Then  we  will  once  more  entreat  Homer  and  the 
other  poets  not  to  depict  Achilles,^  who  is  the  son  of 
a goddess,  first  lying  on  his  side,  then  on  his  back, 
and  then  on  his  face;  then  starting  up  and  sailing  in  a 
frenzy  along  the  shores  of  the  barren  sea;  now  taking 
the  sooty  ashes  in  both  his  hands  ^ and  pouring  them 
over  his  head,  or  weeping  and  wailing  in  the  various 
modes  which  Homer  has  delineated.  Nor  should  he 
describe  Priam  the  kinsman  of  the  gods  as  praying 
and  beseeching, 

“ Rolling  in  the  dirt^  calling  each  man  loudly  by  his  name/'  * 

Still  more  earnestly  will  we  beg  of  him  at  all  events 
not  to  introduce  the  gods  lamenting  and  saying, 

“ Alas ! my  misery ! Alas ! that  I bore  the  bravest  to  my  sor- 
row/' ^ * 

But  if  he  must  introduce  the  gods,  at  any  rate  let  him 
not  dare  so  completely  to  misrepresent  the  greatest 
of  the  gods,  as  to  make  him  say  — 

“ O heavens ! with  my  eyes  verily  I behold  a dear  friend  of 
mine  chased  round  and  round  the  city,  and  my  heart  is  sor- 
rowful." ® 

Or  again: — 

“ Woe  is  me  that  I am  fated  to  have  Sarpedon,  dearest  of  men 
to  me,  subdued  at  the  hands  of  Patroclus  the  son  of  Menoetius."  ® 

1 II.  xxiv.  10.  2 113,  xviii.  23.  xxii.  414.  ‘*11.  xviii.  54- 

®Ib.  xxii.  168.  ®Ib.  xvi.  433. 


88 


THE  REPUBLIC 


For  if,  my  sweet  Adeimantus,  our  youth  seriously 
listen  to  such  unworthy  representations  of  the  gods, 
instead  of  laughing  at  them  as  they  ought,  hardly  will 
any  of  them  deem  that  he  himself,  being  but  a man, 
can  be  dishonored  by  similar  actions;  neither  will  he 
rebuke  any  inclination  which  may  arise  in  his  mind  to 
say  and  do  the  like.  And  instead  of  having  any  shame 
or  self-control,  he  will  be  always  whining  and  lament- 
ing on  slight  occasions. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  most  true. 

Yes,  I replied;  but  that  surely  is  what  ought  not  to 
be,  as  the  argument  has  just  proved  to  us;  and  by  that 
proof  we  must  abide  until  it  is  disproved  by  a better. 

It  ought  not  to  be. 

Neither  ought  our  guardians  to  be  given  to  laughter. 
For  a fit  of  laughter  which  has  been  indulged  to  ex- 
cess almost  always  produces  a violent  reaction. 

So  I believe. 

Then  persons  of  worth,  even  if  only  mortal  men, 
must  not  be  represented  as  overcome  by  laughter,  and 
still  less  must  such  a representation  of  the  gods  be 
allowed. 

Still  less  of  the  gods,  as  you  say,  he  replied. 

Then  we  shall  not  suffer  such  an  expression  to  be 
used  about  the  gods  as  that  of  Homer  when  he 
describes  how 

“ Inextinguishable  laughter  arose  among  the  blessed  gods, 
when  they  saw  Hephaestus  bustling  about  the  mansion.”  ^ 

On  your  views,  we  must  not  admit  them. 

On  my  views,  if  you  like  to  father  them  on  me;  that 
we  must  not  admit  them  is  certain. 

Again,  truth  should  be  highly  valued;  if,  as  we 
were  saying,  a lie  is  useless  to  the  gods,  and  useful 
only  as  a medicine  to  men,  then  the  use  of  such 

lib.  i.  699. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


89 


medicines  should  be  restricted  to  physicians;  private 
individuals  have  no  business  with  them. 

Clearly  not,  he  said. 

Then  if  any  one  at  all  is  to  have  the  privilege  of 
lying,  the  rulers  of  the  State  should  be  the  persons; 
and  they,  in  their  dealings  either  with  enemies  or  with 
their  own  citizens,  may  be  allowed  to  lie  for  the  public 
good.  But  nobody  else  should  meddle  with  anything 
of  the  kind;  and  although  the  rulers  have  this  priv- 
ilege, for  a private  man  to  lie  to  them  in  return  is  to 
be  deemed  a more  heinous  fault  than  for  the  patient  or 
the  pupil  of  a gymnasium  not  to  speak  the  truth  about 
his  own  bodily  illnesses  to  the  physician  or  to  the 
trainer,  or  for  a sailor  not  to  tell  the  captain  what  is 
happening  about  the  ship  and  the  rest  of  the  crew, 
and  how  things  are  going  with  himself  or  his  fellow 
sailors. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

If,  then,  the  ruler  catches  anybody  beside  himself 
lying  in  the  State, 

“ Any  of  the  craftsmen,  whether  he  be  priest  or  physician  or 
carpenter/’  ^ 

he  will  punish  him  for  introducing  a practice  which 
is  equally  subversive  and  destructive  of  ship  or 
State. 

Most  certainly,  he  said,  if  our  idea  of  the  State  is 
ever  carried  out.^ 

In  the  next  place  our  youth  must  be  temperate? 

Certainly. 

Are  not  the  chief  elements  of  temperance,  speaking 
generally,  obedience  to  commanders  and  self-control 
in  sensual  pleasures? 

True. 

^ Od.  xvii.  383  sq. 

2 Or,  “if  his  words  are  accompanied  by  actions.” 


90 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Then  we  shall  approve  such  language  as  that  of 
Diomede  in  Homer, 

‘‘  Friend^  sit  still  and  obey  my  word,’*  ^ 

and  the  verses  which  follow, 

“ The  Greeks  marched  breathing  prowess/ 

....  in  silent  awe  of  their  leaders/’  ^ 

and  other  sentiments  of  the  same  kind. 

We  shall. 

What  of  this  line, 

‘‘  O heavy  with  wine,  who  hast  the  eyes  of  a dog  and  the  heart 
of  a stag/’  ^ 

and  of  the  words  which  follow?  Would  you  say  that 
these,  or  any  similar  impertinences  which  private  in- 
dividuals are  supposed  to  address  to  their  rulers, 
whether  in  verse  or  prose,  are  well  or  ill  spoken? 
They  are  ill  spoken. 

They  may  very  possibly  afford  some  amusement, 
hut  they  do  not  conduce  to  temperance.  And  there- 
fore they  are  likely  to  do  harm  to  our  young  men  — 
you  would  agree  with  me  there  ? 

Yes. 

And  then,  again,  to  make  the  wisest  of  men  say 
that  nothing  in  his  opinion  is  more  glorious  than 

‘‘  When  the  tables  are  full  of  bread  and  meat,  and  the  cup- 
bearer carries  round  wine  which  he  draws  from  the  bowl  and 
pours  into  the  cups ; ” ^ 

is  it  fit  or  conducive  to  temperance  for  a young  man 
to  hear  such  words?  Or  the  verse 

“ The  saddest  of  fates  is  to  die  and  meet  destiny  from  hunger  ” ? ® 

What  would  you  say  again  to  the  tale  of  Zeus,  who, 

» II.  iv.  412.  » Od.  m.  8.  3 ib.  iv.  431.  4 Jb.  j.  226.  « Ib.  ix.  8. 

«Ib.  xii.  842. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


91 


while  other  gods  and  men  were  asleep  and  he  the  only 
person  awake,  lay  devising  plans,  but  forgot  them  all 
in  a moment  through  his  lust,  and  was  so  completely 
overcome  at  the  sight  of  Here  that  he  would  not  even 
go  into  the  hut,  but  wanted  to  lie  with  her  on  the 
ground,  declaring  that  he  had  never  been  in  such  a 
state  of  rapture  before,  even  when  they  first  met  one 
another 

Without  the  knowledge  of  their  parents ^ 

or  that  other  tale  of  how  Hephaestus,  because  of 
similar  goings  on,  cast  a chain  around  Ares  and 
Aphrodite?  ^ 

Indeed,  he  said,  I am  strongly  of  opinion  that  they 
ought  not  to  hear  that  sort  of  thing. 

But  any  deeds  of  endurance  which  are  done  or  told 
by  famous  men,  these  they  ought  to  see  and  hear;  as, 
for  example,  what  is  said  in  the  verses, 

‘‘  He  smote  his  breast^  and  thus  reproached  his  heart, 
Endure,  my  heart ; far  worse  has  thou  endured ! ^ 

Certainly,  he  said. 

In  the  next  place,  we  must  not  let  them  be  receivers 
of  gifts  or  lovers  of  money. 

Certainly  not. 

Neither  must  we  sing  to  them  of 
“ Gifts  persuading  gods,  and  persuading  reverend  kings/’  ^ 

Neither  is  Phoenix,  the  tutor  of  Achilles,  to  be  ap- 
proved or  deemed  to  have  given  his  pupil  good  counsel 
when  he  told  him  that  he  should  take  the  gifts  of  the 
Greeks  and  assist  them ; ® but  that  without  a gift  he 
should  not  lay  aside  his  anger.  Neither  will  we 
believe  or  acknowledge  Achilles  himself  to  have  been 
such  a lover  of  money  that  he  took  Agamemnon’s 

» II.  xiv.  281.  2 Od.  viii.  266.  » Ib.  xx.  17. 

* Quoted  by  Suidas  as  attributed  to  Hesiod.  * II.  ix.  616. 


92 


THE  REPUBLIC 


gifts,  or  that  when  he  had  received  payment  he  re- 
stored the  dead  body  of  Hector,  but  that  without  pay- 
ment he  was  unwilling  to  do  so/ 

Undoubtedly,  he  said,  these  are  not  sentiments 
which  can  be  approved. 

Loving  Homer  as  I do,^  I hardly  like  to  say  that  in 
attributing  these  feelings  to  Achilles,  or  in  believing 
that  they  are  truly  attributed  to  him,  he  is  guilty 
of  downright  impiety.  As  little  can  I believe  the 
narrative  of  his  insolence  to  Apollo,  where  he  says, 

“ Thou  hast  wronged  me,  O far-darter,  most  abominable  of 
deities.  Verily  I would  be  even  with  thee,  if  I had  only  the 
power ; ^ 

or  his  insubordination  to  the  river-god,^  on  whose 
divinity  he  is  ready  to  lay  hands;  or  his  offering  to 
the  dead  Patroclus  of  his  own  hair,®  which  had  been 
previously  dedicated  to  the  other  river-god  Spercheius, 
and  that  he  actually  performed  this  vow;  or  that  he 
dragged  Hector  round  the  tomb  of  Patroclus,®  and 
slaughtered  the  captives  at  the  pyre ; ^ of  all  this  I can 
not  believe  that  he  was  guilty,  any  more  than  I can 
allow  our  citizens  to  believe  that  he,  the  wise  Cheiron’s 
pupil,  the  son  of  a goddess  and  of  Peleus  who  was  the 
gentlest  of  men  and  third  in  descent  from  Zeus, 
was  so  disordered  in  his  wits  as  to  be  at  one  time  the 
slave  of  two  seemingly  inconsistent  passions,  mean- 
ness, not  untainted  by  avarice,  combined  with  over- 
weening contempt  of  gods  and  men. 

You  are  quite  right,  he  replied. 

And  let  us  equally  refuse  to  believe,  or  allow  to  be 
repeated,  the  tale  of  Theseus  son  of  Poseidon,  or  of 
Peirithous  son  of  Zeus,  going  forth  as  they  did  to 
perpetrate  a horrid  rape ; or  of  any  other  hero  or  son 

I Ib.xxiv.  176.  2Cf.  infra,  x.  696.  ®I1.  xxii.  15  sq.  <Lb.  xxi.  130,  223  sq. 

811.  xxui.  161.  «Ib.  xxii.  394.  »Ib.  xxiii.  176. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


93 


of  a god  daring  to  do  such  impious  and  dreadful 
things  as  they  falsely  ascribe  to  them  in  our  day : and 
let  us  further  compel  the  poets  to  declare  either  that 
these  acts  were  not  done  by  them,  or  that  they  were 
not  the  sons  of  gods ; — both  in  the  same  breath  they 
shall  not  be  permitted  to  affirm.  We  will  not  have 
them  trying  to  persuade  our  youth  that  the  gods  are 
the  authors  of  evil,  and  that  heroes  are  no  better  than 
men  — sentiments  which,  as  we  were  saying,  are 
neither  pious  nor  true,  for  we  have  already  proved 
that  evil  can  not  come  from  the  gods. 

Assuredly  not. 

And  further  they  are  likely  to  have  a bad  effect  on 
those  who  hear  them ; for  everybody  will  begin  to  ex- 
cuse his  own  vices  when  he  is  convinced  that  similar 
wickednesses  are  always  being  perpetrated  by  — 

The  kindred  of  the  gods^  the  relatives  of  Zeus^  whose  ances- 
tral altar,  the  altar  of  Zeus,  is  aloft  in  air  on  the  peak  of  Ida,^’ 

and  who  have 

“ the  blood  of  deities  yet  flowing  in  their  veins.”* 

And  therefore  let  us  put  an  end  to  such  tales,  lest 
they  engender  laxity  of  morals  among  the  young. 

By  all  means,  he  replied. 

But  now  that  we  are  determining  what  classes  of 
subjects  are  or  are  not  to  be  spoken  of,  let  us  see 
whether  any  have  been  omitted  by  us.  The  manner 
in  which  gods  and  demigods  and  heroes  and  the 
world  below  should  be  treated  has  been  already 
laid  doMm. 

Very  true. 

And  what  shall  we  say  about  men?  That  is  clearly 
the  remaining  portion  of  our  subject. 

Clearly  so. 

1 From  the  Niobe  of  iEschylus. 


94 


THE  REPUBLIC 


But  we  are  not  in  a condition  to  answer  this  ques- 
tion at  present,  my  friend. 

Why  not? 

Because,  if  I am  not  mistaken,  we  shall  have  to  say 
that  about  men  poets  and  story-tellers  are  guilty  of 
making  the  gravest  misstatements  when  they  tell  us 
that  wicked  men  are  often  happy,  and  the  good  miser- 
able; and  that  injustice  is  profitable  when  undetected, 
but  that  justice  is  a man’s  own  loss  and  another’s 
gain  — these  things  we  shall  forbid  them  to  utter,  and 
command  them  to  sing  and  say  the  opposite. 

To  be  sure  we  shall,  he  replied. 

But  if  you  admit  that  I am  right  in  this,  then  I 
shall  maintain  that  you  have  implied  the  principle 
for  which  we  have  been  all  along  contending. 

I grant  the  truth  of  your  inference. 

That  such  things  are  or  are  not  to  be  said  about 
men  is  a question  which  we  can  not  determine  until 
we  have  discovered  what  justice  is,  and  how  naturally 
advantageous  to  the  possessor,  whether  he  seem  to  be 
just  or  not. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Enough  of  the  subject  of  poetry:  let  us  now  speak 
of  the  style;  and  when  this  has  been  considered,  both 
matter  and  manner  will  have  been  completely  treated. 

I do  not  understand  what  you  mean,  said  Adei- 
mantus. 

Then  I must  make  you  understand;  and  perhaps  I 
may  be  more  intelligible  if  I put  the  matter  in  this 
way.  You  are  aware,  I suppose,  that  all  mythology 
and  poetry  is  a narration  of  events,  either  past,  pres- 
ent, or  to  come  ? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

And  narration  may  be  either  simple  narration,  or 
imitation,  or  a union  of  the  two? 

That  again,  he  said,  I do  not  quite  understand. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


95 


I fear  that  I must  be  a ridiculous  teacher  when  I 
have  so  much  difficulty  in  making  myself  appre^- 
hended.  Like  a bad  speaker,  therefore,  I will  not  take 
the  whole  of  the  subjeet,  but  will  break  a piece  off  in 
illustration  of  my  meaning.  You  know  the  first  lines 
of  the  Iliad,  in  which  the  poet  says  that  Chryses 
prayed  Agamemnon  to  release  his  daughter,  and  that 
Agamemnon  flew  into  a passion  with  him;  where- 
upon Chryses,  failing  of  his  object,  invoked  the  anger 
of  the  God  against  the  Achaeans.  Now  as  far  as  these 
lines, 

‘‘  And  he  prayed  all  the  Greeks^  but  especially  the  two  sons 
of  Atreus,  the  chiefs  of  the  people^'’ 

the  poet  is  speaking  in  his  own  person;  he  never  leads 
us  to  suppose  that  he  is  any  one  else.  But  in  what 
follows  he  takes  the  person  of  Chryses,  and  then  he 
does  all  that  he  can  to  make  us  believe  that  the  speaker 
is  not  Homer,  but  the  aged  priest  himself.  And  in 
this  double  form  he  has  cast  the  entire  narrative  of 
the  events  which  occurred  at  Troy  and  in  Ithaca 
and  throughout  the  Odyssey. 

Yes. 

And  a narrative  it  remains  both  in  the  speeches 
which  the  poet  recites  from  time  to  time  and  in  the 
intermediate  passages? 

Quite  true. 

But  when  the  poet  speaks  in  the  person  of  another, 
may  we  not  say  that  he  assimilates  his  style  to  that 
of  the  person  who,  as  he  informs  you,  is  going  to 
speak? 

Certainly. 

And  this  assimilation  of  himself  to  another,  either 
by  the  use  of  voice  or  gesture,  is  the  imitation  of  the 
person  whose  character  he  assumes? 

Of  course. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Then  in  this  case  the  narrative  of  the  poet  may  be 
said  to  proceed  by  way  of  imitation? 

Very  true. 

Or,  if  the  poet  everywhere  appears  and  never  con- 
ceals himself,  then  again  the  imitation  is  dropped,  and 
his  poetry  becomes  simple  narration.  However,  in 
order  that  I may  make  my  meaning  quite  clear,  and 
that  you  may  no  more  say,  “ I don’t  understand,”  I 
will  show  how  the  change  might  be  effected.  If 
Homer  had  said,  “ The  priest  came,  having  his 
daughter’s  ransom  in  his  hands,  supplicating  the 
Achaeans,  and  above  all  the  kings;”  and  then  if,  in- 
stead of  speaking  in  the  person  of  Chryses,  he  had 
continued  in  his  own  person,  the  words  would  have 
been,  not  imitation,  but  simple  narration.  The  pas- 
sage would  have  run  as  follows  (I  am  no  poet,  and 
therefore  I drop  the  metre),  “ The  priest  came  and 
prayed  the  gods  on  behalf  of  the  Greeks  that  they 
might  capture  Troy  and  return  safely  home,  but 
begged  that  they  would  give  him  back  his  daughter, 
and  take  the  ransom  which  he  brought,  and  respect  the 
God.  Thus  he  spoke,  and  the  other  Greeks  revered 
the  priest  and  assented.  But  Agamemnon  Avas  wToth, 
and  bade  him  depart  and  not  come  again,  lest  the  staff 
and  chaplets  of  the  God  should  be  of  no  avail  to  him  — 
the  daughter  of  Chryses  should  not  be  released,  he 
said  — she  should  grow  old  with  him  in  Argos.  And 
then  he  told  him  to  go  away  and  not  to  provoke  him, 
if  he  intended  to  get  home  unscathed.  And  the  old 
man  went  away  in  fear  and  silence,  and,  AA'hen  he  had 
left  the  camp,  he  called  upon  Apollo  by  his  many 
names,  reminding  him  of  everything  Avhich  he  had 
done  pleasing  him,  whether  in  building  his  temples, 
or  in  offering  sacrifice,  and  praying  that  his  good 
deeds  might  be  returned  to  him,  and  that  the 
Achaeans  might  expiate  hi3  tears  by  the  arrows  of  the 


THE  REPUBLIC 


97 


god,”  — and  so  on.  In  this  way  the  whole  becomes 
simple  narrative. 

I understand,  he  said. 

Or  you  may  suppose  the  opposite  case  — that  the 
intermediate  passages  are  omitted,  and  the  dialogue 
only  left. 

That  also,  he  said,  I understand;  you  mean,  for 
example,  as  in  tragedy. 

You  have  conceived  my  meaning  perfectly;  and  if 
I mistake  not,  what  you  failed  to  apprehend  before  is 
now  made  clear  to  you,  that  poetry  and  mythology 
are,  in  some  cases,  wholly  imitative  — instances  of 
this  are  supplied  by  tragedy  and  comedy;  there  is 
likewise  the  opposite  style,  in  which  the  poet  is  the 
only  speaker  — of  this  the  dithyramb  affords  the  best 
example;  and  the  combination  of  both  is  found  in 
epic,  and  in  several  other  styles  of  poetry.  Do  I take 
you  with  me? 

Yes,  he  said;  I see  now  what  you  meant. 

I will  ask  you  to  remember  also  what  I began  by 
saying,  that  we  had  done  with  the  subject  and  might 
proceed  to  the  style. 

Yes,  I remember. 

In  saying  this,  I intended  to  imply  that  we  must 
come  to  an  understanding  about  the  mimetic  art,  — 
whether  the  poets,  in  narrating  their  stories,  are  to  be 
allowed  by  us  to  imitate,  and  if  so,  whether  in  whole 
or  in  part,  and  if  the  latter,  in  what  parts;  or  should 
all  imitation  be  prohibited? 

You  mean,  I suspect,  to  ask  whether  tragedy  and 
comedy  shall  be  admitted  into  our  State? 

Yes,  I said;  but  there  may  be  more  than  this  in 
question : I really  do  not  know  as  yet,  but  whither  the 
argument  may  blow,  thither  we  go. 

And  go  we  will,  he  said. 

Then,  Adeimantus,  let  me  ask  you  whether  our 


98 


THE  REPUBLIC 


guardians  ought  to  be  imitators;  or  rather,  has  not 
this  question  been  decided  by  the  rule  already  laid 
down  that  one  man  can  only  do  one  thing  well,  and 
not  many;  and  that  if  he  attempt  many,  he  wiU  alto- 
gether fail  of  gaining  much  reputation  in  any? 

Certainly. 

And  this  is  equally  true  of  imitation;  no  one  man 
can  imitate  many  things  as  well  as  he  would  imitate 
a single  one? 

He  can  not. 

Then  the  same  person  will  hardly  be  able  to  play  a 
serious  part  in  life,  and  at  the  same  time  to  be  an 
imitator  and  imitate  many  other  parts  as  well;  for 
even  when  two  species  of  imitation  are  nearly  allied, 
the  same  persons  cannot  succeed  in  both,  as,  for  ex- 
ample, the  writers  of  tragedy  and  comedy  — did  you 
not  just  now  call  them  imitations? 

Yes,  I did;  and  you  are  right  in  thinking  that  the 
same  persons  can  not  succeed  in  both. 

Any  more  than  they  can  be  rhapsodists  and  actors 
at  once? 

True. 

Neither  are  comic  and  tragic  actors  the  same;  yet 
all  these  things  are  but  imitations. 

They  are  so. 

And  human  nature,  Adeimantus,  appears  to  have 
been  coined  into  yet  smaller  pieces,  and  to  be  as  in- 
capable of  imitating  many  things  well,  as  of  perform- 
ing well  the  actions  of  which  the  imitations  are  copies. 

Quite  true,  he  replied. 

If  then  we  adhere  to  our  original  notion  and  bear  in 
mind  that  our  guardians,  setting  aside  every  other 
business,  are  to  dedicate  themselves  wholly  to  the 
maintenance  of  freedom  in  the  State,  making  this 
their  craft,  and  engaging  in  no  work  which  does  not 
bear  on  this  end,  they  ought  not  to  practise  or  imitate 


THE  REPUBLIC 


99 


anything  else;  if  they  imitate  at  all,  they  should  imi- 
tate from  youth  upward  only  those  characters  which 
are  suitable  to  their  profession  — the  courageous, 
temperate,  holy,  free,  and  the  like;  but  they  should 
not  depict  or  be  skilful  at  imitating  any  kind  of  illib- 
erality  or  baseness,  lest  from  imitation  they  should 
come  to  be  what  they  imitate.  Did  you  never  observe 
how  imitations,  beginning  in  early  youth  and  con- 
tinuing far  into  life,  at  length  grow  into  habits  and 
become  a second  nature,  affecting  body,  voice,  and 
mind? 

Yes,  certainly,  he  said. 

Then,  I said,  we  will  not  allow  those  for  whom  we 
profess  a care  and  of  whom  we  say  that  they  ought 
to  be  good  men,  to  imitate  a woman,  whether  young 
or  old,  quarrelling  with  her  husband,  or  striving  and 
vaunting  against  the  gods  in  conceit  of  her  happiness, 
or  when  she  is  in  affliction,  or  sorrow,  or  weeping ; and 
certainly  not  one  who  is  in  sickness,  love,  or  labor. 

Very  right,  he  said. 

Neither  must  they  represent  slaves,  male  or  female, 
performing  the  offices  of  slaves? 

They  must  not. 

And  surely  not  bad  men,  whether  cowards  or  any 
others,  who  do  the  reverse  of  what  we  have  just  been 
prescribing,  who  scold  or  mock  or  revile  one  another 
in  drink  or  out  of  drink,  or  who  in  any  other  manner 
sin  against  themselves  and  their  neighbors  in  word  or 
deed,  as  the  manner  of  such  is.  Neither  should  they 
be  trained  to  imitate  the  action  or  speech  of  men  or 
women  who  are  mad  or  bad;  for  madness,  like  vice, 
is  to  be  known  but  not  to  be  practised  or  imitated. 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Neither  may  they  imitate  smiths  or  other  artificers, 
or  oarsmen,  or  boatswains,  or  the  like? 

How  can  they,  he  said,  when  they  are  not  allowed 


100 


THE  REPUBLIC 


to  apply  their  minds  to  the  callings  of  any  of 
these  ? 

Nor  may  they  imitate  the  neighing  of  horses,  the 
bellowing  of  bulls,  the  murmur  of  rivers  and  roU  of 
the  ocean,  thunder,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing? 

. Nay,  he  said,  if  madness  be  forbidden,  neither  may 
they  copy  the  behavior  of  madmen. 

You  mean,  I said,  if  I understand  you  aright,  that 
there  is  one  sort  of  narrative  style  which  may  be  em- 
ployed by  a truly  good  man  when  he  has  anything  to 
say,  and  that  another  sort  will  be  used  by  a man  of 
an  opposite  character  and  education. 

And  which  are  these  two  sorts?  he  asked. 

Suppose,  I answered,  that  a just  and  good  man 
in  the  course  of  a narration  comes  on  some  saying  or 
action  of  another  good  man,  — I should  imagine  that 
he  will  like  to  personate  him,  and  will  not  be  ashamed 
of  this  sort  of  imitation : he  will  be  most  ready  to  play 
the  part  of  the  good  man  W'hen  he  is  acting  firmly  and 
wisely;  in  a less  degree  when  he  is  overtaken  by  ill- 
ness or  love  or  drink,  or  has  met  with  any  other  dis- 
aster. But  when  he  comes  to  a character  which  is 
unvv^orthy  of  him,  he  will  not  make  a study  of  that ; he 
will  disdain  such  a person,  and  will  assume  his  likeness, 
if  at  all,  for  a moment  only  when  he  is  performing 
some  good  action ; at  other  times  he  will  be  ashamed 
to  play  a part  which  he  has  never  practised,  nor  will 
he  like  to  fashion  and  frame  himself  after  the  baser 
models;  he  feels  the  employment  of  such  an  art,  unless 
in  jest,  to  be  beneath  him,  and  his  mind  revolts  at  it. 

So  I should  expect,  he  replied. 

Then  he  will  adopt  a mode  of  narration  such  as  we 
have  illustrated  out  of  Homer,  that  is  to  say,  his  style 
will  be  both  imitative  and  narrative;  but  there  will 
be  very  little  of  the  former,  and  a great  deal  of  the 
latter.  Do  you  agree  ? 


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101 


Certainly,  he  said;  that  is  the  model  which  such  a 
speaker  must  necessarily  take. 

But  there  is  another  sort  of  character  who  will  nar- 
rate anything,  and,  the  worse  he  is,  the  more  unscru- 
pulous he  will  be;  nothing  will  be  too  bad  for  him: 
and  he  will  be  ready  to  imitate  anything,  not  as  a joke, 
but  in  right  good  earnest,  and  before  a large  company. 
As  I was  just  now  saying,  he  will  attempt  to  repre- 
sent the  roll  of  thunder,  the  noise  of  wind  and  hail, 
or  the  creaking  of  wheels,  and  pulleys,  and  the  vari- 
ous sounds  of  flutes,  pipes,  trumpets,  and  all  sorts  of 
instruments:  he  will  bark  like  a dog,  bleat  like  a 
sheep,  or  crow  like  a cock;  his  entire  art  vdll  consist 
in  imitation  of  voice  and  gesture,  and  there  will  be 
very  little  narration. 

That,  he  said,  will  be  his  mode  of  speaking. 

These,  then,  are  the  two  kinds  of  style? 

Yes. 

And  you  would  agree  with  me  in  saying  that  one 
of  them  is  simple  and  has  but  slight  changes;  and  if 
the  harmony  and  rhythm  are  also  chosen  for  their 
simplicity,  the  result  is  that  the  speaker,  if  he  speaks 
correctly,  is  always  pretty  much  the  same  in  style, 
and  he  will  keep  within  the  limits  of  a single  harmony 
(for  the  changes  are  not  great),  and  in  like  manner 
he  will  make  use  of  nearly  the  same  rhythm? 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said. 

Whereas  the  other  requires  all  sorts  of  harmonies 
.and  all  sorts  of  rhythms,  if  the  music  and  the  style 
are  to  correspond,  because  the  style  has  all  sorts  of 
changes. 

That  is  also  perfectly  true,  he  replied. 

And  do  not  the  two  styles,  or  the  mixture  of  the 
two,  comprehend  all  poetry,  and  every  form  of  ex- 
pression in  words?  No  one  can  say  anything  except 
in  one  or  other  of  them  or  in  both  together. 


102 


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They  include  all,  he  said. 

And  shall  we  receive  into  our  State  all  the  three 
styles,  or  one  only  of  the  two  unmixed  styles?  or 
would  you  include  the  mixed  ? 

I should  prefer  only  to  admit  the  pure  imitator  of 
virtue. 

Yes,  I said,  Adeimantus;  but  the  mixed  style  is 
also  very  charming:  and  indeed  the  pantomimic, 
which  is  the  opposite  of  the  one  chosen  by  you,  is  the 
popular  style  with  children  and  their  attendants,  and 
with  the  world  in  general. 

I do  not  deny  it. 

But  I suppose  you  would  argue  that  such  a style  is 
unsuitable  to  our  State,  in  which  human  nature  is 
not  twofold  or  manifold,  for  one  man  plays  one  part 
only? 

Yes;  quite  unsuitable. 

And  this  is  the  reason  why  in  our  State,  and  in  our 
State  only,  we  shall  find  a shoemaker  to  be  a shoe- 
maker and  not  a pilot  also,  and  a husbandman  to  be 
a husbandman  and  not  a dicast  also,  and  a soldier  a 
soldier  and  not  a trader  also,  and  the  same  through- 
out? 

True,  he  said. 

And  therefore  when  any  one  of  these  pantomimic 
gentlemen,  who  are  so  clever  that  they  can  imitate 
anything,  comes  to  us,  and  makes  a proposal  to  ex- 
hibit himself  and  his  poetry,  we  will  fall  down  and 
worship  him  as  a sweet  and  holy  and  wonderful  being; 
but  we  must  also  inform  him  that  in  our  State  such 
as  he  are  not  permitted  to  exist ; the  law  will  not  allow 
them.  And  so  when  we  have  anointed  him  with  myrrh, 
and  set  a garland  of  wool  upon  his  head,  we  shall  send 
him  away  to  another  city.  For  we  mean  to  employ 
for  our  souls’  health  the  rougher  and  severer  poet  or 
story-teller  who  will  imatate  the  style  of  the  virtuous 


THE  REPUBLIC 


03 

only,  and  will  follow  those  models  which  we  pre- 
scribed at  first  when  we  began  the  education  of  our 
soldiers. 

We  certainly  will,  he  said,  if  we  have  the  power. 

Then  now,  my  friend,  I said,  that  part  of  music  or 
literary  education  which  relates  to  the  story  or  myth 
may  be  considered  to  be  finished ; for  the  matter  and 
manner  have  both  been  discussed. 

I think  so  too,  he  said. 

Next  in  order  will  follow  melody  and  song. 

That  IS  obvious. 

Every  one  can  see  already  what  we  ought  to  say 
about  them,  if  we  are  to  be  consistent  with  ourselves. 

I fear,  said  Glaucon,  laughingly,  that  the  word 
“ every  one  ” hardly  includes  me,  for  I can  not  at  the 
moment  say  what  they  should  be;  though  I may 
guess. 

At  any  rate  you  can  tell  that  a song  or  ode  has  three 
parts  — the  words,  the  melody,  and  the  rhythm ; that 
degree  of  knowledge  I may  presuppose? 

Yes,  he  said;  so  much  as  that  you  may. 

And  as  for  the  words,  there  will  surely  be  no  dif- 
ference between  words  which  are  and  which  are  not 
set  to  music ; both  will  conform  to  the  same  laws,  and 
these  have  been  already  determined  by  us? 

Yes. 

And  the  melody  and  rhythm  will  depend  upon  the 
words? 

Certainly. 

We  were  saying,  when  we  spoke  of  the  subject- 
matter,  that  we  had  no  need  of  lamentation  and  strains 
of  sorrow? 

True. 

And  which  are  the  harmonies  expressive  of  sorrow? 
You  are  musical,  and  can  tell  me. 

The  harmonies  which  you  mean  are  the  mixed  or 


104  THE  REPUBLIC 

tenor  Lydian,  and  the  full-toned  or  bass  Lydian,  and 
such  like. 

These  then,  I said,  must  be  banished;  even  to 
women  who  have  a character  to  maintain  they  are  of 
no  use,  and  much  less  to  men. 

Certainly. 

In  the  next  place,  drunkenness  and  softness  and 
indolence  are  utterly  unbecoming  the  character  of  our 
guardians. 

Utterly  unbecoming. 

And  which  are  the  soft  or  drinking  harmonies? 

The  Ionian,  he  replied,  and  the  Lydian;  they  are 
termed  “ relaxed.” 

Well,  and  are  these  of  any  military  use? 

Quite  the  reverse,  he  replied ; and  if  so  the  Dorian 
and  the  Phrygian  are  the  only  ones  which  you  have 
left. 

I answered:  Of  the  harmonies  I know  nothing, 
but  I want  to  have  one  warlike,  to  sound  the  note  or 
accent  which  a brave  man  utters  in  the  hour  of  dan- 
ger and  stern  resolve,  or  when  his  cause  is  failing,  and 
he  is  going  to  wounds  or  death  or  is  overtaken  by 
some  other  evil,  and  at  every  such  crisis  meets  the 
blows  of  fortune  with  firm  step  and  a determination 
to  endure;  and  another  to  be  used  by  him  in  times 
of  peace  and  freedom  of  action,  when  there  is  no 
pressure  of  necessity,  and  he  is  seeking  to  persuade 
God  by  prayer,  or  man  by  instruction  and  admoni- 
tion, or  on  the  other  hand,  when  he  is  expressing  his 
willingness  to  yield  to  persuasion  or  entreaty  or  ad- 
monition, and  which  represents  him  when  by  prudent 
conduct  he  has  attained  his  end,  not  carried  away  by 
his  success,  but  acting  moderately  and  wisely  under 
the  circumstances,  and  acquiescing  in  the  event.  These 
two  harmonies  I ask  you  to  leave ; the  strain  of  neces- 
sity and  the  strain  of  freedom,  the  strain  of  the  unfor- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


^196 

tunate  and  the  strain  of  the  fortunate,  the  strain  of 
courage,  and  the  strain  of  temperance;  these,  I say, 
leave. 

And  these,  he  replied,  are  the  Dorian  and  Phrygian 
harmonies  of  which  I was  just  now  speaking. 

Then,  I said,  if  these  and  these  only  are  to  be  used 
in  our  songs  and  melodies,  we  shall  not  want  multi- 
plicity of  notes  or  a panharmonic  scale? 

I suppose  not. 

Then  we  shall  not  maintain  the  artificers  of  lyres 
with  three  corners  and  complex  scales,  or  the  makers 
of  any  other  many -stringed  curiously -harmonized  in- 
struments ? 

Certainly  not. 

But  what  do  you  say  to  flute-makers  and  flute- 
players?  Would  you  admit  them  into  our  State  when 
you  reflect  that  in  this  composite  use  of  harmony  the 
flute  is  worse  than  all  the  stringed  instrmnents  put 
together;  even  the  panharmonic  music  is  only  an 
imitation  of  the  flute? 

Clearly  not. 

There  remain  then  only  the  lyre  and  the  harp  for 
use  in  the  city,  and  the  shepherds  may  have  a pipe  in 
the  country. 

That  is  surely  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  the 
argument. 

The  preferring  of  Apollo  and  his  instruments  to 
Marsyas  and  his  instruments  is  not  at  all  strange,  I 
said. 

Not  at  all,  he  replied. 

And  so,  by  the  dog  of  Egypt,  we  have  been  uncon- 
sciously purging  the  State,  which  not  long  ago  we 
termed  luxurious. 

And  we  have  done  wisely,  he  replied. 

Then  let  us  now  finish  the  purgation,  I said.  Next 
in  order  to  harmonies,  rhythms  will  naturally  follow, 


106 


THE  REPUBLIC 


and  they  should  be  subject  to  the  same  rules,  for  we 
ought  not  to  seek  out  complex  systems  of  metre,  or 
metres  of  every  kind,  but  rather  to  discover  what 
rhythms  are  the  expressions  of  a courageous  and  har- 
monious life;  and  when  we  have  found  them,  we  shall 
adapt  the  foot  and  the  melody  to  words  having  a like 
spirit,  not  the  words  to  the  foot  and  melody.  To  say 
what  these  rhythms  are  will  be  your  duty  — you  must 
teach  me  them,  as  you  have  already  taught  me  the 
harmonies. 

But,  indeed,  he  replied,  I can  not  tell  you.  I only 
know  that  there  are  some  three  principles  of  rhythm 
out  of  which  metrical  systems  are  framed,  just  as  in 
sounds  there  are  four  notes  ‘ out  of  which  all  the  har- 
monies are  composed;  that  is  an  observation  which  I 
have  made.  But  of  what  sort  of  lives  they  are  sever- 
ally the  imitations  I am  unable  to  say. 

Then,  I said,  we  must  take  Damon  into  our  coun- 
sels; and  he  will  tell  us  what  rhythms  are  expressive 
of  meanness,  or  insolence,  or  fury,  or  other  unworthi- 
ness, and  what  are  to  be  reserved  for  the  expression 
of  opposite  feelings.  And  I think  that  I have  an 
indistinct  recollection  of  his  mentioning  a complex 
Cretic  rhythm;  also  a dactylic  or  heroic,  and  he  ar- 
ranged them  in  some  manner  which  I do  not  quite 
understand,  making  the  rhythms  equal  in  the  rise  and 
fall  of  the  foot,  long  and  short  alternating;  and, 
unless  I am  mistaken,  he  spoke  of  an  iambic  as  well 
as  of  a trochaic  rhythm,  and  assigned  to  them  short 
and  long  quantities.^  Also  in  some  cases  he  appeared 
to  praise  or  censure  the  movement  of  the  foot  quite 

li.e.  the  four  notes  of  the  tetrachord. 

2 Socrates  expresses  himself  carelessly  in  accordance  with  his  assumed 
ignorance  of  the  details  of  the  subject.  In  the  first  part  of  the  sentence  he 
appears  to  be  speaking  of  paeonic  rhythms  which  are  in  the  ratio  of  | ; 
in  the  second  part,  of  dactylic  and  anapaestic  rhythms,  which  are  in  the 
ratio  of  j ; in  the  last  clause,  of  iambic  and  trochaic  rhythms,  which  are 
in  the  ratio  of  or 


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107 


as  much  as  the  rhythm;  or  perhaps  a combination 
of  the  two;  for  I am  not  certain  what  he  meant. 
These  matters,  however,  as  I was  saying,  had  better 
be  referred  to  Damon  himself,  for  the  analysis  of  the 
subject  would  be  difficult,  you  know? 

Rather  so,  I should  say. 

But  there  is  no  difficulty  in  seeing  that  grace  or  the 
absence  of  grace  is  an  effect  of  good  or  bad  rhythm. 

None  at  all. 

And  also  that  good  and  bad  rhythm  naturally  as- 
similate to  a good  and  bad  style;  and  that  harmony 
and  discord  in  like  manner  follow  style;  for  our  prin- 
ciple is  that  rhythm  and  harmony  are  regulated  by 
the  words,  and  not  the  words  by  them. 

Just  so,  he  said,  they  should  follow  the  words. 

And  will  not  the  words  and  the  character  of  the 
style  depend  on  the  temper  of  the  soul? 

Yes. 

And  everything  else  on  the  style? 

Yes. 

Then  beauty  of  style  and  harmony  and  grace  and 
good  rhythm  depend  on  simplicity,  — I mean  the  true 
simplicity  of  a rightly  and  nobly  ordered  mind  and 
character,  not  that  other  simplicity  which  is  only  an 
euphemism  for  folly? 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

And  if  our  youth  are  to  do  their  work  in  life,  must 
they  not  make  these  graces  and  harmonies  their  per- 
petual aim? 

They  must. 

And  surely  the  art  of  the  painter  and  every  other 
creative  and  constructive  art  are  full  of  them,  — 
weaving,  embroidery,  architecture,  and  every  kind  of 
manufacture;  also  nature,  animal  and  vegetable, — 
in  all  of  them  there  is  grace  or  the  absence  of  grace. 
And  ugliness  and  discord  and  inharmonious  motion 


108 


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are  nearly  allied  to  ill  words  and  ill  nature,  as  grace 
and  harmony  are  the  twin  sisters  of  goodness  and 
virtue  and  bear  their  likeness. 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said. 

But  shall  our  superintendence  go  no  further,  and 
are  the  poets  only  to  be  required  by  us  to  express  the 
image  of  the  good  in  their  works,  on  pain,  if  they  do 
anything  else,  of  expulsion  from  our  State?  Or  is 
the  same  control  to  be  extended  to  other  artists,  and 
are  they  also  to  be  prohibited  from  exhibiting  the 
opposite  forms  of  vice  and  intemperance  and  mean- 
ness and  indecency  in  sculpture  and  building  and  the 
other  creative  arts;  and  is  he  who  can  not  conform 
to  this  rule  of  ours  to  he  prevented  from  practising 
his  art  in  our  State,  lest  the  taste  of  our  citizens  he 
corrupted  by  him?  We  would  not  have  our  guardi- 
ans grow  up  amid  images  of  moral  deformity,  as  in 
some  noxious  pasture,  and  there  browse  and  feed  upon 
many  a baneful  herb  and  flower  day  by  day,  little  by 
little,  until  they  silently  gather  a festering  mass  of 
corruption  in  their  own  soul.  Let  our  artists  rather 
be  those  who  are  gifted  to  discern  the  true  nature  of 
the  beautiful  and  graceful;  then  will  our  youth  dwell 
in  a land  of  health,  amid  fair  sights  and  sounds,  and 
receive  the  good  in  everything;  and  beauty,  the  efflu- 
ence of  fair  works,  shall  flow  into  the  eye  and  ear, 
like  a health-giving  breeze  from  a purer  region,  and 
insensibly  draw  the  soul  from  earliest  years  into  like- 
ness and  sympathy  with  the  beauty  of  reason. 

There  can  he  no  nobler  training  than  that,  he  re- 
plied. 

And  therefore,  I said,  Glaucon,  musical  training 
is  a more  potent  instrument  than  any  other,  because 
rhythm  and  harmony  find  their  way  into  the  inward 
places  of  the  soul,  on  which  they  mightily  fasten, 
imparting  grace,  and  making  the  soul  of  him  who  .is 


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109 


rightly  educated  graceful,  or  of  him  who  is  ill-edu- 
cated ungraceful;  and  also  because  he  who  has  re- 
ceived this  true  education  of  the  inner  being  will  most 
shrewdly  perceive  omissions  or  faults  in  art  and 
nature,  and  with  a true  taste,  while  he  praises  and 
rejoices  over  and  receives  into  his  soul  the  good, 
and  becomes  noble  and  good,  he  will  justly  blame 
and  hate  the  bad,  now  in  the  days  of  his  youth,  even 
before  he  is  able  to  know  the  reason  why;  and 
when  reason  comes  he  will  recognize  and  salute  the 
friend  with  whom  his  education  has  made  him  long 
familiar. 

Yes,  he  said,  I quite  agree  with  you  in  thinking 
that  our  youth  should  be  trained  in  music  and  on  the 
grounds  which  you  mention. 

Just  as  in  learning  to  read,  I said,  we  were  satisfied 
when  we  knew  the  letters  of  the  alphabet,  which  are 
very  few,  in  all  their  recurring  sizes  and  combinations; 
not  slighting  them  as  unimportant  whether  they  oc- 
cupy a space  large  or  small,  but  everywhere  eager  to 
make  them  out;  and  not  thinking  ourselves  perfect 
in  the  art  of  reading  until  we  recognize  them  wherever 
they  are  found : 

True  — 

Or,  as  we  recognize  the  reflection  of  letters  in  the 
water,  or  in  a mirror,  only  when  we  know  the  letters 
themselves;  the  same  art  and  study  giving  us  the 
knowledge  of  both: 

Exactly  — 

Even  so,  as  I maintain,  neither  we  nor  our  guard- 
ians, whom  we  have  to  educate,  can  ever  become  mu- 
sical until  we  and  they  know  the  essential  forms  of 
temperance,  courage,  liberality,  magnificence,  and 
their  kindred,  as  well  as  the  contrary  forms,  in  all 
their  combinations,  and  can  recognize  them  and  their 
images  wherever  they  are  found,  not  slighting  them 


no 


THE  REPUBLIC 


either  in  small  things  or  great,  but  believing  them 
all  to  be  within  the  sphere  of  one  art  and  study. 

Most  assuredly. 

And  when  a beautiful  soul  harmonizes  with  a beau- 
tiful form,  and  the  two  are  cast  in  one  mould,  that 
will  be  the  fairest  of  sights  to  him  who  has  an  eye  to 
see  it? 

The  fairest  indeed. 

And  the  fairest  is  also  the  loveliest? 

That  may  be  assumed. 

And  the  man  who  has  the  spirit  of  harmony  will 
be  most  in  love  with  the  loveliest ; but  he  will  not  love 
him  who  is  of  an  inharmonious  soul  ? 

That  is  true,  he  replied,  if  the  deficiency  be  in  his 
soul;  but  if  there  be  any  merely  bodily  defect  in 
another  he  will  be  patient  of  it,  and  will  love  all  the 
same. 

I perceive,  I said,  that  you  have  or  have  had  experi- 
ences of  this  sort,  and  I agree.  But  let  me  ask  you 
another  question : Has  excess  of  pleasure  any  affinity 
to  temperance? 

How  can  that  be?  he  replied;  pleasure  deprives  a 
man  of  the  use  of  his  faculties  quite  as  much  as  pain. 

Or  any  affinity  to  virtue  in  general? 

None  whatever. 

Any  affinity  to  wantonness  and  intemperance? 

Yes,  the  greatest. 

And  is  there  any  greater  or  keener  pleasure  than 
that  of  sensual  love  ? 

No,  nor  a madder. 

Whereas  true  love  is  a love  of  beauty  and  order  — 
temperate  and  harmonious? 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

Then  no  intemperance  or  madness  should  be  al- 
lowed to  approach  true  love? 

Certainly  not. 


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111 


Then  mad  or  intemperate  pleasure  must  never  be 
allowed  to  come  near  the  lover  and  his  beloved ; neither 
of  them  can  have  any  part  in  it  if  their  love  is  of  the 
right  sort? 

No,  indeed,  Socrates,  it  must  never  come  near  them. 

Then  I suppose  that  in  the  city  which  we  are  found- 
ing you  would  make  a law  to  the  effect  that  a friend 
should  use  no  other  familiarity  to  his  love  than  a father 
would  use  to  his  son,  and  then  only  for  a noble  pur- 
pose, and  he  must  first  have  the  other’s  consent;  and 
this  rule  is  to  limit  him  in  all  his  intercourse,  and  he 
is  never  to  be  seen  going  further,  or,  if  he  exceeds,  he 
is  to  be  deemed  guilty  of  coarseness  and  bad  taste. 

I quite  agree,  he  said. 

Thus  much  of  music,  which  makes  a fair  ending; 
for  what  should  be  the  end  of  music  if  not  the  love  of 
beauty? 

I agree,  he  said. 

After  music  comes  gymnastic,  in  which  our  youth  ^ 
are  next  to  be  trained. 

Certainly. 

Gymnastic  as  well  as  music  should  begin  in  early 
years ; the  training  in  it  should  be  careful  and  should 
continue  through  life.  Now  my  belief  is,  — and  this 
is  a matter  upon  which  I should  like  to  have  your 
opinion  in  confirmation  of  my  own,  but  my  own  belief 
is,  — not  that  the  good  body  by  any  bodily  excellence 
improves  the  soul,  but,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  good 
soul,  by  her  own  excellence,  improves  the  body  as  far 
as  this  may  be  possible.  What  do  you  say? 

Yes,  I agree. 

Then,  to  the  mind  when  adequately  trained,  we 
shall  be  right  in  handing  over  the  more  particular 
care  of  the  body;  and  in  order  to  avoid  prolixity  we 
will  now  only  give  the  general  outlines  of  the  subject. 

Very  good. 


112 


THE  REPUBLIC 


That  they  must  abstain  from  intoxication  has  been 
already  remarked  by  us ; for  of  all  persons  a guardian 
should  be  the  last  to  get  drunk  and  not  know  where 
in  the  world  he  is. 

Yes,  he  said;  that  a guardian  should  require  an- 
other guardian  to  take  care  of  him  is  ridiculous  indeed. 

But  next,  what  shall  we  say  of  their  food;  for  the 
men  are  in  training  for  the  great  contest  of  all  — are 
they  not? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  will  the  habit  of  body  of  our  ordinary  athletes 
be  suited  to  them? 

Why  not  ? 

I am  afraid,  I said,  that  a habit  of  body  such  as 
they  have  is  but  a sleepy  sort  of  thing,  and  rather 
perilous  to  health.  Do  you  not  observe  that  these 
athletes  sleep  away  their  lives,  and  are  liable  to  most 
dangerous  illnesses  if  they  depart,  in  ever  so  slight  a 
degree,  from  their  customary  regimen? 

Yes,  I do. 

Then,  I said,  a finer  sort  of  training  will  be  required 
for  our  warrior  athletes,  who  are  to  be  like  wakeful 
dogs,  and  to  see  and  hear  with  the  utmost  keenness  ; 
amid  the  many  changes  of  water  and  also  of  food,  of 
summer  heat  and  winter  cold,  which  they  will  have  to 
endure  when  on  a campaign,  they  must  not  be  liable 
to  break  down  in  health. 

That  is  my  view. 

The  really  excellent  gymnastic  is  twin  sister  of  that 
simple  music  which  we  were  just  now  describing. 

How  so? 

Why,  I conceive  that  there  is  a g3minastic  which, 
like  our  music,  is  simple  and  good ; and  especially  the 
military  gymnastic. 

What  do  you  mean? 

My  meaning  may  be  learned  from  Homer;  he,  you 


THE  REPUBLIC 


113 


know,  feeds  his  heroes  at  their  feasts,  when  they  are 
campaigning,  on  soldiers’  fare;  they  have  no  fish, 
although  they  are  on  the  shores  of  the  Hellespont,  and 
they  are  not  allowed  boiled  meats  but  only  roast, 
which  is  the  food  most  convenient  for  soldiers,  requir- 
ing only  that  they  should  light  a fire,  and  not  involv- 
ing the  trouble  of  carrying  about  pots  and  pans. 

True. 

And  I can  hardly  be  mistaken  in  saying  that  sweet 
sauces  are  nowhere  mentioned  in  Homer.  In  pro- 
scribing them,  however,  he  is  not  singular;  all  pro- 
fessional athletes  are  well  aware  that  a man  who  is 
to  be  in  good  condition  should  take  nothing  of  the 
kind. 

Yes,  he  said ; and  knowing  this,  they  are  quite  right 
in  not  taking  them. 

Then  you  would  not  approve  of  Syracusan  dinners, 
and  the  refinements  of  Sicilian  cookery? 

I think  not. 

Nor,  if  a man  is  to  be  in  condition,  would  you  allow' 
him  to  have  a Corinthian  girl  as  his  fair  friend? 

Certainly  not. 

Neither  would  you  approve  of  the  delicacies,  as 
they  are  thought,  of  Athenian  confectionery? 

Certainly  not. 

All  such  feeding  and  living  may  be  rightly  com- 
pared by  us  to  melody  and  song  composed  in  the 
panharmonic  style,  and  in  all  the  rhythms. 

Exactly. 

There  complexity  engendered  license,  and  here  dis- 
ease; whereas  simplicity  in  music  was  the  parent  of 
temperance  in  the  soul;  and  simplicity  in  gymnastic 
of  health  in  the  body. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

But  when  intemperance  and  diseases  multiply  in 
a State,  halls  of  justice  and  medicine  are  always  being 


114 


THE  REPUBLIC 


opened;  and  the  arts  of  the  doctor  and  the  lawyer 
give  themselves  airs,  finding  how  keen  is  the  interest 
which  not  only  the  slaves  but  the  freemen  of  a city 
take  about  them. 

Of  course. 

And  yet  what  greater  proof  can  there  be  of  a bad 
and  disgraceful  state  of  education  than  this,  that  not 
only  artisans  and  the  meaner  sort  of  people  need  the 
skill  of  first-rate  physicians  and  judges,  but  also  those 
who  would  profess  to  have  had  a liberal  education? 
Is  it  not  disgraceful,  and  a great  sign  of  the  want 
of  good-breeding,  that  a man  should  have  to  go  abroad 
for  his  law  and  physic  because  he  has  none  of  his  own 
at  home,  and  must  therefore  surrender  himself  into 
the  hands  of  other  men  whom  he  makes  lords  and 
judges  over  him? 

Of  all  things,  he  said,  the  most  disgraceful. 

Would  you  say  “ most,”  I replied,  when  you  con- 
sider that  there  is  a further  stage  of  the  evil  in  which 
a man  is  not  only  a life-long  litigant,  passing  all  his 
days  in  the  courts,  either  as  plaintiff  or  defendant,  but 
is  actually  led  by  his  bad  taste  to  pride  himself  on  his 
litigiousness;  he  imagines  that  he  is  a master  in  dis- 
honesty ; able  to  take  every  crooked  turn,  and  wriggle 
into  and  out  of  every  hole,  bending  like  a withy  and 
getting  out  of  the  way  of  justice : and  all  for  what?  — 
in  order  to  gain  small  points  not  worth  mentioning, 
he  not  knowing  that  so  to  order  his  life  as  to  be  able 
to  do  without  a napping  judge  is  a far  higher  and 
nobler  sort  of  thing.  Is  not  that  still  more  disgrace- 
ful? 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  still  more  disgraceful. 

Well,  I said,  and  to  require  the  help  of  medicine, 
not  when  a wound  has  to  be  cured,  or  on  occasion  of 
an  epidemic,  but  just  because,  by  indolence  and  a habit 
of  life  such  as  we  have  been  describing,  men  fill  them- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


115 


selves  with  waters  and  winds,  as  if  their  bodies  were 
a marsh,  compelling  the  ingenious  sons  of  Asclepius 
to  find  more  names  for  diseases,  such  as  flatulence  and 
catarrh;  is  not  this,  too,  a disgrace? 

Yes,  he  said,  they  do  certainly  give  very  strange 
and  new-fangled  names  to  diseases. 

Yes,  I said,  and  I do  not  believe  that  there  were 
any  such  diseases  in  the  days  of  Asclepius;  and  this 
I infer  from  the  circumstance  that  the  hero  Eurypy- 
lus,  after  he  has  been  wounded  in  Homer,  drinks  a 
posset  of  Pramnian  wine  weU  besprinkled  with  barley- 
meal  and  grated  cheese,  which  are  certainly  inflam- 
matory, and  yet  the  sons  of  Asclepius  who  were  at 
the  Trojan  war  do  not  blame  the  damsel  who  gives 
him  the  drink,  or  rebuke  Patroclus,  who  is  treating 
his  case. 

Well,  he  said,  that  was  surely  an  extraordinary 
drink  to  be  given  to  a person  in  his  condition. 

Not  so  extraordinary,  I replied,  if  you  bear  in  mind 
that  in  former  days,  as  is  commonly  said,  before  the 
time  of  Herodicus,  the  guild  of  Asclepius  did  not 
practise  our  present  system  of  medicine,  which  may  be 
said  to  educate  diseases.  But  Herodicus,  being  a 
trainer,  and  himself  of  a sickly  constitution,  by  a 
combination  of  training  and  doctoring  found  out  a 
way  of  torturing  first  and  chiefly  himself,  and  sec- 
ondly the  rest  of  the  world. 

How  was  that?  he  said. 

By  the  invention  of  lingering  death;  for  he  had  a 
mortal  disease  which  he  perpetually  tended,  and  as 
recovery  was  out  of  the  question,  he  passed  his  entire 
life  as  a valetudinarian;  he  could  do  nothing  but 
attend  upon  himself,  and  he  was  in  constant  torment 
whenever  he  departed  in  anything  from  his  usual 
regimen,  and  so  dying  hard,  by  the  help  of  science 
he  struggled  on  to  old  age. 


116 


THE  REPUBLIC 


A rare  reward  of  his  skill ! 

Yes,  I said;  a reward  which  a man  might  fairly 
expect  who  never  understood  that,  if  Asclepius  did 
not  instruct  his  descendants  in  valetudinarian  arts,  the 
omission  arose,  not  from  ignorance  or  inexperience 
of  such  a branch  of  medicine,  but  because  he  knew 
that  in  all  well-ordered  states  every  individual  has 
an  occupation  to  which  he  must  attend,  and  has  there- 
fore no  leisure  to  spend  in  continually  being  ill.  This 
we  remark  in  the  case  of  the  artisan,  but,  ludicrously 
enough,  do  not  apply  the  same  rule  to  people  of  the 
richer  sort. 

How  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

I mean  this:  When  a carpenter  is  ill  he  asks  the 
physician  for  a rough  and  ready  cure;  an  emetic  or 
a purge  or  a cautery  or  the  knife,  — these  are  his 
remedies.  And  if  some  one  prescribes  for  him  a 
course  of  dietetics,  and  tells  him  that  he  must  swathe 
and  swaddle  his  head,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing,  he 
replies  at  once  that  he  has  no  time  to  be  ill,  and  that 
he  sees  no  good  in  a life  which  is  spent  in  nursing 
his  disease  to  the  neglect  of  his  customary  employ- 
ment; and  therefore  bidding  good-bye  to  this  sort 
of  physician,  he  resumes  his  ordinary  habits,  and 
either  gets  well  and  lives  and  does  his  business,  or,  if 
his  constitution  fails,  he  dies  and  has  no  more  trouble. 

Yes,  he  said,  and  a man  in  his  condition  of  life 
ought  to  use  the  art  of  medicine  thus  far  only. 

Has  he  not,  I said,  an  occupation;  and  what  profit 
would  there  be  in  his  life  if  he  were  deprived  of  his 
occupation? 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

But  with  the  rich  man  this  is  otherwise;  of  him  we 
do  not  say  that  he  has  any  specially  appointed  work 
which  he  must  perform,  if  he  would  live. 

He  is  generally  supposed  to  have  nothing  to  do. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


117 


Then  you  never  heard  of  the  saying  of  Phocylides, 
that  as  soon  as  a man  has  a livelihood  he  should  prac- 
tise virtue? 

Nay,  he  said,  I think  that  he  had  better  begin  some- 
what sooner. 

Let  us  not  have  a dispute  with  him  about  this,  I 
said;  but  rather  ask  ourselves:  Is  the  practice  of 
virtue  obligatory  on  the  rich  man,  or  can  he  live  with- 
out it?  And  if  obligatory  on  him,  then  let  us  raise 
a further  question,  whether  this  dieting  of  disorders, 
which  is  an  impediment  to  the  application  of  the  mind 
in  carpentering  and  the  mechanical  arts,  does  not 
equally  stand  in  the  way  of  the  sentiment  of  Pho- 
cylides? 

Of  that,  he  replied,  there  can  be  no  doubt;  such 
excessive  care  of  the  body,  when  carried  beyond  the 
rules  of  gymnastic,  is  most  inimical  to  the  practice 
of  virtue. 

^ Yes,  indeed,  I replied,  and  equally  incompatible 
with  the  management  of  a house,  an  army,  or  an  office 
of  state ; and,  what  is  most  important  of  all,  irrecon- 
cilable with  any  kind  of  study  or  thought  or  self- 
reflection  — there  is  a constant  suspicion  that  head- 
ache and  giddiness  are  to  be  ascribed  to  philosophy, 
and  hence  all  practising  or  making  trial  of  virtue  in 
the  higher  sense  is  absolutely  stopped;  for  a man  is 
always  fancying  that  he  is  being  made  ill,  and  is  in 
constant  anxiety  about  the  state  of  his  body. 

Yes,  likely  enough. 

And  therefore  our  politic  Asclepius  may  be  sup- 
posed to  have  exhibited  the  power  of  his  art  only  to 
persons  who,  being  generally  of  healthy  constitution 
and  habits  of  life,  had  a definite  ailment;  such  as  these 
he  cured  by  purges  and  operations,  and  bade  them 
live  as  usual,  herein  consulting  the  interests  of  the 

1 Making  the  answer  of  Socrates  begin  at  Kal  ydip  wpbi  k.  r.  X.  J 


118 


THE  REPUBLIC 


State;  but  bodies  which  disease  had  penetrated 
through  and  through  he  would  not  have  attempted 
to  cure  by  gradual  processes  of  evacuation  and  infu- 
sion : he  did  not  want  to  lengthen  out  good-for-noth- 
ing lives,  or  to  have  weak  fathers  begetting  weaker 
sons ; — if  a man  was  not  able  to  live  in  the  ordinary 
way  he  had  no  business  to  cure  him;  for  such  a cure 
would  have  been  of  no  use  either  to  himself,  or  to  the 
State. 

Then,  he  said,  you  regard  Asclepius  as  a statesman. 

Clearly;  and  his  character  is  further  illustrated  by 
his  sons.  Note  that  they  were  heroes  in  the  days  of 
old  and  practised  the  medicines  of  which  I am  speak- 
ing at  the  siege  of  Troy:  You  will  remember  how, 
when  Pandarus  wounded  Menelaus,  they 

“ Sucked  the  blood  out  of  the  wound,  and  sprinkled  soothing 
remedies/'  ^ 

but  they  never  prescribed  what  the  patient  was  after- 
wards to  eat  or  drink  in  the  case  of  Menelaus,  any 
more  than  in  the  case  of  Eurypylus ; the  remedies,  as 
they  conceived,  were  enough  to  heal  any  man  who 
before  he  was  wounded  was  healthy  and  regular  in 
his  habits;  and  even  though  he  did  happen  to  drink 
a posset  of  Pramnian  wine,  he  might  get  well  all  the 
same.  But  they  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  un- 
healthy and  intemperate  subjects,  whose  lives  were 
of  no  use  either  to  themselves  or  others;  the  art  of 
medicine  was  not  designed  for  their  good,  and  though 
they  were  as  rich  as  Midas,  the  sons  of  Asclepius 
would  have  declined  to  attend  them. 

They  were  very  acute  persons,  those  sons  of  Ascle- 
pius. 

Naturally  so,  I replied.  Nevertheless,  the  trage- 
dians and  Pindar  disobeying  our  behests,  although 

1 Iliad  iv.  218, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


119 


they  acknowledge  that  Asclepius  was  the  son  of 
Apollo,  say  also  that  he  was  bribed  into  healing  a rich 
man  who  was  at  the  point  of  death,  and  for  this  rea- 
son he  was  struck  by  lightning.  But  we,  in  accordance 
with  the  principle  already  affirmed  by  us,  will  not 
believe  them  when  they  tell  us  both ; — if  he  was  the 
son  of  a god,  we  maintain  that  he  was  not  avaricious ; 
or,  if  he  was  avaricious,  he  was  not  the  son  of  a god. 

All  that,  Socrates,  is  excellent;  but  I should  like 
to  put  a question  to  you : Ought  there  not  to  be  good 
physicians  in  a State,  and  are  not  the  best  those  who 
have  treated  the  greatest  number  of  constitutions  good 
and  bad?  and  are  not  the  best  judges  in  like  manner 
those  who  are  acquainted  with  all  sorts  of  moral 
natures? 

Yes,  I said,  I too  would  have  good  judges  and  good 
physicians.  But  do  you  know  whom  I think  good? 

Will  you  tell  me? 

I will,  if  I can.  Let  me  however  note  that  in  the 
same  question  you  join  two  things  which  are  not  the 
same. 

How  so?  he  asked. 

Why,  I said,  you  join  physicians  and  judges.  Now 
the  most  skilful  physicians  are  those  who,  from  their 
youth  upwards,  have  combined  with  the  knowledge 
of  their  art  the  greatest  experience  of  disease;  they 
had  better  not  be  robust  in  health,  and  should  have  had 
all  manner  of  diseases  in  their  own  persons.  For  the 
body,  as  I conceive,  is  not  the  instrument  with  which 
they  cure  the  body;  in  that  case  we  could  not  allow 
them  ever  to  be  or  to  have  been  sickly ; but  they  cure 
the  body  with  the  mind,  and  the  mind  which  has  be- 
come and  is  sick  can  cure  nothing. 

That  is  very  true,  he  said. 

But  with  the  judge  it  is  otherwise;  since  he  gov- 
erns mind  by  mind;  he  ought  not  therefore  to  have 


120 


THE  REPUBLIC 


been  trained  among  vicious  minds,  and  to  have  asso- 
ciated with  them  from  youth  upwards,  and  to  have 
gone  through  the  whole  calendar  of  crime,  only  in 
order  that  he  may  quickly  infer  the  crimes  of  others 
as  he  might  their  bodily  diseases  from  his  own  self- 
consciousness;  the  honorable  mind  which  is  to  form 
a healthy  judgment  should  have  had  no  experience 
or  contamination  of  evil  habits  when  young.  And 
this  is  the  reason  why  in  youth  good  men  often  appear 
to  be  simple,  and  are  easily  practised  upon  by  the 
dishonest,  because  they  have  no  examples  of  what  evil 
is  in  their  own  souls. 

Yes,  he  said,  they  are  far  too  apt  to  be  deceived. 

Therefore,  I said,  the  judge  should  not  be  young; 
he  should  have  learned  to  know  evil,  not  from  his  own 
soul,  but  from  late  and  long  observation  of  the  nature 
of  evil  in  others:  knowledge  should  be  his  guide,  not 
personal  experience. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  ideal  of  a judge. 

Yes,  I replied,  and  he  will  be  a good  man  (which  is 
my  answer  to  your  question) ; for  he  is  good  who  has 
a good  soul.  But  the  cunning  and  suspicious  nature 
of  which  we  spoke,  — he  who  has  committed  many 
crimes,  and  fancies  himself  to  be  a master  in  wicked- 
ness, when  he  is  among  his  fellows,  is  wonderful  in 
the  precautions  which  he  takes,  because  he  judges  of 
them  by  himself : but  when  he  gets  into  the  company 
of  men  of  virtue,  who  have  the  experience  of  age, 
he  appears  to  be  a fool  again,  owing  to  his  unseason- 
able suspicions ; he  can  not  recognize  an  honest  man, 
because  he  has  no  pattern  of  honesty  in  himself;  at 
the  same  time,  as  the  bad  are  more  numerous  than  the 
good,  and  he  meets  with  them  oftener,  he  thinks  him- 
self, and  is  by  others  thought  to  be,  rather  wise  than 
foolish. 

Most  true,  he  said. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


121 


Then  the  good  and  wise  judge  whom  we  are  seek- 
ing is  not  this  man,  but  the  other;  for  vice  can  not 
know  virtue  too,  but  a virtuous  nature,  educated  by 
time,  will  acquire  a knowledge  both  of  virtue  and 
vice:  the  virtuous,  and  not  the  vicious  man  has  wisdom 
— in  my  opinion. 

And  in  mine  also. 

This  is  the  sort  of  medicine,  and  this  is  the  sort  of 
law,  which  you  will  sanction  in  your  state.  They  will 
minister  to  better  natures,  giving  health  both  of  soul 
and  of  body;  but  those  who  are  diseased  in  their 
bodies  they  will  leave  to  die,  and  the  corrupt  and 
incurable  souls  they  will  put  an  end  to  them- 
selves. 

That  is  clearly  the  best  thing  both  for  the  patients 
and  for  the  State. 

And  thus  our  youth,  having  been  educated  only  in 
that  simple  music  which,  as  we  said,  inspires  temper- 
ance, will  be  reluctant  to  go  to  law. 

Clearly. 

And  the  musician,  who,  keeping  to  the  same  track, 
is  content  to  practise  the  simple  gymnastic,  will  have 
nothing  to  do  with  medicine  unless  in  some  ex- 
treme case. 

That  I quite  believe. 

The  very  exercises  and  toils  which  he  undergoes  are 
intended  to  stimulate  the  spirited  element  of  his 
nature,  and  not  to  increase  his  strength;  he  will  not, 
like  common  athletes,  use  exercise  and  regimen  to  de- 
velop his  muscles. 

Very  right,  he  said. 

Neither  are  the  two  arts  of  music  and  gymnastic 
really  designed,  as  is  often  supposed,  the  one  for  the 
training  of  the  soul,  the  other  for  the  training  of  the 
body. 

What  then  is  the  real  object  of  them? 


122 


THE  REPUBLIC 


I believe,  I said,  that  the  teachers  of  both  have  in 
view  chiefly  the  improvement  of  the  soul. 

How  can  that  be?  he  asked. 

Did  you  never  observe,  I said,  the  effect  on 
the  mind  itself  of  exclusive  devotion  to  gymnastic, 
or  the  opposite  effect  of  3(n  exclusive  devotion  to 
music? 

In  what  way  shown?  he  said. 

The  one  producing  a temper  of  hardness  and 
ferocity,  the  other  of  softness  and  effeminacy,  I re- 
plied. 

Yes,  he  said,  I am  quite  aware  that  the  mere  athlete 
becomes  too  much  of  a savage,  and  that  the  mere 
musician  is  melted  and  softened  beyond  what  is  good 
for  him. 

Yet  surely,  I said,  this  ferocity  only  comes  from 
spirit,  which,  if  rightly  educated,  would  give  courage, 
but,  if  too  much  intensified,  is  liable  to  become  hard 
and  brutal. 

That  I quite  think. 

On  the  other  hand  the  philosopher  will  have  the 
quality  of  gentleness.  And  this  also,  when  too  much 
indulged,  will  turn  to  softness,  but,  if  educated 
rightly,  will  be  gentle  and  moderate. 

True. 

And  in  our  opinion  the  guardians  ought  to  have 
both  these  qualities? 

Assuredly. 

And  both  should  be  in  harmony? 

Beyond  question. 

And  the  harmonious  soul  is  both  temperate  and 
courageous? 

Yes. 

And  the  inharmonious  is  cowardly  and  boorish? 

Very  true. 

And,  when  a man  allows  music  to  play  upon  him 


THE  REPUBLIC 


123 


and  to  pour  into  his  soul  through  the  funnel  of  his 
ears  those  sweet  and  soft  and  melancholy  airs  of 
which  we  were  just  now  speaking,  and  his  whole  life 
is  past  in  warbling  and  the  delights  of  song;  in  the 
first  stage  of  the  process  the  passion  or  spirit  which 
is  in  him  is  tempered  like  iron,  and  made  useful,  in- 
stead of  brittle  and  useless.  But,  if  he  carries  on  the 
softening  and  soothing  process,  in  the  next  stage  he 
begins  to  melt  and  waste,  until  he  has  wasted  away  his 
spirit  and  cut  out  the  sinews  of  his  soul;  and  he  be- 
comes a feeble  warrior. 

Very  true. 

If  the  element  of  spirit  is  naturally  weak  in  him 
the  change  is  speedily  accomplished,  but  if  he  have  a 
good  deal,  then  the  power  of  music  weakening  the 
spirit  renders  him  excitable ; — on  the  least  provoca- 
tion he  flames  up  at  once,  and  is  speedily  extinguished ; 
instead  of  having  spirit  he  grows  irritable  and  passion- 
ate and  is  quite  impracticable. 

Exactly. 

And  so  in  gymnastics,  if  a man  takes  violent  ex- 
ercise and  is  a great  feeder,  and  the  reverse  of  a great 
student  of  music  and  philosophy,  at  first  the  high 
condition  of  his  body  fills  him  with  pride  and  spirit, 
and  he  becomes  twice  the  man  that  he  was. 

Certainly. 

And  what  happens?  if  he  do  nothing  else,  and  holds 
no  converse  with  the  Muses,  does  not  even  that  intel- 
ligence which  there  may  be  in  him,  having  no  taste  of 
any  sort  of  learning  or  inquiry  or  thought  or  culture, 
grow  feeble  and  dull  and  blind,  his  mind  never 
waking  up  or  receiving  nourishment,  and  his  senses 
not  being  purged  of  their  mists? 

True,  he  said. 

And  he  ends  by  becoming  a hater  of  philosophy, 
uncivilized,  never  using  the  weapon  of  persuasion,  — < 


124 


THE  REPUBLIC 


he  is  like  a wild  beast,  all  violence  and  fierceness,  and 
knows  no  other  way  of  dealing;  and  he  lives  in  all 
ignorance  and  evil  conditions,  and  has  no  sense  of 
propriety  and  grace. 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said. 

; And  as  there  are  two  principles  of  human  nature, 
one  the  spirited  and  the  other  the  philosophical,  some 
I God,  as  I should  say,  has  given  mankind  two  arts 
/ answering  to  them  (and  only  indirectly  to  the  soul 
j and  body),  in  order  that  these  two  principles  (like 
the  strings  of  an  instrument)  may  be  relaxed  or  drawn 
tighter  until  they  are  duly  harmonized. 

That  appears  to  be  the  intention. 

And  he  who  mingles  music  with  gymnastic  in  the 
fairest  proportions,  and  best  attempers  them  to  the 
soul,  may  be  rightly  called  the  true  musician  and 
harmonist  in  a far  higher  sense  than  the  tuner  of  the 
strings. 

You  are  quite  right,  Socrates. 

And  such  a presiding  genius  will  be  always  re- 
quired in  our  State  if  the  government  is  to  last. 

Yes,  he  will  be  absolutely  necessary. 

Such,  then,  are  our  principles  of  nurture  and  educa- 
tion: Where  would  be  the  use  of  going  into  further 
details  about  the  dances  of  our  citizens,  or  about  their 
hunting  and  coursing,  their  gymnastic  and  equestrian 
contests?  For  these  all  follow  the  general  principle, 
and  having  found  that,  we  shall  have  no  difficulty  in 
discovering  them. 

I dare  say  that  there  will  be  no  difficulty. 

Very  good,  I said;  then  what  is  the  next  question? 
Must  we  not  ask  who  are  to  be  rulers  and  who  sub- 
jects? 

Certainly. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  elder  must  rule  the 
younger. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


125 


Clearly.  , 

And  that  the  best  of  these  must  rule.  1 

That  is  also  clear. 

Now,  are  not  the  best  husbandmen  those  who  are 
most  devoted  to  husbandry? 

Yes. 

And  as  we  are  to  have  the  best  of  guardians  for 
our  city,  must  they  not  be  those  who  have  most  the 
character  of  guardians? 

Yes. 

And  to  this  end  they  ought  to  be  wise  and  efficient, 
and  to  have  a special  care  of  the  State? 

True. 

And  a man  will  be  most  likely  to  care  about  that 
which  he  loves? 

To  be  sure. 

And  he  will  be  most  likely  to  love  that  which  he  re- 
gards as  having  the  same  interests  with  himself,  and 
that  of  which  the  good  or  evil  fortune  is  supposed  by 
him  at  any  time  most  to  affect  his  own? 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Then  there  must  be  a selection.  Let  us  note  among 
the  guardians  those  who  in  their  whole  life  show  the 
greatest  eagerness  to  do  what  is  for  the  good  of  their 
country,  and  the  greatest  repugnance  to  do  what  is 
against  her  interests. 

Those  are  the  right  men. 

And  they  will  have  to  be  watched  at  every  age,  in 
order  that  we  may  see  whether  they  preserve  their 
resolution,  and  never,  under  the  influence  either  of* 
force  or  enchantment,  forget  or  cast  off  their  sense  of 
duty  to  the  State. 

How  cast  off?  he  said. 

I will  explain  to  you,  I replied.  A resolution  may 
go  out  of  a man’s  mind  either  with  his  will  or  against 
his  will;  with  his  will  when  he  gets  rid  of  a falsehood 


126 


THE  REPUBLIC 


and  learns  better,  against  his  will  whenever  he  is 
deprived  of  a truth. 

I understand,  he  said,  the  willing  loss  of  a resolu- 
tion ; the  meaning  of  the  unwilling  I have  yet  to  learn. 

Why,  I said,  do  you  not  see  that  men  are  unwill- 
ingly deprived  of  good,  and  willingly  of  evil?  Is  not 
to  have  lost  the  truth  an  evil,  and  to  possess  the  truth 
a good?  and  you  would  agree  that  to  conceive  things 
as  they  are  is  to  possess  the  truth? 

Yes,  he  replied;  I agree  with  you  in  thinking  that 
mankind  are  deprived  of  truth  against  their  will. 

And  is  not  this  involuntary  de;privation  caused 
either  by  theft,  or  force,  or  enchantment? 

Still,  he  replied,  I do  not  understand  you. 

I fear  that  I must  have  been  talking  darkly,  like 
the  tragedians.  I only  mean  that  some  men  are 
changed  by  persuasion  and  that  others  forget;  argu- 
ment steals  away  the  hearts  of  one  class,  and  time  of 
the  other;  and  this  I call  theft.  Now  you  understand 
me? 

Yes. 

Those  again  who  are  forced,  are  those  whom  the 
violence  of  some  pain  or  grief  compels  to  change  their 
opinion. 

I understand,  he  said,  and  you  are  quite  right. 

And  you  would  also  acknowledge  that  the  en- 
chanted are  those  who  change  their  minds  either  under 
the  softer  influence  of  pleasure,  or  the  sterner  in- 
fluence of  fear? 

Yes,  he  said;  everything  that  deceives  may  be  said 
to  enchant. 

Therefore,  as  I was  just  now  saying,  we  must  in- 
quire who  are  the  best  guardians  of  their  own  con- 
viction that  what  they  think  the  interest  of  the  State 
is  to  he  the  rule  of  their  lives.  We  must  watch  them 
from  their  youth  upwards,  and  make  them  perform 


THE  REPUBLIC 


127 


actions  in  which  they  are  most  likely  to  forget  or  to 
he  deceived,  and  he  who  remembers  and  is  not  deceived 
is  to  be  seleeted,  and  he  who  fails  in  the  trial  is  to  be 
rejected.  That  will  be  the  way? 

Yes. 

And  there  should  also  be  toils  and  pains  and  con- 
flicts prescribed  for  them,  in  which  they  will  be  made 
to  give  further  proof  of  the  same  qualities. 

Very  right,  he  replied. 

And  then,  I said,  we  must  try  them  with  enchant- 
ments — that  is  the  sort  of  test  — and  see  what 
will  be  their  behavior : like  those  who  take  eolts  amid 
noise  and  tumult  to  see  if  they  are  of  a timid  nature, 
so  must  we  take  our  youth  amid  terrors  of  some  kind, 
and  again  pass  them  into  pleasures,  and  prove  them 
more  thoroughly  than  gold  is  proved  in  the  furnace, 
that  we  may  discover  whether  they  are  armed  against 
all  enchantments,  and  of  a noble  bearing  always,  good 
guardians  of  themselves  and  of  the  music  which  they 
have  learned,  and  retaining  under  all  circumstanees 
a rhythmical  and  harmonious  nature,  such  as  will  be 
most  serviceable  to  the  individual  and  to  the  State. 
And  he  who  at  every  age,  as  boy  and  youth  and  in 
mature  life,  has  come  out  of  the  trial  victorious  and 
pure,  shall  be  appointed  a ruler  and  guardian  of  the 
State;  he  shall  be  honored  in  life  and  death,  and  shall 
receive  sepulture  and  other  memorials  of  honor,  the 
greatest  that  we  have  to  give.  But  him  who  fails,  Vv^e 
must  reject.  I am  inclined  to  think  that  this  is  the 
sort  of  way  in  whieh  our  rulers  and  guardians  should 
be  chosen  and  appointed.  I speak  generally,  and  not 
with  any  pretension  to  exactness. 

And,  speaking  generally,  I agree  with  you,  he 
said. 

And  perhaps  the  word  “ guardian  ” in  the  fullest 
sense  ought  to  be  applied  to  this  higher  class  only 


128 


THE  REPUBLIC 


who  preserve  us  against  foreign  enemies  and  maintain 
peace  among  our  citizens  at  home,  that  the  one  may 
not  have  the  will,  or  the  others  the  power,  to  harm  us. 
The  young  men  whom  we  before  called  guardians 
may  be  more  properly  designated  auxiliaries  and  sup- 
porters of  the  principles  of  the  rulers. 

I agree  with  you,  he  said. 

How  then  may  we  devise  one  of  those  needful 
falsehoods  of  which  we  lately  spoke  — just  one  royal 
lie  which  may  deceive  the  rulers,  if  that  be  possible, 
and  at  any  rate  the  rest  of  the  city? 

What  sort  of  lie?  he  said. 

Nothing  new,  I replied;  only  an  old  Phoenician^ 
tale  of  what  has  often  occurred  before  now  in  other 
places,  (as  the  poets  say,  and  have  made  the  world 
believe),  though  not  in  our  time,  and  I do  not 
know  whether  such  an  event  could  ever  happen 
again,  or  could  now  even  be  made  probable,  if  it  did. 

How  your  words  seem  to  hesitate  on  your  lips! 

You  will  not  wonder,  I replied,  at  my  hesitation 
when  you  have  heard. 

Speak,  he  said,  and  fear  not. 

Well  then,  I will  speak,  although  I really  know 
not  how  to  look  you  in  the  face,  or  in  what  words  to 
utter  the  audacious  fiction,  which  I propose  to  com- 
municate gradually,  fii'st  to  the  rulers,  then  to  the 
soldiers,  and  lastly  to  the  people.  They  are  to  be 
told  that  their  youth  was  a dream,  and  the  education 
and  training  which  they  received  from  us,  an  appear- 
ance only;  in  reality  during  all  that  time  they  were 
being  formed  and  fed  in  the  womb  of  the  earth,  where 
they  themselves  and  their  arms  and  appurtenances 
were  manufactured;  when  they  were  completed,  the 
earth,  their  mother,  sent  them  up;  and  so,  their 
country  being  their  mother  and  also  their  nurse,  they 

1 Cp.  Laws,  663  E. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


129 


are  bound  to  advise  for  her  good,  and  to  defend 
her  against  attacks,  and  her  citizens  they  are  to 
regard  as  children  of  the  earth  and  their  own 
brothers. 

You  had  good  reason,  he  said,  to  be  ashamed  of  the 
lie  which  you  were  going  to  tell. 

True,  I replied,  but  there  is  more  coming;  I have 
only  told  you  half.  Citizens,  we  shall  say  to  them  in 
our  tale,  you  are  brothers,  yet  God  has  framed  you 
differently.  Some  of  you  have  the  power  of  com-\ 
mand,  and  in  the  composition  of  these  he  has  mingled  1 
gold,  wherefore  also  they  have  the  greatest  honor;  v 
others  he  has  made  of  silver,  to  be  auxiliaries;  others  ) 
again  who  are  to  be  husbandmen  and  craftsmen  he  / 
has  composed  of  brass  and  iron ; and  the  species  will  / 
generally  be  preserved  in  the  children.  But  as  all  are  | 
of  the  same  original  stock,  a golden  parent  will  some-  ’ 
times  have  a silver  son,  or  a silver  parent 
a golden  son.  And  God  proclaims  as  a first 
principle  to  the  rulers,  and  above  all  else,  that  there  ' 
is  nothing  which  they  should  so  anxiously  guard,  or 
of  which  they  are  to  be  such  good  guardians,  as  of  the 
purity  of  the  race.  They  should  observe  what 
elements  mingle  in  their  offspring;  for  if  the  son  of  a 
golden  or  silver  parent  has  an  admixture  of  brass  and 
iron,  then  nature  orders  a transportation  of  ranks 
and  the  eye  of  the  ruler  must  not  be  pitiful  towards 
the  child  because  he  has  to  descend  in  the  scale  and 
become  a husbandman  or  artisan,  just  as  there  may  be 
sons  of  artisans  who  having  an  admixture  of  gold  or 
silver  in  them  are  raised  to  honor,  and  become 
guardians  or  auxiliaries.  For  an  oracle  says  that 
when  a man  of  brass  or  iron  guards  the  State,  it  will 
be  destroyed.  Such  is  the  tale ; is  there  any  possibility 
of  making  our  citizens  believe  in  it? 

Not  in  the  present  generation,  he  replied;  there  is 


130 


THE  REPUBLIC 


no  way  of  accomplishing  this;  but  their  sons  may  be 
made  to  believe  in  the  tale,  and  their  sons’  sons,  and 
posterity  after  them. 

I see  the  difficulty,  I replied;  yet  the  fostering  of 
such  a belief  will  make  them  care  more  for  the  city 
and  for  one  another.  Enough,  however,  of  the  fiction, 
which  may  now  fly  abroad  upon  the  wings  of  rumor, 
while  we  arm  our  earth-born  heroes,  and  lead  them 
forth  under  the  command  of  their  rulers.  Let  them 
look  round  and  select  a spot  whence  they  can  best 
suppress  insurrection,  if  any  prove  refractory  within, 
and  also  defend  themselves  against  enemies,  who  like 
wolves  may  come  down  on  the  fold  from  without; 
there  let  them  encamp,  and  when  they  have  encamped, 
let  them  sacrifice  to  the  proper  Gods  and  prepare 
their  dwellings. 

Just  so,  he  said. 

And  their  dwellings  must  be  such  as  will  shield 
them  against  the  cold  of  winter  and  the  heat  of  sum- 
mer. 

I suppose  that  you  mean  houses,  he  replied. 

Yes,  I said;  but  they  must  be  the  houses  of  soldiers, 
and  not  of  shop-keepers. 

What  is  the  difference?  he  said. 

That  I will  endeavor  to  explain,  I replied.  To 
keep  watch-dogs,  who,  from  want  of  discipline  or 
hunger,  or  some  evil  habit  or  other,  would  turn  upon 
the  sheep  and  worry  them,  and  behave  not  like  dogs 
but  wolves,  would  be  a foul  and  monstrous  thing  in  a 
shepherd  ? 

Truly  monstrous,  he  said. 

And  therefore  every  care  must  be  taken  that  our 
auxiliaries,  being  stronger  than  our  citizens,  may  not 
grow  to  be  too  much  for  them  and  become  savage 
tyrants  instead  of  friends  and  allies? 

Yes,  great  care  should  be  taken. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


131 


And  would  not  a really  good  education  furnish  the 
best  safeguard? 

But  they  are  well-educated  already,  he  replied. 

I can  not  be  so  confident,  my  dear  Glaucon,  I said ; 

I am  much  more  certain  that  they  ought  to  be,  and 
that  true  education,  whatever  that  may  be,  will  have 
the  greatest  tendency  to  civilize  and  humanize  them  i 
in  their  relations  to  one  another,  and  to  those  who  are  j 
under  their  protection. 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

And  not  only  their  education,  but  their  habitations, 
and  all  that  belongs  to  them,  should  be  such  as  will 
neither  impair  their  virtue  as  guardians,  nor  tempt 
them  to  prey  upon  the  other  citizens.  Any  man  of 
sense  must  acknowledge  that. 

He  must. 

Then  now  let  us  consider  what  will  be  their  way  of 
life,  if  they  are  to  realize  our  idea  of  them.  In  the 
first  place,  none  of  them  should  have  any  property! 
of  his  own  beyond  what  is  absolutely  necessary;] 
neither  should  they  have  a private  house  or  store 
closed  against  any  one  who  has  a mind  to  enter ; their 
provisions  should  be  only  such  as  are  required  by 
trained  warriors,  who  are  men  of  temperance  and 
courage;  they  should  agree  to  receive  from  the 
citizens  a fixed  rate  of  pay,  enough  to  meet  the  ex- 
penses of  the  year  and  no  more;  and  they  will  go  to^ 
mess  and  live  together  like  soldiers  in  a camp.  Gold,  \ ' 
and  silver  we  will  tell  them  that  they  have  from  God;M\ 
the  diviner  metal  is  within  them,  and  they  have  there- 
fore no  need  of  the  dross  which  is  current  among  \ > 
them,  and  ought  not  to  pollute  the  divine  by  any  such  * 
earthly  admixture;  for  that  commoner  metal  has  been 
the  source  of  many  unholy  deeds,  but  their  own  is  un- 
defiled. And  they  alone  of  all  the  citizens  may  not 
touch  or  handle  silver  or  gold,  or  be  under  the  sam^ 


132 


THE  REPUBLIC 


roof  with  them,  or  wear  them,  or  drink  from  them. 
And  this  will  be  their  salvation,  and  they  will  be 
the  saviors  of  the  State.  But  should  they  ever 
acquire  homes  or  lands  or  moneys  of  their  own,  they 
will  become  housekeepers  and  husbandmen  instead  of 
guardians,  enemies  and  tyrants  instead  of  allies  of  the 
other  citizens;  hating  and  being  hated,  plotting  and 
being  plotted  against,  they  will  pass  their  whole  life 
in  much  greater  terror  of  internal  than  of  external 
enemies,  and  the  hour  of  ruin,  both  to  themselves  and 
to  the  rest  of  the  State,  will  be  at  hand.  For  all 
which  reasons  may  we  not  say  that  thus  shall  our 
State  be  ordered,  and  that  these  shall  be  the  regula- 
tions appointed  by  us  for  our  guardians  concerning 
their  houses  and  all  other  matters? 

Yes,  said  Glaucon. 


BOOK  IV 


Here  Adeimantus  interposed  a question:  How 
would  you  answer,  Socrates,  said  he,  if  a person  were 
to  say  that  you  are  making^  these  people  miserable, 
and  that  they  are  the  cause  of  their  own  unhap- 
piness; the  city  in  fact  belongs  to  them,  but  they  are 
none  the  better  for  it;  whereas  other  men  acquire 
lands,  and  build  large  and  handsome  houses,  and  have 
everything  handsome  about  them,  offering  sacrifices 
to  the  gods  on  their  own  account,  and  practising  hos- 
pitality; moreover,  as  you  were  saying  just  now,  they 
have  gold  and  silver,  and  all  that  is  usual  among  the 
favorites  of  fortune;  but  our  poor  citizens  are  no 
better  than  mercenaries  who  are  quartered  in  the  city 
and  are  always  mounting  guard? 

Yes,  I said;  and  you  may  add  that  they  are  only 
fed,  and  not  paid  in  addition  to  their  food,  like  other 
men;  and  therefore  they  can  not,  if  they  would,  take  , 
a journey  of  pleasure;  they  have  no  money  to  spend' 
on  a mistress  or  any  other  luxurious  fancy,  which,  as 
the  world  goes,  is  thought  to  be  happiness ; and  manyf 
other  accusations  of  the  same  nature  might  be  added! 

But,  said  he,  let  us  suppose  all  this  to  be  included 
in  the  charge. 

You  mean  to  ask,  I said,  what  will  be  our  answer? 

Yes. 

If  we  proceed  along  the  old  path,  my  belief,  I said, 
is  that  we  shall  find  the  answer.  And  our  answer  will 
be  that,  even  as  they  are,  our  guardians  may  very 
likely  be  the  happiest  of  men;  but  that  our  aim  in 

1 Or,  “that  for  their  own  good  you  are  making  these  people  miserable.” 

133 


134 


THE  REPUBLIC 


founding  the  State  was  not  the  disproportionate  hap- 
piness of  any  one  class,  but  the  greatest  happiness  of 
the  whole ; we  thought  that  in  a State  which  is  ordered 
with  a view  to  the  good  of  the  whole  we  should  be 
most  likely  to  find  justice,  and  in  the  ill-ordered  State 
injustice:  and,  having  found  them,  we  might  then 
decide  which  of  the  two  is  the  happier.  At  present,  I 
take  it,  we  are  fashioning  the  happy  State,  not  piece- 
meal, or  with  a view  of  making  a few  happy  citizens, 
but  as  a whole ; and  by-and-by  we  will  proceed  to  view 
the  opposite  kind  of  State.  Suppose  that  we  were 
painting  a statue,  and  some  one  came  up  to  us  and 
said.  Why  do  you  not  put  the  most  beautiful  colors 
on  the  most  beautiful  parts  of  the  body  — the  eyes 
ought  to  be  purple,  but  you  have  made  them  black  — 
to  him  we  might  fairly  answer.  Sir,  you  would  not 
surely  have  us  beautify  the  eyes  to  such  a degree  that 
they  are  no  longer  eyes;  consider  rather  whether,  by 
giving  this  and  the  other  features  their  due  propor- 
tion, we  make  the  whole  beautiful.  And  so  I say 
to  you,  do  not  compel  us  to  assign  to  the  guardians  a 
sort  of  happiness  which  will  make  them  anything  but 
guardians;  for  we  too  can  clothe  our  husbandmen  in 
royal  apparel,  and  set  crowns  of  gold  on  their  heads, 
and  bid  them  till  the  ground  as  much  as  they  like,  and 
no  more.  Our  potters  also  might  be  allowed  to  repose 
on  couches,  and  feast  by  the  fireside,  passing  round 
the  winecup,  while  their  wheel  is  conveniently  at  hand, 
and  working  at  pottery  only  as  much  as  they  like; 
in  this  way  we  might  make  every  class  happy  — and 
then,  as  you  imagine,  the  whole  State  would  be  happy. 
But  do  not  put  this  idea  into  our  heads;  for,  if  we 
listen  to  you,  the  husbandman  will  be  no  longer  a 
husbandman,  the  potter  will  cease  to  be  a potter,  and 
no  one  will  have  the  character  of  any  distinct  class  in 
the  State.  Now  this  is  not  of  much  consequence 


THE  REPUBLIC 


135 


where  the  corruption  of  society,  and  pretension  to  be 
what  you  are  not,  is  confined  to  cobblers ; but  when  the 
guardians  of  the  laws  and  of  the  government  are  only 
seeming  and  not  real  guardians,  then  see  how  they 
turn  the  State  upside  down;  and  on  the  other  hand 
they  alone  have  the  power  of  giving  order  and  hap- 
piness to  the  State.  We  mean  our  guardians  to  be 
true  saviors  and  not  the  destroyers  of  the  State, 
whereas  our  opponent  is  thinking  of  peasants  at  a 
festival,  who  are  enjoying  a life  of  revelry,  not  of 
citizens  who  are  doing  their  duty  to  the  State.  But, 
if  so,  we  mean  different  things,  and  he  is  speaking  of 
something  which  is  not  a State.  And  therefore  we 
must  consider  whether  in  appointing  our  guardians 
we  would  look  to  their  greatest  happiness  individually, 
or  whether  this  principle  of  happiness  does  not  rather 
reside  in  the  State  as  a whole.  But  if  the  latter  be  the 
truth,  then  the  guardians  and  auxiliaries,  and  all 
others  equally  with  them,  must  be  compelled  or  in- 
duced to  do  their  own  work  in  the  best  way.  And 
thus  the  whole  State  will  grow  up  in  a noble  order, 
and  the  several  classes  will  receive  the  proportion  of 
happiness  which  nature  assigns  to  them. 

I think  that  you  are  quite  right. 

I wonder  whether  you  will  agree  with  another 
remark  which  occurs  to  me. 

What  may  that  be? 

There  seem  to  be  two  causes  of  the  deterioration 
of  the  arts. 

What  are  they? 

Wealth,  I said,  and  poverty. 

How  do  they  act? 

The  process  is  as  follows:  When  a potter  becomes 
rich,  will  he,  think  you,  any  longer  take  the  same 
pains  with  his  art? 

Certainly  not. 


136  THE  REPUBLIC 

He  will  grow  more  and  more  indolent  and  care- 
less? 

Very  true. 

And  the  result  will  be  that  he  becomes  a worse 
potter? 

Yes;  he  greatly  deteriorates. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  has  no  money,  and 
can  not  provide  himself  with  tools  or  instruments,  he 
will  not  work  equally  well  himself,  nor  will  he  teach 
his  sons  or  apprentices  to  work  equally  well. 

Certainly  not. 

Then,  under  the  influence  either  of  poverty  or  of 
wealth,  workmen  and  their  work  are  equally  liable  to 
degenerate  ? 

That  is  evident. 

Here,  then,  is  a discovery  of  new  evils,  I said, 
against  which  the  guardians  will  have  to  watch,  or 
they  will  creep  into  the  city  unobserved. 

' What  evils? 

Wealth,  I said,  and  poverty;  the  one  is  the  parent 
of  luxury  and  indolence,  and  the  other  of  meanness 
land  viciousness,  and  both  of  discontent. 

That  is  very  true,  he  replied ; but  still  I should  like 
to  know,  Socrates,  how  our  city  will  be  able  to  go  to 
war,  especially  against  an  enemy  who  is  rich  and 
powerful,  if  deprived  of  the  sinews  of  war. 

There  would  certainly  be  a difficulty,  I replied, 
in  going  to  war  with  one  such  enemy;  but  there  is  no 
difficulty  where  there  are  two  of  them. 

How  so?  he  asked. 

In  the  first  place,  I said,  if  we  have  to  fight,  our  side 
will  be  trained  warriors  fighting  against  an  army  of 
rich  men. 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

And  do  you  not  suppose,  Adeimantus,  that  a single 
boxer  who  was  perfect  in  his  art  would  easily  be  a 


THE  REPUBLIC 


137 


match  for  two  stout  and  well-to-do  gentlemen  who 
were  not  boxers? 

Hardly,  if  they  came  upon  him  at  once. 

What,  not,  I said,  if  he  were  able  to  run  away  and 
then  turn  and  strike  at  the  one  who  first  came  up? 
And  supposing  he  were  to  do  this  several  times  under 
the  heat  of  a scorching  sun,  might  he  not,  being  an 
expert,  overturn  more  than  one  stout  personage? 

Certainly,  he  said,  there  would  be  nothing  wonder- 
ful in  that. 

And  yet  rieh  men  probably  have  a greater 
superiority  in  the  science  and  practise  of  boxing  than 
they  have  in  military  qualities. 

Likely  enough. 

Then  we  may  assume  that  our  athletes  will  be 
able  to  fight  with  two  or  three  times  their  own  num- 
ber? — 

I agree  with  you,  for  I think  you  right. 

And  suppose  that,  before  engaging,  our  citizens 
send  an  embassy  to  one  of  the  two  cities,  telling  them 
what  is  the  truth : Silver  and  gold  we  neither  have  nor 
are  permitted  to  have,  but  you  may ; do  you  therefore 
come  and  help  us  in  war,  and  take  the  spoils  of  the 
other  city:  Who,  on  hearing  these  words,  would 
choose  to  fight  against  lean  wiry  dogs,  rather  than, 
with  the  dogs  on  their  side,  against  fat  and  tender 
sheep? 

That  is  not  likely;  and  yet  there  might  be  a danger 
to  the  poor  State  if  the  wealth  of  many  States  were 
to  be  gathered  into  one. 

But  how  simple  of  you  to  use  the  term  State  at  all 
of  any  but  our  own! 

Why  so? 

You  ought  to  speak  of  other  States  in  the  plural 
number;  not  of  them  is  a city,  but  many  cities,  as 
they  say  in  the  game.  For  indeed  any  city,  however 


138 


THE  REPUBLIC 


small,  is  in  fact  divided  into  two,  one  the  city  of  the 
jpoor,  the  other  of  the  rich;  these  are  at  war  with  one 
(another ; and  in  either  there  are  many  smaller  divisions, 
land  you  would  be  altogether  beside  the  mark  if  you 
treated  them  all  as  a single  State.  But  if  you  deal 
with  them  as  many,  and  give  the  wealth  or  power  or 
persons  of  the  one  to  the  others,  you  will  always  have 
a great  many  friends  and  not  many  enemies.  And 
your  State,  while  the  wise  order  which  has  now  been 
prescribed  continues  to  prevail  in  her,  will  be  the 
greatest  of  States,  I do  not  mean  to  say  in  reputation 
or  appearance,  but  in  deed  and  truth,  though  she 
number  not  more  than  a thousand  defenders.  A 
single  State  which  is  her  equal  you  will  hardly  find, 
either  among  Hellenes  or  barbarians,  though  many 
that  appear  to  be  as  great  and  many  times  greater. 

That  is  most  true,  he  said. 

And  what,  I said,  will  be  the  best  limit  for  our 
rulers  to  fix  when  they  are  considering  the  size  of  the 
State  and  the  amount  of  territory  whieh  they  are  to 
include,  and  beyond  whieh  they  will  not  go? 

What  limit  would  you  propose? 

I would  allow  the  State  to  increase  so  far  as  is 
consistent  with  unity;  that,  I think,  is  the  proper 
limit. 

Very  good,  he  said. 

Here  then,  I said,  is  another  order  which  will  have 
to  be  conveyed  to  our  guardians : Let  our  city  be  ac- 
counted neither  large  nor  small,  but  one  and  self- 
sufficing. 

And  surely,  said  he,  this  is  not  a very  severe  order 
which  we  impose  upon  them. 

And  the  other,  said  I,  of  which  we  were  speaking 
before  is  lighter  still,  — I mean  the  duty  of  degrading 
the  offspring  of  the  guardians  when  inferior,  and  of 
elevating  into  the  rank  of  guardians  the  offspring  of 


THE  REPUBLIC 


139 


the  lower  classes,  when  naturally  superior.  The  in- 
tention was,  that,  in  the  case  of  the  citizens  generally, 
each  individual  should  be  put  to  the  use  for  which 
nature  intended  him,  one  to  one  work,  and  then  every 
man  would  do  his  own  business,  and  be  one  and  not 
many;  and  so  the  whole  city  would  be  one  and  not 
many. 

Yes,  he  said;  that  is  not  so  difficult. 

The  regulations  which  we  are  prescribing,  my  good 
Adeimantus,  are  not,  as  might  be  supposed,  a num- 
ber of  great  principles,  but  trifles  all,  if  care  be  taken, 
as  the  saying  is,  of  the  one  great  thing,  — a thing, 
however,  which  I would  rather  call,  not,  great,  but 
sufficient  for  our  purpose. 

What  may  that  be?  he  asked. 

Education,  I said,  and  nurture:  If  our  citizens  are 
well  educated,  and  grow  into  sensible  men,  they  will 
easily  see  their  way  through  all  these,  as  well  as  other 
matters  which  I omit ; such,  for  example,  as  marriage, 
the  possession  of  women  and  the  procreation  of  chil- 
dren, which  will  all  follow  the  general  principle  that 
friends  have  all  things  in  common,  as  the  proverb 
says. 

That  will  be  the  best  way  of  settling  them. 

Also,  I said,  the  State,  if  once  started  well,  moves 
with  accumulating  force  like  a wheel.  For  good 
nurture  and  education  implant  good  constitutions, 
and  these  good  constitutions  taking  root  in  a good 
education  improve  more  and  more,  and  this  im- 
provement affects  the  breed  in  man  as  in  other 
animals. 

Very  possibly,  he  said. 

Then  to  sum  up:  This  is  the  point  to  which,  above 
all,  the  attention  of  our  rulers  should  be  directed,  — 
that  music  and  gymnastic  be  preserved  in  their 
original  form,  and  no  innovation  made.  They  must 


140 


THE  REPUBLIC 


do  their  utmost  to  maintain  them  intact.  And  when 
/ any  one  says  that  mankind  most  regard 

I The  newest  song  which  the  singers  have^’*  ^ 

I they  will  be  afraid  that  he  may  be  praising,  not  new 
I songs,  but  a new  kind  of  song;  and  this  ought  not  to 
I be  praised,  or  conceived  to  be  the  meaning  of  the  poet ; 

’ for  any  musical  innovation  is  full  of  danger  to  the 
whole  State,  and  ought  to  be  prohibited.  So  Damon 
tells  me,  and  I can  quite  believe  him ; — he  says  that 
when  modes  of  music  change,  the  fundamental  laws 
of  the  State  always  change  with  them. 

Yes,  said  Adeimantus;  and  you  may  add  my  suf- 
frage to  Damon’s  and  your  own. 

Then,  I said,  our  guardians  must  lay  the  founda- 
tions of  their  fortress  in  music? 

Yes,  he  said;  the  lawlessness  of  which  you  speak 
too  easily  steals  in. 

Yes,  I replied,  in  the  form  of  amusement;  and  at 
first  sight  it  appears  harmless. 

Why,  yes,  he  said,  and  there  is  no  harm;  were  it  not 
that  little  by  little  this  spirit  of  license,  finding  a home, 
imperceptibly  penetrates  into  manners  and  customs; 
whence,  issuing  with  greater  force,  it  invades  contracts 
between  man  and  man,  and  from  contracts  goes  on 
to  laws  and  constitutions,  in  utter  recklessness,  ending 
at  last,  Socrates,  by  an  overthrow  of  all  rights,  private 
as  well  as  public. 

Is  that  true?  I said. 

That  is  my  belief,  he  replied. 

Then,  as  I was  saying,  our  youth  should  be  trained 
from  the  first  in  a stricter  system,  for  if  amusements 
become  lawless,  and  the  youths  themselves  become 
lawless,  they  can  never  grow  up  into  well-conducted 
and  virtuous  citizens. 

I Od.  i.  362. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


141 


Very  true,  he  said. 

And  when  they  have  made  a good  beginning  in 
play,  and  by  the  help  of  music  have  gained  the  habit 
of  good  order,  then  this  habit  of  order,  in  a manner 
how  unlike  the  lawless  play  of  the  others!  will  accom- 
pany them  in  all  their  actions  and  be  a principle  of 
growth  to  them,  and  if  there  be  any  fallen  places  in 
the  State  will  raise  them  up  again. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Thus  educated,  they  will  invent  for  themselves  any 
lesser  rules  which  their  predecessors  have  altogether 
neglected. 

What  do  you  mean? 

I mean  such  things  as  these : — when  the  young  are 
to  be  silent  before  their  elders ; how  they  are  to  show 
respect  to  them  by  standing  and  making  them  sit; 
what  honor  is  due  to  parents ; what  garments  or  shoes 
are  to  be  worn;  the  mode  of  dressing  the  hair;  de- 
portment and  manners  in  general.  You  would  agree 
with  me  ? 

Yes. 

But  there  is,  I think,  small  wisdom  in  legislating 
about  such  matters,  — I doubt  if  it  is  ever  done ; nor 
are  any  precise  written  enactments  about  them  likely 
to  he  lasting. 

Impossible. 

It  would  seem,  Adeimantus,  that  the  direction  in 
which  education  starts  a man,  will  determine  his  fu- 
ture life.  Does  not  like  always  attract  like? 

To  be  sure. 

Until  some  one  rare  and  grand  result  is  reached 
which  may  be  good,  and  may  be  the  reverse  of  good? 

That  is  not  to  he  denied. 

And  for  this  reason,  I said,  I shall  not  attempt  to 
legislate  further  about  them. 

Naturally  enough,  he  replied. 


142 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Well,  and  about  the  business  of  the  agora,  and  the 
ordinary  dealings  between  man  and  man,  or  again 
about  agreements  with  artisans;  about  insult  and 
injury,  or  the  commencement  of  actions,  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  juries,  what  would  you  say?  there  may 
also  arise  questions  about  any  impositions  and  exac- 
tions of  market  and  harbor  dues  which  may  be  re- 
quired, and  in  general  about  the  regulations  of  mar- 
kets, police,  harbors,  and  the  like.  But,  oh  heavens! 
shall  we  condescend  to  legislate  on  any  of  these  par- 
ticulars? 

I think,  he  said,  that  there  is  no  need  to  impose  laws 
about  them  on  good  men ; what  regulations  are  neces- 
sary they  will  find  out  soon  enough  for  themselves. 

Yes,  I said,  my  friend,  if  God  will  only  preserve  to 
them  the  laws  which  we  have  given  them. 

And  without  divine  help,  said  Adeimantus,  they 
will  go  on  forever  making  and  mending  their  laws 
and  their  lives  in  the  hope  of  attaining  perfection. 

You  would  compare  them,  I said,  to  those  invalids 
who,  having  no  self-restraint,  will  not  leave  off  their 
habits  of  intemperance  ? 

Exactly. 

Yes,  I said;  and  what  a delightful  life  they  lead! 
they  are  always  doctoring  and  increasing  and  com- 
plicating their  disorders,  and  always  fancying  that 
they  will  be  cured  by  any  nostrum  which  anybody 
advises  them  to  try. 

Such  cases  are  very  common,  he  said,  with  invalids 
of  this  sort. 

Yes,  I replied;  and  the  charming  thing  is  that  they 
deem  him  their  worst  enemy  who  tells  them  the  truth, 
which  is  simply  that,  unless  they  give  up  eating  and 
drinking  and  wenching  and  idling,  neither  drug  nor 
cautery  nor  spell  nor  amulet  nor  any  other  remedy 
will  avail. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


143 


Charming!  he  replied.  I see  nothing  charming  in 
going  into  a passion  with  a man  who  tells  you  what 
is  right. 

These  gentlemen,  I said,  do  not  seem  to  be  in  your 
good  graces. 

Assuredly  not. 

Nor  would  you  praise  the  behavior  of  States  which 
act  like  the  men  whom  I was  just  now  describing. 
For  are  there  not  ill-ordered  States  in  which  the  cit- 
izens are  forbidden  under  pain  of  death  to  alter  the 
constitution;  and  yet  he  who  most  sweetly  courts 
those  who  live  under  this  regime  and  indulges  them 
and  fawns  upon  them  and  is  skilful  in  anticipating 
and  gratifying  their  humors  is  held  to  be  a great  and 
good  statesman  — do  not  these  States  resemble  the 
persons  whom  I was  describing? 

Yes,  he  said;  the  States  are  as  bad  as  the  men;  and 
I am  very  far  from  praising  them. 

But  do  you  not  admire,  I said,  the  coolness  and 
dexterity  of  these  ready  ministers  of  political  corrup- 
tion? 

Yes,  he  said,  I do ; but  not  of  all  of  them,  for  there 
are  some  whom  the  applause  of  the  multitude  has 
deluded  into  the  belief  that  they  are  really  statesmen, 
and  these  are  not  much  to  be  admired. 

What  do  you  mean  ? I said ; you  should  have  more 
feeling  for  them.  When  a man  can  not  measure,  and 
a great  many  others  who  can  not  measure  declare  that 
he  is  four  cubits  high,  can  he  help  believing  what  they 
say? 

Nay,  he  said,  certainly  not  in  that  case. 

Well,  then,  do  not  be  angry  with  them;  for  are 
they  not  as  good  as  a play,  trying  their  hand  at  paltry 
reforms  such  as  I was  describing;  they  are  always 
fancying  that  by  legislation  they  will  make  an  end 
of  frauds  in  contracts,  and  the  other  rascalities  which 


144 


THE  REPUBLIC 


I was  mentioning,  not  knowing  that  they  are  in  reality 
cutting  off  the  heads  of  a hydra? 

Yes,  he  said ; that  is  just  what  they  are  doing. 

I conceive,  I said,  that  the  true  legislator  will  not 
trouble  himself  with  this  class  of  enactments  whether 
concerning  laws  or  the  constitution  either  in  an  ill- 
ordered  or  in  a well-ordered  State;  for  in  the 
former  they  are  quite  useless,  and  in  the  latter  there 
will  be  no  difficulty  in  devising  them;  and  many  of 
them  will  naturally  flow  out  of  our  previous  regu- 
lations. 

What,  then,  he  said,  is  still  remaining  to  us  of  the 
work  of  legislation? 

Nothing  to  us,  I replied;  but  to  Apollo,  the  god 
of  Delphi,  there  remains  the  ordering  of  the  greatest 
and  noblest  and  chiefest  things  of  all. 

Which  are  they?  he  said. 

The  institution  of  temples  and  sacrifices,  and  the 
entire  service  of  gods,  demigods,  and  heroes ; also  the 
ordering  of  the  repositories  of  the  dead,  and  the  rites 
which  have  to  he  observed  by  him  who  would  pro- 
pitiate the  inhabitants  of  the  world  below.  These 
are  matters  of  which  we  are  ignorant  ourselves,  and 
as  founders  of  a city  we  should  be  unwise  in  trusting 
them  to  any  interpreter  but  our  ancestral  deity.  He 
is  the  god  who  sits  in  the  centre,  on  the  navel  of  the 
earth,  and  he  is  the  interpreter  of  religion  to  all  man- 
kind. 

You  are  right,  and  we  will  do  as  you  propose. 

But  where,  amid  all  this,  is  justice?  son  of  Ariston, 
tell  me  where.  Now  that  our  city  has  been  made  hab- 
itable, light  a candle  and  search,  and  get  your  brother 
and  Polemarchus  and  the  rest  of  our  friends  to  help, 
and  let  us  see  where  in  it  we  can  discover  justice  and 
where  injustice,  and  in  what  they  differ  from  one 
another,  and  which  of  them  the  man  who  would  he 


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happy  should  have  for  his  portion,  whether  seen  or 
unseen  by  gods  and  men. 

Nonsense,  said  Glaucon:  did  you  not  promise  to 
search  yourself,  saying  that  for  you  not  to  help  jus- 
tice in  her  need  would  be  an  impiety? 

I do  not  deny  that  I said  so;  and  as  you  remind 
me,  I will  be  as  good  as  my  word;  but  you  must  join. 

We  will,  he  replied. 

Well,  then,  I hope  to  make  the  discovery  in  this 
way:  I mean  to  begin  with  the  assumption  that  our 
State,  if  rightly  ordered,  is  perfect. 

That  is  most  certain. 

And  being  perfect,  is  therefore  wise  and  valiant 
and  temperate  and  just. 

That  is  likewise  clear. 

And  whichever  of  these  qualities  we  find  in  the 
State,  the  one  which  is  not  foimd  will  be  the  residue? 

Very  good. 

If  there  were  four  things,  and  we  were  searching  | 
for  one  of  them,  wherever  it  might  be,  the  one  sought 
for  might  be  known  to  us  from  the  first,  and  there 
would  be  no  further  trouble;  or  we  might  know  the 
other  three  first,  and  then  the  fourth  would  clearly 
be  the  one  left. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  is  not  a similar  method  to  be  pursued  about 
the  virtues,  which  are  also  four  in  number? 

Clearly. 

First  among  the  virtues  found  in  the  State,  wisdom  | 
comes  into  view,  and  in  this  I detect  a certain  pecu- 1 
liarity.  I 

What  is  that? 

The  State  which  we  have  been  describing  is  said  to 
be  wise  as  being  good  in  counsel? 

Very  true. 

And  good  counsel  is  clearly  a kind  of  knowledge. 


146 


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for  not  by  ignorance,  but  by  knowledge,  do  men  coun- 
sel well  ? 

Clearly. 

And  the  kinds  of  knowledge  in  a State  are  many 
and  diverse? 

Of  course. 

There  is  the  knowledge  of  the  carpenter;  but  is  that 
the  sort  of  knowledge  which  gives  a city  the  title  of 
wise  and  good  in  counsel  ? 

Certainly  not ; that  would  only  give  a city  the  repu- 
tation of  skill  in  carpentering.  _ 

Then  a city  is  not  to  be  called  wise  because  possess- 
ing a knowledge  which  counsels  for  the  best  about 
wooden  implements? 

Certainly  not. 

Nor  by  reason  of  a knowledge  which  advises  about 
brazen  pots,  he  said,  nor  as  possessing  any  other  sim- 
ilar knowledge? 

Not  by  reason  of  any  of  them,  he  said. 

Nor  yet  by  reason  of  a knowledge  which  cultivates 
the  earth ; that  would  give  the  city  the  name  of  agri- 
cultural? 

Yes. 

Well,  I said,  and  is  there  any  knowledge  in  our 
recently-founded  State  among  any  of  the  citizens 
which  advises,  not  about  any  particular  thing  in  the 
State,  but  about  the  whole,  and  considers  how  a State 
can  best  deal  with  itself  and  with  other  States  ? 

There  certainly  is. 

And  what  is  this  knowledge,  and  among  whom  is 
it  found?  I asked. 

It  is  the  knowledge  of  the  guardians,  he  replied, 
and  is  found  among  those  whom  we  were  just  now 
describing  as  perfect  guardians. 

And  what  is  the  name  which  the  city  derives  from 
the  possession  of  this  sort  of  knowledge? 


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147 


The  name  of  good  in  counsel  and  truly  wise. 

And  will  there  be  in  our  city  more  of  these  true 
guardians  or  more  smiths? 

The  smiths,  he  replied,  will  be  far  more  numerous. 

Will  not  the  guardians  be  the  smallest  of  all  the 
classes  who  receive  a name  from  the  profession  of 
some  kind  of  knowledge  ? 

Much  the  smallest. 

And  so  by  reason  of  the  smallest  part  or  class,  and 
of  the  knowledge  which  resides  in  this  presiding  and  ) 
ruling  part  of  itself,  the  whole  State,  being  thus  con- 
stituted according  to  nature,  will  be  wise;  and  this, 
which  has  the  only  knowledge  worthy  to  be  called 
wisdom,  has  been  ordained  by  nature  to  be  of  all 
classes  the  least. 

Most  true. 

Thus,  then,  I said,  the  nature  and  place  in  the  State 
of  one  of  the  four  virtues  has  somehow  or  other  been 
discovered. 

And,  in  my  humble  opinion,  very  satisfactorily  dis- 
covered, he  replied. 

Again,  I said,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  seeing  the 
nature  of  courage,  and  in  what  part  that  quality  re- 
sides which  gives  the  name  of  courageous  to  the  State. 

How  do  you  mean? 

Why,  I said,  every  one  who  calls  any  State  cour- 
ageous or  cowardly,  will  be  thinking  of  the  part  which 
fights  and  goes  out  to  war  on  the  State’s  behalf. 

No  one,  he  replied,  would  ever  think  of  any  other. 

The  rest  of  the  citizens  may  be  courageous  or  may 
be  cowardly,  but  their  courage  or  cowardice  will  not, 
as  I conceive,  have  the  effect  of  making  the  city  either 
the  one  or  the  other. 

Certainly  not. 

The  city  will  be  courageous  in  virtue  of  a portion 
of  herself  which  preserves  under  all  circumstances  that 


148 


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opinion  about  the  nature  of  things  to  be  feared  and  not 
to  be  feared  in  which  our  legislator  educated  them; 
and  this  is  what  you  term  courage. 

I should  like  to  hear  what  you  are  saying  once  more, 
for  I do  not  think  that  I perfectly  understand  you. 

I mean  that  courage  is  a kind  of  salvation. 

Salvation  of  what? 

Of  the  opinion  respecting  things  to  be  feared,  what 
they  are  and  of  what  nature,  which  the  law  implants 
through  education ; and  I mean  by  the  words  “ under 
all  circumstances  ” to  intimate  that  in  pleasure  or  in 
pain,  or  under  the  influence  of  desire  or  fear,  a man 
preserves  and  does  not  lose  this  opinion.  Shall  I give 
you  an  illustration? 

If  you  please. 

You  know,  I said,  that  dyers,  when  they  want  to 
dye  wool  for  making  the  true  sea-purple,  begin  by 
selecting  their  white  color  first ; this  they  prepare  and 
dress  with  much  care  and  pains,  in  order  that  the 
white  ground  may  take  the  purple  hue  in  full  per- 
fection. The  dyeing  then  proceeds;  and  whatever 
is  dyed  in  this  manner  becomes  a fast  color,  and  no 
washing  either  with  lyes  or  without  them  can  take 
away  the  bloom.  But,  when  the  ground  has  not  been 
duly  prepared,  you  will  have  noticed  how  poor  is  the 
look  either  of  purple  or  of  any  other  color. 

Yes,  he  said;  I know  that  they  have  a washed-out 
and  ridiculous  appearance. 

^ Then  now,  I said,  you  will  understand  what  our 
object  was  in  selecting  our  soldiers,  and  educating 
them  in  music  and  gymnastic;  we  were  contriving 
influences  which  would  prepare  them  to  take  the  dye 
of  the  laws  in  perfection,  and  the  color  of  their  opin- 
i ion  about  dangers  and  of  every  other  opinion  was  to 
I be  indelibly  fixed  by  their  nurture  and  training,  not 
' to  be  washed  away  by  such  potent  lyes  as  pleasure  — 


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149 


mightier  agent  far  in  washing  the  soul  than  any  soda 
or  lye;  or  by  sorrow,  fear,  and  desire,  the  mightiest 
of  all  other  solvents.  And  this  sort  of  universal  sav- 
ing power  of  true  opinion  in  conformity  with  law 
about  real  and  false  dangers  I call  and  maintain  to 
be  courage,  unless  you  disagree. 

But  I agree,  he  replied;  for  I suppose  that  you 
mean  to  exclude  mere  uninstructed  courage,  such  as 
that  of  a wild  beast  or  of  a slave  — this,  in  your  opin- 
ion, is  not  the  courage  which  the  law  ordains,  and 
ought  to  have  another  name. 

Most  certainly. 

Then  I may  infer  courage  to  be  such  as  you  de- 
scribe? 

Why,  yes,  said  I,  you  may,  and  if  you  add  the 
words  “ of  a citizen,”  you  will  not  be  far  wrong ; — 
hereafter,  if  you  like,  we  will  carry  the  examination 
further,  but  at  present  we  are  seeking  not  for  courage 
but  justice;  and  for  the  purpose  of  our  inquiry  we 
have  said  enough. 

You  are  right,  he  replied. 

Two  virtues  remain  to  be  discovered  in  the  State  — 
first,  temperance,  and  then  justice  which  is  the  end  of 
our  search. 

Very  true. 

Now,  can  we  find  justice  without  troubling  our- 
selves about  temperance? 

I do  not  know  how  that  can  be  accomplished,  he 
said,  nor  do  I desire  that  justice  should  be  brought 
to  light  and  temperance  lost  sight  of;  and  therefore 
I wish  that  you  would  do  me  the  favor  of  considering 
temperance  first. 

Certainly,  I replied,  I should  not  be  justified  in 
refusing  your  request. 

Then  consider,  he  said. 

Yes,  I replied;  I will;  and  as  far  as  I can  at  pres- 


150 


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ent  see,  the  virtue  of  temperance  has  more  of  the 
nature  of  harmony  and  symphony  than  the  preceding. 

How  so  ? he  asked. 

Temperance,  I replied,  is  the  ordering  or  control- 
ling of  certain  pleasures  and  desires ; this  is  curiously 
enough  implied  in  the  saying  of  “ a man  being  his  own 
master;  ” and  other  traces  of  the  same  notion  may  be 
found  in  language. 

No  doubt,  he  said. 

There  is  something  ridiculous  in  the  expression 
“ master  of  himself ; ” for  the  master  is  also  the  serv- 
ant and  the  servant  the  master ; and  in  all  these  modes 
of  speaking  the  same  person  is  denoted. 

Certainly. 

The  meaning  is,  I believe,  that  in  the  human  soul 
there  is  a better  and  also  a worse  principle ; and  when 
the  better  has  the  worse  under  control,  then  a man 
is  said  to  be  master  of  himself ; and  this  is  a term  of 
praise:  but  when,  owing  to  evil  education  or  asso- 
ciation, the  better  principle,  which  is  also  the  smaller, 
is  overwhelmed  by  the  greater  mass  of  the  worse  — 
in  this  case  he  is  blamed  and  is  called  the  slave  of  self 
and  unprincipled. 

Yes,  there  is  reason  in  that. 

And  now,  I said,  look  at  our  newly-created  State, 
and  there  you  will  find  one  of  these  two  conditions 
realized ; for  the  State,  as  you  will  acknowledge,  may 
be  justly  called  master  ef  itself,  if  the  words  “ tem- 
perance ” and  “ self-mastery  ” truly  express  the  rule 
of  the  better  part  over  the  worse. 

Yes,  he  said,  I see  that  what  you  say  is  true. 

Let  me  further  note  that  the  manifold  and  complex 
pleasures  and  desires  and  pains  are  generally  found 
in  children  and  women  and  servants,  and  in  the  free- 
men so  called  who  are  of  the  lowest  and  more  numer- 
ous class. 


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151 


Certainly,  he  said. 

Whereas  the  simple  and  moderate  desires  which 
follow  reason,  and  are  under  the  guidance  of  mind 
and  true  opinion,  are  to  be  found  only  in  a few,  and 
those  the  best  born  and  best  educated. 

Very  true. 

These  two,  as  you  may  perceive,  have  a place  in  our 
State;  and  the  meaner  desires  of  the  many  are  held 
down  by  the  virtuous  desires  and  wisdom  of  the  few. 

That  I perceive,  he  said. 

Then  if  there  be  any  city  which  may  be  described 
as  master  of  its  own  pleasures  and  desires,  and  mas- 
ter of  itself,  ours  may  claim  such  a designation? 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

It  may  also  be  called  temperate,  and  for  the  same 
reasons? 

Yes. 

And  if  there  be  any  State  in  which  rulers  and  sub- 
jects will  be  agreed  as  to  the  question  who  are  to  rule, 
that  again  will  be  our  State? 

Undoubtedly. 

And  the  citizens  being  thus  agreed  among  them- 
selves, in  which  class  will  temperance  be  found  — in 
the  rulers  or  in  the  subjects? 

In  both,  as  I should  imagine,  he  replied. 

Do  you  observe  that  we  were  not  far  wrong  in  our 
guess  that  temperance  was  a sort  of  harmony? 

Why  so? 

Why,  because  temperance  is  unlike  courage  and. 
wisdom,  each  of  which  resides  in  a part  only,  the  one' 
making  the  State  wise  and  the  other  valiant;  not  so 
temperance,  which  extends  to  the  whole,  and  runs 
through  all  the  notes  of  the  scale,  and  produces  a har- 
mony of  the  weaker  and  the  stronger  and  the  middle 
class,  whether  you  suppose  them  to  be  stronger  or 
weaker  in  wisdom  or  power  or  numbers  or  wealth. 


152 


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or  anything  else.  Most  truly  then  may  we  deem 
temperance  to  be  the  agreement  of  the  naturally 
superior  and  inferior,  as  to  the  right  to  rule  of  either, 
both  in  states  and  individuals. 

I entirely  agree  with  you. 

And  so,  I said,  we  may  consider  three  out  of  the 
four  virtues  to  have  been  discovered  in  our  State. 
The  last  of  those  qualities  which  make  a state  virtuous 
must  be  justice,  if  we  only  knew  what  that  was. 

The  inference  is  obvious. 

The  time  then  has  arrived,  Glaucon,  when,  like 
huntsmen,  we  should  surround  the  cover,  and  look 
sharp  that  justice  does  not  steal  away,  and  pass  out 
of  sight  and  escape  us;  for  beyond  a doubt  she  is 
somewhere  in  this  country : watch  therefore  and  strive 
to  catch  a sight  of  her,  and  if  you  see  her  first,  let  me 
know. 

Would  that  I could!  but  you  should  regard  me 
rather  as  a follower  who  has  just  eyes  enough  to  see 
what  you  show  him  — that  is  about  as  much  as  I am 
good  for. 

Olfer  up  a prayer  with  me  and  follow. 

I will,  but  you  must  show  me  the  way. 

Here  is  no  path,  I said,  and  the  wood  is  dark  and 
perplexing;  still  we  must  push  on. 

Let  us  push  on. 

Here  I saw  something:  Halloo!  I said,  I begin  to 
perceive  a track,  and  I believe  that  the  quarry  will 
not  escape. 

Good  news,  he  said. 

Truly,  I said,  we  are  stupid  fellows. 

Why  so  ? 

Why,  my  good  sir,  at  the  beginning  of  our  inquiry, 
ages  ago,  there  was  justice  tumbling  out  at  our  feet, 
and  we  never  saw  her;  nothing  could  be  more 
ridiculous.  Like  people  who  go  about  looking  for 


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153 


what  they  have  in  their  hands  — that  was  the  way  with 
us  — we  looked  not  at  what  we  were  seeking,  but  at 
what  was  far  off  in  the  distance;  and  therefore,  I sup- 
pose, we  missed  her. 

What  do  you  mean? 

I mean  to  say  that  in  reality  for  a long  time  past 
we  have  been  talking  of  justice,  and  have  failed  to 
recognize  her. 

I grow  impatient  at  the  length  of  your  exordium. 

Well  then,  tell  me,  I said,  whether  I am  right  or 
not:  You  remember  the  original  principle  which  we 
were  always  laying  down  at  the  foundation  of  the 
State,  that  one  man  should  practise  one  thing  only, 
the  thing  to  which  his  nature  was  best  adapted;  — 
now  justice  is  this  principle  or  a part  of  it. 

Yes,  we  often  said  that  one  man  should  do  one  thing 
only. 

Further,  we  affirmed  that  justice  was  doing  one’s 
own  business,  and  not  being  a busybody;  we  said  so 
again  and  again,  and  many  others  have  said  the  same 
to  us. 

Yes,  we  said  so. 

Then  to  do  one’s  own  business  in  a certain  way  may 
be  assumed  to  be  justice.  Can  you  tell  me  whence  I 
derive  this  inference? 

I can  not,  but  I should  like  to  be  told. 

Because  I think  that  this  is  the  only  virtue  which  ’ 
remains  in  the  State  when  the  other  virtues  of  tem- 
perance and  courage  and  wisdom  are  abstracted ; and, 
that  this  is  the  ultimate  cause  and  condition  of  the 
existence  of  all  of  them,  and  while  remaining  in  them 
is  also  their  preservative;  and  we  were  saying  that 
if  the  three  were  discovered  by  us,  justice  woxild  be 
the  fourth  or  remaining  one. 

That  follows  of  necessity. 

If  we  are  asked  to  determine  which  of  these  four 


154 


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qualities  by  its  presence  contributes  most  to  the  excel- 
lence of  the  State,  whether  the  agreement  of  rulers 
and  subjects,  or  the  preservation  in  the  soldiers  of  the 
opinion  which  the  law  ordains  about  the  true  nature 
of  dangers,  or  wisdom  and  watchfulness  in  the  rulers, 
or  whether  this  other  which  I am  mentioning,  and 
which  is  found  in  children  and  women,  slave  and  free- 
man, artisan,  ruler,  subject,  — the  quality,  I mean, 
of  every  one  doing  his  own  work,  and  not  being  a 
busybody,  would  claim  the  palm  — the  question  is  not 
so  easily  answered. 

Certainly,  he  replied,  there  would  be  a difficulty  in 
saying  which. 

Then  the  power  of  each  individual  in  the  State  to 
do  his  own  work  appears  to  compete  with  the  other 
political  virtues,  wisdom,  temperance,  courage. 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  the  virtue  which  enters  into  this  competition  is 
justice  ? 

Exactly. 

Let  us  look  at  the  question  from  another  point  of 
view:  Are  not  the  rulers  in  a State  those  to  whom 
you  would  entrust  the  office  of  determining  suits  at 
law? 

Certainly. 

And  are  suits  decided  on  any  other  ground  but  that 
a man  may  neither  take  what  is  another’s,  nor  be 
deprived  of  what  is  his  own? 

Yes;  that  is  their  principle. 

' Which  is  a just  principle? 

Yes. 

Then  on  this  view  also  justice  will  he  admitted  to 
be  the  having  and  doing  what  is  a man’s  own,  and 
belongs  to  him? 

Very  true. 

Think,  now,  and  say  whether  you  agree  with  me  or 


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155 


not.  Suppose  a carpenter  to  be  doing  the  business  of 
a cobbler,  or  a cobbler  of  a carpenter;  and  suppose 
them  to  exchange  their  implements  or  their  duties, 
or  the  same  person  to  be  doing  the  work  of  both, 
or  whatever  be  the  change;  do  you  think  that  any 
great  harm  would  result  to  the  State? 

Not  much. 

But  when  the  cobbler  or  any  other  man  whom  na- 
ture designed  to  be  a trader,  having  his  heart  lifted 
up  by  wealth  or  strength  or  the  number  of  his  fol- 
lowers, or  any  like  advantage,  attempts  to  force  hi$ 
way  into  the  class  of  warriors,  or  a warrior  into  that 
of  legislators  and  guardians,  for  which  he  is  unfittedi,  | 
and  either  to  take  the  implements  or  the  duties  of  the 
other ; or  when  one  man  is  trader,  legislator,  and  war- 
rior all  in  one,  then  I think  you  will  agree  with  me  in 
saying  that  this  interchange  and  this  meddling  of  one^ 
with  another  is  the  ruin  of  the  State. 

Most  true. 

Seeing  then,  I said,  that  there  are  three  distinct . 
classes,  any  meddling  of  one  with  another,  or  the  j 
change  of  one  into  another,  is  the  greatest  harm  to  the 
State,  and  may  be  most  justly  termed  evil-doing? 

Precisely. 

And  the  greatest  degree  of  evil-doing  to  one’s  own 
city  would  be  termed  by  you  injustice? 

Certainly. 

This  then  is  injustice;  and  on  the  other  hand  when 
the  trader,  the  auxiliary,  and  the  guardian  each  do 
their  own  business,  that  is  justice,  and  will  make  the 
city  just. 

I agree  with  you. 

We  will  not,  I said,  be  over-positive  as  yet;  but 
if,  on  trial,  this  conception  of  justice  be  verified  in  the 
individual  as  well  as  in  the  State,  there  will  be  no 
longer  any  room  for  doubt;  if  it  be  not  verified,  we 


156 


THE  REPUBLIC 


must  have  a fresh  inquiry.  First  let  us  complete  the 
old  investigation,  which  we  began,  as  you  remember, 
under  the  impression  that,  if  we  could  previously 
examine  justice  on  the  larger  scale,  there  would  be 
less  difficulty  in  discerning  her  in  the  individual.  That 
larger  example  appeared  to  be  the  State,  and  accord- 
ingly we  constructed  as  good  a one  as  we  could,  know- 
ing well  that  in  the  good  State  justice  would  be  found. 

/Let  the  discovery  which  we  made  be  now  applied  to 
the  individual  — if  they  agree,  we  shall  be  satisfied ; 
or,  if  there  be  a difference  in  the  individual,  we  will 
come  back  to  the  State  and  have  another  trial  of  the 
theory.  The  friction  of  the  two  when  rubbed  together 
j may  possibly  strike  a light  in  which  justice  will  shine 
forth,  and  the  vision  which  is  then  revealed  we  will 
fix  in  our  souls. 

That  will  be  in  regular  course;  let  us  do  as  you 
say. 

I proceeded  to  ask:  When  two  things,  a greater 
and  less,  are  called  by  the  same  name,  are  they  like 
or  unhke  in  so  far  as  they  are  called  the  same? 

Like,  he  replied. 

The  just  man  then,  if  we  regard  the  idea  of  justice 
only,  will  be  like  the  just  State? 

He  wiU. 

And  a State  was  thought  by  us  to  be  just  when  the 
three  classes  in  the  State  severally  did  their  own  busi- 
ness; and  also  thought  to  be  temperate  and  valiant 
and  wise  by  reason  of  certain  other  affections  and 
qualities  of  these  same  classes? 

True,  he  said. 

And  so  of  the  individual;  we  may  assume  that  he 
has  the  same  three  principles  in  his  own  soul  which 
are  found  in  the  State;  and  he  may  be  rightly  de- 
scribed in  the  same  terms,  because  he  is  affected  in  the 
same  manner? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


157 


Certainly,  he  said. 

Once  more  then,  O my  friend,  we  may  have  alighted 
upon  an  easy  question  — whether  the  soul  has  these 
three  principles  or  not? 

An  easy  question!  Nay,  rather,  Socrates,  the 
proverb  holds  that  hard  is  the  good. 

Very  true,  I said;  and  I do  not  think  that  the 
method  which  we  are  employing  is  at  all  adequate  to 
the  accurate  solution  of  this  question ; the  true  method 
is  another  and  a longer  one.  Still  we  may  arrive  at  a 
solution  not  below  the  level  of  the  previous  inquiry. 

May  we  not  be  satisfied  with  that?  he  said;  — under 
the  circumstances,  I am  quite  content. 

I too,  I replied,  shall  be  extremely  well  satisfied. 

Then  faint  not  in  pursuing  the  speculation,  he  said. 

Must  we  not  acknowledge,  I said,  that  in  each  of  us 
there  are  the  same  principles  and  habits  which  there 
are  in  the  State;  and  that  from  the  individual  they 
pass  into  the  State?  — how  else  can  they  come  there? 
Take  the  quality  of  passion  or  spirit ; — it  would  be 
ridiculous  to  imagine  that  this  quality,  when  found 
in  States,  is  not  derived  from  the  individuals  who  are 
supposed  to  possess  it,  e.  g.  the  Thracians,  Scythians, 
and  in  general  the  northern  nations;  and  the  same 
may  be  said  of  the  love  of  knowledge,  which  is  the 
special  characteristic  of  our  part  of  the  world,  or  of 
the  love  of  money,  which  may,  with  equal  truth,  be 
attributed  to  the  Phoenicians  and  Egyptians. 

Exactly  so,  he  said. 

There  is  no  difficulty  in  understanding  this. 

None  whatever. 

But  the  question  is  not  quite  so  easy  when  we  pro- 
ceed to  ask  whether  these  principles  are  three  or  one; 
whether,  that  is  to  say,  we  learn  with  one  part  of  our 
nature,  are  angry  with  another,  and  with  a third  part 
desire  the  satisfaction  of  our  natural  appetites;  or 


158 


THE  REPUBLIC 

whether  the  whole  soul  comes  into  play  in  each  sort 
of  action  — to  determine  that  is  the  difficulty. 

Yes,  he  said;  there  lies  the  difficulty. 

Then  let  us  now  try  and  determine  whether  they  are 
the  same  or  different. 

How  can  we?  he  asked. 

I replied  as  follows:  The  same  thing  clearly  can 
not  act  or  be  acted  upon  in  the  same  part  or  in  rela- 
tion to  the  same  thing  at  the  same  time,  in  contrary 
ways;  and  therefore  whenever  this  contradiction  oc- 
curs in  things  apparently  the  same,  we  know  that  they 
are  really  not  the  same,  but  different. 

Good. 

For  example,  I said,  can  the  same  thing  he  at  rest 
and  in  motion  at  the  same  time  in  the  same  part? 

Impossible. 

' Still,  I said,  let  us  have  a more  precise  statement 
of  terms,  lest  we  should  hereafter  fall  out  by  the  way. 
Imagine  the  case  of  a man  who  is  standing  and  also 
moving  his  hands  and  his  head,  and  suppose  a person 
to  say  that  one  and  the  same  person  is  in  motion  and 
at  rest  at  the  same  moment  — to  such  a mode  of 
speech  we  should  object,  and  should  rather  say  that 
one  part  of  him  is  in  motion  while  another  is  at  rest. 

Very  true. 

And  suppose  the  objector  to  refine  still  further, 
and  to  draw  the  nice  distinction  that  not  only  parts 
of  tops,  hut  whole  tops,  when  they  spin  round  with 
their  pegs  fixed  on  the  spot,  are  at  rest  and  in  motion 
at  the  same  time  (and  he  may  say  the  same  of  any- 
thing which  revolves  in  the  same  spot),  his  objection 
would  not  be  admitted  by  us,  because  in  such  cases 
things  are  not  at  rest  and  in  motion  in  the  same  parts 
of  themselves;  we  should  rather  say  that  they  have 
both  an  axis  and  a circumference;  and  that  the  axis 
stands  still,  for  there  is  no  deviation  from  the  per- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


159 


pendicular;  and  that  the  circumference  goes  round. 
But  if,  while  revolving,  the  axis  inclines  either  to  the 
right  or  left,  forwards  or  backwards,  then  in  no  point 
of  view  can  they  be  at  rest. 

That  is  the  correct  mode  of  describing  them,  he 
replied. 

Then  none  of  these  objections  will  confuse  us,  or 
incline  us  to  believe  that  the  same  thing  at  the  same 
time,  in  the  same  part  or  in  relation  to  the  same  thing, 
can  act  or  be  acted  upon  in  contrary  ways. 

Certainly  not,  according  to  my  way  of  thinking. 

Yet,  I said,  that  we  may  not  be  compelled  to  ex- 
amine all  such  objections,  and  prove  at  length  that 
they  are  untrue,  let  us  assume  their  absurdity,  and  go 
forward  on  the  understanding  that  hereafter,  if  this 
assumption  turn  out  to  be  untrue,  all  the  consequences 
which  follow  shall  be  withdrawn. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  will  be  the  best  way. 

Well,  I said,  would  you  not  allow  that  assent  and 
dissent,  desire  and  aversion,  attraction  and  repulsion, 
are  all  of  them  opposites,  whether  they  are  regarded 
as  active  or  passive  (for  that  makes  no  difference  in 
the  fact  of  their  opposition)  ? 

Yes,  he  said,  they  are  opposites. 

Well,  I said,  and  hunger  and  thirst,  and  the  de- 
sires in  general,  and  again  willing  and  wishing,  — 
all  these  you  would  refer  to  the  classes  already  men- 
tioned. You  would  say  — would  you  not?  — that  the 
soul  of  him  who  desires  is  seeking  after  the  object  of 
his  desire ; or  that  he  is  drawing  to  himself  the  thing 
which  he  wishes  to  possess:  or  again,  when  a person 
wants  anything  to  be  given  him,  his  mind,  longing 
for  the  realization  of  his  desire,  intimates  his  wish  to 
have  it  by  a nod  of  assent,  as  if  he  had  been  asked 
a question? 

Very  trae. 


160 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  what  would  you  say  of  unwillingness  and  dis- 
like and  the  absence  of  desire;  should  not  these  be 
referred  to  the  opposite  class  of  repulsion  and  rejec- 
tion? 

Certainly. 

Admitting  this  to  be  true  of  desire  generally,  let 
us  suppose  a particular  class  of  desires,  and  out  of 
these  we  will  select  hunger  and  thirst,  as  they  are 
termed,  which  are  the  most  obvious  of  them? 

Let  us  take  that  class,  he  said. 

The  object  of  one  is  food,  and  of  the  other  drink? 

Yes. 

And  here  comes  the  point:  is  not  thirst  the  desire 
which  the  soul  has  of  drink,  and  of  drink  only ; not  of 
drink  qualified  by  anything  else;  for  example,  warm 
or  cold,  or  much  or  little,  or,  in  a word,  drink  of  any 
particular  sort:  but  if  the  thirst  be  accompanied  by 
heat,  then  the  desire  is  of  cold  drink;  or,  if  accom- 
panied by  cold,  then  of  warm  drink;  or,  if  the  thirst 
be  excessive,  then  the  drink  which  is  desired  will  be 
excessive;  or,  if  not  great,  the  quantity  of  drink  will 
also  be  small:  hut  thirst  pure  and  simple  will 
desire  drink  pure  and  simple,  which  is  the  natural 
satisfaction  of  thirst,  as  food  is  of  hunger? 

Yes,  he  said;  the  simple  desire  is,  as  you  say,  in 
every  case  of  the  simple  object,  and  the  qualified 
desire  of  the  qualified  object. 

But  here  a confusion  may  arise;  and  I should  wish 
to  guard  against  an  opponent  starting  up  and  saying 
that  no  man  desires  drink  only,  but  good  drink,  or 
food  only,  hut  good  food;  for  good  is  the  universal 
object  of  desire,  and  thirst  being  a desire,  will  neces- 
sarily be  thirst  after  good  drink ; and  the  same  is  true 
of  every  other  desire. 

Yes,  he  replied,  the  opponent  might  have  something 
to  say. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


161 


Nevertheless  I should  still  maintain,  that  of 
relatives  some  have  a quality  attached  to  either  term 
of  the  relation;  others  are  simple  and  have  their  cor- 
relatives sinlple. 

I do  not  know  what  you  mean. 

Well,  you  know  of  course  that  the  greater  is 
relative  to  the  less? 

Certainly. 

And  the  much  greater  to  the  much  less? 

Yes. 

And  the  sometime  greater  to  the  sometime  less,  and 
the  greater  that  is  to  be  to  the  less  that  is  to  be? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  so  of  more  and  less,  and  of  other  correlative 
terms,  such  as  the  double  and  the  half,  or  again,  the 
heavier  and  the  lighter,  the  swifter  and  the  slower; 
and  of  hot  and  cold,  and  of  any  other  relatives ; — is 
not  this  true  of  all  of  them? 

Yes. 

And  does  not  the  same  principle  hold  in  the\ 
sciences?  The  object  of  science  is  knowledge  (as-  | 
suming  that  to  be  the  true  definition),  hut  the  object 
of  a particular  science  is  a particular  kind  of  knowl- 
edge; I mean,  for  example,  that  the  science  of  house-  j 
building  is  a kind  of  knowledge  which  is  defined  and  1 
distinguished  from  other  kinds  and  is  therefore  termed 
architecture. 

Certainly. 

Because  it  has  a particular  quality  which  no  other 
has? 

Yes. 

And  it  has  this  particular  quality  because  it  has  an  ^ 
object  of  a particular  kind;  and  this  is  true  of  the  \ 
other  arts  and  sciences?  I 

Yes. 

Now,  then,  if  I have  made  myself  clear,  you  will  un- 


162 


THE  REPUBLIC 


derstand  my  original  meaning  in  what  I said  about 
relatives.  My  meaning  was,  that  if  one  term  of  a 
relation  is  taken  alone,  the  other  is  taken  alone;  if 
one  term  is  qualified,  the  other  is  also  qualified.  I 
do  not  mean  to  say  that  relatives  may  not  be  disparate, 
or  that  the  science  of  health  is  healthy,  or  of  disease 
necessarily  diseased,  or  that  the  sciences  of  good  and 
evil  are  therefore  good  and  evil;  hut  only  that,  when 
the  term  science  is  no  longer  used  absolutely,  but  has  a 
qualified  object  which  in  this  case  is  the  nature  of 
health  and  disease,  it  becomes  defined,  and  is  hence 
called  not  merely  science,  but  the  science  of  medicine. 

I quite  understand,  and  I think  as  you  do. 

Would  you  not  say  that  thirst  is  one  of  these  essen- 
tially relative  terms,  having  clearly  a relation  — 

Yes,  thirst  is  relative  to  drink. 

And  a certain  kind  of  thirst  is  relative  to  a certain 
kind  of  drink ; but  thirst  taken  alone  is  neither  of  much 
nor  little,  nor  of  good  nor  bad,  nor  of  any  particular 
kind  of  drink,  but  of  drink  only? 

Certainly. 

Then  the  soul  of  the  thirsty  one,  in  so  far  as  he  is 
thirsty,  desires  only  drink;  for  this  he  yearns  and  tries 
to  obtain  it? 

That  is  plain. 

And  if  you  suppose  something  which  pulls  a thirsty 
soul  away  from  drink,  that  must  be  different  from  the 
thirsty  principle  which  draws  him  like  a beast  to  drink : 
for,  as  we  were  saying,  the  same  thing  can  not  at  the 
same  time  with  the  same  part  of  itself  act  in  contrary 
ways  about  the  same. 

Impossible. 

No  more  than  you  can  say  that  the  hands  of  the 
archer  push  and  pull  the  how  at  the  same  time,  but 
what  you  say  is  that  one  hand  pushes  and  the  other 
pulls. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


163 


Exactly  so,  he  replied. 

And  might  a man  be  thirsty,  and  yet  unwilling  to 
drink? 

Yes,  he  said,  it  eonstantly  happens. 

And  in  such  a case  what  is  one  to  say?  Would  you 
not  say  that  there  was  something  in  the  soul  bidding  a 
man  to  drink,  and  something  else  forbidding  him, 
which  is  other  and  stronger  than  the  principle  which 
bids  him? 

I should  say  so. 

And  the  forbidding  principle  is  derived  from 
reason,  and  that  which  bids  and  attracts  proceeds  from 
passion  and  disease? 

Clearly. 

Then  we  may  fairly  assume  that  they  are  two,  and 
that  they  differ  from  one  another;  the  one  with  which 
a man  reasons,  we  may  call  the  rational  principle  of 
the  soul,  the  other,  with  which  he  loves  and  hungers 
and  thirsts  and  feels  the  flutterings  of  any  other 
desire,  may  be  termed  the  irrational  or  appetitive, 
the  ally  of  sundry  pleasures  and  satisfactions? 

Yes,  he  said,  we  may  fairly  assume  them  to  be  dif- 
ferent. 

Then  let  us  finally  determine  that  there  are  two 
principles  existing  in  the  soul.  And  what  of  passion, 
or  spirit?  Is  it  a third,  or  akin  to  one  of  the  pre- 
ceding? 

I should  be  inclined  to  say  — akin  to  desire. 

Well,  I said,  there  is  a story  which  I remember  to 
have  heard,  and  in  which  I put  faith.  The  story  is, 
that  Leontius,  the  son  of  Aglaion,  coming  up  one  day 
from  the  Piraeus,  under  the  north  wall  on  the  outside, 
observed  some  dead  bodies  lying  on  the  ground  at 
the  place  of  execution.  He  felt  a desire  to  see  them, 
and  also  a dread  and  abhorrence  of  them;  for  a time 
he  struggled  and  covered  his  eyes,  but  at  length  the 


1G4 


THE  REPUBLIC 


desire  got  the  better  of  him;  and  forcing  them  open, 
he  ran  up  to  the  dead  bodies,  saying.  Look,  ye 
wretches,  take  your  fill  of  the  fair  sight, 

I have  heard  the  story  myself,  he  said. 

The  moral  of  the  tale  is,  that  anger  at  times  goes 
to  war  with  desire,  as  though  they  were  two  distinct 
things. 

Yes;  that  is  the  meaning,  he  said. 

And  are  there  not  many  other  cases  in  which  we 
observe  that  when  a man’s  desires  violently  prevail 
over  his  reason,  he  reviles  himself,  and  is  angry  at  the 
violence  within  him,  and  that  in  this  struggle,  which 
is  like  the  struggle  of  factions  in  a State,  his  spirit  is 
on  the  side  of  his  reason;  — but  for  the  passionate  or 
spirited  element  to  take  part  with  the  desires  when 
reason  decides  that  she  should  not  be  opposed,'  is  a 
sort  of  thing  which  I believe  that  you  never  observed 
occurring  in  yourself,  nor,  as  I should  imagine,  in  any 
one  else? 

Certainly  not. 

Suppose  that  a man  thinks  he  has  done  a wrong  to 
another,  the  nobler  he  is  the  less  able  is  he  to  feel 
indignant  at  any  suffering,  such  as  hunger,  or  cold, 
or  any  other  pain  which  the  injured  person  may  in- 
flict upon  him  — these  he  deems  to  be  just,  and,  as  I 
say,  his  anger  refuses  to  be  excited  by  them. 

True,  he  said. 

But  when  he  thinks  that  he  is  the  sufferer  of  the 
wrong,  then  he  boils  and  chafes,  and  is  on  the  side  of 
what  he  believes  to  be  justice;  and  because  he  suffers 
hunger  or  cold  or  other  pain  he  is  only  the  more  de- 
termined to  persevere  and  conquer.  His  noble  spirit 
will  hot  be  quelled  until  he  either  slays  or  is  slain ; or 
until  he  hears  the  voice  of  the  shepherd,  that  is,  reason, 
bidding  his  dog  bark  no  more. 

^ ReadiDg  ix^  deiv  dvrLTrpdrTeiVj  without  a comma  after  deiv. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


m 


The  illustration  is  perfect,  he  replied;  and  in  our 
State,  as  we  were  saying,  the  auxiliaries  were  to  be 
dogs,  and  to  hear  the  voice  of  the  rulers,  who  are  their 
shepherds. 

I perceive,  I said,  that  you  quite  understand  me; 
there  is,  however,  a further  point  which  I wish  you  to 
consider. 

What  point? 

You  remember  that  passion  or  spirit  appeared  at 
first  sight  to  be  a kind  of  desire,  but  now  we  should 
say  quite  the  contrary;  for  in  the  conflict  of  the  soul 
spirit  is  arrayed  on  the  side  of  the  rational  princi- 
ple. 

Most  assuredly. 

But  a further  question  arises:  Is  passion  different 
from  reason  also,  or  only  a kind  of  reason;  in  which 
latter  case,  instead  of  three  principles  in  the  soul, 
there  will  be  only  two,  the  rational  and  the  con- 
cupiscent; or  rather,  as  the  State  was  composed  of  I 
three  classes,  traders,  auxiliaries,  counsellors,  so  may 
there  not  be  in  the  individual  soul  a third  element 
which  is  passion  or  spirit,  and  when  not  cor- 
rupted by  bad  education  is  the  natural  auxiliary  of 
reason? 

Yes,  he  said,  there  must  be  a third. 

Yes,  I replied,  if  passion,  which  has  already  been 
shown  to  be  different  from  desire,  turn  out  also  to  be 
different  from  reason. 

But  that  is  easily  proved:  — We  may  observe  even 
in  young  children  that  they  are  full  of  spirit  almost 
as  soon  as  they  are  born,  whereas  some  of  them  never 
seem  to  attain  to  the  use  of  reason,  and  most  of  them 
late  enough. 

Excellent,  I said,  and  you  may  see  passion  equally 
in  brute  animals,  which  is  a further  proof  of  the  truth 
of  what  you  are  saying.  And  we  may  once  more 


166 


THE  REPUBLIC 


appeal  to  the  words  of  Homer,  which  have  been 
already  quoted  by  us, 

“ He  smote  his  breast,  and  thus  rebuked  his  soul;  ” ^ 

for  in  this  verse  Homer  has  clearly  supposed  the 
power  which  reasons  about  the  better  and  worse  to  be 
different  from  the  unreasoning  anger  which  is  re- 
buked by  it. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  so,  after  much  tossing,  we  have  reached  land, 
and  are  fairly  agreed  that  the  same  principles  which 
exist  in  the  State  exist  also  in  the  individual,  and 
that  they  are  three  in  number. 

Exactly. 

Must  we  not  then  infer  that  the  individual  is  wise  in 
the  same  way,  and  in  virtue  of  the  same  quality  which 
makes  the  State  wise? 

Certainly. 

Also  that  the  same  quality  which  constitutes 
courage  in  the  State  constitutes  courage  in  the  in- 
dividual, and  that  both  the  State  and  the  individual 
bear  the  same  relation  to  all  the  other  virtues? 

Assuredly. 

And  the  individual  will  be  acknowledged  by  us  to 
be  just  in  the  same  way  in  which  the  State  is  just? 

That  follows  of  course. 

We  can  not  but  remember  that  the  justice  of  the 
State  consisted  in  each  of  the  three  classes  doing  the 
work  of  its  own  class  ? 

We  are  not  very  likely  to  have  forgotten,  he  said. 

We  must  recollect  that  the  individual  in  whom  the 
several  qualities  of  his  nature  do  their  own  work  will 
be  just,  and  vdll  do  his  own  work? 

Yes,  he  said,  we  must  remember  that  too. 

And  ought  not  the  rational  principle,  which  is  wise, 

^ Od.  XX.  17,  quoted  supra. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


167 


and  has  the  care  of  the  whole  soul,  to  rule,  and  the 
passionate  or  spirited  principle  to  be  the  subject  and 
ally? 

Certainly. 

And,  as  we  were  saying,  the  united  influence  of 
music  and  gymnastic  will  bring  them  into  accord, 
nerving  and  sustaining  the  reason  with  noble  words 
and  lessons,  and  moderating  and  soothing  and 
civilizing  the  wildness  of  passion  by  harmony  and 
rhythm? 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

And  these  two,  thus  nurtured  and  educated,  and 
having  learned  truly  to  know  their  own  fimctions, 
will  rule  ^ over  the  concupiscent,  which  in  each  of  us 
is  the  largest  part  of  the  soul  and  by  nature  most 
insatiable  of  gain ; over  this  they  will  keep  guard,  lest, 
waxing  great  and  strong  with  the  fulness  of  bodily 
pleasures,  as  they  are  termed,  the  concupiscent  soul, 
no  longer  confined  to  her  own  sphere,  should  attempt 
to  enslave  and  rule  those  who  are  not  her  natural-born 
subjects,  and  overturn  the  whole  life  of  man? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Both  together  will  they  not  be  the  best  defenders 
of  the  whole  soul  and  the  whole  body  against  attacks 
from  without;  the  one  counselling,  and  the  other  fight- 
ing under  his  leader,  and  courageously  executing  his 
commands  and  counsels? 

True. 

And  he  is  to  be  deemed  courageous  whose  spirit 
retains  in  pleasure  and  in  pain  the  commands 
of  reason  about  what  he  ought  or  ought  not  to 
fear? 

1 Reading  TrpoaTaT'jficeTov  with  Bekker ; or,  if  the  reading  irpoo’T'/jffeTOPy 
which  is  found  in  the  MSS.,  be  adopted,  then  the  nominative  must  be  sup- 
plied from  the  previous  sentence  : “ Music  and  gymnastic  will  place  in 
authority  over  ...”  This  is  very  awkward,  and  the  awkwardness  is  in- 
creased by  the  necessity  of  changing  the  subject  at  TrjprjacTov, 


168 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Right,  he  replied. 

And  him  we  call  wise  who  has  in  him  that  little  part 
which  rules,  and  which  proclaims  these  commands; 
that  part  too  being  supposed  to  have  a knowledge  of 
what  is  for  the  interest  of  each  of  the  three  parts  and 
of  the  whole? 

Assuredly. 

And  would  you  not  say  that  he  is  temperate  who 
has  these  same  elements  in  friendly  harmony,  in  whom 
the  one  ruling  principle  of  reason,  and  the  two  subject 
ones  of  spirit  and  desire  are  equally  agreed  that  reason 
ought  to  rule,  and  do  not  rebel? 

Certainly,  he  said,  that  is  the  true  account  of  tem- 
perance whether  in  the  State  or  individual. 

And  surely,  I said,  we  have  explained  again  and 
again  how  and  by  virtue  of  what  quality  a man  will 
be  just. 

That  is  very  certain. 

And  is  justice  dimmer  in  the  individual,  and  is  her 
form  different,  or  is  she  the  same  which  we  found  her 
to  be  in  the  State? 

There  is  no  difference  in  my  opinion,  he  said. 

Because,  if  any  doubt  is  still  lingering  in  our 
minds,  a few  commonplace  instances  will  satisfy  us  of 
the  truth  of  what  I am  saying. 

What  sort  of  instances  do  you  mean? 

If  the  case  is  put  to  us,  must  we  not  admit  that  the 
just  State,  or  the  man  who  is  trained  in  the  principles 
of  such  a State,  will  be  less  likely  than  the  unjust  to 
make  away  with  a deposit  of  gold  or  silver?  Would 
any  one  deny  this? 

No  one,  he  replied. 

Will  the  just  man  or  citizen  ever  be  guilty  of 
sacrilege  or  theft,  or  treachery  either  to  his  friends 
or  to  his  country? 

Never. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


169 


Neither  will  he  ever  break  faith  where  there  have 
been  oaths  or  agreements? 

Impossible. 

No  one  will  be  less  likely  to  commit  adultery,  or  to 
dishonor  his  father  and  mother,  or  to  fail  in  his 
religious  duties? 

No  one. 

And  the  reason  is  that  each  part  of  him  is  do- 
ing its  own  business,  whether  in  ruling  or  being 
ruled? 

Exactly  so. 

Are  you  satisfied  then  that  the  quality  which  makes 
such  men  and  such  states  is  justice,  or  do  you  hope  to 
discover  some  other? 

Not  I,  indeed. 

Then  our  dream  has  been  realized ; and  the  suspicion 
which  we  entertained  at  the  beginning  of  our  work  of 
construction,  that  some  divine  power  must  have  con- 
ducted us  to  a primary  form  of  justice,  has  now  been 
verified? 

Yes,  certainly. 

And  the  division  of  labor  which  required  the  car- 
penter and  the  shoemaker  and  the  rest  of  the  citizens 
to  be  doing  each  his  own  business,  and  not  another’s, 
was  a shadow  of  justice,  and  for  that  reason  it  was  of 
use? 

Clearly. 

But  in  reality  justice  was  such  as  we  were 
describing,  being  concerned  however,  not  with  the 
outward  man,  but  with  the  inward,  which  is  the  true 
self  and  concernment  of  man:  for  the  just  man  does 
not  permit  the  several  elements  within  him  to  inter- 
fere with  one  another,  or  any  of  them  to  do  the  work 
of  others,  — he  sets  in  order  his  own  inner  life,  and  is\ 
his  own  master  and  his  own  law,  and  at  peace  with] 
himself;  and  when  he  has  bound  together  the  three 


170 


THE  REPUBLIC 


principles  within  him,  which  may  be  compared  to  the 
higher,  lower,  and  middle  notes  of  the  scale,  and  the 
intermediate  intervals  — when  he  has  bound  all  these 
together,  and  is  no  longer  many,  but  has  become  one 
entirely  temperate  and  perfectly  adjusted  nature, 
then  he  proceeds  to  act,  if  he  has  to  act,  whether  in  a 
matter  of  property,  or  in  the  treatment  of  the  body, 
or  in  some  affair  of  politics  or  private  business ; always 
thinking  and  calling  that  which  preserves  and  co- 
operates with  this  harmonious  condition,  just  and 
good  action,  and  the  knowledge  which  presides  over 
it,  wisdom,  and  that  which  at  any  time  impairs  this 
condition,  he  will  call  unjust  action,  and  the  opinion 
which  presides  over  it  ignorance. 

You  have  said  the  exact  truth,  Socrates. 

Very  good;  and  if  we  were  to  affirm  that  we  had 
discovered  the  just  man  and  the  just  State,  and  the 
nature  of  justice  in  each  of  them,  we  should  not  be 
telling  a falsehood? 

Most  certainly  not. 

May  we  say  so,  then? 

Let  us  say  so. 

/And  now,  I said,  injustice  has  to  be  considered. 
j ! Clearly. 

/ Must  not  injustice  be  a strife  which  arises  among 
Ijiie  three  principles  — a meddlesomeness,  and  inter- 
ference, and  rising  up  of  a part  of  the  soul  against 
the  whole,  an  assertion  of  unlawful  authority,  which 
^s  made  by  a rebellious  subject  against  a true  prince, 
of  whom  he  is  the  natural  vassal,  — what  is  all  this 
confusion  and  delusion  but  injustice,  and  intem- 
perance and  cowardice  and  ignorance,  and  every  form 
of  vice? 

Exactly  so. 

And  if  the  nature  of  justice  and  injustice  be  known, 
then  the  meaning  of  acting  unjustly  and  being  un- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


171 


just,  or,  again,  of  acting  justly,  will  also  be  perfectly 
clear? 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

Why,  I said,  they  are  like  disease  and  health ; being 
in  the  soul  just  what  disease  and  health  are  in  the 
body. 

How  so?  he  said. 

Why,  I said,  that  which  is  healthy  causes  health, 
and  that  which  is  unhealthy  causes  disease. 

Yes. 

And  just  actions  cause  justice,  and  unjust  actions 
cause  injustice? 

That  is  certain. 

And  the  creation  of  health  is  the  institution  of  a 
natural  order  and  government  of  one  by  another  in 
the  parts  of  the  body;  and  the  creation  of  disease  is 
the  production  of  a state  of  things  at  variance  with 
this  natural  order? 

True. 

And  is  not  the  creation  of  justice  the  institution  of 
a natural  order  and  government  of  one  by  another  in 
the  parts  of  the  soul,  and  the  creation  of  injustice  the 
production  of  a state  of  things  at  variance  with  the 
natural  order? 

Exactly  so,  he  said. 

Then  virtue  is  the  health  and  beauty  and  well-being 
of  the  soul,  and  vice  the  disease  and  weakness  and 
deformity  of  the  same? 

True. 

And  do  not  good  practices  lead  to  virtue,  and  evil 
practices  to  vice? 

Assuredly. 

Still  our  old  question  of  the  comparative  advantage!! 
of  justice  and  injustice  has  not  been  answered:  Which  11 
is  the  more  profitable,  to  be  just  and  act  justly  and  |' 
practise  virtue,  whether  seen  or  unseen  of  gods  and  , 


172 


THE  REPUBLIC 


men,  or  to  be  unjust  and  act  im justly,  if  only  un- 
punished and  unreformed? 

In  my  judgment,  Socrates,  the  question  has  now 
become  ridiculous.  We  know  that,  when  the  bodily 
constitution  is  gone,  life  is  no  longer  endurable, 
though  pampered  with  all  kinds  of  meats  and  drinks, 
and  having  all  wealth  and  all  power;  and  shall  we  be 
told  that  when  the  very  essence  of  the  vital  principle 
is  undermined  and  corrupted,  life  is  still  worth  having 
to  a man,  if  only  he  be  allowed  to  do  whatever  he  likes 
with  the  single  exception  that  he  is  not  to  acquire 
justice  and  virtue,  or  to  escape  from  injustice  and 
vice;  assuming  them  both  to  be  such  as  we  have 
described  ? 

Yes,  I said,  the  question  is,  as  you  say,  ridiculous. 
Still,  as  we  are  near  the  spot  at  which  we  may  see  the 
truth  in  the  clearest  manner  with  our  own  eyes,  let 
us  not  faint  by  the  way. 

Certainly  not,  he  replied. 

Come  up  hither,  I said,  and  behold  the  various 
forms  of  vice,  those  of  them,  I mean,  which  are  worth 
looking  at. 

I am  following  you,  he  replied:  proceed. 

I said.  The  argument  seems  to  have  reached  a 
height  from  which,  as  from  some  tower  of  specula- 
tion, a man  may  look  down  and  see  that  virtue  is  one, 
but  that  the  forms  of  vice  are  innumerable;  there 
being  four  special  ones  which  are  deserving  of  note. 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

I mean,  I replied,  that  there  appear  to  be  as  many 
forms  of  the  soul  as  there  are  distinct  forms  of  the 
State. 

How  many? 

There  are  five  of  the  State,  and  five  of  the  soul,  I 
, said. 

What  are  they? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


173 


The  first,  I said,  is  that  which  we  have  been  de 
scribing',  and  which  may  be  said  to  have  two  names 
monarchy  and  aristocracy,  accordingly  as  rule  is  exer 
cised  by  one  distinguished  man  or  by  many. 

True,  he  replied. 

But  I regard  the  two  names  as  describing  one 
form  only;  for  whether  the  government  is  in  the 
hands  of  one  or  many,  if  the  governors  have  been 
trained  in  the  manner  which  we  have  supposed,  the 
fundamental  laws  of  the  State  will  be  maintained. 

That  is  true,  he  replied. 


BOOK  V 


> 


Such  is  the  good  and  true  City  or  State,  and  the 
good  and  true  man  is  of  the  same  pattern;  and  if 
this  is  right  every  other  is  wrong;  and  the  evil  is  one 
which  affects  not  only  the  ordering  of  the  State,  but 
also  the  regulation  of  the  individual  soul,  and  is  ex- 
hibited in  four  forms. 

What  are  they?  he  said. 

I was  proceeding  to  tell  the  order  in  which  the  four 
evil  forms  appeared  to  me  to  succeed  one  another, 
when  Polemarchus,  who  was  sitting  a little  way  off, 
just  beyond  Adeimantus,  began  to  whisper  to  him: 
stretching  forth  his  hand,  he  took  hold  of  the  upper 
part  of  his  coat  by  the  shoulder,  and  drew  him  towards 
him,  leaning  forward  himself  so  as  to  be  quite  close 
and  saying  something  in  his  ear,  of  which  I only 
caught  the  words,  “ Shall  we  let  him  off,  or  what  shall 
we  do?  ” 

Certainly  not,  said  Adeimantus,  raising  his  voice. 

Who  is  it,  I said,  whom  you  are  refusing  to  let  off? 

You,  he  said. 

I repeated,^  Why  am  I especially  not  to  be  let  off? 

Why,  he  said,  we  think  that  you  are  lazy,  and  mean 
to  cheat  us  out  of  a whole  chapter  which  is  a very  im- 
portant part  of  the  story;  and  you  fancy  that  we  shall 
not  notice  your  airy  way  of  proceeding ; as  if  it  were 
self-evident  to  everybody,  that  in  the  matter  of  women 
and  children  “ friends  have  all  things  in  common.” 

And  was  I not  right,  Adeimantus? 

Yes,  he  said;  but  what  is  right  in  this  particular 


^ Reading  cIttop, 

/ •f'  'f'  /fj  ^ ^ 

If  'I  ^ 


174 


THE  REPUBLIC 


175 


case,  like  everything  else,  requires  to  be  explained; 
for  community  may  be  of  many  kinds.  Please,  there- 
fore, to  say  what  sort  of  community  you  mean.  We 
have  been  long  expecting  that  you  would  tell  us  some- 
thing about  the  family  life  of  your  citizens  — how 
they  will  bring  children  into  the  world,  and  rear  them 
when  they  have  arrived,  and,  in  general,  what  is  the 
nature  of  this  community  of  women  and  children  — 
for  w’e  are  of  opinion  that  the  right  or  wrong  manage- 
ment of  sueh  matters  will  have  a great  and  paramoimt 
influence  on  the  State  for  good  or  for  evil.  And  now, 
since  the  question  is  still  undetermined,  and  you  are 
taking  in  hand  another  State,  we  have  resolved,  as 
you  heard,  not  to  let  you  go  until  you  give  an  account 
of  all  this. 

To  that  resolution,  said  Glaucon,  you  may  regard 
me  as  saying  Agreed. 

And  without  more  ado,  said  Thras3nmachus,  you 
may  consider  us  all  to  be  equally  agreed. 

I said.  You  know  not  what  you  are  doing  in  thus 
assailing  me:  What  an  argument  are  you  raising 
about  the  State!  Just  as  I thought  that  I had  fln- 
ished,  and  was  only  too  glad  that  I had  laid  this 
question  to  sleep,  and  was  reflecting  how  fortunate 
I was  in  your  acceptance  of  what  I then  said,  you  ask 
me  to  begin  again  at  the  very  foundation,  ignorant  of 
what  a hornet’s  nest  of  words  you  are  stirring.  Now 
I foresaw  this  gathering  trouble,  and  avoided  it. 

For  what  purpose  do  you  conceive  that  we  have 
come  here,  said  Thrasymachus,  — to  look  for  gold, 
or  to  hear  discourse? 

Yes,  but  discourse  should  have  a limit. 

Yes,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon,  and  the  whole  of  life 
is  the  only  limit  which  wise  men  assign  to  the  hearing 
of  such  discourses.  But  never  mind  about  us;  take 
heart  yourself  and  ansrwer  the  question  in  your  own 


176 


THE  REPUBLIC 


way:  What  sort  of  community  of  women  and  chil- 
dren is  this  which  is  to  prevail  among  our  guardians? 
and  how  shall  we  manage  the  period  between  birth 
and  education,  which  seems  to  require  the  greatest 
care?  Tell  us  how  these  things  will  be. 

Yes,  my  simple  friend,  but  the  answer  is  the  reverse 
of  easy;  many  more  doubts  arise  about  this  than 
about  our  previous  conclusions.  For  the  practicabil- 
ity of  what  is  said  may  be  doubted ; and  looked  at  in 
another  point  of  view,  whether  the  scheme,  if  ever  so 
practicable,  would  be  for  the  best,  is  also  doubtful. 
Hence  I feel  a reluctance  to  approach  the  subject, 
lest  our  aspiration,  my  dear  friend,  should  turn  out  to 
be  a dream  only. 

Fear  not,  he  replied,  for  your  audience  will  not  be 
hard  upon  you ; they  are  not  sceptical  or  hostile. 

I said:  My  good  friend,  I suppose  that  you  mean 
to  encourage  me  by  these  words. 

Yes,  he  said. 

Then  let  me  tell  you  that  you  are  doing  just  the 
reverse;  the  encouragement  which  you  offer  would 
have  been  all  very  well  had  I myself  believed  that  I 
knew  what  I was  talking  about:  to  declare  the  truth 
about  matters  of  high  interest  which  a man  honors 
and  loves  among  wise  men  who  love  him  need  occasion 
no  fear  or  faltering  in  his  mind;  but  to  carry  on  an 
argument  when  you  are  yourself  only  a hesitating  in- 
quirer, which  is  my  condition,  is  a dangerous  and 
slippery  thing;  and  the  danger  is  not  that  I shall  be 
laughed  at  (of  which  the  fear  would  be  childish),  but 
that  I shall  miss  the  truth  where  I have  most  need  to 
be  sure  of  my  footing,  and  drag  my  friends  after  me 
in  my  fall.  And  I pray  Nemesis  not  to  visit  upon  me 
the  words  which  I am  going  to  utter.  For  I do  in- 
deed believe  that  to  be  an  involuntary  homicide  is  a 
less  crime  than  to  be  a deceiver  about  beauty  or  good- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


177 


ness  or  justice  in  the  matter  of  laws.^  And  that  is  a 
risk  which  I would  rather  run  among  enemies  than 
among  friends,  and  therefore  you  do  well  to  encour- 
age me.^ 

Glaucon  laughed  and  said:  Well  then,  Socrates, 
in  case  you  and  your  argument  do  us  any  serious 
injury  you  shall  be  acquitted  beforehand  of  the  homi- 
cide, and  shall  not  be  held  to  be  a deceiver;  take 
courage  then  and  speak. 

Well,  I said,  the  law  says  that  when  a man  is  ac- 
quitted he  is  free  from  guilt,  and  what  holds  at  law 
may  hold  in  argument. 

Then  why  should  you  mind? 

Well,  I replied,  I suppose  that  I must  retrace  my 
steps  and  say  what  I perhaps  ought  to  have  said  be- 
fore in  the  proper  place.  The  part  of  the  men  has 
been  played  out,  and  now  properly  enough  comes  the 
turn  of  the  women.  Of  them  I will  proceed  to  speak, 
and  the  more  readily  since  I am  invited  by  you. 

For  men  born  and  educated  like  our  citizens,  the 
only  way,  in  my  opinion,  of  arriving  at  a right  con- 
clusion about  the  possession  and  use  of  women  and 
children  is  to  follow  the  path  on  which  we  originally 
started,  when  we  said  that  the  men  were  to  be  the 
guardians  and  watchdogs  of  the  herd. 

True. 

Let  us  further  suppose  the  birth  and  education  of 
our  women  to  be  subject  to  similar  or  nearly  similar 
regulations;  then  we  shall  see  whether  the  result  ac- 
cords with  our  design. 

What  do  you  mean? 

What  I mean  may  be  put  into  the  form  of  a ques- 
tion, I said:  Are  dogs  divided  into  hes  and  shes,  or 

1 Or  inserting  Kal  before  voixlfxoiv  ; ‘‘a  deceiver  about  beauty  or  goodness 
or  principles  of  justice  or  law.” 

2 Heading  ujare  eC  fie  irapafivdel. 


178 


THE  REPUBLIC 


do  they  both  share  equally  in  hunting  and  in  keeping 
watch  and  in  the  other  duties  of  dogs?  or  do  we  en- 
trust to  the  males  the  entire  and  exclusive  care  of  the 
flocks,  while  we  leave  the  females  at  home,  under  the 
idea  that  the  bearing  and  suckling  their  puppies  is 
labor  enough  for  them? 

No,  he  said,  they  share  alike;  the  only  difference 
between  them  is  that  the  males  are  stronger  and  the 
females  weaker. 

But  can  you  use  different  animals  for  the  same 
purpose,  unless  they  are  bred  and  fed  in  the  same 
way? 

You  can  not. 

Then,  if  women  are  to  have  the  same  duties  as 
men,  they  must  have  the  same  nurture  and  education? 

Yes. 

The  education  which  was  assigned  to  the  men  was 
music  and  gymnastic. 

Yes. 

Then  women  must  be  taught  music  and  gymnastic 
and  also  the  art  of  war,  which  they  must  practise  like 
the  men? 

That  is  the  inference,  I suppose. 

I should  rather  expect,  I said,  that  several  of  our 
proposals,  if  they  are  carried  out,  being  unusual,  may 
appear  ridiculous. 

No  doubt  of  it. 

Yes,  and  the  most  ridiculous  thing  of  all  will  be  the 
sight  of  women  naked  in  the  palaestra,  exercising  with 
the  men,  especially  when  they  are  no  longer  young; 
they  certainly  will  not  be  a vision  of  beauty,  any  more 
than  the  enthusiastic  old  men  who  in  spite  of  wrinkles 
and  ugliness  continue  to  frequent  the  gymnasia. 

Yes,  indeed,  he  said:  according  to  present  notions 
the  proposal  would  be  thought  ridiculous. 

But  then,  I said,  as  we  have  determined  to  speak 


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179 


our  minds,  we  must  not  fear  the  jests  of  the  wits 
which  will  he  directed  against  this  sort  of  innovation ; 
how  they  will  talk  of  women’s  attainments  both  in 
music  and  gymnastic,  and  above  all  about  their  wear- 
ing armor  and  riding  upon  horseback! 

Very  true. 

Yet  having  begun  we  must  go  forward  to  the  rough 
places  of  the  law ; at  the  same  time  begging  of  these 
gentlemen  for  once  in  their  life  to  be  serious.  Not 
long  ago,  as  we  shall  remind  them,  the  Hellenes  were 
of  the  opinion,  which  is  still  generally  received  among 
the  barbarians,  that  the  sight  of  a naked  man  was 
ridiculous  and  improper;  and  when  first  the  Cretans 
and  then  the  Lacedaemonians  introduced  the  custom, 
the  wits  of  that  day  might  equally  have  ridiculed  the 
innovation. 

No  doubt. 

But  when  experience  showed  that  to  let  all  things 
he  uncovered  was  far  better  than  to  cover  them  up, 
and  the  ludicrous  effect  to  the  outward  eye  vanished 
before  the  better  principle  which  reason  asserted,  then 
the  man  was  perceived  to  he  a fool  who  directs  the 
shafts  of  his  ridicule  at  any  other  sight  but  that  of 
folly  and  vice,  or  seriously  inclines  to  weigh  the  beau- 
tiful by  any  other  standard  but  that  of  the  good.^ 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

First,  then,  whether  the  question  is  to  be  put  in  jest 
or  in  earnest,  let  us  come  to  an  understanding  about 
the  nature  of  woman : Is  she  capable  of  sharing  either 
wholly  or  partially  in  the  actions  of  men,  or  not  at 
all?  And  is  the  art  of  war  one  of  those  arts  in  which 
she  can  or  can  not  share?  That  will  he  the  best  way 
of  commencing  the  inquiry,  and  will  probably  lead 
to  the  fairest  conclusion. 

That  will  be  much  the  best  way. 

^ Beading  with  Paris  A.  nal  koKoO  . • , 


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THE  REPUBLIC 


Shall  we  take  the  other  side  first  and  begin  by 
arguing  against  ourselves;  in  this  manner  the  adver- 
sary’s position  will  not  be  undefended. 

Why  not?  he  said. 

Then  let  us  put  a speech  into  the  mouths  of  our 
opponents.  They  will  say:  “ Socrates  and  Glaucon, 
no  adversary  need  convict  you,  for  you  yourselves,  at 
the  first  foundation  of  the  State,  admitted  the  prin- 
ciple that  everybody  was  to  do  the  one  work  suited 
to  his  own  nature.”  And  certainly,  if  I am  not  mis- 
taken, such  an  admission  was  made  by  us.  “ And 
do  not  the  natures  of  men  and  women  differ  very 
much  indeed?  ” And  we  shall  reply:  Of  course  they 
do.  Then  we  shall  be  asked,  “ Whether  the  tasks 
assigned  to  men  and  to  women  should  not  be  differ- 
ent, and  such  as  are  agreeable  to  their  different 
natures?  ” Certainly  they  should.  “ But  if  so,  have 
you  not  fallen  into  a serious  inconsistency  in  saying 
that  men  and  women,  whose  natures  are  so  entirely 
different,  ought  to  perform  the  same  actions?”  — 
What  defence  will  you  make  for  us,  my  good  Sir, 
against  any  one  who  offers  these  objections? 

That  is  not  an  easy  question  to  answer  when  asked 
suddenly;  and  I shall  and  I do  beg  of  you  to  draw 
out  the  case  on  our  side. 

These  are  the  objections,  Glaucon,  and  there  are 
many  others  of  a like  kind,  which  I foresaw  long  ago; 
they  made  me  afraid  and  reluctant  to  take  in  hand 
any  law  about  the  possession  and  nurture  of  women 
and  children. 

By  Zeus,  he  said,  the  problem  to  be  solved  is  any- 
thing but  easy 

Why  yes,  I said,  but  the  fact  is  that  when  a man  is 
out  of  his  depth,  whether  he  has  fallen  into  a little 
swimming  bath  or  into  mid  ocean,  he  has  to  swim  all 
the  same. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


181 


Very  true. 

And  must  not  we  swim  and  try  to  reach  the  shore : 
we  will  hope  that  Arion’s  dolphin  or  some  other 
miraculous  help  may  save  us  ? 

I suppose  so,  he  said. 

Well  then,  let  us  see  if  any  way  of  escape  can  be 
found.  We  acknowledged  — did  we  not?  that  dif- 
ferent natures  ought  to  have  different  pursuits,  and 
that  men’s  and  women’s  natures  are  different.  And 
now  what  are  we  saying?  — that  different  natures 
ought  to  have  the  same  pursuits,  — this  is  the  incon- 
sistency which  is  charged  upon  us. 

Precisely. 

Verily,  Glaucon,  I said,  glorious  is  the  power  of  the 
art  of  contradiction! 

Why  do  you  say  so? 

Because  I think  that  many  a man  falls  into  the 
practice  against  his  will.  When  he  thinks  that  he  is 
reasoning  he  is  really  disputing,  just  because  he  can 
not  define  and  divide,  and  so  know  that  of  which  he  is 
speaking;  and  he  will  pursue  a merely  verbal  op- 
position in  the  spirit  of  contention  and  not  of  fair  dis- 
cussion. 

Yes,  he  replied,  such  is  very  often  the  case;  but 
what  has  that  to  do  with  us  and  our  argument? 

A great  deal ; for  there  is  certainly  a danger  of  our 
getting  unintentionally  into  a verbal  opposition. 

In  what  way? 

Why  we  valiantly  and  pugnaciously  insist  upon 
the  verbal  truth,  that  different  natures  ought  to  have 
different  pursuits,  but  we  never  considered  at  all  what 
was  the  meaning  of  sameness  or  difference  of  nature, 
or  why  we  distinguished  them  when  we  assigned 
different  pursuits  to  different  natures  and  the  same 
to  the  same  natures. 

Why,  no,  he  said,  that  was  never  considered  by  us. 


182 


THE  REPUBLIC 


I said : Suppose  that  by  way  of  illustration  we  were 
to  ask  the  question  whether  there  is  not  an  opposition 
in  nature  between  bald  men  and  hairy  men;  and  if 
this  is  admitted  by  us,  then,  if  bald  men  are  cobblers, 
we  should  forbid  the  hairy  men  to  be  cobblers,  and 
conversely? 

That  would  be  a jest,  he  said. 

Yes,  I said,  a jest;  and  why?  because  we  never 
meant  when  we  constructed  the  State,  that  the  op- 
position of  natures  should  extend  to  every  difference, 
but  only  to  those  differences  which  affected  the  pur- 
suit in  which  the  individual  is  engaged;  we  should 
have  argued,  for  example,  that  a physician  and  one 
who  is  in  mind  a physician  ^ may  be  said  to  have  the 
same  nature. 

True. 

Whereas  the  physician  and  the  carpenter  have  dif- 
ferent natures? 

Certainly. 

And  if,  I said,  the  male  and  female  sex  appear  to 
differ  in  their  fitness  for  any  art  or  pursuit,  we  should 
say  that  such  pursuit  or  art  ought  to  be  assigned  to 
one  or  the  other  of  them ; but  if  the  difference  consists 
only  in  women  bearing  and  men  begetting  children, 
this  does  not  amount  to  a proof  that  a woman  differs 
from  a man  in  respect  of  the  sort  of  education  she 
should  receive;  and  we  shall  therefore  continue  to 
maintain  that  our  guardians  and  their  wives  ought  to 
have  the  same  pursuits. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Next,  we  shall  ask  our  opponent  how,  in  reference 
to  any  of  the  pursuits  or  arts  of  civic  life,  the  nature 
\ of  a woman  differs  from  that  of  a man? 

''  That  will  be  quite  fair. 

And  perhaps  he,  like  yourself,  will  reply  that  to 

* Heading  larpbv  pikv  i^al  larpiKbv  bvTq,. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


183 


give  a sufficient  answer  on  the  instant  is  not  easy;  but 
after  a little  reflection  there  is  no  difficulty. 

Yes,  perhaps. 

Suppose  then  that  we  invite  him  to  accompany  us  in 
the  argmnent,  and  then  we  may  hope  to  show  him 
that  there  is  nothing  peculiar  in  the  constitution  of 
women  which  would  affect  them  in  the  administration 
of  the  State. 

By  all  means. 

Let  us  say  to  him : Come  now,  and  we  will  ask  you 
a question : — when  you  spoke  of  a nature  gifted  or 
not  gifted  in  any  respect,  did  you  mean  to  say  that 
one  man  will  acquire  a thing  easily,  another  with  dif- 
ficulty; a little  learning  will  lead  the  one  to  discover 
a great  deal;  whereas  the  other,  after  much  study  and 
application,  no  sooner  learns  than  he  forgets;  or  again, 
did  you  mean,  that  the  one  has  a body  which  is  a good 
servant  to  his  mind,  while  the  body  of  the  other  is  a 
hindrance  to  him?  — would  not  these  be  the  sort  of 
differences  which  distinguish  the  man  gifted  by  nature 
from  the  one  who  is  ungifted? 

No  one  will  deny  that. 

And  can  you  mention  any  pursuit  of  mankind  in 
which  the  male  sex  has  not  all  these  gifts  and  qualities 
in  a higher  degree  than  the  female?  Need  I waste 
time  in  speaking  of  the  art  of  weaving,  and  the  man- 
agement of  pancakes  and  preserves,  in  which 
womankind  does  really  appear  to  be  great,  and  in 
which  for  her  to  be  beaten  by  a man  is  of  all  things 
the  most  absurd? 

You  are  quite  right,  he  replied,  in  maintaining  the 
general  inferiority  of  the  female  sex:  although  many 
women  are  in  many  things  superior  to  many  men,  yet 
on  the  whole  what  you  say  is  true. 

And  if  so,  my  friend,  I said,  there  is  no  special 
faculty  of  administration  in  a state  which  a woman 


184 


THE  REPUBLIC 


has  because  she  is  a woman,  or  which  a man  has  by 
virtue  of  his  sex,  but  the  gifts  of  nature  are  alike 
diffused  in  both;  all  the  pursuits  of  men  are  the  pur- 
suits of  women  also,  but  in  all  of  them  a woman  is 
inferior  to  a man. 

. Very  true. 

Then  are  we  to  impose  all  oim  enactments  on  men 
and  none  of  them  on  women? 

That  will  never  do. 

One  woman  has  a gift  of  healing,  another  not;  one 
is  a musician,  and  another  has  no  music  in  her  nature? 

Very  true. 

And  one  woman  has  a turn  for  gymnastic  and 
military  exercises,  and  another  is  unwarlike  and  hates 
gymnastics  ? 

Certainly. 

And  one  woman  is  a philosopher,  and  another  is  an 
enemy  of  philosophy;  one  has  spirit,  and  another  is 
without  spirit? 

That  is  also  true. 

Then  one  woman  will  have  the  temper  of  a 
guardian,  and  another  not.  Was  not  the  selection  of 
the  male  guardians  determined  by  differences  of  this 
sort? 

Yes. 

Men  and  women  alike  possess  the  qualities  which 
make  a guardian;  they  differ  only  in  their  com- 
parative strength  or  weakness. 

Obviously. 

And  those  women  who  have  such  (malities  are  to  be 
selected  as  the  companions  and  colleagues  of  men 
who  have  similar  qualities  and  whom  they  resemble  in 
capacity  and  in  character? 

Very  true. 

And  ought  not  the  same  natures  to  have  the  same 
pursuits? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


185 


They  ought. 

Then,  as  we  were  saying  before,  there  is  nothing 
unnatural  in  assigning  music  and  gymnastic  to  the 
wives  of  the  guardians  — to  that  point  we  come  round 
again. 

Certainly  not. 

The  law  which  we  then  enacted  was  agreeable  to 
nature,  and  therefore  not  an  impossibility  or  mere 
aspiration;  and  the  contrary  practice,  which  prevails 
at  present,  is  in  reality  a violation  of  nature. 

That  appears  to  be  true. 

We  had  to  consider,  first,  whether  our  proposals 
were  possible,  and  secondly  whether  they  were  the 
most  beneficial? 

Yes. 

And  the  possibility  has  been  acknowledged? 

Yes. 

The  very  great  benefit  has  next  to  be  established? 

Quite  so. 

You  will  admit  that  the  same  education  which 
makes  a man  a good  guardian  will  make  a woman  a 
good  guardian;  for  their  original  nature  is  the  same? 

Yes. 

I should  like  to  ask  you  a question. 

What  is  it? 

Would  you  say  that  all  men  are  equal  in  excellence, 
or  is  one  man  better  than  another? 

The  latter. 

And  in  the  commonwealth  which  we  were  founding 
do  you  conceive  the  guardians  who  have  been  brought 
up  on  our  model  system  to  be  more  perfect  men,  or 
the  cobblers  whose  education  has  been  cobbling? 

What  a ridiculous  question! 

You  have  answered  me,  I replied:  Well,  and  may 
we  not  further  say  that  our  guardians  are  the  best  of 
our  citizens? 


186 


THE  REPUBLIC 


By  far  the  best. 

And  will  not  their  wives  he  the  best  women? 

Yes,  by  far  the  best. 

And  can  there  be  anything  better  for  the  interests 
of  the  State  than  that  the  men  and  women  of  a State 
should  be  as  good  as  possible? 

There  can  be  nothing  better. 

And  this  is  what  the  arts  of  music  and  gymnastic, 
when  present  in  such  manner  as  we  have  described, 
will  accomplish? 

Certainly. 

Then  we  have  made  an  enactment  not  only 
possible  but  in  the  highest  degree  beneficial  to  the 
State? 

True. 

Then  let  the  wives  of  our  guardians  strip,  for  their 
virtue  will  be  their  robe,  and  let  them  share  in  the  toils 
of  war  and  the  defence  of  their  country;  only  in  the 
distribution  of  labors  the  lighter  are  to  be  assigned 
to  the  women,  who  are  the  weaker  natures,  but  in 
other  respects  their  duties  are  to  be  the  same.  And  as 
for  the  man  who  laughs  at  naked  women  exercising 
their  bodies  from  the  best  of  motives,  in  his  laughter 
he  is  plucking 


and  he  himself  is  ignorant  of  what  he  is  laughing  at, 
( or  what  he  is  about;  — for  that  is,  and  ever  will  be. 


very  true. 

Here,  then,  is  one  difficulty  in  our  law  about  women, 
which  we  may  say  that  we  have  now  escaped;  the 
wave  has  not  swallowed  us  up  alive  for  enacting  that 
the  guardians  of  either  sex  should  have  all  their  pur- 
suits in  common;  to  the  utility  and  also  to  the 


A fruit  of  unripe  wisdom,' 


THE  REPUBLIC 


187 


possibility  of  this  arrangement  the  consistency  of  the 
argument  with  itself  bears  witness. 

^ Yes,  that  was  a mighty  wave  which  you  have 
escaped. 

Yes,  I said,  but  a greater  is  coming;  you  will  not 
think  much  of  this  when  you  see  the  next. 

Go  on ; let  me  see. 

The  law,  I said,  which  is  the  sequel  of  this  and  of 
all  that  has  preceded,  is  to  the  following  effect, — 
“ that  the  wives  of  our  guardians  are  to  be  common, 
and  their  children  are  to  be  common,  and  no  parent  is 
to  know  his  own  child,  nor  any  child  his  parent.” 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  a much  greater  wave  than  the 
other;  and  the  possibility  as  well  as  the  utility  of  such 
a law  are  far  more  questionable. 

I do  not  think,  I said,  that  there  can  be  any  dispute 
about  the  very  great  utility  of  having  wives  and 
children  in  common;  the  possibility  is  quite  another 
matter,  and  will  be  very  much  disputed. 

I think  that  a good  many  doubts  may  be  raised 
about  both. 

You  imply  that  the  two  questions  must  be  com- 
bined, I replied.  Now  I meant  that  you  should 
admit  the  utility;  and  in  this  way,  as  I thought,  I 
should  escape  from  one  of  them,  and  then  there  would 
remain  only  the  possibility. 

But  that  little  attempt  is  detected,  and  therefore 
you  will  please  to  give  a defence  of  both. 

Well,  I said,  I submit  to  my  fate.  Yet  grant  me  a 
little  favor:  let  me  feast  my  mind  with  the  dream  as 
day  dreamers  are  in  the  habit  of  feasting  themselves 
when  they  are  walking  alone;  for  before  they  have 
discovered  any  means  of  effecting  their  wishes  — that 
is  a matter  which  never  troubles  them  — they  would 
rather  not  tire  themselves  by  thinking  about  pos- 
sibilities ; but  assuming  that  what  they  desire  is  already 


188 


THE  REPUBLIC 


granted  to  them,  they  proceed  with  their  plan,  and 
dehght  in  detailing  what  they  mean  to  do  when  their 
wish  has  come  true  — that  is  a way  which  they  have 
of  not  doing  much  good  to  a capacity  which  was  never 
good  for  much.  Now  I myself  am  beginning  to  lose 
heart,  and  I should  like,  with  your  permission,  to  pass 
over  the  question  of  possibility  at  present.  Assuming 
therefore  the  possibility  of  the  proposal,  I shall  now 
proceed  to  inquire  how  the  mlers  will  carry  out  these 
arrangements,  and  I shall  demonstrate  that  our  plan, 
if  executed,  will  be  of  the  greatest  benefit  to  the  State 
and  to  the  guardians.  First  of  all,  then,  if  you  have 
no  objection,  I will  endeavor  with  your  help  to  con- 
sider the  advantages  of  the  measure;  and  hereafter 
the  question  of  possibility. 

I have  no  objection;  proceed. 

First,  I think  that  if  our  rulers  and  their  auxiliaries 
are  to  be  worthy  of  the  name  which  they  bear,  there 
must  be  willingness  to  obey  in  the  one  and  the  power 
of  command  in  the  other;  the  guardians  must  them- 
selves obey  the  laws,  and  they  must  also  imitate  the 
spirit  of  them  in  any  details  which  are  entrusted  to 
their  care. 

That  is  right,  he  said. 

You,  I said,  who  are  their  legislator,  having 
selected  the  men,  will  now  select  the  women  and  give 
them  to  them;  — they  must  be  as  far  as  possible  of 
like  natures  with  them ; and  they  must  live  in  common 
houses  and  meet  at  common  meals.  None  of  them 
will  have  anything  specially  his  or  her  own;  they  will 
he  together,  and  will  be  brought  up  together,  and 
will  associate  at  gymnastic  exercises.  And  so  they 
will  be  drawn  by  a necessity  of  their  natures  to  liave 
intercourse  with  each  other  — necessity  is  not  too 
strong  a word,  I think? 

Yes,  he  said;  — necessity,  not  geometrical,  but 


THE  REPUBLIC 


189 


another  sort  of  necessity  which  lovers  know,  arid^ 
which  is  far  more  convincing  and  constraim  to  the  V 
mass  of  mankind. 

True,  I said;  and  this,  Glaucon,  like  all  the  rest,\ 
must  proceed  after  an  orderly  fashion ; in  a city  of  the  ] 
blessed,  licentiousness  is  an  unholy  thing  which  th.^ 
rulers  will  fofhid. 

Yes,  he  said,  and  it  ought  not  to  be  permitted. 

Then  clearly  the  next  thing  will  be  to  make 
matrimony  sacred  in  the  highest  degree,  and  what  is 
most  beneficial  will  be  deemed  sacred? 

Exactly. 

And  how  can  marriages  be  made  most  beneficial? 
— that  is  a question  which  I put  to  you,  because  I see 
in  your  house  dogs  for  hunting,  and  of  the  nobler  sort 
of  birds  not  a few.  Now,  I beseech  you,  do  tell  me, 
have  you  ever  attended  to  their  pairing  and  breed- 
ing? 

In  what  particulars? 

Why,  in  the  first  place,  although  they  are  all  of  a 
good  sort,  are  not  some  better  than  others? 

True. 

And  do  you  breed  from  them  all  indifferently,  or 
do  you  take  care  to  breed  from  the  best  only? 

From  the  best. 

And  do  you  take  the  oldest  or  the  youngest,  or  only 
those  of  ripe  age? 

I choose  only  those  of  ripe  age. 

And  if  care  was  not  taken  in  the  breeding,  your 
dogs  and  birds  would  greatly  deteriorate? 

Certainly. 

And  the  same  of  horses  and  of  animals  in  general? 

Undoubtedly. 

Good  heavens!  my  dear  friend,  I said,  what  con- 
summate skill  will  our  rulers  need  if  the  same  prin- 
ciple holds  of  the  human  species  I 


190 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Certainly,  the  same  principle  holds;  but  why  does 
this  involve  any  particular  skill? 

Because,  I said,  our  rulers  will  often  have  to  prac- 
tise upon  the  body  corporate  with  medicines.  Now 
you  know  that  when  patients  do  not  require  medicines, 
but  have  only  to  be  put  under  a regimen,  the  inferior 
sort  of  practitioner  is  deemed  to  be  good  enough ; but 
when  medicine  has  to  be  given,  then  the  doctor  should 
be  more  of  a man. 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said;  but  to  what  ai*e  you 
alluding? 

I mean,  I replied,  that  our  rulers  will  find  a con- 
siderable dose  of  falsehood  and  deceit  necessary  for 
the  good  of  their  subjects:  we  were  sa5ung  that  the  use 
of  all  these  things  regarded  as  medicines  might  be  of 
advantage. 

And  we  were  very  right. 

And  this  lawful  use  of  them  seems  likely  to  be  often 
needed  in  the  regulations  of  marriages  and  births. 

How  so? 

Why,  I said,  the  principle  has  been  already  laid 
down  that  the  best  of  either  sex  should  be  united  with 
the  best  as  often,  and  the  inferior  with  the  inferior, 
as  seldom  as  possible;  and  that  they  should  rear  the 
offspring  of  the  one  sort  of  union,  but  not  of  the  other, 
if  the  flock  is  to  be  maintained  in  first-rate  condition. 
Now  these  goings  on  must  be  a secret  which  the  rulers 
only  know,  or  there  will  be  a further  danger  of  our 
herd,  as  the  guardians  may  be  termed,  breaking  out 
into  rebellion. 

Very  true. 

Had  we  not  better  appoint  certain  festivals  at 
which  we  will  bring  together  the  brides  and  bride- 
grooms, and  sacrifices  will  be  offered  and  suitable 
hymeneal  songs  composed  by  our  poets:  the  number 
of  weddings  is  a matter  which  must  be  left  to  the 


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191 


discretion  of  the  rulers,  whose  aim  will  be  to  preserve 
the  average  of  population?  There  are  many  other 
things  which  they  will  have  to  consider,  such  as  the 
effects  of  wars  and  diseases  and  any  similar  agencies, 
in  order  as  far  as  this  is  possible  to  prevent  the  State 
from  becoming  either  too  large  or  too  small. 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

We  shall  have  to  invent  some  ingenious  kind  of  lots 
which  the  less  worthy  may  draw  on  eaeh  occasion  of 
our  bringing  them  together,  and  then  they  will  accuse 
their  own  ill-luek  and  not  the  rulers. 

To  be  sure,  he  said. 

And  I think  that  our  braver  and  better  youth, 
besides  their  other  honors  and  rewards,  might  have 
greater  facilities  of  intercourse  with  women  given 
them;  their  bravery  will  be  a reason,  and  such  fathers 
ought  to  have  as  many  sons  as  possible. 

True. 

And  the  proper  officers,  whether  male  or  female 
or  both,  for  offices  are  to  be  held  by  women  as  well  as 
by  men  — 

Yes  — 

The  proper  officers  will  take  the  offspring  of  the 
good  parents  to  the  pen  or  fold,  and  there  they  will 
deposit  them  with  certain  nurses  who  dwell  in  a 
separate  quarter;  but  the  offspring  of  the  inferior, 
or  of  the  better  when  they  chance  to  be  deformed, 
will  be  put  away  in  some  mysterious,  unknown  place, 
as  they  should  be. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  must  be  done  if  the  breed  of  the 
guardians  is  to  be  kept  pure. 

They  will  provide  for  their  nurture,  and  will  bring 
the  mothers  to  the  fold  when  they  are  full  of  milk, 
taking  the  greatest  possible  care  that  no  mother  reeog- 
nizes  her  own  child;  and  other  wet-nurses  may  be 
engaged  if  more  are  required.  Care  will  also  be 


192 


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taken  that  the  process  of  suckling  shall  not  be  pro- 
tracted too  long ; and  the  mothers  will  have  no  getting 
up  at  night  or  other  trouble,  but  will  hand  over  all 
this  sort  of  thing  to  the  nurses  and  attendants. 

You  suppose  the  wives  of  our  guardians  to  have  a 
fine  easy  time  of  it  when  they  are  having  children. 

Why,  said  I,  and  so  they  ought.  Let  us,  however, 
proceed  with  our  scheme.  We  were  saying  that  the 
parents  should  be  in  the  prime  of  life? 

Very  true. 

And  what  is  the  prime  of  life?  May  it  not  be 
defined  as  a period  of  about  twenty  years  in  a woman’s 
life,  and  thirty  in  a man’s? 

Which  years  do  you  mean  to  include? 

A woman,  I said,  at  twenty  years  of  age  may  begin 
to  bear  children  to  the  State,  and  continue  to  bear 
them  until  forty ; a man  may  begin  at  five-and-twenty, 
when  he  has  passed  the  point  at  which  the  pulse  of  life 
beats  quickest,  and  continue  to  beget  children  until 
he  be  fifty-five. 

Certainly,  he  said,  both  in  men  and  women  those 
years  are  the  prime  of  physical  as  well  as  of  intel- 
lectual vigor. 

Any  one  above  or  below  the  prescribed  ages  who 
takes  part  in  the  public  hymeneals  shall  be  said  to 
have  done  an  unholy  and  unrighteous  thing; 
the  child  of  which  he  is  the  father,  if  it  steals  into  life, 
will  have  been  conceived  under  auspices  very  unlike 
the  sacrifices  and  prayers,  which  at  each  hymeneal 
priestesses  and  priests  and  the  whole  city  will  offer, 
that  the  new  generation  may  be  better  and  more 
useful  than  their  good  and  useful  parents,  whereas 
his  child  will  be  the  offspring  of  darkness  and  strange 
lust. 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

And  the  same  law  will  apply  to  any  one  of  those 


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193 


within  the  prescribed  age  who  forms  a connection 
with  any  woman  in  the  prime  of  life  without  the 
sanction  of  the  rulers;  for  we  shall  say  that  he  is 
raising  up  a bastard  to  the  State,  uncertified  and  un- 
consecrated. 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

This  applies,  however,  only  to  those  who  are  within 
the  specified  age : after  that  we  allow  them  to 

range  at  will,  except  that  a man  may  not  marry  his 
daughter  or  his  daughter’s  daughter,  or  his  mother  or 
his  mother’s  mother;  and  women,  on  the  other  hand, 
are  prohibited  from  marrying  their  sons  or  fathers, 
or  son’s  son  or  father’s  father,  and  so  on  in  either 
direction.  And  we  grant  all  this,  accompanying  the 
permission  with  strict  orders  to  prevent  any  embryo 
which  may  come  into  being  from  seeing  the  light; 
and  if  any  force  a way  to  the  birth,  the  parents  must 
understand  that  the  offspring  of  such  an  union  can  not 
be  maintained,  and  arrange  accordingly. 

That  also,  he  said,  is  a reasonable  proposition.  But 
how  will  they  know  who  are  fathers  and  daughters, 
and  so  on? 

They  will  never  know.  The  way  will  be  this : — 
dating  from  the  day  of  the  hymeneal,  the  bridegroom 
who  was  then  married  will  call  all  the  male  children 
who  are  born  in  the  seventh  and  the  tenth  month  after- 
wards his  sons,  and  the  female  children  his  daughters, 
and  they  will  call  him  father,  and  he  will  call  their 
children  his  grandchildren,  and  they  will  call  the  elder 
generation  grandfathers  and  grandmothers.  All 
who  were  begotten  at  the  time  when  their  fathers  and 
mothers  came  together  will  be  called  their  brothers 
and  sisters,  and  these,  as  I was  saying,  will  be  forbid- 
den to  intermarry.  This,  however,  is  not  to  be  under- 
stood as  an  absolute  prohibition  of  the  marriage  of 
brothers  and  sisters ; if  the  lot  favors  them,  and  they 


194 


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receive  the  sanction  of  the  P5i;hian  oracle,  the  law  will 
allow  them. 

Quite  right,  he  replied. 

Such  is  the  scheme,  Glaucon,  according  to  which 
the  guardians  of  our  State  are  to  have  their  wives  and 
families  in  common.  And  now  you  would  have  the 
argument  show  that  this  community  is  consistent  with 
the  rest  of  our  polity,  and  also  that  nothing  can  be 
better  — would  you  not? 

Yes,  certainly. 

Shall  we  try  to  find  a common  basis  by  asking  of 
ourselves  what  ought  to  be  the  chief  aim  of  the  legis- 
lator in  making  laws  and  in  the  organization  of  a 
State,  — what  is  the  greatest  good,  and  what  is  the 
greatest  evil,  and  then  consider  whether  our  previous 
description  has  the  stamp  of  the  good  or  of  the  evil? 

By  all  means. 

Can  there  be  any  greater  evil  than  discord  and 
distraction  and  plurality  where  unity  ought  to  reign? 
or  any  greater  good  than  the  bond  of  unity? 

There  can  not. 

And  there  is  unity  where  there  is  community  of 
pleasures  and  pains  — where  all  the  citizens  are  glad 
or  grieved  on  the  same  occasions  of  joy  and  sorrow? 

No  doubt. 

Yes;  and  where  there  is  no  common  but  only 
private  feeling  a State  is  disorganized  — when  you 
have  one  half  of  the  world  triumphing  and  the  other 
plunged  in  grief  at  the  same  events  happening  to  the 
city  or  the  citizens? 

Certainly. 

Such  differences  commonly  originate  in  a disagree- 
ment about  the  use  of  the  terms  “ mine  ” and  “ not 
.mine,”  “ his  ” and  “ not  his.” 

Exactly  so. 

And  is  not  that  the  best-ordered  State  in  which  the 


THE  REPUBLIC 


195 


greatest  number  of  persons  apply  the  terms  “ mine  ” 
and  “ not  mine  ” in  the  same  way  to  the  same  thing? 

Quite  true. 

Or  that  again  which  most  nearly  approaches  to  the 
condition  of  the  individual  — as  in  the  body,  when 
hut  a finger  of  one  of  us  is  hurt,  the  whole  frame, 
drawn  towards  the  soul  as  a centre  and  forming  one 
kingdom  under  the  ruling  power  therein,  feels  the 
hurt  and  sympathizes  all  together  with  the  part 
affected,  and  we  say  that  the  man  has  a pain  in  his 
finger;  and  the  same  expression  is  used  about  any 
other  part  of  the  body,  which  has  a sensation  of  pain 
at  suffering  or  of  pleasure  at  the  alleviation  of  suffer- 

ing- 

Very  true,  he  replied;  and  I agree  with  you  that  in 
the  best-ordered  State  there  is  the  nearest  approach 
to  this  common  feeling  which  you  describe. 

. Then  when  any  one  of  the  citizens  experiences  any 
good  or  evil,  the  whole  State  will  make  his  case  their 
own,  and  will  either  rejoice  or  sorrow  with  him? 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  what  will  happen  in  a well- 
ordered  State. 

It  will  now  be  time,  I said,  for  us  to  return  to  our 
State  and  see  whether  this  or  some  other  form  is  most 
in  accordance  with  these  fundamental  principles. 

Very  good. 

Our  State  like  every  other  has  rulers  and  subjects? 

True. 

All  of  whom  will  call  one  another  citizens? 

Of  course. 

But  is  there  not  another  name  which  people  give  to 
their  rulers  in  other  States? 

Generally  they  call  them  masters,  but  in  democratic 
States  they  simply  call  them  rulers. 

And  in  our  State  what  other  name  besides  that  of 
citizens  do  the  people  give  the  rulers?' 


196 


THE  REPUBLIC 


They  are  called  saviours  and  helpers,  he  replied. 

And  what  do  the  rulers  call  the  people? 

Their  maintainers  and  foster-fathers. 

And  what  do  they  call  them  in  other  States? 

Slaves. 

And  what  do  the  rulers  call  one  another  in  other 
States  ? 

Fellow-rulers. 

And  what  in  ours? 

F ellow-guardians. 

Did  you  ever  know  an  example  in  any  other  State 
of  a ruler  who  would  speak  of  one  of  his  colleagues 
as  his  friend  and  of  another  as  not  being  his  friend? 

Yes,  very  often. 

And  the  friend  he  regards  and  describes  as  one  in 
whom  he  has  an  interest,  and  the  other  as  a stranger 
in  whom  he  has  no  interest? 

Exactly. 

But  would  any  of  your  guardians  think  or  speak 
of  any  other  guardian  as  a stranger? 

Certainly  he  would  not;  for  every  one  whom  they 
meet  will  be  regarded  by  them  either  as  a brother  or 
sister,  or  father  or  mother,  or  son  or  daughter, 
or  as  the  child  or  parent  of  those  who  are  thus  con- 
nected with  him. 

Capital,  I said ; but  let  me  ask  you  once  more : Shall 
they  be  a family  in  name  only;  or  shall  they  in  all 
their  actions  be  true  to  the  name?  For  example,  in 
the  use  of  the  word  “ father,”  would  the  care  of  a 
father  be  implied  and  the  filial  reverence  and  duty  and 
obedience  to  him  which  the  law  commands ; and  is  the 
violator  of  these  duties  to  be  regarded  as  an  impious 
and  unrighteous  person  who  is  not  likely  to  receive 
much  good  either  at  the  hands  of  God  or  of  man? 
Are  these  to  be  or  not  to  be  the  strains  which  the 
children  will  hear  repeated  in  their  ears  by  all  the 


THE  REPUBLIC 


197 


citizens  about  those  who  are  intimated  to  them  to  be 
their  parents  and  the  rest  of  their  kinsfolk? 

These,  he  said,  and  none  other;  for  what  can  be 
more  ridiculous  than  for  them  to  utter  the  names  of 
family  ties  with  the  lips  only  and  not  to  act  in  the 
spirit  of  them? 

Then  in  our  city  the  language  of  harmony  and  con- 
cord will  be  more  often  heard  than  in  any  other.  As 
I was  describing  before,  when  any  one  is  well  or  ill, 
the  universal  word  will  be  “ with  me  it  is  well  ” or  “ it 
is  ill.” 

Most  true. 

And  agreeably  to  this  mode  of  thinking  and  speak- 
ing, were  we  not  saying  that  they  will  have  their 
pleasures  and  pains  in  common? 

Yes,  and  so  they  will. 

And  they  will  have  a common  interest  in  the  same 
thing  which  they  will  alike  call  “ my  own,”  and  having 
this  common  interest  they  will  have  a common  feeling 
of  pleasure  and  pain? 

Yes,  far  more  so  than  in  other  States. 

And  the  reason  of  this,  over  and  above  the  general 
constitution  of  the  State,  will  be  that  the  guardians 
will  have  a community  of  women  and  children? 

That  will  be  the  chief  reason. 

And  this  unity  of  feeling  we  admitted  to  be  the 
greatest  good,  as  was  implied  in  our  own  comparison 
of  a well-ordered  State  to  the  relation  of  the  body 
and  the  members,  when  affected  by  pleasure  or 
pain? 

That  we  acknowledge,  and  very  rightly. 

Then  the  community  of  wives  and  children  among 
our  citizens  is  clearly  the  source  of  the  greatest  good 
to  the  State? 

Certainly. 

Ajid  this  agrees  with  the  other  principle  which  we 


198 


THE  REPUBLIC 


were  affirming,  — that  the  guardians  were  not  to  have 
houses  or  lands  or  any  other  property;  their  pay  was 
to  be  their  food,  which  they  were  to  receive  from  the 
other  citizens,  and  they  were  to  have  no  private  ex- 
penses; for  we  intended  them  to  preserve  their  true 
character  of  guardians. 

Right,  he  replied. 

Both  the  community  of  property  and  the  commu- 
nity of  families,  as  I am  saying,  tend  to  make  them 
more  truly  guardians;  they  will  not  tear  the  city  in 
pieces  by  differing  about  “ mine  ” and  “ not  mine  ” ; 
each  man  dragging  any  acquisition  which  he  has  made 
into  a separate  house  of  his  own,  where  he  has  a 
separate  wife  and  children  and  private  pleasures  and 
pains;  but  all  will  be  affected  as  far  as  may  be  by 
the  same  pleasures  and  pains  because  they  are  all  • 
of  one  opinion  about  what  is  near  and  dear  to  them, 
and  therefore  they  all  tend  towards  a common 
end. 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

And  as  they  have  nothing  but  their  persons  which 
they  can  call  their  own,  suits  and  complaints  will  have 
no  existence  among  them ; they  will  be  delivered  from 
all  those  quarrels  of  which  money  or  children  or 
relations  are  the  occasion. 

Of  course  they  will. 

Neither  will  trials  for  assault  or  insult  ever  be 
likely  to  occur  among  them.  For  that  equals  should 
defend  themselves  against  equals  we  shall  maintain  to 
be  honorable  and  right;  we  shall  make  the  protection 
of  the  person  a matter  of  necessity. 

That  is  good,  he  said. 

Yes;  and  there  is  a further  good  in  the  law;  viz. 
that  if  a man  has  a quarrel  with  another  he  will  satisfy 
his  resentment  then  and  there,  and  not  proceed  to 
more  dangerous  lengths. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


199 


Certainly. 

To  the  elder  shall  be  assigned  the  duty  of  ruling 
and  chastising  the  younger. 

Clearly. 

Nor  can  there  be  a doubt  that  the  younger  will  not 
strike  or  do  any  other  violence  to  an  elder,  unless  the 
magistrates  command  him;  nor  will  he  slight  him  in 
any  way.  For  there  are  two  guardians,  shame  and 
fear,  mighty  to  prevent  him:  shame,  which  makes  men 
refrain  from  laying  hands  on  those  who  are  to  them 
in  the  relation  of  parents;  fear,  that  the  injured  one 
will  be  succored  by  the  others  who  are  his  brothers, 
sons,  fathers. 

That  is  true,  he  replied. 

Then  in  every  way  the  laws  will  help  the  citizens 
to  keep  the  peace  with  one  another? 

Yes,  there  will  be  no  want  of  peace. 

And  as  the  guardians  will  never  quarrel  among 
themselves  there  will  be  no  danger  of  the  rest  of  the 
city  being  divided  either  against  them  or  against  one 
another. 

None  whatever. 

I hardly  like  even  to  mention  the  little  meannesses 
of  which  they  will  be  rid,  for  they  are  beneath  notice : 
such,  for  example,  as  the  flattery  of  the  rich  by  the 
poor,  and  all  the  pains  and  pangs  which  men  experi- 
ence in  bringing  up  a family,  and  in  finding  money 
to  buy  necessaries  for  their  household,  borrowing  and 
then  repudiating,  getting  how  they  can,  and  giving 
the  money  into  the  hands  of  women  and  slaves  to  keep 
— the  many  evils  of  so  many  kinds  which  people 
suffer  in  this  way  are  mean  enough  and  obvious 
enough,  and  not  worth  speaking  of. 

Yes,  he  said,  a man  has  no  need  of  eyes  in  order 
to  perceive  that. 

And  from  all  these  evils  they  will  be  delivered,  and 


200 


THE  REPUBLIC 


their  life  will  be  blessed  as  the  life  of  Olympic  victors 
and  yet  more  blessed. 

How  so? 

The  Olympic  victor,  I said,  is  deemed  happy  in 
receiving  a part  only  of  the  blessedness  which  is  se- 
cured to  our  citizens,  who  have  won  a more  glorious 
victory  and  have  a more  complete  maintenance  at  the 
public  cost.  For  the  victory  which  they  have  won  is 
the  salvation  of  the  whole  State;  and  the  crown  with 
which  they  and  their  children  are  crowned  is  the  ful- 
ness of  all  that  life  needs;  they  receive  rewards  from 
the  hands  of  their  country  while  living,  and  after 
death  have  an  honorable  burial. 

Yes,  he  said,  and  glorious  rewards  they  are. 

Do  you  remember,  I said,  how  in  the  course  of  the 
previous  discussion  some  one  who  shall  be  nameless 
accused  us  of  making  our  guardians  unhappy  — they 
had  nothing  and  might  have  possessed  all  things  — to 
whom  we  replied  that,  if  an  occasion  offered,  we  niight 
perhaps  hereafter  consider  this  question,  but  that,  as 
at  present  advised,  we  would  make  our  guardians 
truly  guardians,  and  that  we  were  fashioning  the 
State  with  a view  to  the  greatest  happiness,  not  of 
any  particular  class,  but  of  the  whole? 

Yes,  I remember. 

And  what  do  you  say,  now  that  the  life  of  our  pro- 
tectors is  made  out  to  be  far  better  and  nobler  than 
that  of  Olympic  victors  — is  the  life  of  shoemakers, 
or  any  other  artisans,  or  of  husbandmen,  to  be  com- 
pared with  it? 

Certainly  not. 

At  the  same  time  I ought  here  to  repeat  what  I 
have  said  elsewhere,  that  if  any  of  our  guardians 
shall  try  to  be  happy  in  such  a manner  that  he  will 
cease  to  he  a guardian,  and  is  not  content  with  this 
safe  and  harmonious  hfe,  which,  in  our  judgment,  is 


THE  REPUBLIC 


201 


of  all  lives  the  best,  but  infatuated  by  some  youthful 
conceit  of  happiness  which  gets  up  into  his  head  shall 
seek  to  appropriate  the  whole  state  to  himself,  then 
he  will  have  to  learn  how  wisely  Hesiod  spoke,  when 
he  said,  “ half  is  more  than  the  whole.” 

If  he  were  to  consult  me,  I should  say  to  him : Stay 
where  you  are,  when  you  have  the  offer  of  such  a 
life. 

You  agree  then,  I said,  that  men  and  women  are  to 
have  a common  way  of  life  such  as  we  have  de- 
scribed — common  education,  common  children ; and 
they  are  to  watch  over  the  citizens  in  common  whether 
abiding  in  the  city  or  going  out  to  war;  they  are  to 
keep  watch  together,  and  to  hunt  together  like  dogs ; 
and  always  and  in  all  things,  as  far  as  they  are  able, 
women  are  to  share  with  the  men?  And  in  so  doing 
they  will  do  what  is  best,  and  will  not  violate,  but 
preserve  the  natural  relation  of  the  sexes. 

I agree  with  you,  he  replied. 

The  inquiry,  I said,  has  yet  to  be  made,  whether 
such  a community  will  be  found  possible  — as  among 
other  animals,  so  also  among  men  — and  if  possible, 
in  what  way  possible? 

You  have  anticipated  the  question  which  I was 
about  to  suggest. 

There  is  no  difficulty,  I said,  in  seeing  how  war 
will  be  carried  on  by  them. 

How? 

Why,  of  course  they  will  go  on  expeditions  to- 
gether; and  will  take  with  them  any  of  their  children 
who  are  strong  enough,  that,  after  the  manner  of  the 
artisan’s  child,  they  may  look  on  at  the  work  which 
they  will  have  to  do  when  they  are  grown  up;  and 
besides  looking  on  they  will  have  to  help  and  be  of 
use  in  war,  and  to  wait  upon  their  fathers  and 
mothers.  Did  you  never  observe  in  the  arts  how  the 


202 


THE  REPUBLIC 


potters’  boys  look  on  and  help,  long  before  they  toucK 
the  wheel? 

Yes,  I have. 

And  shall  potters  be  more  careful  in  educating 
their  children  and  in  giving  them  the  opportunity  of 
seeing  and  practising  their  duties  than  our  guardians 
will  be? 

The  idea  is  ridiculous,  he  said. 

There  is  also  the  effect  on  the  parents,  with  whom, 
as  with  other  animals,  the  presence  of  their  young 
ones  will  be  the  greatest  incentive  to  valor. 

That  is  quite  true,  Socrates;  and  yet  if  they  are 
defeated,  which  may  often  happen  in  war,  how  great 
the  danger  is ! the  children  will  be  lost  as  well  as  their 
parents,  and  the  State  will  never  recover. 

True,  I said;  but  would  you  never  allow  them  to 
run  any  risk? 

I am  far  from  saying  that. 

Well,  but  if  they  are  ever  to  run  a risk  should  they 
not  do  so  on  some  occasion  when,  if  they  escape  dis- 
aster, they  will  be  the  better  for  it? 

Clearly. 

Whether  the  future  soldiers  do  or  do  not  see  war  in 
the  days  of  their  youth  is  a very  important  matter, 
for  the  sake  of  which  some  risk  may  fairly  be  incurred. 

Yes,  very  important. 

This  then  must  be  our  first  step,  — to  make  our 
children  spectators  of  war ; but  we  must  also  contrive 
that  they  shall  be  secured  against  danger;  then  all 
will  be  well. 

True. 

Their  parents  may  be  supposed  not  to  be  blind  to 
the  risks  of  war,  but  to  know,  as  far  as  human  fore- 
sight can,  what  expeditions  are  safe  and  what  dan- 
gerous? 

That  may  be  assumed. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


203 


'And  they  will  take  them  on  the  safe  expeditions 
and  be  cautious  about  the  dangerous  ones? 

True. 

And  they  will  place  them  under  the  command  of 
experienced  veterans  who  will  be  their  leaders  and 
teachers? 

Very  properly. 

Still,  the  dangers  of  war  can  not  be  always  fore- 
seen; there  is  a good  deal  of  chance  about  them? 

True. 

Then  against  such  chances  the  children  must  be  at 
once  furnished  with  wings,  in  order  that  in  the  hour 
of  need  they  may  fly  away  and  escape. 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

I mean  that  we  must  mount  them  on  horses  in  their 
earliest  youth,  and  when  they  have  learned  to  ride, 
take  them  on  horseback  to  see  war:  the  horses  must 
not  be  spirited  and  warlike,  but  the  most  tractable  and 
yet  the  swiftest  that  can  be  had.  In  this  way  they 
will  get  an  excellent  view  of  what  is  hereafter  to  be 
their  own  business;  and  if  there  is  danger  they  have 
only  to  follow  their  elder  leaders  and  escape. 

I believe  that  you  are  right,  he  said. 

Next,  as  to  war;  what  are  to  be  the  relations  of 
your  soldiers  to  one  another  and  to  their  enemies?  I 
should  be  inclined  to  propose  that  the  soldier  who 
leaves  his  rank  or  throws  away  his  arms,  or  is  guilty 
of  any  other  act  of  cowardice,  should  be  degraded 
into  the  rank  of  a husbandman  or  artisan.  What  do 
you  think? 

By  all  means,  I should  say. 

And  he  who  allows  himself  to  be  taken  prisoner 
may  as  well  be  made  a present  of  to  his  enemies;  he 
is  their  lawful  prey,  and  let  them  do  what  they  like 
with  him. 

Certainly. 


204 


THE  REPUBLIC 


But  the  hero  who  has  distinguished  himself,  what 
shall  be  done  to  him?  In  the  first  place,  he  shall 
receive  honor  in  the  army  from  his  youthful  com- 
rades; every  one  of  them  in  succession  shall  crown 
him.  What  do  you  say? 

I approve. 

And  what  do  you  say  to  his  receiving  the  right 
hand  of  fellowship? 

To  that  too,  I agree. 

But  you  will  hardly  agree  to  my  next  proposal. 

What  is  your  proposal? 

That  he  should  kiss  and  be  kissed  by  them. 

Most  certainly,  and  I should  be  disposed  to  go 
further,  and  say:  Let  no  one  whom  he  has  a mind  to 
kiss  refuse  to  be  kissed  by  him  while  the  expedition 
lasts.  So  that  if  there  be  a lover  in  the  army,  whether 
his  love  be  youth  or  maiden,  he  may  be  more  eager 
to  win  the  prize  of  valor. 

Capital,  I said.  That  the  brave  man  is  to  have 
more  wives  than  others  has  been  already  determined: 
and  he  is  to  have  first  choices  in  such  matters  more 
than  others,  in  order  that  he  may  have  as  many  chil- 
dren as  possible? 

Agreed. 

Again,  there  is  another  manner  in  which,  according 
to  Homer,  brave  youths  should  be  honored;  for  he 
tells  how  Ajax,^  after  he  had  distinguished  himself  in 
battle,  was  rewarded  with  long  chines,  which  seems  to 
be  a compliment  appropriate  to  a hero  in  the  flower 
of  his  age,  being  not  only  a tribute  of  honor  but  also 
a very  strengthening  thing. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Then  in  this,  I said,  Homer  shall  be  our  teacher; 
and  we  too,  at  sacrifices  and  on  the  like  occasions,  will 
honor  the  brave  according  to  the  measure  of  their 

i Iliad,  vii.  321. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


205 


valor,  whether  men  or  women,  with  hymns  and  those 
other  distinctions  which  we  were  mentioning;  also 
with 

“ seats  of  precedence,  and  meats  and  full  cups ; ” ^ 

and  in  honoring  them,  we  shall  be  at  the  same  time 
training  them. 

That,  he  replied,  is  excellent. 

Yes,  I said;  and  when  a man  dies  gloriously  in  war 
shall  we  not  say,  in  the  first  place,  that  he  is  of  the 
golden  race? 

To  be  sure. 

Nay,  have  we  not  the  authority  of  Hesiod  for  af- 
firming that  when  they  are  dead 

“ They  are  holy  angels  upon  the  earth,  authors  of  good,  avert- 
ers  of  evil,  the  guardians  of  speech-gifted  men  ” ? * 

Yes;  and  we  accept  his  authority. 

We  must  learn  of  the  god  how  we  are  to  order  the 
sepulture  of  divine  and  heroic  personages,  and  what 
is  to  be  their  special  distinction;  and  we  must  do  as 
he  bids? 

By  all  means. 

And  in  ages  to  come  we  will  reverence  them  and 
kneel  before  their  sepulchres  as  at  the  graves  of  heroes. 
And  not  only  they  but  any  who  are  deemed  pre- 
eminently  good,  whether  they  die  from  age,  or  in  any 
other  way,  shall  be  admitted  to  the  same  honors. 

That  is  very  right,  he  said. 

Next,  how  shall  our  soldiers  treat  their  enemies? 
What  about  this? 

In  what  respect  do  you  mean? 

First  of  all,  in  regard  to  slavery?  Do  you  think  it 
right  that  Hellenes  should  enslave  Hellenic  States, 
or  allow  others  to  enslave  them,  if  they  can  help? 
Should  not  their  custom  be  to  spare  them,  considering 

i Iliad,  viii.  162.  2 probably  Works  and  Days,  121  foil. 


206 


THE  REPUBLIC 


the  danger  which  there  is  that  the  whole  race  may  one 
day  fall  under  the  yoke  of  the  barbarians? 

To  spare  them  is  infinitely  better. 

Then  no  Hellene  should  be  owned  by  them  as  a 
slave;  that  is  a rule  which  they  will  observe  and  ad- 
vise the  other  Hellenes  to  observe. 

Certainly,  he  said;  they  will  in  this  way  be  united 
against  the  barbarians  and  will  keep  their  hands  off 
one  another. 

Next  as  to  the  slain;  ought  the  conquerors,  I said, 
to  take  anything  but  their  armor?  Does  not  the 
practice  of  despoiling  an  enemy  afford  an  excuse  for 
not  facing  the  battle?  Cowards  skulk  about  the  dead, 
pretending  that  they  are  fulfilling  a duty,  and  many 
an  army  before  now  has  been  lost  from  this  love  of 
plunder. 

Very  true. 

And  is  there  not  illiberality  and  avarice  in  robbing 
a corpse,  and  also  a degree  of  meanness  and  woman- 
ishness in  making  an  enemy  of  the  dead  body  when 
the  real  enemy  has  flown  away  and  left  only  his  fight- 
ing gear  behind  him,  — is  not  this  rather  like  a dog 
who  can  not  get  at  his  assailant,  quarrelling  with  the 
stones  which  strike  him  instead? 

Very  like  a dog,  he  said. 

Then  we  must  abstain  from  spoiling  the  dead  or 
hindering  their  burial? 

Yes,  he  replied,  we  most  certainly  must. 

Neither  shall  we  offer  up  arms  at  the  temples  of 
the  gods,  least  of  all  the  arms  of  Hellenes,  if  we  care 
to  maintain  good  feeling  with  other  Hellenes;  and, 
indeed,  we  have  reason  to  fear  that  the  offering  of 
spoils  taken  from  kinsmen  may  be  a pollution  unless 
commanded  by  the  god  himself? 

Very  true. 

Again,  as  to  the  devastation  of  Hellenic  ter- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


207 


ritory  or  the  burning  of  houses,  what  is  to  be  the 
practice? 

May  I have  the  pleasure,  he  said,  of  hearing  your 
opinion? 

Both  should  be  forbidden,  in  my  judgment;  I 
would  take  the  annual  produce  and  no  more.  Shall 
I tell  you  why? 

Pray  do. 

Why,  you  see,  there  is  a difference  in  the  names 
“ discord  ” and  “ war,”  and  I imagine  that  there  is 
also  a difference  in  their  natures ; the  one  is  expressive 
of  what  is  internal  and  domestic,  the  other  of  what  is 
external  and  foreign;  and  the  first  of  the  two  is 
termed  discord,  and  only  the  second,  war. 

That  is  a very  proper  distinction,  he  replied. 

And  may  I not  observe  with  equal  propriety  that 
the  Hellenic  race  is  all  united  together  by  ties  of 
blood  and  friendship,  and  alien  and  strange  to  the 
barbarians? 

Very  good,  he  said. 

And  therefore  when  Hellenes  fight  with  barbarians 
and  barbarians  with  Hellenes,  they  will  be  described 
by  us  as  being  at  war  when  they  fight,  and  by  nature 
enemies,  and  this  kind  of  antagonism  should  be  called 
war;  but  when  Hellenes  fight  with  one  another  we 
shall  say  that  Hellas  is  then  in  a state  of  disorder  's 
and  discord,  they  being  by  nature  friends;  and  such  j 
enmity  is  to  be  called  d^iscord.  ' 

I agree. 

Consider  then,  I said,  when  that  which  we  have 
acknowledged  to  be  discord  occurs,  and  a city  is 
divided,  if  both  parties  destroy  the  lands  and  burn  the 
houses  of  one  another,  how  wicked  does  the  strife 
appear!  No  true  lover  of  his  country  would  bring 
himself  to  tear  in  pieces  his  own  nurse  and  mother: 
There  might  be  reason  in  the  conqueror  depriving  ! 


208 


THE  REPUBLIC 


the  conquered  of  their  harvest,  but  still  they  would 
have  the  idea  of  peace  in  their  hearts  and  would  not 
mean  to  go  on  fighting  forever. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  a better  temper  than  the  other. 

And  will  not  the  city,  which  you  are  founding,  be 
an  Hellenic  city? 

It  ought  to  be,  he  replied. 

Then  will  not  the  citizens  be  good  and  civilized? 

Yes,  very  civilized. 

And  will  they  not  be  lovers  of  Hellas,  and  think 
of  Hellas  as  their  own  land,  and  share  in  the  common 
temples  ? 

Most  certainly. 

And  any  difference  which  arises  among  them  will 
be  regarded  by  them  as  discord  only  — a quarrel 
among  friends,  which  is  not  to  be  called  a war? 

Certainly  not. 

Then  they  will  quarrel  as  those  who  intend  some 
day  to  be  reconciled? 

Certainly. 

They  will  use  friendly  correction,  but  will  not  en- 
slave or  destroy  their  opponents;  they  will  be  cor- 
rectors, not  enemies? 

Just  so. 

And  as  they  are  Hellenes  themselves  they  will  not 
devastate  Hellas,  nor  will  they  burn  houses,  nor  ever 
suppose  that  the  whole  population  of  a city  — men, 
women,  and  children  — are  equally  their  enemies,  for 
they  know  that  the  guilt  of  war  is  always  confined  to 
a few  persons  and  that  the  many  are  their  friends. 
And  for  all  these  reasons  they  will  be  unwilling  to 
waste  their  lands  and  raze  their  houses;  their  enmity 
to  them  will  only  last  until  the  many  innocent  suf- 
ferers have  compelled  the  guilty  few  to  give  satis- 
faction? 

I agree,  he  said,  that  our  citizens  should  thus  deal 


THE  REPUBLIC 


209 


with  their  Hellenic  enemies;  and  with  barbarians  as 
the  Hellenes  now  deal  with  one  another. 

Then  let  us  enact  this  law  also  for  our  guardians:  — 
that  they  are  neither  to  devastate  the  lands  of  Hellenes 
nor  to  burn  their  houses. 

Agreed;  and  we  may  agree  also  in  thinking  that 
these,  like  all  our  previous  enactments,  are  very  good. 

But  still  I must  say,  Socrates,  that  if  you  are  al- 
lowed to  go  on  in  this  way  you  will  entirely  forget 
the  other  question  which  at  the  commencement  of  this 
discussion  you  thrust  aside:  — Is  such  an  order  of 
things  possible,  and  how,  if  at  all?  For  I am  quite 
ready  to  acknowledge  that  the  plan  which  you  pro- 
pose, if  only  feasible,  would  do  all  sorts  of  good  to  the 
State.  I will  add,  what  you  have  omitted,  that  your 
citizens  will  be  the  bravest  of  warriors,  and  will  never 
leave  their  ranks,  for  they  will  all  know  one  another, 
and  each  will  call  the  other  father,  brother,  son;  and 
if  you  suppose  the  women  to  join  their  armies, 
whether  in  the  same  rank  or  in  the  rear,  either  as  a 
terror  to  the  enemy,  or  as  auxiliaries  in  case  of  need, 
I know  that  they  will  then  be  absolutely  invincible; 
and  there  are  many  domestic  advantages  which  might 
also  be  mentioned  and  which  I also  fully  acknowl- 
edge: but,  as  I admit  all  these  advantages  and  as 
many  more  as  you  please,  if  only  this  State  of  yours 
were  to  come  into  existence,  we  need  say  no  more 
about  them ; assuming  then  the  existence  of  the  State, 
let  us  now  turn  to  the  question  of  possibility  and  ways 
and  means  — the  rest  may  be  left. 

If  I loiter  ‘ for  a moment,  you  instantly  make  a 
raid  upon  me,  I said,  and  have  no  mercy;  I have 
hardly  escaped  the  first  and  second  waves,  and  you 
seem  not  to  be  aware  that  you  are  now  bringing  upon 
me  the  third,  which  is  the  greatest  and  heaviest. 

1 Reading  arpayyevofjiivtf. 


210 


THE  REPUBLIC 


When  you  have  seen  and  heard  the  third  wave,  I 
think  you  will  be  more  considerate  and  will  acknowl- 
edge that  some  fear  and  hesitation  was  natural  re- 
specting a proposal  so  extraordinary  as  that  which  I 
have  now  to  state  and  investigate. 

The  more  appeals  of  this  sort  which  you  make,  he 
said,  the  more  determined  are  we  that  you  shall  tell  us 
how  such  a State  is  possible:  speak  out  and  at  once. 

Let  me  begin  by  reminding  you  that  we  found  our 
way  hither  in  the  search  after  justice  and  injustice. 

True,  he  replied;  but  what  of  that? 

I was  only  going  to  ask  whether,  if  we  have  dis- 
covered them,  we  are  to  require  that  the  just  man 
should  in  nothing  fail  of  absolute  justice;  or  may 
we  be  satisfied  with  an  approximation,  and  the  at- 
tainment in  him  of  a higher  degree  of  justice  than  is 
to  be  found  in  other  men? 

The  approximation  will  be  enough. 

We  were  inquiring  into  the  nature  of  absolute  jus- 
tice and  into  the  character  of  the  perfectly  just,  and 
into  injustice  and  the  perfectly  unjust,  that  we  might 
have  an  ideal.  We  we?e  to  look  at  these  in  order  that 
we  might  judge  oUdur  own  happiness  and  unhappi- 
ness according  to  the  standard  which  they  exhibited 
and  the  degree  in  which  we  resembled  them,  l^t  not 
with  any  view  of  shOtUng  that  they  could  exist  in  fact. 

True,  he  said. 

Would  a painter  be  any  the  worse  because,  after 
having  delineated  with  consummate  art  an  ideal  of  a 
perfectly  beautiful  man,  he  was  unable  to  show  that 
any  such  man  could  ever  have  existed? 

He  would  be  none  the  worse. 

Well,  and  were  we  not  creating  an  ideal  of  a per- 
fect State? 

To  be  sure. 

And  is  our  theory  a worse  theory  because  we  are 


THE  REPUBLIC 


211 


unable  to  prove  the  possibility  of  a city  being  ordered 
in  the  manner  described? 

Surely  not,  he  replied. 

That  is  the  truth,  I said.  But  if,  at  your  request, 

I am  to  try  and  show  how  and  under  what  conditions 
the  possibility  is  highest,  I must  ask  you,  having  this 
in  view,  to  repeat  your  former  admissions. 

What  admissions? 

I want  to  know  whether  ideals  are  ever  fully  real- 
ized in  language?  Does  not  the  word  express  more 
than  the  fact,  and  must  not  the  actual,  whatever  a 
man  may  think,  always,  in  the  nature  of  things,  fall  , 
short  of  the  truth?  What  do  you  say? 

I agree. 

Then  you  must  not  insist  on  my  proving  that  the 
actual  State  will  in  every  respect  coincide  with  the| 
ideal : if  we  are  only  able  to  discover  how  a city  may 
be  governed  nearly  as  we  proposed,  you  will  admit 
that  we  have  discovered  the  possibility  which  you  de- 
mand ; and  will  be  contented.  I am  sure  that  I should 
be  contented  — will  not  you? 

Yes,  I will. 

Let  me  next  endeavor  to  show  what  is  that  fault 
in  States  which  is  the  cause  of  their  present  malad- 
ministration, and  what  is  the  least  change  which  will 
enable  a State  to  pass  into  the  truer  form;  and  let 
the  change,  if  possible,  be  of  one  thing  only,  or,  if 
not,  of  two;  at  any  rate,  let  the  changes  be  as  few 
and  slight  as  possible. 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

I think,  I said,  that  there  might  be  a reform  of  the 
State  if  only  one  change  were  made,  which  is  not  a 
slight  or  easy  though  still  a possible  one. 

What  is  it?  he  said. 

Now  then,  I said,  I go  to  meet  that  which  I liken 
to  the  greatest  of  the  waves;  yet  shall  the  word  be 


212 


THE  REPUBLIC 


spoken,  even  though  the  wave  break  and  drown  me 
in  laughter  and  dishonor;  and  do  you  mark  my 
w'ords. 

Proceed. 

^ I said:  Until  philosophers  are  kings,  or  the  kings 
j and  princes  of  this  world  have  the  spirit  and  power  of 
philosophy , and  political  greatness  and  wisdom  meet 
in  one,  and  those  commoner  natures  who  pursue  either 
to  the  exclusion  of  the  other  are  compelled  to  stand 
aside,  cities  will  never  have  rest  from  their  evils, — 
no,  nor  the  human  race,  as  I believe,  — and  then  only 
will  this  our  State  have  a possibility  of  life  and  behold 
> the  light  of  day.  Such  was  the  thought,  my  dear 
Glaucon,  which  I would  fain  have  uttered  if  it  had  not 
seemed  too  extravagant;  for  to  be  convinced  that 
in  no  other  State  can  there  be  happiness  private  or 
public  is  indeed  a hard  thing. 

Socrates,  what  do  you  mean?  I would  have  you 
consider  that  the  word  which  you  have  uttered  is  one 
at  which  numerous  persons,  and  very  respectable  per- 
sons too,  in  a figure  pulling  off  their  coats  all  in  a 
moment,  and  seizing  any  weapon  that  comes  to  hand, 
will  run  at  you  might  and  main,  before  you  know 
where  you  are,  intending  to  do  heaven  knows  what; 
and  if  you  don’t  prepare  an  answer,  and  put  yourself 
in  motion,  you  will  be  “ pared  by  their  fine  wits,”  and 
no  mistake. 

You  got  me  into  the  scrape,  I said. 

And  I was  quite  right ; however,  I will  do  all  I can 
to  get  you  out  of  it;  but  I can  only  give  you  good- 
will and  good  advice,  and,  perhaps,  I may  be  able  to 
fit  answers  to  your  questions  better  than  another  — 
that  is  all.  And  now,  having  such  an  auxiliary,  you 
must  do  your  best  to  show  the  unbelievers  that  you 
are  right. 

I ought  to  try,  I said,  since  you  offer  me  sucli  in- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


213 


valuable  assistance.  And  I think  that,  if  there  is  to 
be  a chance  of  our  escaping,  we  must  explain  to  them 
whom  we  meati  when  we  say  that  philosophers  are  to 
rule  in  the  State;  then  we  shall  be  able  to  defend 
ourselves:  There  will  be  discovered  to  be  some 

natures  who  ought  to  study  philosophy  and  to  be 
leaders  in  the  State;  and  others  who  are  not  born 
to  be  philosophers,  and  are  meant  to  be  followers 
rather  than  leaders. 

Then  now  for  a definition,  he  said. 

Follow  me,  I said,  and  I hope  that  I may  in  some 
way  or  other  be  able  to  give  you  a satisfactory  ex- 
planation. 

Proceed. 

I dare  say  that  you  remember,  and  therefore  I need 
not  remind  you,  that  a lover,  if  he  is  worthy  of  the 
name,  ought  to  show  his  love,  not  to  some  one  part 
of  that  which  he  loves,  but  to  the  whole. 

I really  do  not  understand,  and  therefore  beg  of 
you  to  assist  my  memory. 

Another  person,  I said,  might  fairly  reply  as  you 
do;  but  a man  of  pleasure  like  yourself  ought  to 
know  that  all  who  are  in  the  flower  of  youth  do  some- 
how or  other  raise  a pang  or  emotion  in  a lover’s 
breast,  and  are  thought  by  him  to  be  worthy  of  his 
affectionate  regards.  Is  not  this  a way  which  you 
have  with  the  fair:  one  has  a snub  nose,  and  you 
praise  his  charming  face;  the  hook-nose  of  another 
has,  you  say,  a royal  look;  while  he  who  is  neither 
snub  nor  hooked  has  the  grace  of  regularity:  the 
dark  visage  is  manly,  the  fair  are  children  of  the 
gods;  and  as  to  the  sweet  “ honey  pale,”  as  they  are 
called,  what  is  the  very  name  but  the  invention  of  a 
lover  who  talks  in  diminutives,  and  is  not  averse  to 
paleness  if  appearing  on  the  cheek  of  youth?  In  a 
word,  there  is  no  excuse  which  you  will  not  make,  and 


214 


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nothing  which  you  will  not  say,  in  order  not  to  lose 
a single  flower  that  blooms  in  the  spring-time  of 
youth. 

If  you  make  me  an  authority  in  matters  of  love, 
for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  I assent. 

And  what  do  you  say  of  lovers  of  wine?  Do  you 
not  see  them  doing  the  same?  They  are  glad  of  any 
pretext  of  drinking  any  wine. 

Very  good. 

And  the  same  is  true  of  ambitious  men;  if  they 
can  not  command  an  army,  they  are  willing  to  com- 
mand a file ; and  if  they  can  not  be  honored  by  really 
great  and  important  persons,  they  are  glad  to  be 
honored  by  lesser  and  meaner  people,  — but  honor 
of  some  kind  they  must  have. 

Exactly. 

Once  more  let  me  ask:  Does  he  who  desires  any 
class  of  goods,  desire  the  whole  class  or  a part  only? 

The  whole. 

And  may  we  not  say  of  the  philosopher  that  he  is 
a lover,  not  of  a part  of  wisdom  only,  but  of  the 
whole? 

Yes,  of  the  whole. 

And  he  who  dislikes  learning,  especially  in  youth, 
when  he  has  no  power  of  judging  what  is  good  and 
what  is  not,  such  an  one  we  maintain  not  to  be  a 
philosopher  or  a lover  of  knowledge,  just  as  he  who 
refuses  his  food  is  not  hungry,  and  may  be  said  to 
have  a bad  appetite  and  not  a good  one? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Whereas  he  who  has  a taste  for  every  sort  of  knowl- 
edge and  who  is  curious  to  learn  and  is  never  satisfied, 
may  be  justly  termed  a philosopher?  Am  I not  right? 

Glaucon  said:  If  curiosity  makes  a philosopher, 
you  will  find  many  a strange  being  will  have  a title 
to  the  name.  All  the  lovers  of  sights  have  a delight 


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215 


in  learning,  and  must  therefore  be  included.  Musical 
amateurs,  too,  are  a folk  strangely  out  of  place  among 
philosophers,  for  they  are  the  last  persons  in  the  world 
who  would  come  to  anything  like  a philosophical  dis- 
cussion, if  they  could  help,  while  they  run  about  at 
the  Dionysiac  festivals  as  if  they  had  let  out  their 
ears  to  hear  every  chorus;  whether  the  performance 
is  in  town  or  country  — that  makes  no  difference  — 
they  are  there.  Now  are  we  to  maintain  that  all  these 
and  any  who  have  similar  tastes,  as  well  as  the  pro- 
fessors of  quite  minor  arts,  are  philosophers? 

Certainly  not,  I replied ; they  are  only  an  imitation. 

He  said:  Who  then  are  the  true  philosophers? 

Those,  I said,  who  are  lovers  of  the  vision  of  truth. 

That  is  also  good,  he  said;  but  I should  like  to 
know  what  you  mean? 

To  another,  I replied,  I might  have  a difficulty  in 
explaining;  but  I am  sure  that  you  will  admit  a 
proposition  which  I am  about  to  make. 

What  is  the  proposition? 

That  since  beauty  is  the  opposite  of  ugliness,  they 
are  two? 

Certainly. 

And  inasmuch  as  they  are  two,  each  of  them  is  one  ? 

True  again. 

And  of  just  and  unjust,  good  and  evil,  and  of 
every  other  class,  the  same  remark  holds ; taken 
singly,  each  of  them  is  one;  but  from  the  various 
combinations  of  them  with  actions  and  things  and 
with  one  another,  they  are  seen  in  all  sorts  of  lights 
and  appear  many? 

Very  true. 

And  this  is  the  distinction  which  I draw  between 
the  sight-loving,  art-loving,  practical  class  and  those 
of  whom  I am  speaking,  and  who  are  alone  worthy 
of  the  name  of  philosophers. 


216 


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How  do  you  distinguish  them?  he  said. 

The  lovers  of  sounds  and  sights,  I replied,  are,  as 
I conceive,  fond  of  fine  tones  and  colors  and  forms 
and  all  the  artificial  products  that  are  made  out  of 
them,  but  their  mind  is  incapable  of  seeing  or  loving 
absolute  beauty. 

True,  he  replied. 

Few  are  they  who  are  able  to  attain  to  the  sight  of 
this. 

Very  true. 

And  he  who,  having  a sense  of  beautiful  things  has 
no  sense  of  absolute  beauty,  or  who,  if  another  lead 
him  to  a knowledge  of  that  beauty  is  unable  to  fol- 
low — of  such  an  one  I ask.  Is  he  awake  or  in  a dream 
only?  Reflect:  is  not  the  dreamer,  sleeping  or  wak- 
ing, one  who  likens  dissimilar  things,  who  puts  the 
copy  in  the  place  of  the  real  object? 

I should  certainly  say  that  such  an  one  was  dream- 
ing. 

But  take  the  case  of  the  other,  who  recognizes  the 
existence  of  absolute  beauty  and  is  able  to  distinguish 
the  idea  from  the  objects  which  participate  in  the 
idea,  neither  putting  the  objects  in  the  place  of  the 
idea  nor  the  idea  in  the  place  of  the  objects  — is  he 
a dreamer,  or  is  he  awake? 

He  is  wide  awake. 

And  may  we  not  say  that  the  mind  of  the  one  who 
knows  has  knowledge,  and  that  the  mind  of  the  other, 
who  opines  only,  has  opinion? 

Certainly. 

But  suppose  that  the  latter  should  quarrel  with  us 
and  dispute  our  statement,  can  we  administer  any 
soothing  cordial  or  advice  to  him,  without  revealing 
to  him  that  there  is  sad  disorder  in  his  wits? 

We  must  certainly  offer  him  some  good  advioe,  he 
replied. 


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217 


Come,  then,  and  let  us  think  of  something  to  say  to 
him.  Shall  we  begin  by  assuring  him  that  he  is  wel- 
come to  any  knowledge  which  he  may  have,  and  that 
we  are  rejoiced  at  his  having  it?  But  we  should  like 
to  ask  him  a question:  Does  he  who  has  knowledge 
know  something  or  nothing?  (You  must  answer  for 
him.) 

I answer  that  he  knows  something. 

Something  that  is  or  is  not? 

Something  that  is;  for  how  can  that  which  is  not 
ever  be  known? 

And  are  we  assured,  after  looking  at  the  matter 
from  many  points  of  view,  that  absolute  being  is  or 
may  be  absolutely  known,  but  that  the  utterly  non- 
existent is  utterly  unknown? 

Nothing  can  be  more  certain. 

Good.  But  if  there  be  anything  which  is  of  such 
a nature  as  to  be  and  not  to  be,  that  will  have  a place 
intermediate  between  pure  being  and  the  absolute 
negation  of  being? 

Yes,  between  them. 

And,  as  knowledge  corresponded  to  being  and  ig- 
norance of  necessity  to  not-being,  for  that  inter- 
mediate between  being  and  not-being  there  has  to 
be  discovered  a corresponding  intermediate  between 
ignorance  and  knowledge,  if  there  be  such? 

Certainly. 

Do  we  admit  the  existence  of  opinion? 

Undoubtedly. 

As  being  the  same  with  knowledge,  or  another 
faculty? 

Another  faculty. 

Then  opinion  and  knowledge  have  to  do  with  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  matter  corresponding  to  this  difference 
of  faculties? 

Yes. 


218 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  knowledge  is  relative  to  being  and  knows 
being.  But  before  I proceed  further  I will  make  a 
division. 

What  division? 

I will  begin  by  placing  faculties  in  a class  by  them- 
selves: they  are  powers  in  us,  and  in  all  other  things, 
by  which  we  do  as  we  do.  Sight  and  hearing,  for 
example,  I should  call  faculties.  Have  I clearly  ex- 
plained the  class  which  I mean? 

Yes,  I quite  understand. 

Then  let  me  tell  you  my  view  about  them.  I do 
not  see  them,  and  therefore  the  distinctions  of  figure, 
color,  and  the  like,  which  enable  me  to  discern  the 
differences  of  some  things,  do  not  apply  to  them.  In 
speaking  of  a faculty  I think  only  of  its  sphere  and 
its  result ; and  that  which  has  the  same  sphere  and  the 
same  result  I call  the  same  faculty,  but  that  which  has 
another  sphere  and  another  result  I call  different. 
Would  that  be  your  way  of  speaking? 

Yes. 

And  will  you  be  so  very  good  as  to  answer  one  more 
question?  Would  you  say  that  knowledge  is  a faculty, 
or  in  what  class  would  you  place  it  ? 

Certainly  knowledge  is  a faculty,  and  the  mightiest 
of  all  faculties. 

And  is  opinion  also  a faculty? 

Certainly,  he  said;  for  opinion  is  that  with  which 
we  are  able  to  form  an  opinion. 

And  yet  you  were  acknowledging  a little  while  ago 
that  knowledge  is  not  the  same  as  opinion? 

Why,  yes,  he  said:  how  can  any  reasonable  being 
ever  identify  that  W'hich  is  infallible  with  that  which 
errs? 

An  excellent  answer,  proving,  I said,  that  we  are 
quite  conscious  of  a distinction  between  them. 

Yes. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


219 


Then  knowledge  and  opinion  having  distinct 
powers  have  also  distinct  spheres  or  subject-matters? 

That  is  certain.  \ 

Being  is  the  sphere  or  subject-matter  of  knowledge,! 
and  knowledge  is  to  know  the  nature  of  being? 

Yes.  _ _ _ ^ 

And  opinion  is  to  have  an  opinion? 

Yes. 

And  do  we  know  what  we  opine?  or  is  the  subject- 
matter  of  opinion  the  same  as  the  subject-matter  of 
knowledge? 

Nay,  he  replied,  that  has  been  already  disproven; 
if  difference  in  faculty  implies  difference  in  the 
sphere  or  subject-matter,  and  if,  as  we  were  saying, 
opinion  and  knowledge  are  distinct  faculties,  then  the 
sphere  of  knowledge  and  of  opinion  can  not  be  the 
same. 

Then  if  being  is  the  subject-matter  of  knowledge, 
something  else  must  be  the  subject-matter  of  opinion? 

Yes,  something  else. 

Well  then,  is  not-being  the  subject-matter  of 
opinion?  or,  rather,  how  can  there  be  an  opinion  at  all 
about  not-being?  Reflect:  when  a man  has  an  opin- 
ion, has  he  not  an  opinion  about  something?  Can 
he  have  an  opinion  which  is  an  opinion  about 
nothing? 

Impossible. 

He  who  has  an  opinion  has  an  opinion  about  some 
one  thing? 

Yes. 

And  not-being  is  not  one  thing  but,  properly  speak- 
ing, nothing? 

True. 

Of  not-being,  ignorance  was  assumed  to  be  the 
necessary  correlative;  of  being,  knowledge? 

True,  he  said. 


220 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Then  opinion  is  not  concerned  either  with  being  or 
with  not -being? 

Not  with  either. 

And  can  therefore  neither  be  ignorance  nor  knowl- 
edge? 

That  seems  to  be  true. 

But  is  opinion  to  be  sought  without  and  beyond 
either  of  them,  in  a greater  clearness  than  knowledge, 
or  in  a greater  darkness  than  ignorance? 

In  neither. 

Then  I suppose  that  opinion  appears  to  you  to  be 
darker  than  knowledge,  but  lighter  than  ignorance? 

Both;  and  in  no  small  degree. 

And  also  to  be  within  and  between  them? 

Yes. 

Then  you  would  infer  that  opinion  is  intermediate? 

No  question. 

But  were  we  not  saying  before,  that  if  anything 
appeared  to  be  of  a sort  which  is  and  is  not  at  the  same 
time,  that  sort  of  thing  would  appear  also  to  lie  in 
the  interval  between  pure  being  and  absolute  not- 
being;  and  that  the  corresponding  faculty  is  neither 
knowledge  nor  ignorance,  but  will  be  found  in  the 
interval  between  them? 

True. 

And  in  that  interval  there  has  now  been  discovered 
something  which  we  call  opinion? 

There  has. 

Then  what  remains  to  be  discovered  is  the  object 
which  partakes  equally  of  the  nature  of  being  and  not- 
being,  and  can  not  rightly  be  termed  either,  pure  and 
simple ; this  unknown  term,  when  discovered,  we  may 
truly  call  the  subject  of  opinion,  and  assign  each  to 
their  proper  faculty,  — the  extremes  to  the  faculties 
of  the  extremes  and  the  mean  to  the  faculty  of  the 
mean. 


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221 


True. 

This  being  premised,  I would  ask  the  gentleman 
who  is  of  opinion  that  there  is  no  absolute  or  unchange- 
able idea  of  beauty  — in  whose  opinion  the  beautiful 
is  the  manifold  — he,  I say,  your  lover  of  beautiful 
sights,  who  can  not  bear  to  be  told  that  the  beautiful 
is  one,  and  the  just  is  one,  or  that  anything  is  one  — 
to  him  I would  appeal,  saying.  Will  you  be  so  very 
kind,  sir,  as  to  tell  us  whether,  of  all  these  beautiful 
things,  there  is  one  which  will  not  be  found  ugly;  or 
of  the  just,  which  will  not  be  found  unjust;  or  of  the 
holy,  which  will  not  also  be  unholy? 

No,  he  replied;  the  beautiful  will  in  some  point  of 
view  be  found  ugly;  and  the  same  is  true  of  the 
rest. 

And  may  not  the  many  which  are  doubles  be  also 
halves  ? — doubles,  that  is,  of  one  thing,  and  halves 
of  another? 

Quite  true. 

And  things  great  and  small,  heavy  and  light,  as 
they  are  termed,  will  not  be  denoted  by  these  any 
more  than  by  the  opposite  names? 

True;  both  these  and  the  opposite  names  will 
always  attach  to  all  of  them. 

And  can  any  one  of  those  many  things  which  are 
called  by  particular  names  be  said  to  be  this  rather 
than  not  to  be  this? 

He  replied:  They  are  like  the  punning  riddles 
which  are  asked  at  feasts  or  the  children’s  puzzle  about 
the  eunuch  aiming  at  the  bat,  with  what  he  hit  him, 
as  they  say  in  the  puzzle,  and  upon  what  the  bat  was 
sitting.  The  individual  objects  of  which  I am  speak- 
ing are  also  a riddle,  and  have  a double  sense : nor  can 
you  fix  them  in  your  mind,  either  as  being  or  not- 
being,  or  both,  or  neither. 

Then  what  Avill  you  do  with  them?  I said.  Can 


222 


THE  REPUBLIC 


they  have  a better  place  than  between  being  and  not- 
being?  For  they  are  clearly  not  in  greater  darkness 
or  negation  than  not-being,  or  more  full  of  light  and 
existence  than  being. 

That  is  quite  true,  he  said. 

Thus  then  we  seem  to  have  discovered  that  the 
many  ideas  which  the  multitude  entertain  about  the 
beautiful  and  about  all  other  things  are  tossing  about 
in  some  region  which  is  half-way  between  pure  being 
and  pure  not-being? 

We  have. 

Yes;  and  we  had  before  agreed  that  anything  of 
this  kind  which  we  might  find  was  to  be  described  as 
matter  of  opinion,  and  not  as  matter  of  knowledge; 
being  the  intermediate  flux  which  is  caught  and  de- 
tained by  the  intermediate  faculty. 

Quite  true. 

Then  those  who  see  the  many  beautiful,  and  who 
yet  neither  see  absolute  beauty,  nor  can  follow  any 
guide  who  points  the  way  thither;  who  see  the  many 
just,  and  not  absolute  justice,  and  the  like,  — such 
persons  may  be  said  to  have  opinion  but  not  knowl- 
edge? 

That  is  certain. 

But  those  who  see  the  absolute  and  eternal  and  im- 
mutable may  be  said  to  know,  and  not  to  have  opinion 
only? 

Neither  can  that  be  denied. 

The  one  love  and  embrace  the  subjects  of  knowl- 
edge, the  other  those  of  opinion?  The  latter  are  the 
same,  as  I dare  say  you  will  remember,  who  listened 
to  sweet  sounds  and  gazed  upon  fair  colors,  but  would 
not  tolerate  the  existence  of  absolute  beauty. 

Yes,  I remember. 

Shall  we  then  be  guilty  of  any  impropriety  in  call- 
ing them  lovers  of  opinion  rather  than  lovers  of 


THE  REPUBLIC 


223 


wisdom,  and  will  they  be  very  angry  with  us  for  thus 
describing  them? 

I shall  tell  them  not  to  be  angry;  no  man  should 
be  angry  at  what  is  true. 

But  those  who  love  the  truth  in  each  thing  are  to 
be  called  lovers  of  wisdom  and  not  lovers  of  opinion. 

Assuredly. 


BOOK  VI 

iVsTD  thus,  Glaucon,  after  the  argument  has  gone 
a weary  way,  the  true  and  the  false  philosophers 
have  at  length  appeared  in  view. 

I do  not  think,  he  said,  that  the  way  could  have 
been  shortened. 

I suppose  not,  I said;  and  yet  I believe  that  we 
might  have  had  a better  view  of  both  of  them  if  the 
discussion  could  have  been  confined  to  this  one  sub- 
ject and  if  there  were  not  many  other  questions  await- 
ing us,  which  he  who  desires  to  see  in  what  respect 
the  life  of  the  just  differs  from  that  of  the  unjust 
must  consider. 

And  what  is  the  next  question?  he  asked. 

Surely,  I said,  the  one  which  follows  next  in  order. 

(Inasmuch  as  philosophers  only  are  able  to  grasp 
the  eternal  and  unchangeable,  and  those  who  wander 
in  the  region  of  the  many  and  variable  are  not  philos- 
ophers, I must  ask  you  which  of  the  two  classes  should 
be  the  rulers  of  our  State? 

And  how  can  we  rightly  answer  that  question? 

Whichever  of  the  two  are  best  able  to  guard  the 
laws  and  institutions  of  our  State  — let  them  be  our 
guardians. 

Very  good. 

Neither,  I said,  can  there  be  any  question  that  the 
guardian  who  is  to  keep  anything  should  have  eyes 
rather  than  no  eyes? 

There  can  be  no  question  of  that. 

And  are  not  those  who  are  verily  and  indeed  want- 
ing in  the  knowledge  of  the  true  being  of  each  thing, 

224 


THE  REPUBLIC 


225 


and  who  have  in  their  souls  no  clear  pattern,  and  are 
unable  as  with  a painter’s  eye  to  look  at  the  absolute 
truth  and  to  that  original  to  repair,  and  having  per- 
fect vision  of  the  other  world  to  order  the  laws  about 
beauty,  goodness,  justice  in  this,  if  not  already  or- 
dered, and  to  guard  and  preserve  the  order  of  them  — 
are  not  such  persons,  I ask,  simply  blind? 

Truly,  he  replied,  they  are  much  in  that  condition. 

And  shall  they  be  oirr  guardians  when  there  are 
others  who,  besides  being  their  equals  in  experience 
and  falling  short  of  them  in  no  particular  of  virtue, 
also  know  the  very  truth  of  each  thing? 

There  can  be  no  reason,  he  said,  for  rejecting  those 
who  have  this  greatest  of  all  great  qualities;  they 
must  always  have  the  first  place  unless  they  fail  in 
some  other  respect. 

Suppose  then,  I said,  that  we  determine  how  far 
they  can  unite  this  and  the  other  excellences. 

By  all  means. 

In  the  first  place,  as  we  began  by  observing,  the 
nature  of  the  philosopher  has  to  be  ascertained.  We 
must  come  to  an  understanding  about  him,  and,  when 
we  have  done  so,  then,  if  I am  not  mistaken,  we  shall 
also  acknowledge  that  such  an  union  of  qualities  is 
possible,  and  that  those  in  whom  they  are  united,  and 
those  only,  should  be  rulers  in  the  State^i 

^What  do  you  mean? 

' Let  us  suppose  that  philosophical  minds  always  love 
knowledge  of  a sort  which  shows  them  the  eternal 
nature  not  varying  from  generation  and  corruption.) 

Agreed. 

And  further,  I said,  let  us  agree  that  they  are  lovers 
of  all  true  being;}  there  is  no  part  whether  greater  or 
less,  or  more  or  less  honorable,  which  they  are  willing 
to  renounce;  as  we  said  before  of  the  lover  and  the 
man  of  ambition. 


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True. 

And  if  they  are  to  be  what  we  were  describing,  is 
there  not  another  quality  which  they  should  also  pos- 
sess ? 

What  quality? 

Truthfulness:  they  will  never  intentionally  receive 
into  their  mind  falsehood,  which  is  their  detestation, 
and  they  will  love  the  truth. 

Yes,  that  may  be  safely  affirmed  of  them. 

“ May  he,”  my  friend,  I replied,  is  not  the  word; 
say  rather,  “must  be  affrmed:”  for  he  whose  na- 
ture is  amorous  of  anything  can  not  help  loving  all 
that  belongs  or  is  akin  to  the  object  of  his  affec- 
tions. 

Right,  he  said. 

And  is  there  anything  more  akin  to  wisdom  than 
truth  ? 

How  can  there  be? 

Can  the  same  nature  be  a lover  of  wisdom  and  a 
lover  of  falsehood? 

Never. 

The  true  lover  of  learning  then  must  from  his  earli- 
est youth,  as  far  as  in  him  lies,  desire  all  truth? 

Assuredly. 

But  then  again,  as  we  know  by  experience,  he 
whose  desires  are  strong  in  one  direction  will  have 
them  weaker  in  others;  they  will  be  like  a stream 
which  has  been  drawn  off  into  another  channel. 

True. 

He  whose  desires  are  drawn  towards  knowledge 
in  every  form  will  be  absorbed  in  the  pleasures  of  the 
soul,  and  will  hardly  feel  bodily  pleasure  — I mean, 
if  he  be  a true  philosopher  and  not  a sham  one. 

That  is  most  certain. 

Such  an  one  is  sure  to  he  temperate  and  the  reverse 
of  covetous ; for  the  motives  which  make  another  mail 


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227 


desirous  of  having  and  spending,  have  no  place  in  his 
character^ 

Very  true. 

Another  criterion  of  the  philosophical  nature  has 
also  to  be  considered. 

What  is  that? 

There  should  be  no  secret  comer  of  illiberality ; 
nothing  can  be  more  antagonistic  than  meanness  to  a 
soul  which  is  ever  longing  after  the  whole  of  things 
both  divine  and  human^ 

Most  true,  he  replied. 

Then  how  can  he  who  has  magnificence  of  mind 
and  is  the  spectator  of  all  time  and  all  existence,  think 
much  of  human  hfe? 

He  can  not. 

Or  can  such  an  one  account  death  fearful? 

No  indeed. 

(Then  the  cowardly  and  mean  nature  has  no  part  in 
tnie  philosophy? 

Certainly  not. 

Or  again:  can  he  who  is  harmoniously  constituted, 
who  is  not  covetous  or  mean,  or  a boaster,  or  a 
coward  — can  he,  I say,  ever  be  unjust  or  hard  in  his 
dealings  ? 

Impossible. 

Then  you  will  soon  observe  whether  a man  is  just 
and  gentle,  or  rude  and  unsociable;  these  are  the 
signs  which  distinguish  even  in  youth  the  philosoph- 
ical nature  from  the  unphilosophical. 

True. 

There  is  another  point  which  should  he  remarked. 

What  point? 

(Whether  he  has  or  has  not  a pleasure  in  learning; 
for  no  one  will  love  that  which  gives  him  pain,  and 
in  which  after  much  toil  he  makes  little  progress.) 

Certainly  not. 


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And  again,  if  he  is  forgetful  and  retains  nothing 
of  what  he  learns,  will  he  not  be  an  empty  vessel? 

That  is  certain. 

Laboring  in  vain,  he  must  end  in  hating  himself 
and  his  fruitless  occupation? 

Yes. 

(Then  a soul  which  forgets  can  not  be  ranked  among 
genuine  philosophic  natures;  we  must  insist  that  the 
philosopher  should  have  a good  memory j) 

Certainly. 

And  once  more,  the  inharmonious  and  imseemly 
nature  can  only  tend  to  disproportion? 

Undoubtedly. 

And  do  you  consider  truth  to  be  akin  to  proportion 
or  to  disproportion? 

To  proportion. 

Then,  besides  other  qualities,  we  must  try  to  find 
a naturally  well-proportioned  and  gracious  mind, 
which  will  move  spontaneously  towards  the  true 
being  of  everything. 

Certainly. 

Well,  and  do  not  all  these  qualities,  which  we  have 
been  enumerating,  go  together,  and  are  they  not,  in 
a manner,  necessary  to  a soul,  which  is  to  have  a full 
and  perfect  participation  of  being? 

They  are  absolutely  necessary,  he  replied. 

And  must  not  that  be  a blameless  study  which  he 
only  can  pursue  who  has  the  gift  of  a good  memory, 
and  is  quick  to  learn,  — noble,  gracious,  the  friend 
of  truth,  justice,  courage,  temperance,  who  are  his 
kindred^ 

The  god  of  jealousy  himself,  he  said,  could  find 
no  fault  with  such  a study. 

And  to  men  like  him,  I said,  when  perfected  by 
years  and  education,  and  to  these  only  you  will 
entrust  the  State.^ 


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22J 


Here  Adeimantus  interposed  and  said:  To  these 
statements,  Socrates,  no  one  can  offer  a reply;  but 
when  you  talk  in  this  way,  a strange  feeling  passes 
over  the  minds  of  your  hearers : They  fancy  that  they 
are  led  astray  a little  at  each  step  in  the  argument, 
owing  to  their  own  want  of  skill  in  asking  and  answer- 
ing questions ; these  littles  accumulate,  and  at  the  end 
of  the  discussion  they  are  found  to  have  sustained  a 
mighty  overthrow  and  all  their  former  notions  appear 
to  be  turned  upside  down.  And  as  unskilful  players 
of  draughts  are  at  last  shut  up  by  their  more  skilful 
adversaries  and  have  no  piece  to  move,  so  they  too 
find  themselves  shut  up  at  last ; for  they  have  nothing 
to  say  in  this  new  game  of  which  words  are  the 
counters;  and  yet  all  the  time  they  are  in  the  right. 
The  observation  is  suggested  to  me  by  what  is  now 
occurring.  For  any  one  of  us  might  say,  that  al- 
though in  words  he  is  not  able  to  meet  you  at  each 
step  of  the  argument,  he  sees  as  a fact  that  the  vo- 
taries of  philosophy,  when  they  carry  on  the  study, 
not  only  in  youth  as  a part  of  education,  but  as  the 
pursuit  of  their  maturer  years,  most  of  them  become 
strange  monsters,  not  to  say  utter  rogues,  and  that 
those  who  may  be  considered  the  best  of  them  are 
made  useless  to  the  world  by  the  very  study  which  you 
extol. 

Well,  and  do  you  think  that  those  who  say  so  are 
wrong? 

I can  not  tell,  he  replied ; but  I should  hke  to  know 
what  is  your  opinion. 

Hear  my  answer;  I am  of  opinion  that  they  are 
quite  right. 

Then  how  can  jmu  be  justified  in  saying  that  cities 
will  not  cease  from  evil  until  philosophers  rule  in 
them,  when  philosophers  are  acknowledged  by  us  to 
be  of  no  use  to  them? 


I 


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You  ask  a question,  I said,  to  which  a reply  can 
only  be  given  in  a parable. 

Yes,  Socrates;  and  that  is  a way  of  speaking  to 
which  you  are  not  at  all  accustomed,  I suppose. 

I perceive,  I said,  that  you  are  vastly  amused  at 
having  plunged  me  into  such  a hopeless  discussion; 
but  now  hear  the  parable,  and  then  you  will  be  still 
more  amused  at  the  meagreness  of  my  imagination: 
for  the  manner  in  which  the  best  men  are  treated  in 
their  own  States  is  so  grievous  that  no  single  thing 
on  earth  is  comparable  to  it;  and  therefore,  if  I am 
to  plead  their  cause,  I must  have  recourse  to  fiction, 
and  put  together  a figure  made  up  of  many  things, 
like  the  fabulous  unions  of  goats  and  stags  which  are 
found  in  pictures.  Imagine  then  a fleet  or  a ship  in 
which  there  is  a captain  who  is  taller  and  stronger 
than  any  of  the  crew,  but  he  is  a little  deaf  and  has 
a similar  infirmity  in  sight,  and  his  knowledge  of 
navigation  is  not  much  better.  The  sailors  are  quar- 
relling with  one  another  about  the  steering  — every 
one  is  of  opinion  that  he  has  a right  to  steer,  though 
he  has  never  learned  the  art  of  navigation  and  can  not 
tell  who  taught  him  or  when  he  learned,  and  will 
further  assert  that  it  can  not  be  taught,  and  they  are 
ready  to  cut  in  pieces  any  one  who  says  the  contrary. 
They  throng  about  the  captain,  begging  and  praying 
him  to  commit  the  helm  to  them;  and  if  at  any  time 
they  do  not  prevail,  but  others  are  preferred  to  them, 
they  kill  the  others  or  throw  them  overboard,  and 
having  first  chained  up  the  noble  captain’s  senses  with 
drink  or  some  narcotic  drug,  they  mutiny  and  take 
possession  of  the  ship  and  make  free  with  the  stores; 
thus,  eating  and  drinking,  they  proceed  on  their  voy- 
age in  such  manner  as  might  be  expected  of  them. 
Him  who  is  their  partisan  and  cleverly  aids  them  in 
their  plot  for  getting  the  ship  out  of  the  captain’s 


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231 


hands  into  their  own  whether  by  force  or  persuasion, 
they  compliment  with  the  name  of  sailor,  pilot,  able 
seaman,  and  abuse  the  other  sort  of  man,  whom  they 
call  a good-for-nothing ; but  that  the  true  pilot  must 
pay  attention  to  the  year  and  seasons  and  sky  and 
stars  and  winds,  and  whatever  else  belongs  to  his  art, 
if  he  intends  to  be  really  qualified  for  the  command 
of  a ship,  and  that  he  must  and  will  be  the  steerer, 
whether  other  people  like  or  not  — the  possibility  of 
this  union  of  authority  with  the  steerer’s  art  has  never 
seriously  entered  into  their  thoughts  or  been  made 
part  of  their  calling.^  Now  in  vessels  which  are  in  a 
state  of  mutiny  and  by  sailors  who  are  mutineers,  how 
will  the  true  pilot  be  regarded?  Will  he  not  be  called 
by  them  a prater,  a star-gazer,  a good-for-nothing? 

Of  course,  said  Adeimantus. 

Then  you  will  hardly  need,  I said,  to  hear  the 
interpretation  of  the  figure,  which  describes  the  true 
philosopher  in  his  relation  to  the  State;  for  you 
understand  already. 

Certainly. 

Then  suppose  you  now  take  this  parable  to  the 
gentleman  who  is  surprised  at  finding  that  philos- 
ophers have  no  honor  in  their  cities ; explain  it  to  him 
and  try  to  convince  him  that  their  having  honor  would 
be  far  more  extraordinary. 

I will. 

Say  to  him,  that,  in  deeming  the  best  votaries  of 
philosophy  to  be  useless  to  the  rest  of  the  world,  he  is 
right;  but  also  tell  him  to  attribute  their  uselessness 
to  the  fault  of  those  who  will  not  use  them,  and  not  to 
themselves.  The  pilot  should  not  humbly  beg  the 
sailors  to  be  commanded  by  him  — that  is  not  the 

1 Or,  applying  Sttws  5^  Kv^epv'qaei  to  the  mutineers,  “ But  only  understand- 
ing {^TraiovTas)  that  he  (the  mutinous  pilot)  must  rule  in  spite  of  other  people, 
never  considering  that  there  is  an  art  of  command  which  may  be  practised 
in  combination  with  the  pilot’s  art.” 


232 


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order  of  nature ; neither  are  “ the  wise  to  go  to  the 
doors  of  the  rich  ” — the  ingenious  author  of  this  say- 
ing told  a lie  — hut  the  truth  is,  that,  when  a man  is 
ill,  whether  he  be  rich  or  poor,  to  the  physician  he  must 
go,  and  he  who  wants  to  be  governed,  to  him  who  is 
able  to  govern.  The  ruler  who  is  good  for  anything 
ought  not  to  beg  his  subjects  to  be  ruled  by  him;  al- 
though the  present  governors  of  mankind  are  of  a 
different  stamp;  they  may  be  justly  compared  to  the 
mutinous  sailors,  and  the  true  helmsmen  to  those  who 
are  called  by  them  good-for-nothings  and  star-gazers. 

Precisely  so,  he  said. 

For  these  reasons,  and  among  men  like  these,  phi- 
losophy, the  noblest  pursuit  of  all,  is  not  likely  to  be 
much  esteemed  by  those  of  the  opposite  faction;  not 
that  the  greatest  and  most  lasting  injury  is  done  to 
her  by  her  opponents,  but  by  her  own  professing  fol- 
lowers, the  same  of  whom  you  suppose  the  accuser  to 
say,  that  the  greater  number  of  them  are  arrant 
rogues,  and  the  best  are  useless;  in  which  opinion  I 
agreed. 

Yes. 

And  the  reason  why  the  good  are  useless  has  now 
been  explained? 

True. 

Then  shall  we  proceed  to  show  that  the  corruption 
of  the  majority  is  also  unavoidable,  and  that  this  is 
not  to  be  laid  to  the  charge  of  philosophy  any  more 
than  the  other? 

By  all  means. 

And  let  us  ask  and  answer  in  turn,  first  going  back 
to  the  description  of  the  gentle  and  noble  nature. 
Truth,  as  you  will  remember,  was  his  leader,  whom 
he  followed  always  and  in  all  things;  failing  in  this, 
he  was  an  impostor,  and  had  no  part  or  lot  in  true 
philosophy. 


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233 


Yes,  that  was  said. 

Well,  and  is  not  this  one  quality,  to  mention  no 
others,  greatly  at  variance  with  present  notions  of 
him? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  have  we  not  a right  to  say  in  his  defence,  that 
the  true  lover  of  knowledge  is  always  striving  after 
being  — that  is  his  nature ; he  will  not  rest  in  the 
multiplicity  of  individuals  which  is  an  appearance 
only,  but  will  go  on  — the  keen  edge  will  not  be 
blunted,  nor  the  force  of  his  desire  abate  until  he  have 
attained  the  knowledge  of  the  true  nature  of  every 
essence  by  a sympathetic  and  kindred  power  in  the 
soul,  and  by  that  power  drawing  near  and  mingling 
and  becoming  incorporate  with  very  being,  having 
begotten  mind  and  truth,  he  will  have  knowledge  and 
will  live  and  grow  truly,  and  then,  and  not  till  then, 
will  he  cease  from  his  travail. 

Nothing,  he  said,  can  be  more  just  than  such  a 
description  of  him. 

And  will  the  love  of  a lie  be  any  part  of  a philos- 
opher’s nature?  Will  he  not  utterly  hate  a lie? 

He  will. 

And  when  truth  is  the  captain,  we  can  not  suspect 
any  evil  of  the  band  which  he  leads? 

Impossible. 

Justice  and  health  of  mind  will  be  of  the  company, 
and  temperance  will  follow  after? 

True,  he  replied. 

Neither  is  there  any  reason  why  I should  again  set 
in  array  the  philosopher’s  virtues,  as  you  will  doubt- 
less remember  that  courage,  magnificence,  apprehen- 
sion, memory,  were  his  natural  gifts.  And  you  ob- 
jected that,  although  no  one  could  deny  what  I then 
said,  still,  if  you  leave  words  and  look  at  facts,  the 
persons  who  are  thus  described  are  some  of  them 


234 


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manifestly  useless,  and  the  greater  number  utterly 
depraved;  we  were  then  led  to  inquire  into  the 
grounds  of  these  accusations,  and  have  now  arrived 
at  the  point  of  asking  why  are  the  majority  bad, 
which  question  of  necessity  brought  us  back  to  the 
examination  and  definition  of  the  true  philosopher. 

Exactly. 

And  we  have  next  to  consider  the  corruptions  of 
the  philosophic  nature,  why  so  many  are  spoiled  and 
so  few  escape  spoiling  — I am  speaking  of  those  who 
were  said  to  be  useless  but  not  wicked  — and,  when 
we  have  done  with  them,  we  will  speak  of  the  imitators 
of  philosophy,  what  manner  of  men  are  they  who 
aspire  after  a profession  which  is  above  them  and  of 
which  they  are  unworthy,  and  then,  by  their  manifold 
inconsistencies,  bring  upon  philosophy,  and  upon  all 
philosophers,  that  universal  reprobation  of  which  we 
speak. 

What  are  these  corruptions?  he  said. 

I will  see  if  I can  explain  them  to  you.  Every  one 
will  admit  that  a nature  having  in  perfection  all  the 
qualities  which  we  required  in  a philosopher,  is  a rare 
plant  which  is  seldom  seen  among  men. 

Rare  indeed. 

And  what  numberless  and  powerful  causes  tend 
to  destroy  these  rare  natures! 

What  causes? 

In  the  first  place  there  are  their  own  virtues,  their 
courage,  temperance,  and  the  rest  of  them,  every  one 
of  which  praiseworthy  qualities  (and  this  is  a most 
singular  circumstance)  destroys  and  distracts  from 
philosophy  the  soul  which  is  the  possessor  of  them. 

That  is  very  singular,  he  replied. 

Then  there  are  all  the  ordinary  goods  of  life  — 
beauty,  wealth,  strength,  rank,  and  great  connections 
in  the  State  — you  understand  the  sort  of  things 


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235 


— these  also  have  a corrupting  and  distracting  ef- 
fect. 

I understand ; but  I should  like  to  know  more  pre- 
cisely what  you  mean  about  them. 

Grasp  the  truth  as  a whole,  I said,  and  in  the  right 
way ; you  will  then  have  no  difficulty  in  apprehending 
the  preceding  remarks,  and  they  will  no  longer  ap- 
pear strange  to  you. 

And  how  am  I to  do  so?  he  asked. 

Why,  I said,  we  know  that  all  germs  or  seeds, 
whether  vegetable  or  animal,  when  they  fail  to  meet 
with  proper  nutriment  or  climate  or  soil,  in  propor- 
tion to  their  vigor,  are  all  the  more  sensitive  to  the 
want  of  a suitable  environment,  for  evil  is  a greater 
enemy  to  what  is  good  than  to  what  is  not. 

Very  true. 

There  is  reason  in  supposing  that  the  finest  natures, 
when  under  alien  conditions,  receive  more  injury  than 
the  inferior,  because  the  contrast  is  greater. 

Certainly. 

And  may  we  not  say,  Adeimantus,  that  the  most 
gifted  minds,  when  they  are  ill-educated,  become  pre- 
eminently bad?  Do  not  great  crimes  and  the  spirit 
of  pure  evil  spring  out  of  a fulness  of  nature  ruined 
by  education  rather  than  from  any  inferiority,  whereas 
weak  natures  are  scarcely  capable  of  any  very  great 
good  or  very  great  evil? 

There  I think  that  you  are  right. 

And  our  philosopher  follows  the  same  analogy  — 
he  is  like  a plant  which,  having  proper  nurture,  must 
necessarily  grow  and  mature  into  all  virtue,  but,  if 
sown  and  planted  in  an  alien  soil,  becomes  the  most 
noxious  of  all  weeds,  unless  he  be  preserved  by  some 
divine  power.  Do  you  really  think,  as  people  so  often 
say,  that  our  youth  are  corrupted  by  Sophists,  or  that 
private  teachers  of  the  art  corrupt  them  in  any  de- 


236 


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gree  worth  speaking  of?  Are  not  the  public  who  say 
these  things  the  greatest  of  all  Sophists?  And  do 
they  not  educate  to  perfection  young  and  old,  men 
and  women  alike,  and  fashion  them  after  their  own 
hearts? 

When  is  this  accomplished?  he  said. 

When  they  meet  together,  and  the  w'orld  sits  down 
at  an  assembly,  or  in  a court  of  law,  or  a theatre,  or 
a camp,  or  in  any  other  popular  resort,  and  there  is 
a great  uproar,  and  they  praise  some  things  which  are 
being  said  or  done,  and  blame  other  things,  equally 
exaggerating  both,  shouting  and  clapping  their  hands, 
and  the  echo  of  the  rocks  and  the  place  in  which  they^ 
are  assembled  redoubles  the  sound  of  the  praise 
blame  — at  such  a time  will  not  a young  man’s  heart, 
as  they  say,  leap  within  him?  Will  any  private  train- 
ing enable  him  to  stand  firm  against  the  overwhelm- 
ing flood  of  popular  opinion?  or  will  he  be  carried 
away  by  the  stream?  Will  he  not  have  the  notions  of 
good  and  evil  which  the  public  in  general  have  — he 
will  do  as  they  do,  and  as  they  are,  such  will  he  be? 

Yes,  Socrates;  necessity  will  compel  him. 

And  yet,  I said,  there  is  a still  greater  necessity, 
which  has  not  been  mentioned. 

What  is  that? 

The  gentle  force  of  attainder  or  confiscation  or 
death,  which,  as  you  are  aware,  these  new  Sophists 
and  educators,  who  are  the  public,  apply  when  their 
words  are  powerless. 

Indeed  they  do;  and  in  right  good  earnest. 

Now  what  opinion  of  any  other  Sophist,  or  of  any 
private  person,  can  be  expected  to  overcome  in  such 
an  unequal  contest? 

None,  he  replied. 

No,  indeed,  I said,  even  to  make  the  attempt  is  a 
great  piece  of  folly;  there  neither  is,  nor  has  been. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


237 


nor  is  ever  likely  to  be,  any  different  type  of  char- 
aeter  ^ which  has  had  no  other  training  in  virtue  but 
that  which  is  supplied  by  public  opinion  ^ — I speak, 
my  friend,  of  human  virtue  only;  what  is  more  than 
human,  as  the  proverb  says,  is  not  included:  for  I 
would  not  have  you  ignorant  that,  in  the  present  evil 
state  of  governments,  whatever  is  saved  and  comes 
to  good  is  saved  by  the  power  of  God,  as  we  may 
truly  say. 

I quite  assent,  he  replied. 

Then  let  me  crave  your  assent  also  to  a further 
observation. 

What  are  you  going  to  say? 

Why,  that  all  those  mercenary  individuals,  whom 
the  many  call  Sophists  and  whom  they  deem  to  be 
their  adversaries,  do,  in  fact,  teach  nothing  but  the 
opinion  of  the  many,  that  is  to  say,  the  opinions  of 
their  assemblies;  and  this  is  their  wisdom.  I might 
compare  them  to  a man  who  should  study  the  tempers 
and  desires  of  a mighty  strong  beast  who  is  fed  by 
him  — he  would  learn  how  to  approach  and  handle 
him,  also  at  what  times  and  from  what  causes  he  is 
dangerous  or  the  reverse,  and  what  is  the  meaning 
of  his  several  cries,  and  by  what  sounds,  when  another 
utters  them,  he  is  soothed  or  infuriated ; and  you  may 
suppose  further,  that  when,  by  continually  attending 
upon  him,  he  has  become  perfect  in  all  this,  he  calls 
his  knowledge  wisdom,  and  makes  of  it  a system  or 
art,  which  he  proceeds  to  teach,  although  he  has  no 
real  notion  of  what  he  means  by  the  principles  or 
passions  of  which  he  is  speaking,  but  calls  this  hon- 
orable and  that  dishonorable,  or  good  or  evil,  or 
just  or  unjust,  all  in  accordance  with  the  tastes  and 
tempers  of  the  great  brute.  Good  he  pronounces  to 
be  that  in  which  the  beast  delights  and  evil  to  be  that 

1 Or,  taking  Trap  A in  another  sense,  trained  to  virtue  on  their  principles.” 


238 


THE  REPUBLIC 


which  he  dislikes;  and  he  can  give  no  other  account 
of  them  except  that  the  just  and  noble  are  the  neces- 
sary, having  never  himself  seen,  and  having  no  power 
of  explaining  to  others  the  nature  of  either,  or  the 
difference  between  them,  which  is  immense.  By 
heaven,  would  not  such  an  one  be  a rare  educator? 

Indeed  he  would. 

And  in  what  way  does  he  who  thinks  that  wisdom  is 
the  discernment  of  the  tempers  and  tastes  of  the  mot- 
ley multitude,  whether  in  painting  or  music,  or,  finally, 
in  politics,  differ  from  him  whom  I have  been  describ- 
ing? For  when  a man  consorts  with  the  many,  and 
exhibits  to  them  his  poem  or  other  work  of  art  or  the 
service  which  he  has  done  the  State,  making  them  his 
judges  ^ when  he  is  not  obliged,  the  so-called  necessity 
of  Diomede  will  oblige  him  to  produce  whatever  they 
praise.  And  yet  the  reasons  are  utterly  ludicrous 
which  they  give  in  confirmation  of  their  own  notions 
about  the  honorable  and  good.  Did  you  ever  hear 
any  of  them  which  were  not? 

No,  nor  am  I likely  to  hear. 

You  recognize  the  truth  of  what  I have  been  say- 
ing? Then  let  me  ask  you  to  consider  further  whether 
the  world  will  ever  be  induced  to  believe  in  the  exist- 
ence of  absolute  beauty  rather  than  of  the  many  beau- 
tiful, or  of  the  absolute  in  each  kind  rather  than  of 
the  many  in  each  kind? 

Certainly  not. 

Then  the  world  can  not  possibly  be  a philosopher? 

Impossible. 

And  therefore  philosophers  must  inevitably  fall 
under  the  censure  of  the  world  ? 

They  must. 

And  of  individuals  who  consort  with  the  mob  and 
seek  to  please  them? 

1 Putting  a comma  after  tQv  avayKaluiv, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


239 


# 


That  is  evident. 

Then,  do  you  see  any  way  in  which  the  philosopher 
can  be  preserved  in  his  calling  to  the  end?  and  re- 
member what  we  were  saying  of  him,  that  he  was  to 
have  quickness  and  memory  and  courage  and  mag- 
nificence — these  were  admitted  by  us  to  be  the  true 
philosopher’s  gifts. 

Yes. 

Will  not  such  an  one  from  his  early  childhood  be 
in  all  things  first  among  all,  especially  if  his  bodily 
endowments  are  like  his  mental  ones? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  his  friends  and  fellow-citizens  will  want  to  use 
him  as  he  gets  older  for  their  own  purposes? 

No  question. 

Falling  at  his  feet,  they  will  make  requests  to  him 
and  do  him  honor  and  flatter  him,  because  they  want 
to  get  into  their  hands  now,  the  power  which  he  will 
one  day  possess. 

That  often  happens,  he  said. 

And  what  will  a man  such  as  he  is  be  likely  to  do 
under  such  circumstances,  especially  if  he  be  a citizen 
of  a great  city,  rich  and  noble,  and  a tall  proper 
youth?  Will  he  not  be  full  of  boundless  aspirations, 
and  fancy  himself  able  to  manage  the  affairs  of  Hel- 
lenes and  of  barbarians,  and  having  got  such  notions 
into  his  head  will  he  not  dilate  and  elevate  himself 
in  the  fulness  of  vain  pomp  and  senseless  pride? 

To  be  sure  he  will. 

Now,  when  he  is  in  this  state  of  mind,  if  some  one 
gently  comes  to  him  and  tells  him  that  he  is  a fool  and 
must  get  understanding,  which  can  only  be  got  by 
slaving  for  it,  do  you  think  that,  under  such  adverse 
circumstances,  he  will  be  easily  induced  to  listen? 

Far  otherwise. 

And  even  if  there  be  some  one  who  through  in- 


240 


THE  REPUBLIC 


herent  goodness  or  natural  reasonableness  has  had  his 
eyes  opened  a little  and  is  humbled  and  taken  captive 
by  philosophy,  how  will  his  friends  behave  when  they 
think  that  they  are  likely  to  lose  the  advantage  which 
they  were  hoping  to  reap  from  his  companionship? 
Will  they  not  do  and  say  anything  to  prevent  him 
from  yielding  to  his  better  nature  and  to  render  his 
teacher  powerless,  using  to  this  end  private  intrigues 
as  well  as  public  prosecutions? 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  it. 

And  how  can  one  who  is  thus  circumstanced  ever 
become  a philosopher? 

Impossible. 

Then  were  we  not  right  in  saying  that  even  the 
very  qualities  which  make  a man  a philosopher  may, 
if  he  be  ill-educated,  divert  him  from  philosophy,  no 
less  than  riches  and  their  accompaniments  and  the 
other  so-called  goods  of  life? 

We  were  quite  right. 

Thus,  my  excellent  friend,  is  brought  about  all 
that  ruin  and  failure  which  I have  been  describing 
of  the  natures  best  adapted  to  the  best  of  all  pursuits ; 
they  are  natures  which  we  maintain  to  be  rare  at  any 
time ; this  being  the  class  out  of  which  come  the  men 
who  are  the  authors  of  the  greatest  evil  to  States  and 
individuals;  and  also  of  the  greatest  good  when  the 
tide  carries  them  in  that  direction;  but  a small  man 
never  was  the  doer  of  any  great  thing  either  to  in- 
dividuals or  to  States. 

That  is  most  true,  he  said. 

And  so  philosophy  is  left  desolate,  with  her  mar- 
riage rite  incomplete:  for  her  own  have  fallen  away 
and  forsaken  her,  and  while  they  are  leading  a false 
and  unbecoming  life,  other  unworthy  persons,  seeing 
that  she  has  no  kinsmen  to  be  her  protectors,  enter 
in  and  dishonor  her;  and  fasten  upon  her  the  re- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


241 


proaches  which,  as  you  say,  her  reprovers  utter,  who 
affirm  of  her  votaries  that  some  are  good  for  nothing, 
and  that  the  greater  number  deserve  the  severest 
punishment. 

That  is  certainly  what  people  say. 

Yes;  and  what  else  would  you  expect,  I said,  when 
you  think  of  the  puny  creatures  who,  seeing  this  land 
open  to  them  — a land  well  stocked  with  fair  names 
and  showy  titles  — like  prisoners  running  out  of 
prison  into  a sanctuary,  take  a leap  out  of  their  trades 
into  philosophy;  those  who  do  so  being  probably  the 
cleverest  hands  at  their  own  miserable  crafts?  For, 
although  philosophy  be  in  this  evil  case,  still  there 
remains  a dignity  about  her  which  is  not  to  be  found 
in  the  arts.  And  many  are  thus  attracted  by  her 
whose  natures  are  imperfect  and  whose  souls  are 
maimed  and  disfigured  by  their  meannesses,  as  their 
bodies  are  by  their  trades  and  crafts.  Is  not  this  un- 
avoidable ? 

Yes. 

Are  they  not  exactly  like  a bald  little  tinker  who 
has  just  got  out  of  durance  and  come  into  a fortune; 
he  takes  a bath  and  puts  on  a new  coat,  and  is  decked 
out  as  a bridegroom  going  to  marry  his  master’s 
daughter,  who  is  left  poor  and  desolate? 

A most  exact  parallel. 

What  will  be  the  issue  of  such  marriages?  Will 
they  not  be  vile  and  bastard? 

There  can  be  no  question  of  it. 

And  when  persons  who  are  unworthy  of  education 
approach  philosophy  and  make  an  alliance  with  her 
who  is  in  a rank  above  them,  what  sort  of  ideas  and 
opinions  are  likely  to  be  generated?  ^ Will  they  not 
be  sophisms  captivating  to  the  ear,^  having  nothing 
in  them  genuine,  or  worthy  of  or  akin  to  true  wisdom? 

» Or,  “ will  they  not  deserve  to  be  called  sophisms,”  • . • 


242 


THE  REPUBLIC 


No  doubt,  he  said. 

Then,  Adeimantus,  I said,  the  worthy  disciples  of 
philosophy  will  be  but  a small  remnant:  perchance 
some  noble  and  well-educated  person,  detained  by 
exile  in  her  service,  who  in  the  absence  of  corrupting 
influences  remains  devoted  to  her;  or  some  lofty  soul 
born  in  a mean  city,  the  politics  of  which  he  contemns 
and  neglects;  and  there  may  be  a gifted  few  who 
leave  the  arts,  which  they  justly  despise,  and  come 
to  her ; — or  peradventure  there  are  some  who  are  re- 
strained by  our  friend  Theages’  bridle;  for  every- 
thing in  the  life  of  Theages  conspired  to  divert  him 
from  philosophy;  but  ill-health  kept  him  away  from 
politics.  My  own  case  of  the  internal  sign  is  hardly 
worth  mentioning,  for  rarely,  if  ever,  has  such  a 
monitor  been  given  to  any  other  man.  Those  who 
belong  to  this  small  class  have  tasted  how  sweet  and 
blessed  a possession  philosophy  is,  and  have  also  seen 
enough  of  the  madness  of  the  multitude;  and  they 
know  that  no  politician  is  honest,  nor  is  there  any 
champion  of  justice  at  whose  side  they  may  fight  and 
be  saved.  Such  an  one  may  be  compared  to  a man 
who  has  fallen  among  wild  beasts  — he  will  not  join 
in  the  wickedness  of  his  fellows,  but  neither  is  he  able 
singly  to  resist  all  their  fierce  natures,  and  therefore 
seeing  that  he  would  be  of  no  use  to  the  State  or  to 
his  friends,  and  reflecting  that  he  would  have  to  throw 
away  his  life  without  doing  any  good  either  to  him- 
self or  others,  he  holds  his  peace,  and  goes  his  own 
way.  He  is  like  one  who,  in  the  storm  of  dust  and 
sleet  which  the  driving  wind  hurries  along,  retires 
under  the  shelter  of  a wall;  and  seeing  the  rest  of 
mankind  full  of  wickedness,  he  is  content,  if  only  he 
can  live  his  own  life  and  be  pure  from  evil  or  un- 
righteousness, and  depart  in  peace  and  good-will, 
with  bright  hopes. 


243 


THE  REPUBLIC 

Yes,  he  said,  and  he  will  have  done  a great  work 
before  he  departs.  j 

A great  work  — yes ; but  not  the  greatest,  unless 
he  find  a State  suitable  to  him;  for  in  a State  which 
is  suitable  to  him,  he  will  have  a larger  growth  and 
be  the  savior  of  his  country,  as  well  as  of  himself. 

The  causes  why  philosophy  is  in  such  an  evil  name 
have  now  been  sufficiently  explained:  the  injustice 
of  the  charges  against  her  has  been  shown  — is  there 
anything  more  which  you  wish  to  say? 

Nothing  more  on  that  subject,  he  replied;  but  I 
should  like  to  know  which  of  the  governments  now 
existing  is  in  your  opinion  the  one  adapted  to  her. 

Not  any  of  them,  I said;  and  that  is  precisely  the 
accusation  which  I bring  against  them  — not  one  of 
them  is  worthy  of  the  philosophic  nature,  and  hence 
that  nature  is  warped  and  estranged ; — as  the  exotic 
seed  which  is  sown  in  a foreign  land  becomes  de- 
naturalized, and  is  wont  to  be  overpowered  and  to 
lose  itself  in  the  new  soil,  even  so  this  growth  of  phi- 
losophy, instead  of  persisting,  degenerates  and  re- 
ceives another  character.  But  if  philosophy  ever  finds 
in  the  State  that  perfection  which  she  herself  is,  then 
will  be  seen  that  she  is  in  truth  divine,  and  that  all 
other  things,  whether  natures  of  men  or  institutions, 
are  but  human ; — and  now,  I know,  that  you  are 
going  to  ask.  What  that  State  is: 

No,  he  said;  there  you  are  wrong,  for  I was  going 
to  ask  another  question  — whether  it  is  the  State  of 
which  we  are  the  founders  and  inventors,  or  some 
other? 

Yes,  I replied,  ours  in  most  respects;  but  you  may 
remember  my  saying  before,  that  some  living  au- 
thority would  always  be  required  in  the  State  having 
the  same  idea  of  the  constitution  which  guided  you 
when  as  legislator  you  were  laying  down  the  laws, 


244 


.THE  REPUBLIC 


That  was  said,  he  replied. 

Yes,  but  not  in  a satisfactory  manner;  you  fright- 
ened us  by  interposing  objections,  which  certainly 
showed  that  the  discussion  would  be  long  and  difficult ; 
and  what  still  remains  is  the  reverse  of  easy. 

What  is  there  remaining? 

The  question  how  the  study  of  philosophy  may  be 
so  ordered  as  not  to  be  the  ruin  of  the  State : All  great 
attempts  are  attended  with  risk;  “ hard  is  the  good,” 
as  men  say. 

Still,  he  said,  let  the  point  be  cleared  up,  and  the 
inquiry  will  then  be  complete. 

I shall  not  be  hindered,  I said,  by  any  want  of  will, 
but,  if  at  all,  by  a want  of  power:  my  zeal  you  may 
see  for  yourselves;  and  please  to  remark  in  what  I 
am  about  to  say  how  boldly  and  unhesitatingly  I 
declare  that  States  should  pursue  philosophy,  not  as 
they  do  now,  but  in  a different  spirit. 

In  what  manner? 

At  present,  I said,  the  students  of  philosophy  are 
quite  young;  beginning  when  they  are  hardly  past 
childhood,  they  devote  only  the  time  saved  from 
moneymaking  and  housekeeping  to  such  pursuits; 
and  even  those  of  them  who  are  reputed  to  have  most 
of  the  philosophic  spirit,  when  they  come  within  sight 
of  the  great  difficulty  of  the  subject,  I mean  dialectic, 
take  themselves  off.  In  after  life  when  invited  by 
some  one  else,  they  may,  perhaps,  go  and  hear  a lec- 
ture, and  about  this  they  make  much  ado,  for  philos- 
ophy is  not  considered  by  them  to  be  their  proper 
business:  at  last,  when  they  grow  old,  in  most  cases 
they  are  extinguished  more  truly  than  Heracleitus’ 
sun,  inasmuch  as  they  never  light  up  again.^ 

But  what  ought  to  be  their  course  ? 

1 Heracleitus  said  that  the  sun  was  extinguished  every  evening  and  re- 
lighted every  morning. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


245 


Just  the  opposite.  In  childhood  and  youth  their 
study,  and  what  philosophy  they  learn,  should  be 
suited  to  their  tender  years : during  this  period  while 
they  are  growing  up  towards  manhood,  the  chief  and 
special  care  should  be  given  to  their  bodies  that  they 
may  have  them  to  use  in  the  service  of  philosophy ; as 
life  advances  and  the  intellect  begins  to  mature,  let 
them  inerease  the  gymnastics  of  the  soul;  but  when 
the  strength  of  our  citizens  fails  and  is  past  civil  and 
military  duties,  then  let  them  range  at  will  and  engage 
in  no  serious  labor,  as  we  intend  them  to  live  hap- 
pily here,  and  to  crown  this  life  with  a similar  hap- 
piness in  another. 

How  truly  in  earnest  you  are,  Socrates!  he  said;  I 
am  sure  of  that;  and  yet  most  of  your  hearers,  if  I am 
not  mistaken,  are  likely  to  be  still  more  earnest  in 
their  opposition  to  you,  and  will  never  be  convinced; 
Thrasymachus  least  of  all. 

Do  not  make  a quarrel,  I said,  between  Thrasy- 
machus and  me,  who  have  recently  become  friends, 
although,  indeed,  we  were  never  enemies;  for  I shall 
go  on  striving  to  the  utmost  until  I either  convert  him 
and  other  men,  or  do  something  which  may  profit 
them  against  the  day  when  they  live  again,  and  hold 
the  like  discourse  in  another  state  of  existence. 

You  are  speaking  of  a time  which  is  not  very  near. 

Rather,  I replied,  of  a time  which  is  as  nothing 
in  comparison  with  eternity.  Nevertheless,  I do  not 
wonder  that  the  many  refuse  to  believe;  for  they  have 
never  seen  that  of  which  we  are  now  speaking  realized ; 
they  have  seen  only  a conventional  imitation  of 
philosophy,  consisting  of  words  artificially  brought 
fpgether,  not  like  these  of  ours  having  a natural  unity. 
But  a human  being  who  in  word  and  work  is  perfectly 
moulded,  as  far  as  can  be,  into  the  proportion  and 
likeness  of  virtue  — such  a man  ruling  in  a city 


246 


THE  REPUBLIC 


which  bears  the  same  image,  they  have  never  yet  seen, 
neither  one  nor  many  of  them  — do  you  think  that 
they  ever  did? 

No  indeed. 

No,  my  friend,  and  they  have  seldom,  if  ever,  heard 
free  and  noble  sentiments;  such  as  men  utter  when 
they  are  earnestly  and  by  every  means  in  their  power 
seeking  after  truth  for  the  sake  of  knowledge,  while 
they  look  coldly  on  the  subtleties  of  controversy,  of 
which  the  end  is  opinion  and  strife,  whether  they  meet 
with  them  in  the  courts  of  law  or  in  society. 

They  are  strangers,  he  said,  to  the  words  of  which 
you  speak. 

And  this  was  what  we  foresaw,  and  this  was  the 
reason  why  truth  forced  us  to  admit,  not  without  fear 
and  hesitation,  that  neither  cities  nor  States  nor  in- 
dividuals will  ever  attain  perfection  until  the  small 
class  of  philosophers  whom  we  termed  useless  but 
not  corrupt  are  providentially  compelled,  whether 
they  will  or  not,  to  take  care  of  the  State,  and  until  a 
like  necessity  be  laid  on  the  State  to  obey  them;^  or 
until  kings,  or  if  not  kings,  the  sons  of  kings  or  princes, 
are  divinely  inspired  with  a true  love  of  true  philos- 
ophy. That  either  or  both  of  these  alternatives  are 
impossible,  I see  no  reason  to  affirm:  if  they  were  so, 
we  might  indeed  be  justly  ridiculed  as  dreamers  and 
visionaries.  Am  I not  right? 

Quite  right. 

If  then,  in  the  countless  ages  of  the  past,  or  at  the 
present  hour  in  some  foreign  clime  which  is  far  away 
and  beyond  our  ken,  the  perfected  philosopher  is  or 
has  been  or  hereafter  shall  be  compelled  by  a superior 
power  to  have  the  charge  of  the  State,  we  are  ready  to 
assert  to  the  death,  that  this  our  constitution  has  been, 
and  is  — yea,  and  will  be  whenever  the  Muse  of  Phi- 

^ Reading  KaTrjK6(i>  or  KaT7]K6ois. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


247 


losophy  is  queen.  There  is  no  impossibility  in  all  this ; 
that  there  is  a diffieulty,  we  aeknowledge  ourselves. 

My  opinion  agrees  with  yours,  he  said. 

But  do  you  mean  to  say  that  this  is  not  the  opinion 
of  the  multitude? 

I should  imagine  not,  he  replied. 

0 my  friend,  I said,  do  not  attack  the  multitude: 
they  will  change  their  minds,  if,  not  in  an  aggressive 
spirit,  but  gently  and  with  the  view  of  soothing  them 
and  removing  their  dislike  of  over-education,  you 
show  them  your  philosophers  as  they  really  are  and 
describe  as  you  were  just  now  doing  their  character 
and  profession,  and  then  mankind  will  see  that  he  of 
whom  you  are  speaking  is  not  such  as  they  supposed 
— if  they  view  him  in  this  new  light,  they  will  surely 
change  their  notion  of  him,  and  answer  in  another 
strain.^  Who  can  be  at  enmity  with  one  who  loves 
them,  who  that  is  himself  gentle  and  free  from  envy 
will  be  jealous  of  one  in  whom  there  is  no  jealousy? 
Nay,  let  me  answer  for  you,  that  in  a few  this  harsh 
temper  may  be  found  but  not  in  the  majority  of 
mankind. 

1 quite  agree  with  you,  he  said. 

And  do  you  not  also  think,  as  I do,  that  the  harsh 
feeling  whieh  the  many  entertain  towards  philosophy 
originates  in  the  pretenders,  who  rush  in  uninvited, 
and  are  always  abusing  them,  and  finding  fault  with 
them,  *^o  make  persons  instead  of  things  the  theme 
of  their  conversation'?>  and  nothing  can  be  more  unbe- 
coming in  philosophers  than  this. 

It  is  most  unbecoming. 

For  he,  Adeimantus,  whose  mind  is  fixed  upon 
true  being,  has  surely  no  time  to  look  down  upon  the 

^ Reading  y Kal  iav  oi5rw  OeCopTat,  without  a question,  and  dWoiap  tol  : or, 
retaining  the  question  and  taking  dWotau  dd^av  in  a new  sense:  “Do  you 
mean  to  say  really  that,  viewing  him  in  this  light,  they  will  be  of  another 
mmd  from  yours,  and  answer  in  another  strain?  ” 


248 


THE  REPUBLIC 


affairs  of  earth,  or  to  be  filled  with  malice  and  envy, 
contending  against  men;  his  eye  is  ever  directed 
towards  things  fixed  and  immutable,  which  he  sees 
neither  injuring  nor  injured  by  one  another,  but  all 
in  order  moving  according  to  reason ; these  he  imitates, 
and  to  these  he  will,  as  far  as  he  can,  conform  himself. 
Can  a man  help  imitating  that  with  which  he  holds 
reverential  converse? 

Impossible. 

And  the  philosopher  holding  converse  with  the 
divine  order,  becomes  orderly  and  divine,  as  far  as  the 
nature  of  man  alloAvs;  hut  like  every  one  else,  he  will 
suffer  from  detraction. 

Of  course. 

And  if  a necessity  be  laid  upon  him  of  fashioning, 
not  only  himself,  but  human  nature  generally,  whether 
in  States  or  individuals,  into  that  which  he  beholds 
elsewhere,  will  he,  think  you,  be  an  unskilful  artificer 
of  justice,  temperance,  and  every  civil  virtue? 

Anything  but  unskilful. 

And  if  the  world  perceives  that  what  we  are  saying 
about  him  is  the  truth,  will  they  be  angry  with  philos- 
ophy? Will  they  disbelieve  us,  when  we  tell  them 
that  no  State  can  be  happy  which  is  not  designed  by 
artists  who  imitate  the  heavenly  pattern? 

They  will  not  be  angry  if  they  understand,  he  said. 
But  how  will  they  draw  out  the  plan  of  which  you  are 
speaking? 

They  will  begin  by  taking  the  State  and  the  man- 
ners of  men,  from  which,  as  frorn  a tablet,  they  will 
rub  out  the  picture,  and  leave  a clean  surface.  This  is 
no  easy  task.  But  whether  easy  or  not,  herein  will 
lie  the  difference  between  them  and  every  other  legis- 
lator, — they  will  have  nothing  to  do  either  with  in- 
dividual or  State,  and  will  inscribe  no  laws,  until  they 
have  either  found,  or  themselves  made,  a clean  surface. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


249 


They  will  be  very  right,  he  said. 

Having  effected  this,  they  will  proceed  to  trace  an 
outline  of  the  constitution? 

No  doubt. 

And  when  they  are  filling  in  the  work,  as  I con- 
ceive, they  will  often  turn  their  eyes  upwards  and 
downwards : I mean  that  they  will  first  look  at 
absolute  justice  and  beauty  and  temperance,  and 
again  at  the  human  copy ; and  will  mingle  and  temper 
the  various  elements  of  life  into  the  image  of  a man; 
and  this  they  will  conceive  according  to  that  other 
image,  which,  when  existing  among  men,  Homer  calls 
the  form  and  likeness  of  God. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  one  feature  they  will  erase,  and  another 
they  will  put  in,  until  they  have  made  the  ways  of 
men,  as  far  as  possible,  agreeable  to  the  ways  of 
God? 

Indeed,  he  said,  in  no  way  could  they  make  a fairer 
picture. 

And  now,  I said,  are  we  beginning  to  persuade 
those  whom  you  described  as  rushing  at  us  with  might 
and  main,  that  the  painter  of  constitutions  is  such  an 
one  as  we  were  praising;  at  whom  they  were  so  very 
indignant  because  to  his  hands  we  committed  the 
State;  and  are  they  growing  a little  calmer  at  what 
they  have  just  heard? 

Much  calmer,  if  there  is  any  sense  in  them. 

Why,  where  can  they  still  find  any  ground  for 
objection?  Will  they  doubt  that  the  philosopher  is  a 
lover  of  truth  and  being? 

They  would  not  he  so  unreasonable. 

Or  that  his  nature,  being  such  as  we  have  delineated, 
is  akin  to  the  highest  good? 

Neither  can  they  doubt  this. 

But  again,  will  they  tell  us  that  such  a nature, 


250 


THE  REPUBLIC 


placed  under  favorable  circumstances,  will  not  be 
perfectly  good  and  wise  if  any  ever  was?  Or  will 
they  prefer  those  whom  we  have  rejected? 

Surely  not. 

Then  will  they  still  be  angry  at  our  saying,  that, 
until  philosophers  bear  rule.  States  and  individuals 
will  have  no  rest  from  evil,  nor  will  this  our  imaginary 
State  ever  be  realized? 

I think  that  they  will  be  less  angry. 

Shall  we  assume  that  they  are  not  only  less  angry 
but  quite  gentle,  and  that  they  have  been  converted 
and  for  very  shame,  if  for  no  other  reason,  can  not 
refuse  to  come  to  terms? 

By  all  means,  he  said. 

Then  let  us  suppose  that  the  reconciliation  has  been 
effected.  Will  any  one  deny  the  other  point,  that 
there  may  be  sons  of  kings  or  princes  who  are  by 
nature  philosophers? 

Surely  no  man,  he  said. 

And  when  they  have  come  into  being  will  any  one 
say  that  they  must  of  necessity  be  destroyed ; that  they 
can  hardly  be  saved  is  not  denied  even  by  us ; but  that 
in  the  whole  course  of  ages  no  single  one  of  them  can 
escape  — who  will  venture  to  affirm  this  ? 

Who  indeed! 

But,  said  I,  one  is  enough;  let  there  be  one  man  who 
has  a city  obedient  to  his  will,  and  he  might  bring  into 
existence  the  ideal  polity  about  which  the  world  is  so 
incredulous. 

Yes,  one  is  enough. 

The  ruler  may  impose  the  laws  and  institutions 
which  we  have  been  describing,  and  the  citizens  may 
possibly  be  willing  to  obey  them? 

Certainly. 

And  that  others  should  approve,  of  what  we  ap- 
provCj  is  no  miracle  or  impossibility? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


251 


I think  not. 

But  we  have  sufficiently  shown,  in  what  has  pre- 
ceded, that  all  this,  if  only  possible,  is  assuredly  for 
the  best. 

We  have. 

And  now  we  say  not  only  that  our  laws,  if  they 
could  be  enacted,  would  be  for  the  best,  but  also  that 
the  enactment  of  them,  though  difficult,  is  not  impos- 
sible. 

Very  good. 

And  so  with  pain  and  toil  we  have  reached  the  end 
of  one  subject,  but  more  remains  to  be  discussed;  — 
how  and  by  what  studies  and  pursuits  will  the  saviors 
of  the  constitution  be  created,  and  at  what  ages  are 
they  to  apply  themselves  to  their  several  studies? 

Certainly. 

I omitted  the  troublesome  business  of  the  possession 
of  women,  and  the  procreation  of  children,  and  the 
appointment  of  the  rulers,  because  I knew  that  the 
perfect  State  would  be  eyed  with  jealousy  and  was 
difficult  of  attainment;  but  that  piece  of  cleverness 
was  not  of  much  service  to  me,  for  I had  to  discuss 
them  all  the  same.  The  women  and  children  are  now 
disposed  of,  but  the  other  question  of  the  rulers  must 
be  investigated  from  the  very  beginning.  We  were 
saying,  as  you  will  remember,  that  they  were  to 
be  lovers  of  their  country,  tried  by  the  test  of 
pleasures  and  pains,  and  neither  in  hardships,  nor  in 
dangers,  nor  at  any  other  critical  moment  were 
to  lose  their  patriotism  — he  was  to  be  rejected  who 
failed,  but  he  who  always  came  forth  pure,  like  gold 
tried  in  the  refiner’s  fire,  was  to  be  made  a ruler,  and 
to  receive  honors  and  rewards  in  life  and  after  death. 
This  was  the  sort  of  thing  which  was  being  said,  and 
then  the  argument  turned  aside  and  veiled  her  face; 
not  liking  to  stir  the  question  which  has  now  arisen. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


252  ‘ 

I perfectly  remember,  he  said. 

Yes,  my  friend,  I said,  and  I then  shrank  from 
hazarding  the  bold  word;  but  now  let  me  dare  to  say 
— that  the  perfect  guardian  must  be  a philosopher. 

Yes,  he  said,  let  that  be  affirmed. 

And  do  not  suppose  that  there  will  be  many  of 
them;  for  the  gifts  which  were  deemed  by  us  to  be 
essential  rarely  grow  together ; they  are  mostly  found 
in  shreds  and  patches. 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

You  are  aware,  I replied,  that  quick  intelligence, 
memory,  sagacity,  cleverness,  and  similar  qualities,  do 
not  often  grow  together,  and  that  persons  who  possess 
them  and  are  at  the  same  time  high-spirited  and 
magnanimous  are  not  so  constituted  by  nature  as  to 
live  orderly  and  in  a peaceful  and  settled  manner; 
they  are  driven  any  way  by  their  impulses,  and  all 
solid  principle  goes  out  of  them. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

On  the  other  hand,  those  steadfast  natures  which 
can  better  be  depended  upon,  which  in  a battle  are 
impregnable  to  fear  and  immovable,  are  equally  im- 
movable when  there  is  anything  to  be  learned;  they 
are  always  in  a torpid  state,  and  are  apt  to  yawn  and 
go  to  sleep  over  any  intellectual  toil. 

Quite  true. 

And  yet  we  were  saying  that  both  qualities  were 
necessary  in  those  to  whom  the  higher  education  is  to 
be  imparted,  and  who  are  to  share  in  any  office  or  com- 
mand. 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  will  they  be  a class  which  is  rarely  found? 

Yes,  indeed. 

Then  the  aspirant  must  not  only  be  tested  in  those 
labors  and  dangers  and  pleasures  which  we  men- 
tioned before,  but  there  is  another  kind  of  probation 


THE  REPUBLIC 


253 


which  we  did  not  mention  — he  must  be  exercised  also 
in  many  kinds  of  knowledge,  to  see  whether  the  soul 
will  be  able  to  endure  the  highest  of  all,  or  will  faint 
under  them,  as  in  any  other  studies  and  exercises. 

Yes,  he  said,  you  are  quite  right  in  testing  him. 
But  what  do  you  mean  by  the  highest  of  all  knowl- 
edge? 

You  may  remember,  I said,  that  we  divided  the 
soul  into  three  parts;  and  distinguished  the  several 
natures  of  justice,  temperance,  courage,  and  wisdom? 

Indeed,  he  said,  if  I had  forgotten,  I should  not 
deserve  to  hear  more. 

And  do  you  remember  the  word  of  caution  which 
preceded  the  discussion  of  them?  ^ 

Tx)  what  do  you  refer? 

We  were  saying,  if  I am  not  mistaken,  that  he  who 
wanted  to  see  them  in  their  perfect  beauty  must  take 
a longer  and  more  circuitous  way,  at  the  end  of  which 
they  would  appear;  but  that  we  could  add  on  a 
popular  exposition  of  them  on  a level  with  the  dis- 
cussion which  had  preceded.  And  you  replied  that 
such  an  exposition  would  be  enough  for  you,  and  so 
the  inquiry  was  continued  in  what  to  me  seemed  to  be 
a very  inaccurate  manner ; whether  you  were  satisfied 
or  not,  it  is  for  you  to  say. 

Yes,  he  said,  I thought  and  the  others  thought  that 
you  gave  us  a fair  measure  of  truth. 

But,  my  friend,  I said,  a measure  of  such  things 
which  in  any  degree  falls  short  of  the  whole  truth  is 
not  fair  measure ; for  nothing  imperfect  is  the  measure 
of  anything,  although  persons  are  too  apt  to  be  con- 
tented and  think  that  they  need  search  no  further. 

Not  an  uncommon  case  when  people  are  indolent. 

Yes,  I said;  and  there  can  not  be  any  worse  fault  in 
a guardian  of  the  State  and  of  the  laws. 

1 Cp.  IV  435  D. 


254 


THE  REPUBLIC 


True. 

The  guardian  then,  I said,  must  be  required  to  take 
the  longer  circuit,  and  toil  at  learning  as  well  as  at 
gymnastics,  or  he  will  never  reach  the  highest  knowl- 
edge of  all  which,  as  we  were  just  now  saying,  is  his 
proper  calling. 

What,  he  said,  is  there  a knowledge  still  higher  than 
this  — higher  than  justice  and  the  other  virtues? 

Yes,  I said,  there  is.  And  of  the  virtues  too  we 
must  behold  not  the  outline  merely,  as  at  present  — 
nothing  short  of  the  most  finished  picture  should 
satisfy  us.  When  little  things  are  elaborated  with  an 
infinity  of  pains,  in  order  that  they  may  appear  in 
their  full  beauty  and  utmost  clearness,  how  ridiculous 
that  we  should  not  think  the  highest  truths  worthy  of 
attaining  the  highest  accuracy ! 

A right  noble  thought;  ^ but  do  you  suppose  that  we 
shall  refrain  from  asking  you  what  is  this  highest 
knowledge  ? 

Nay,  I said,  ask  if  you  will;  but  I am  certain  that 
you  have  heard  the  answer  many  times,  and  now  you 
either  do  not  understand  me  or,  as  I rather  think,  you 
are  disposed  to  be  troublesome  ;^or  you  have  often 
been  told  that  the  idea  of  good  is  the  highest  knowl- 
edge, and  that  all  other  things  becoi^e  useful  and  ad- 
vantageous only  by  their  use  of  this.y  You  can  hardly 
be  ignorant  that  of  this  I was  about  to  speak,  concern- 
ing which,  as  you  have  often  heard  me  say,  we  know 
so  little;  and,  without  which,  any  other  knowledge  or 
possession  of  any  kind  will  profit  us  nothing.  Do 
you  think  that  the  possession  of  all  other  things  is  of 
any  value  if  we  do  not  possess  the  good  ? or  the  knowl- 
edge of  all  other  things  if  we  have  no  knowledge  of 
beauty  and  goodness? 

1 Or,  separating  Kal  fidXa  from  “ True,  he  said,  and  a noble  thought 

or  d^iop  t6  biapbriiia  may  be  a gloss. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


255 


Assuredly  not. 

You  are  further  aware  that  most  people  affirm 
pleasure  to  be  the  good,  but  the  finer  sort  of  wits  say 
it  is  knowledge  ? 

Yes. 

And  you  are  aware  too  that  the  latter  can  not  ex- 
plain what  they  mean  by  knowledge,  but  are  obliged 
after  all  to  say  knowledge  of  the  good? 

How  ridiculous! 

Yes,  I said,  that  they  should  begin  by  reproaching 
us  with  our  ignorance  of  the  good,  and  then  presume 
our  knowledge  of  it  — for  the  good  they  define  to  be 
knowledge  of  the  good,  just  as  if  we  understood  them 
when  they  use  the  term  “ good  ” — this  is  of  course 
ridiculous. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

And  those  who  make  pleasure  their  good  are  in 
equal  perplexity ; for  they  are  compelled  to  admit  that 
there  are  bad  pleasures  as  well  as  good. 

Certainly. 

And  therefore  to  acknowledge  that  bad  and  good 
are  the  same? 

True. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  numerous  dif- 
ficulties in  which  this  question  is  involved. 

There  can  be  none. 

Further,  do  we  not  see  that  many  are  willing  to  do 
or  to  have  or  to  seem  to  be  what  is  just  and  honor- 
able without  the  reality;  but  no  one  is  satisfied  with 
the  appearance  of  good  — the  reality  is  what  they 
seek;  in  the  case  of  the  good,  appearance  is  despised 
by  every  one. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Of  this  then,  which  every  soul  of  man  pursues  and 
makes  the  end  of  all  his  actions,  having  a presentiment 
that  there  is  such  an  end,  and  yet  hesitating  because 


256 


THE  REPUBLIC 


neither  knowing  the  nature  nor  having  the  same  as- 
surance of  this  as  of  other  things,  and  therefore  losing 
whatever  good  there  is  in  other  things,  — of  a prin- 
ciple such  and  so  great  as  this  ought  the  best  men 
in  our  State,  to  whom  everything  is  entrusted,  to  be 
in  the  darkness  of  ignorance  ? 

Certainly  not,  he  said. 

I am  sure,  I said,  that  he  who  does  not  know  how 
the  beautiful  and  the  just  are  likewise  good  will  be 
but  a sorry  guardian  of  them;  and  I suspect  that  no 
one  who  is  ignorant  of  the  good  will  have  a true 
knowledge  of  them. 

That,  he  said,  is  a shrewd  suspicion  of  yours. 

And  if  we  only  have  a guardian  who  has  this  knowl- 
edge our  State  will  be  perfectly  ordered? 

Of  course,  he  replied ; but  I wish  that  you  would 
tell  me  whether  you  conceive  this  supreme  principle 
of  the  good  to  be  knowledge  or  pleasure,  or  different 
from  either? 

Aye,  I said,  I knew  all  along  that  a fastidious 
gentleman  ^ like  you  would  not  be  contented  with  the 
thoughts  of  other  people  about  these  matters. 

True,  Socrates;  but  I must  say  that  one  who  like 
you  has  passed  a lifetime  in  the  study  of  philosophy 
should  not  be  always  repeating  the  opinions  of  others, 
and  never  telling  his  own. 

Well,  but  has  any  one  a right  to  say  positively  what 
he  does  not  know? 

Not,  he  said,  with  the  assurance  of  positive  cer- 
tainty; he  has  no  right  to  do  that:  but  he  may  say 
what  he  thinks,  as  a matter  of  opinion. 

And  do  you  not  know,  I said,^at  all  mere  opinions 
are  bad,  and  the  best  of  them  blind  You  would  not 
deny  that  those  who  have  any  true  notion  without 

1 Reading  dv^p  Ka\6s:  or  reading  dv^p  Ka\ws,  “ I quite  well  knew  from  the 
very  first,  that  you,  etc.” 


THE  REPUBLIC 


257 


intelligence  are  only  like  blind  men  who  feel  their  way 
along  the  road? 

Very  true. 

And  do  you  wish  to  behold  what  is  blind  and  crooked 
and  base,  when  others  will  tell  you  of  brightness  and 
beauty? 

Still,  I must  implore  you,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon, 
not  to  turn  away  just  as  you  are  reaching  the  goal; 
if  you  will  only  give  such  an  explanation  of  the 
good  as  you  have  already  given  of  justice  and  tem- 
perance and  the  other  virtues,  we  shall  be  satisfied. 

Yes,  my  friend,  and  I shall  be  at  least  equally 
satisfied,  but  I can  not  help  fearing  that  I shall  fail, 
and  that  my  indiscreet  zeal  will  bring  ridicule  upon 
me.  No,  sweet  sirs,  let  us  not  at  present  ask  what  is 
the  actual  nature  of  the  good,  for  to  reach  what  is  now 
in  my  thoughts  would  be  an  effort  too  great  for  me. 
But  of  the  child  of  the  good  who  is  likest  him,  I would 
fain  speak,  if  I could  be  sure  that  you  wished  to  hear 
— otherwise,  not. 

By  all  means,  he  said,  tell  us  about  the  child,  and  you 
shall  remain  in  our  debt  for  the  account  of  the  parent. 

I do  indeed  wish,  I replied,  that  I could  pay,  and 
you  receive,  the  account  of  the  parent,  and  not,  as 
now,  of  the  offspring  only;  take,  however,  this  latter 
by  way  of  interest,^  and  at  the  same  time  have  a care 
that  I do  not  render  a false  account,  although  I have 
no  intention  of  deceiving  you. 

Yes,  we  will  take  all  the  care  that  we  can:  proceed. 

Yes,  I said,  but  I must  first  come  to  an  rmderstand- 
ing  with  you,  and  remind  you  of  what  I have  men- 
tioned in  the  course  of  this  discussion,  and  at  many 
other  times. 

What? 

The  old  story,  that  there  is  a many  beautiful  and  a 

* A play  upon  t6kos,  which  means  both  “ offspring  ” and  “ interest.’^ 


258 


THE  REPUBLIC 


many  good,  and  so  of  other  things  which  we  describe 
and  define ; to  all  of  them  the  term  “ many  ” is  ap- 
plied. 

True,  he  said. 

And  there  is  an  absolute  beauty  and  an  absolute 
good,  and  of  other  things  to  which  the  term  “ many  ” 
is  applied  there  is  an  absolute;  for  they  rAay  be 
brought  under  a single  idea,  which  is  called  the  es- 
sence of  each. 

Very  true. 

The  many,  as  we  say,  are  seen  but  not  known,  and 
the  ideas  are  known  but  not  seen. 

Exactly. 

And  what  is  the  organ  with  which  we  see  the  visible 
things? 

The  sight,  he  said. 

And  with  the  hearing,  I said,  we  hear,  and  with  the 
other  senses  perceive  the  other  obiects  of  sense? 

True. 

But  have  you  remarked  that  sight  is  by  far  the 
most  costly  and  complex  piece  of  workmanship  which 
the  artificer  of  the  senses  ever  contrived? 

No,  I never  have,  he  said. 

Then  reflect : has  the  ear  or  voice  need  of  any  third 
or  additional  nature  in  order  that  the  one  may  be  able 
to  hear  and  the  other  to  he  heard? 

Nothing  of  the  sort. 

No,  indeed,  I replied;  and  the  same  is  true  of  most, 
if  not  all,  the  other  senses  — you  would  not  say  that 
any  of  them  requires  such  an  addition? 

Certainly  not. 

But  you  see  that  without  the  addition  of  some  other 
nature  there  is  no  seeing  or  being  seen? 

How  do  you  mean? 

Sight  being,  as  I conceive,  in  the  eyes,  and  he  who 
has  eyes  wanting  to  see;  color  being  also  present  in 


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259 


them,  still  unless  there  be  a third  nature  specially 
adapted  to  the  purpose,  the  owner  of  the  eyes  will  see 
nothing  and  the  colors  will  be  invisible. 

Of  what  nature  are  you  speaking? 

Of  that  which  you  term  light,  I replied. 

True,  he  said. 

Noble,  then,  is  the  bond  which  links  together  sight 
and  visibility,  and  great  beyond  other  bonds  by  no 
small  difference  of  nature ; for  light  is  their  bond,  and 
light  is  no  ignoble  thing? 

Nay,  he  said,  the  reverse  of  ignoble. 

And  which,  I said,  of  the  gods  in  heaven  would  you 
say  was  the  lord  of  this  element?  Whose  is  that  light 
which  makes  the  eye  to  see  perfectly  and  the  visible  to 
appear? 

You  mean  the  sun,  as  you  and  all  mankind  say. 

May  not  the  relation  of  sight  to  this  deity  be  de- 
scribed as  follows? 

How? 

Neither  sight  nor  the  eye  in  which  sight  resides  is 
the  sun? 

No. 

Yet  of  all  the  organs  of  sense  the  eye  is  the  most 
like  the  sun? 

By  far  the  most  like. 

And  the  power  which  the  eye  possesses  is  a sort  of 
effluence  which  is  dispensed  from  the  sun? 

Exactly. 

Then  the  sun  is  not  sight,  but  the  author  of  sight 
who  is  recognized  by  sight? 

True,  he  said. 

And  this  is  he  whom  I call  the  child  of  the  good, 
whom  the  good  begat  in  his  own  likeness,  to  be  in  the  ^ 
visible  world,  in  relation  to  sight  and  the  things  of 
sight,  what  the  good  is  in  the  intellectual  world  in 
relation  to  mind  and  the  things  of  mind; 


260 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Will  you  be  a little  more  explicit?  he  said. 

Why,  you  know,  I said,  that  the  eyes,  when  a person 
directs  them  towards  objects  on  which  the  light  of  day 
is  no  longer  shining,  but  the  moon  and  stars  only,  see 
dimly,  and  are  nearly  blind;  they  seem  to  have  no 
clearness  of  vision  in  them? 

Very  true. 

But  when  they  are  directed  towards  objects  on 
which  the  sun  shines,  they  see  clearly  and  there  is  sight 
in  them? 

Certainly. 

And  the  soul  is  like  the  eye : when  resting  upon  that 
on  which  truth  and  being  shine^  the  soul  perceives  and 
understands,  and  is  radiant  with  intelligence;  but 
when  turned  towards  the  twilight  of  becoming  and 
perishing,  then  she  has  opinion  only,  and  goes  blink- 
ing about,  and  is  first  of  one  opinion  and  then  of  an- 
other, and  seems  to  have  no  intelligence^^ 

Just  so. 

<Now,  that  which  imparts  truth  to  the  known  and 
the  power  of  knowing  to  the  knqwer  is  what  I would 
have  you  term  the  idea  of  good,  and  this  you  will 
deem  to  be  the  cause  of  science,^  and  of  truth  in  so  far 
as  the  latter  beeomes  the  subject  of  knowledge;  beau- 
tiful too,  as  are  both  truth  and  knowledge,  you  will  be 
right  in  esteeming  this  other  nature  as  more  beautiful 
than  either ; and,  as  in  the  previous  instance,  light  and 
sight  may  be  truly  said  to  be  like  the  sun,  and  yet  not 
to  be  the  sun,  so  in  this  other  sphere,-^icience  and  truth 
may  be  deemed  to  be  like  the  good,  but  not  the  good ; 
the  good  has  a place  of  honor  yet  higher^ 

What  a wonder  of  beauty  that  must  be,  he  said, 
which  is  the  author  of  science  and  truth,  and  yet  sur- 
passes them  in  beauty;  for  you  surely  can  not  mean  to 
say  that  pleasure  is  the  good? 

Reading  54a*/ooC, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


261 


God  forbid,  I replied;  but  may  I ask  you  to  consider 
the  image  in  another  point  of  view? 

In  what  point  of  view? 

You  would  say,  would  you  not,  that  the  sun  is  not 
only  the  author  of  visibility  in  all  visible  things,  hut  of 
generation  and  nourishment  and  growth,  though  he 
himself  is  not  generation? 

Certainly. 

•Ill  like  manner  the  good  may  be  said  to  be  not  only 
the  author  of  knowledge  to  all  things  known,  hut  of 
their  being  and  essence,  and  yet  the  good  is  not 
essence,  hut  far  exceeds  essence  in  dignity  and  powers 

Glaucon  said,  with  a ludicrous  earnestness : By  the 
light  of  heaven,  how  amazing! 

Yes,  I said,  and  the  exaggeration  may  be  set  down 
to  you;  for  you  made  me  utter  my  fancies. 

And  pray  continue  to  utter  them;  at  any  rate  let 
us  hear  if  there  is  anything  more  to  be  said  about  the 
similitude  of  the  sun. 

Yes,  I said,  there  is  a great  deal  more. 

Then  omit  nothing,  however  slight. 

I will  do  my  best,  I said ; but  I should  think  that  a 
great  deal  will  have  to  be  omitted. 

I hope  not,  he  said. 

You  have  to  imagine,  then,  that  there  are  two  ruling 
powers,  and  that  one  of  them  is  set  over  the  intel- 
lectual world,  the  other  over  the  visible.  I do  not  say 
heaven,  lest  you  should  fancy  that  I am  playing  upon 
the  name  {ovpav&i,  6pa7<k).  May  I suppose  that 
you  have  this  distinction  of  the  visible  and  intelligible 
fixed  in  your  mind? 

I have. 

Now  take  a line  which  has  been  cut  into  two  un- 
equal^ parts,  and  divide  each  of  them  again  in  the 
same  proportion,  and  suppose  the  two  main  divisions 

^Reading  &vura> 


262 


THE  REPUBLIC 


to  answer,  one  to  the  visible  and  the  other  to  the  intel- 
ligible, and  then  compare  the  subdivisions  in  respect 
of  their  clearness  and  want  of  clearness,  and  you  will 
find  that  the  first  section  in  the  sphere  of  the  visible 
consists  of  images.  And  by  images  I mean,  in  the 
first  place,  shadows,  and  in  the  second  place,  reflec- 
tions in  water  and  in  solid,  smooth  and  polished  bodies 
and  the  like : Do  you  understand  ? 

Yes,  I understand. 

Imagine,  now,  the  other  section,  of  which  this  is  only 
the  resemblance,  to  include  the  animals  which  we  see, 
and  everything  that  grows  or  is  made. 

Very  good. 

Would  you  not  admit  that  both  the  sections  of  this 
division  have  different  degrees  of  truth,  and  that  the 
copy  is  to  the  original  as  the  sphere  of  opinion  is  to 
the  sphere  of  knowledge? 

Most  undoubtedly. 

Next  proceed  to  consider  the  manner  in  which  the 
sphere  of  the  intellectual  is  to  be  divided. 

In  what  manner? 

Thus : — There  are  two  subdivisions,  in  the  lower 
of  which  the  soul  uses  the  figures  given  by  the  former 
division  as  images;  the  inquiry  can  only  be  hypothet- 
ical, and  instead  of  going  upwards  to  a principle 
descends  to  the  other  end;  in  the  higher  of  the  two, 
the  soul  passes  out  of  hypotheses,  and  goes  up  to  a 
principle  which  is  above  hypotheses,  making  no  use 
of  images  ^ as  in  the  former  case,  but  proceeding  only 
in  and  through  the  ideas  themselves. 

I do  not  quite  understand  your  meaning,  he  said. 

Then  I will  try  again;  you  will  understand  me 
better  when  I have  made  some  preliminary  remarks. 
You  are  aware  that  students  of  geometry,  arithmetic, 
and  the  kindred  sciences  assume  the  odd  and  the  even 

^ Reading  tJ^vircp  iKcTpo  eUbpoiv, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


263 


and  the  figures  and  three  kinds  of  angles  and  the  like 
in  their  several  branches  of  science;  these  are  their 
hypotheses,  which  they  and  everybody  are  supposed 
to  know,  and  therefore  they  do  not  deign  to  give  any 
account  of  them  either  to  themselves  or  others;  but 
they  begin  with  them,  and  go  on  until  they  arrive  at 
last,  and  in  a consistent  manner,  at  their  conclusion? 

Yes,  he  said,  I know. 

And  do  you  not  know  also  that  although  they  make 
use  of  the  visible  forms  and  reason  about  them,  they 
are  thinking  not  of  these,  but  of  the  ideals  which  they 
resemble;  not  of  the  figures  which  they  draw,  but  of 
the  absolute  square  and  the  absolute  diameter,  and  so 
on  — the  forms  which  they  draw  or  make,  and  which 
have  shadows  and  reflections  in  water  of  their  own, 
are  converted  by  them  into  images,  but  they  are  really 
seeking  to  behold  the  things  themselves,  which  can 
only  be  seen  with  the  eye  of  the  mind? 

That  is  true. 

And  of  this  I spoke  as  the  intelligible,  although  in 
the  search  after  it  the  soul  is  compelled  to  use 
hypotheses ; not  ascending  to  a first  principle,  because 
she  is  unable  to  rise  above  the  region  of  hypothesis, 
but  employing  the  objects  of  which  the  shadows  below 
are  resemblances  in  their  turn  as  images,  they  having 
in  relation  to  the  shadows  and  reflections  of  them  a 
greater  distinctness,  and  therefore  a higher  value. 

I understand,  he  said,  that  you  are  speaking  of  the 
province  of  geometry  and  the  sister  arts. 

And  when  I speak  of  the  other  division  of  the  intel- 
ligible, you  will  understand  me  to  speak  of  that  other 
sort  of  knowledge  which  reason  herself  attains  by  the 
power  of  dialectic,  using  the  hypotheses  not  as  first 
principles,  but  only  as  hypotheses  — that  is  to  say,  as 
steps  and  points  of  departure  into  a world  which  is 
above  hypotheses,  in  order  that  she  may  soar  beyond 


264 


THE  REPUBLIC 


them  to  the  first  prineiple  of  the  whole ; and  clinging 
to  this  and  then  to  that  which  depends  on  this,  by  suc- 
cessive steps  she  descends  again  without  the  aid  of 
any  sensible  object,  from  ideas,  through  ideas,  and  in 
ideas  she  ends. 

I understand  you,  he  replied;  not  perfectly,  for 
you  seem  to  me  to  be  describing  a task  which  is  really 
tremendous ; but,  at  any  rate,  I understand  you  to  say 
that  knowledge  and  being,  which  the  science  of 
dialectic  contemplates,  are  clearer  than  the  notions  of 
the  arts,  as  they  are  termed,  which  proceed  from 
hypotheses  only:  these  are  also  contemplated  by  the 
understanding,  and  not  by  the  senses:  yet,  because 
they  start  from  hypotheses  and  do  not  ascend  to  a 
principle,  those  who  contemplate  them  appear  to  you 
not  to  exercise  the  higher  reason  upon  them,  although 
when  a first  principle  is  added  to  them  they  are  cog- 
nizable by  the  higher  reason.  And  the  habit  which  is 
concerned  with  geometry  and  the  cognate  sciences  I 
suppose  that  you  would  term  understanding  and  not 
reason,  as  being  intermediate  between  opinion  and 
reason. 

You  have  quite  conceived  my  meaning,  I said;  and 
now,  coiTesponding  to  these  four  divisions,  let  there 
be  four  faculties  in  the  soul  — reason  answering  to 
the  highest,  understanding  to  the  second,  faith  (or 
conviction ) to  the  third,  and  perception  of  shadows  to 
the  last  — and  let  there  be  a scale  of  them,  and  let  us 
suppose  that  the  several  faculties  have  clearness  in  the 
same  degree  that  their  objects  have  truth^ 

I understand,  he  replied,  and  give  my  assent,  and 
accept  your  arrangement. 


BOOK  VII 


And  now,  I said,  let  me  show  in  a figure  how  far 
our  nature  is  enlightened  or  unenlightened : — Be- 
hold! human  beings  living  in  an  underground  den, 
which  has  a mouth  open  towards  the  light  and  reach- 
ing all  along  the  den ; here  they  have  been  from  their 
childhood,  and  have  their  legs  and  necks  chained  so 
that  they  can  not  move,  and  can  only  see  before  them, 
being  prevented  by  the  chains  from  turning  round 
their  heads.  Above  and  behind  them  a fire  is  blazing 
at  a distance,  and  between  the  fire  and  the  prisoners 
there  is  a raised  way;  and  you  will  see,  if  you  look,  a 
low  wall  built  along  the  way,  like  the  screen  which 
marionette  players  have  in  front  of  them,  over  which 
they  show  the  puppets. 

I see. 

And  do  you  see,  I said,  men  passing  along  the  wall 
carrying  all  sorts  of  vessels,  and  statues  and  figures 
of  animals  made  of  wood  and  stone  and  various 
materials,  which  appear  over  the  wall?  Some  of  them 
are  talking,  others  silent. 

You  have  shown  me  a strange  image,  and  they  are 
strange  prisoners. 

Like  ourselves,  I replied;  and  they  see  only  their 
own  shadows,  or  the  shadows  of  one  another,  which 
the  fire  throws  on  the  opposite  wall  of  the  cave? 

True,  he  said ; how  coidd  they  see  anything  but  the 
shadows  if  they  were  never  allowed  to  move  their 
heads? 

And  of  the  objects  which  are  being  carried  in  like 
manner  they  would  only  see  the  shadows? 

265 


266 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Yes,  he  said. 

And  if  they  were  able  to  converse  with  one  another, 
would  they  not  suppose  that  they  were  naming  what 
was  actually  before  them?  ^ 

Very  true. 

And  suppose  further  that  the  prison  had  an  echo 
which  came  from  the  other  side,  would  they  not  be 
sure  to  fancy  when  one  of  the  passers-by  spoke  that 
the  voice  which  they  heard  came  from  the  passing 
shadow  ? 

No  question,  he  replied. 

To  them,  I said,  the  truth  would  be  literally  noth- 
ing but  the  shadows  of  the  images. 

That  is  certain. 

And  now  look  again,  and  see  what  will  naturally 
follow  if  the  prisoners  are  released  and  disabused  of 
their  error.  At  first,  when  any  of  them  is  liberated 
and  compelled  suddenly  to  stand  up  and  turn  his 
neck  round  and  walk  and  look  towards  the  light,  he 
will  suffer  sharp  pains;  the  glare  will  distress  him, 
and  he  will  be  unable  to  see  the  realities  of  which  in 
his  former  state  he  had  seen  the  shadows;  and  then 
conceive  some  one  saying  to  him,  that  what  he  saw 
before  was  an  illusion,  but  that  now,  when  he  is  ap- 
proaching nearer  to  being  and  his  eye  is  turned 
towards  more  real  existence,  he  has  a clearer  vision,  — 
what  will  be  his  reply?  And  you  may  further  imag- 
ine that  his  instructor  is  pointing  to  the  objects  as 
they  pass  and  requiring  him  to  name  them,  — will  he 
not  be  perplexed?  Will  he  not  fancy  that  the  shadows 
which  he  formerly  saw  are  truer  than  the  objects 
which  are  now  shown  to  him? 

Far  truer. 

And  if  he  is  compelled  to  look  straight  at  the  light, 
will  he  not  have  a pain  in  his  eyes  which  will  make  him 

^ Beading  wapdinra. 


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267 


turn  away  to  take  refuge  in  the  objects  of  vision  which 
he  can  see,  and  which  he  will  conceive  to  be  in  reality 
clearer  than  the  things  which  are  now  being  shown 
to  him? 

True,  he  said. 

And  suppose  once  more,  that  he  is  reluctantly 
dragged  up  a steep  and  rugged  ascent,  and  held  fast 
until  he  is  forced  into  the  presence  of  the  sun  himself, 
is  he  not  likely  to  be  pained  and  irritated?  When  he 
approaches  the  light  his  eyes  will  be  dazzled,  and  he 
will  not  be  able  to  see  anything  at  all  of  what  are 
now  called  realities. 

Not  all  in  a moment,  he  said. 

He  will  require  to  grow  accustomed  to  the  sight  of 
the  upper  world.  And  first  he  will  see  the  shadows 
best,  next  the  reflections  of  men  and  other  objects  in 
the  water,  and  then  the  objects  themselves;  then  he 
will  gaze  upon  the  light  of  the  moon  and  the  stars 
and  the  spangled  heaven;  and  he  will  see  the  sky 
and  the  stars  by  night  better  than  the  sun  or  the  light 
of  the  sun  by  day? 

Certainly. 

Last  of  all  he  will  be  able  to  see  the  sun,  and  not 
mere  reflections  of  him  in  the  water,  but  he  will  see 
him  in  his  own  proper  place,  and  not  in  another ; and 
he  will  contemplate  him  as  he  is. 

Certainly. 

He  will  then  proceed  to  argue  that  this  is  he  who 
gives  the  season  and  the  years,  and  is  the  guardian  of 
all  that  is  in  the  visible  world,  and  in  a certain  way 
the  cause  of  all  things  which  he  and  his  fellows  have 
been  accustomed  to  behold? 

Clearly,  he  said,  he  would  first  see  the  sun  and  then 
reason  about  him. 

And  when  he  remembered  his  old  habitation,  and 
the  wisdom  of  the  den  and  his  fellow-prisoners,  do 


268 


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you  not  suppose  that  he  would  felicitate  himself  on 
the  change,  and  pity  them? 

Certainly,  he  would. 

And  if  they  were  in  the  habit  of  conferring  honors 
among  themselves  on  those  who  were  quickest  to  ob- 
serve the  passing  shadows  and  to  remark  which  of 
them  went  before,  and  which  followed  after,  and 
which  were  together;  and  who  were  therefore  best 
able  to  draw  conclusions  as  to  the  future,  do  you  think 
that  he  would  care  for  such  honors  and  glories,  or 
envy  the  possessors  of  them?  Would  he  not  say  with 
Homer, 

“ Better  to  be  the  poor  servant  of  a poor  master/' 

and  to  endure  anything,  rather  than  think  as  they  do 
and  live  after  their  manner? 

Yes,  he  said,  I think  that  he  would  rather  suffer 
anything  than  entertain  these  false  notions  and  live 
in  this  miserable  manner. 

Imagine  once  more,  I said,  such  an  one  coming 
suddenly  out  of  the  sun  to  be  replaced  in  his  old  situa- 
tion; would  he  not  be  certain  to  have  his  eyes  full  of 
darkness? 

To  be  sure,  he  said. 

And  if  there  were  a contest,  and  he  had  to  compete 
in  measuring  the  shadows  with  the  prisoners  who  had 
never  moved  out  of  the  den,  while  his  sight  was  still 
weak,  and  before  his  eyes  had  become  steady  (and  the 
time  which  would  be  needed  to  acquire  this  new  habit 
of  sight  might  be  very  considerable) , would  he  not  be 
ridiculous?  Men  would  say  of  him  that  up  he  went 
and  down  he  came  without  his  eyes  ; and  that  it  was 
better  not  even  to  think  of  ascending;  and  if  any  one 
tried  to  loose  another  and  lead  him  up  to  the  light, 
let  them  only  catch  the  offender,  and  they  would  put 
him  to  death. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


269 


No  question,  he  said. 

This  entire  allegory,  I said,  you  may  now  append, 
dear  Glaucon,  to  the  previous  argument;  the  prison- 
house  is  the  world  of  sight,  the  light  of  the  fire  is  the 
sun,  and  you  will  not  misapprehend  me  if  you  inter- 
pret the  journey  upwards  to  be  the  ascent  of  the  soul 
into  the  intellectual  world  according  to  my  poor  be- 
lief, which,  at  your  desire,  I have  expressed  — 
whether  rightly  or  wrongly  God  knows.  But, 
whether  true  or  false,  my  opinion  is  that  in  the  world 
of  knowledge  the  idea  of  good  appears  last  of  all, 
and  is  seen  only  with  an  effort;  and,  when  seen,  is 
also  inferred  to  be  the  universal  author  of  all  things 
beautiful  and  right,  parent  of  light  and  of  the  lord 
of  light  in  this  visible  world,  and  the  immediate  source 
of  reason  and  truth  in  the  intellectual;  and  that  this 
is  the  power  upon  which  he  who  would  act  rationally 
either  in  public  or  private  life  must  have  his  eye  fix^, 

I agree,  he  said,  as  far  as  I am  able  to  understand 
you. 

Moreover,  I said,  you  must  not  wonder  that  those 
who  attain  to  this  beatific  vision  are  unwilling  to  de- 
scend to  human  affairs;  for  their  souls  are  ever 
hastening  into  the  upper  world  where  they  desire  to 
dwell;  which  desire  of  theirs  is  very  natural,  if  our 
allegory  may  be  trusted. 

Yes,  very  natural. 

And  is  there  anything  surprising  in  one  who  passes 
from  divine  contemplations  to  the  evil  state  of  man, 
misbehaving  himself  in  a ridiculous  manner ; if,  while 
his  eyes  are  blinking  and  before  he  has  become  accus- 
tomed to  the  surrounding  darkness,  he  is  compelled 
to  fight  in  courts  of  law,  or  in  other  places,  about  the 
images  or  the  shadows  of  images  of  justice,  and  is 
endeavoring  to  meet  the  conceptions  of  those  who  have 
never  yet  seen  absolute  justice? 


270 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Anything  but  surprising,  he  replied. 

Any  one  who  has  common  sense  will  remember  that 
the  bewilderments  of  the  eyes  are  of  two  kinds,  and 
arise  from  two  causes,  either  from  coming  out  of  the 
light  or  from  going  into  the  light,  which  is  true  of  the 
mind’s  eye,  quite  as  much  as  of  the  bodily  eye;  and 
he  who  remembers  this  when  he  sees  any  one  whose 
vision  is  perplexed  and  weak,  will  not  be  too  ready 
to  laugh;  he  will  first  ask  whether  that  soul  of  man 
has  come  out  of  the  brighter  life,  and  is  unable  to  see 
because  unaccustomed  to  the  dark,  or  having  turned 
from  darkness  to  the  day  is  dazzled  by  excess  of 
light.  And  he  will  count  the  one  happy  in  his  condi- 
tion and  state  of  being,  and  he  will  pity  the  other; 
or,  if  he  have  a mind  to  laugh  at  the  soul  which  comes 
from  below  into  the  light,  there  will  be  more  reason 
in  this  than  in  the  laugh  which  greets  him  who  returns 
from  above  out  of  the  light  into  the  den. 

That,  he  said,  is  a very  just  distinction. 

But  then,  if  I am  right,  certain  professors  of  edu- 
cation must  be  wrong  when  they  say  that  they  can  put 
a knowledge  into  the  soul  which  was  not  there  before, 
like  sight  into  blind  eyes. 

They  undoubtedly  say  this,  he  replied. 

Whereas,  our  argument  shows  that  the  power  and 
capacity  of  learning  exists  in  the  soul  already;  and 
that  just  as  the  eye  was  unable  to  turn  from  dark- 
ness to  light  without  the  whole  body,  so  too  the  instru- 
ment of  knowledge  can  only  by  the  movement  of  the 
whole  soul  be  turned  from  the  world  of  becoming  into 
that  of  being,  and  learn  by  degrees  to  endure  the 
sight  of  being,  and  of  the  brightest  and  best  of  being, 
or  in  other  words,  of  the  good. 

Very  true. 

And  must  there  not  be  some  art  which  will  effect 
conversion  in  the  easiest  and  quickest  manner;  not 


THE  REPUBLIC 


271 


implanting  the  faculty  of  sight,  for  that  exists  al- 
ready, but  has  been  turned  in  the  wrong  direction, 
and  is  looking  away  from  the  truth? 

Yes,  he  said,  such  an  art  may  be  presumed. 

And  whereas  the  other  so-called  virtues  of  the  soul 
seem  to  be  akin  to  bodily  qualities,  for  even  when  they 
are  not  originally  innate  they  can  be  implanted  later 
by  habit  and  exercise,  the  virtue  of  wisdom  more  than 
anything  else  contains  a divine  element  which  always 
remains,  and  by  this  conversion  is  rendered  useful  and 
profitable;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  hurtful  and  useless. 
Did  you  never  observe  the  narrow  intelligence  flash- 
ing from  the  keen  eye  of  a clever  rogue  — how  eager 
he  is,  how  clearly  his  paltry  soul  sees  the  way  to  his 
end ; he  is  the  reverse  of  blind,  but  his  keen  eye-sight 
is  forced  into  the  service  of  evil,  and  he  is  mischievous 
in  proportion  to  his  cleverness? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

But  what  if  there  had  been  a circumcision  of  such 
natures  in  the  days  of  their  youth;  and  they  had  been 
severed  from  those  sensual  pleasures,  such  as  eating 
and  drinking,  which,  like  leaden  weights,  were  at- 
tached to  them  at  their  birth,  and  which  drag  them 
down  and  turn  the  vision  of  their  souls  upon  the  things 
that  are  below  — if,  I say,  they  had  been  released 
from  these  impediments  and  turned  in  the  opposite 
direction,  the  very  same  faculty  in  them  would  have 
seen  the  truth  as  keenly  as  they  see  what  their  eyes 
are  turned  to  now. 

Very  likely. 

Yes,  I said;  and  there  is  another  thing  which  is 
likely,  or  rather  a necessary  inference  from  what  has 
preceded,  that  neither  the  uneducated  and  unin- 
formed of  the  truth,  nor  yet  those  who  never  make 
an  end  of  their  education,  will  be  able  ministers  of 
State;  not  the  former,  because  they  have  no  single 


272 


THE  REPUBLIC 


aim  of  duty  which  is  the  rule  of  all  their  actions, 
private  as  well  as  public;  nor  the  latter,  because  they 
will  not  act  at  all  except  upon  compulsion,  fancying 
that  they  are  already  dwelling  apart  in  the  islands  of 
the  blest. 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Then,  I said,  the  business  of  us  who  are  the  founders 
of  the  State  will  be  to  compel  the  best  minds  to  attain 
that  knowledge  which  we  have  already  shown  to  be 
the  greatest  of  all  — they  must  continue  to  ascend 
until  they  arrive  at  the  good;  but  when  they  have 
ascended  and  seen  enough  we  must  not  allow  them 
to  do  as  they  do  now. 

What  do  you  mean? 

I mean  that  they  remain  in  the  upper  world:  but 
this  must  not  be  allowed;  they  must  be  made  to  de- 
scend again  among  the  prisoners  in  the  den,  and  par- 
take of  their  labors  and  honors,  whether  they  are 
worth  having  or  not. 

But  is  not  this  unjust?  he  said;  ought  we  to  give 
them  a worse  life,  when  they  might  have  a better? 

You  have  again  forgotten,  my  friend,  I said,  the 
intention  of  the  legislator,  who  did  not  aim  at  making 
any  one  class  in  the  State  happy  above  the  rest;  the 
happiness  was  to  be  in  the  whole  State,  and  he  held 
the  citizens  together  by  persuasion  and  necessity, 
making  them  benefactors  of  the  State,  and  therefore 
benefactors  of  one  another;  to  this  end  he  created 
them,  not  to  please  themselves,  but  to  be  his  instru- 
ments in  binding  up  the  State. 

True,  he  said,  I had  forgotten. 

Observe,  Glaucon,  that  there  will  be  no  injustice 
in  compelling  our  philosophers  to  have  a care  and 
providence  of  others;  we  shall  explain  to  them  that 
in  other  States,  men  of  their  class  are  not  obliged  to 
share  in  the  toils  of  politics:  and  this  is  reasonable, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


273 


for  they  grow  up  at  their  own  sweet  will,  and  the 
government  would  rather  not  have  them.  Being  self- 
taught,  they  can  not  be  expected  to  show  any  grati- 
tude for  a culture  whieh  they  have  never  received. 
But  we  have  brought  you  into  the  world  to  be  rulers 
of  the  hive,  kings  of  yourselves  and  of  the  other  citi- 
zens, and  have  educated  you  far  better  and  more  per- 
fectly than  they  have  been  educated,  and  you  are 
better  able  to  share  in  the  double  duty.  Wherefore 
each  of  you,  when  his  turn  comes,  must  go  down  to 
the  general  underground  abode,  and  get  the  habit 
of  seeing  in  the  dark.  When  you  have  acquired  the 
habit,  you  will  see  ten  thousand  times  better  than  the 
inhabitants  of  the  den,  and  you  will  know  what  the 
several  images  are,  and  what  they  represent,  because 
you  have  seen  the  beautiful  and  just  and  good  in 
their  truth.  And  thus  our  State,  which  is  also  yours, 
will  be  a reality,  and  not  a dream  only,  and  will  be 
administered  in  a spirit  unlike  that  of  other  States, 
in  which  men  fight  with  one  another  about  shadows 
only  and  are  distracted  in  the  strug^l^  for  power, 
which  in  their  eyes  is  a great  good.  I Whereas  the 
truth  is  that  the  State  in  which  the  rulers  are  most 
reluctant  to  govern  is  always  the  best  and  most 
quietly  governed,  and  the  State  in  which  they  are 
most  eager,  the  worst^// 

Quite  true,  he  replied. 

And  will  our  pupils,  when  they  hear  this,  refuse  to 
take  their  turn  at  the  toils  of  State,  when  they  are 
allowed  to  spend  the  greater  part  of  their  time  with 
one  another  in  the  heavenly  light? 

Impossible,  he  answered;  for  they  are  just  men, 
and  the  commands  which  we  impose  upon  them  are 
just;  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  every  one  of  them 
will  take  office  as  a stern  necessity,  and  not  after  the 
fashion  of  our  present  rulers  of  State. 


274 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Yes,  my  friend,  I said;  and  there  lies  the  point. 
You  must  contrive  for  your  future  rulers  another  and 
a better  life  than  that  of  a ruler,  and  then  you  may 
have  a well-ordered  State ; for  only  in  the  State  which 
offers  this,  will  they  rule  who  are  truly  rich,  not  in 
silver  and  gold,  but  in  virtue  and  wisdom,  which  are 
the  true  blessings  of  life.  Whereas  if  they  go  to  the 
administration  of  public  affairs,  poor  and  hungering 
after  their  own  private  advantage,  thinking  that 
hence  they  are  to  snatch  the  chief  good,  order  there 
can  never  be;  for  they  will  be  fighting  about  office, 
and  the  civil  and  domestic  broils  which  thus  arise 
will  be  the  ruin  of  the  rulers  themselves  and  of  the 
whole  State. 

Most  true,  he  replied. 

And  the  only  life  which  looks  down  upon  the  life 
of  political  ambition  is  that  of  true  philosophy.  Do 
you  know  of  any  other? 

Indeed,  I do  not,  he  said. 

And  those  who  govern  ought  not  to  be  lovers  of  the 
task?  For,  if  they  are,  there  will  be  rival  lovers,  and 
they  will  fight. 

iSTo  question. 

Who  then  are  those  whom  we  shall  compel  to  be 
guardians?  Surely  they  will  be  the  men  who  are 
wisest  about  affairs  of  State,  and  by  whom  the  State 
is  best  administered,  and  who  at  the  same  time  have 
other  honors  and  another  and  a better  life  than  that 
of  politics?/ 

They  are  the  men,  and  I will  choose  them,  he  re- 
plied. 

And  now  shall  we  consider  in  what  way  such 
guardians  will  be  produced,  and  how  they  are  to  be 
brought  from  darkness  to  light,  — as  some  are  said 
to  have  ascended  from  the  world  below  to  the  gods? 

By  all  means,  he  replied. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


275 


The  process,  I said,  is  not  the  turning  over  of  an 
oyster-sheU,^  but  the  turning  round  of  a soul  passing 
from  a day  whieh  is  little  better  than  night  to  the  true 
day  of  being,  that  is,  the  ascent  from  below,^  which 
we  affirm  to  be  true  philosophy? 

Quite  so. 

And  should  we  not  inquire  what  sort  of  knowledge 
has  the  power  of  effecting  such  a change? 

Certainly. 

What  sort  of  knowledge  is  there  which  would  draw 
the  soul  from  beeoming  to  being?  And  another  con- 
sideration has  just  occurred  to  me:  You  will  remem- 
ber that  our  young  men  are  to  be  warrior  athletes? 

Yes,  that  was  said. 

Then  this  new  kind  of  knowledge  must  have  an 
additional  quality? 

What  quality? 

Usefulness  in  war. 

Yes,  if  possible. 

There  were  two  parts  in  our  former  scheme  of  edu- 
cation, were  there  not? 

Just  so. 

There  was  gymnastic  which  presided  over  the 
growth  and  decay  of  the  body,  and  may  therefore  be 
regarded  as  having  to  do  with  generation  and  cor- 
ruption? 

True. 

Then  that  is  not  the  knowledge  which  we  are  seek- 
ing to  discover? 

No. 

But  what  do  you  say  of  music,  what  also  entered 
to  a eertain  extent  into  our  former  seheme? 

Musie,  he  said,  as  you  will  remember,  was  the 

1 In  allusion  to  a game  in  which  two  parties  fled  or  pursued  according  as 
an  oyster-shell  w^hich  was  thrown  into  the  air  fell  with  llie  dark  or  light  side 
uppermost,  2 Reading  odaap  iirdvodop* 


276 


THE  REPUBLIC 


counterpart  of  gymnastic,  and  trained  the  guardians 
by  the  influences  of  habit,  by  harmony  making  them 
harmonious,  by  rhythm  rhythmical,  but  not  giving 
them  seience;  and  the  words,  whether  fabulous  or 
possibly  true,  had  kindred  elements  of  rhythm  and 
harmony  in  them.  But  in  music  there  was  nothing 
which  tended  to  that  good  whieh  you  are  now  seeking. 

You  are  most  aecurate,  I said,  in  your  recollection; 
in  music  there  certainly  was  nothing  of  the  kind. 
But  what  branch  of  knowledge  is  there,  my  dear 
Glaucon,  which  is  of  the  desired  nature;  since  all  the 
useful  arts  were  reckoned  mean  by  us? 

Undoubtedly ; and  yet  if  music  and  gymnastic  are 
excluded,  and  the  arts  are  also  excluded,  what  re- 
mains? 

Well,  I said,  there  may  be  nothing  left  of  our 
special  subjects;  and  then  we  shall  have  to  take 
something  which  is  not  special,  but  of  universal  ap- 
plication. 

What  may  that  be? 

(A  something  whieh  all  arts  and  sciences  and  intel- 
ligences use  in  common,  and  which  every  one  first  has 
to  learn  among  the  elements  of  education. 

What  is  that? 

The  little  matter  of  distinguishing  one,  two,  and 
three  — in  a word,  number  and  calculation:  — do  not 
all  arts  and  sciences  necessarily  partake  of  them?j 

Yes. 

Then  the  art  of  war  partakes  of  them? 

To  be  sure. 

Then  Palamedes,  whenever  he  appears  in  tragedy, 
proves  Agamemnon  ridiculously  unfit  to  be  a general. 
Did  you  never  remark  how  he  declares  that  he  had 
invented  number,  and  had  numbered  the  ships  and  set 
in  array  the  ranks  of  the  army  at  Troy;  which  im- 
plies that  they  had  never  been  numbered  before,  and  , 


THE  REPUBLIC 


277 


Agamemnon  must  be  supposed  literally  to  have  been 
ineapable  of  counting  his  own  feet  — how  could  he  if 
he  was  ignorant  of  number?  And  if  that  is  true, 
what  sort  of  general  must  he  have  been? 

I should  say  a very  strange  one,  if  this  was  as  you 
say. 

Can  we  deny  that  a warrior  should  have  a knowl- 
edge of  arithmetic? 

Certainly  he  should,  if  he  is  to  have  the  smallest 
understanding  of  military  tactics,  or  indeed,  I should 
rather  say,  if  he  is  to  be  a man  at  aU. 

I should  like  to  know  whether  you  have  the  same 
notion  which  I have  of  this  study? 

What  is  your  notion? 

It  appears  to  me  to  be  a study  of  the  kind  which 
we  are  seeking,  and  which  leads  naturally  to  reflec- 
tion, but  never  to  have  been  rightly  used;  for  the 
true  use  of  it  is  simply  to  draw  the  soul  towards 
being. 

Will  you  explain  your  meaning?  he  said. 

I will  try,  I said ; and  I wish  you  would  share  the 
inquiry  with  me,  and  say  “ yes  ” or  “ no  ” when  I 
attempt  to  distinguish  in  my  own  mind  what  branches 
of  knowledge  have  this  attracting  power,  in  order 
that  we  may  have  clearer  proof  that  arithmetic  is, 
as  I suspect,  one  of  them. 

Explain,  he  said. 

I mean  to  say  that  objects  of  sense  are  of  two  kinds ; 
some  of  them  do  not  invite  thought  because  the  sense 
is  an  adequate  judge  of  them;  while  in  the  case  of 
other  objects  sense  is  so  untrustworthy  that  further 
inquiry  is  imperatively  demanded. 

You  are  clearly  referring,  he  said,  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  senses  are  imposed  upon  by  distance,  and 
by  painting  in  light  and  shade. 

No,  I said,  that  is  not  at  all  my  meaning. 


278 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Then  what  is  your  meaning? 

When  speaking  of  uninviting  objects,  I mean  those 
which  do  not  pass  from  one  sensation  to  the  opposite; 
inviting  objects  are  those  which  do;  in  this  latter  case 
the  sense  coming  upon  the  object,  whether  at  a dis- 
tance or  near,  gives  no  more  vivid  idea  of  anything 
in  particular  than  of  its  opposite.  An  illustration 
will  make  my  meaning  clearer : — here  are  three  fin- 
gers — a little  finger,  a second  finger,  and  a middle 
finger. 

Very  good. 

You  may  suppose  that  they  are  seen  quite  close: 
And  here  comes  the  point. 

What  is  it? 

Each  of  them  equally  appears  a finger,  whether 
seen  in  the  middle  or  at  the  extremity,  whether  white 
or  black,  or  thick  or  thin  — it  makes  no  difference ; a 
finger  is  a finger  all  the  same.  In  these  cases  a man 
is  not  compelled  to  ask  of  thought  the  question  what 
is  a finger?  for  the  sight  never  intimates  to  the  mind 
that  a finger  is  other  than  a finger. 

True. 

And  therefore,  I said,  as  we  might  expect,  there 
is  nothing  here  which  invites  or  excites  intelligence. 

There  is  not,  he  said. 

But  is  this  equally  true  of  the  greatness  and  small- 
ness of  the  fingers?  Can  sight  adequately  perceive 
them?  and  is  no  difference  made  by  the  circumstance 
that  one  of  the  fingers  is  in  the  middle  and  another  at 
the  extremity?  And  in  like  manner  does  the  touch 
adequately  perceive  the  qualities  of  thickness  or  thin- 
ness, of  softness  or  hardness?  And  so  of  the  other 
senses ; do  they  give  perfect  intimations  of  such  mat- 
ters? Is  not  their  mode  of  operation  on  this  wise  — 
the  sense  which  is  concerned  with  the  quality  of  hard- 
ness is  necessarily  concerned  also  with  the  quality  of 


THE  REPUBLIC 


279 


softness,  and  only  intimates  to  the  soul  that  the  same 
thing  is  felt  to  be  both  hard  and  soft? 

You  are  quite  right,  he  said. 

And  must  not  the  soul  be  perplexed  at  this  intima- 
tion which  the  sense  gives  of  a hard  which  is  also 
soft?  What,  again,  is  the  meaning  of  light  and  heavy, 
if  that  which  is  light  is  also  heavy,  and  that  which  is 
heavy,  light? 

Yes,  he  said,  these  intimations  which  the  soul  re- 
ceives are  very  curious  and  require  to  be  explained. 

Yes,  I said,  and  in  these  perplexities  the  soul  natu- 
rally summons  to  her  aid  calculation  and  intelligence, 
that  she  may  see  whether  the  several  objects  an- 
nounced to  her  are  one  or  two. 

True. 

And  if  they  turn  out  to  be  two,  is  not  each  of  them 
one  and  different? 

Certainly. 

And  if  each  is  one,  and  both  are  two,  she  will  con- 
ceive the  two  as  in  a state  of  division,  for  if  they  were 
undivided  they  could  only  be  conceived  of  as  one? 

True. 

The  eye  certainly  did  see  both  small  and  great,  but 
only  in  a confused  manner;  they  were  not  distin- 
guished. 

Yes. 

Whereas  the  thinking  mind,  intending  to  light  up 
the  chaos,  was  compelled  to  reverse  the  process,  and 
look  at  small  and  great  as  separate  and  not  confused. 

Very  true. 

Was  not  this  the  beginning  of  the  inquiry  “ What 
is  great?  ” and  “ What  is  small?  ” 

Exactly  so. 

And  thus  arose  the  distinction  of  the  visible  and  the 
intelligible. 

Most  true. 


280 


THE  REPUBLIC 


This  was  what  I meant  when  I spoke  of  impres- 
sions which  invited  the  intellect,  or  the  reverse  — 
those  which  are  simultaneous  with  opposite  impres- 
sions, invite  thought;  those  which  are  simultaneous 
do  not. 

I understand,  he  said,  and  agree  with  you. 

And  to  which  class  do  unity  and  number  belong? 

I do  not  know,  he  replied. 

Think  a little  and  you  will  see  that  what  has  pre- 
ceded will  supply  the  answer;  for  if  simple  unity 
could  be  adequately  perceived  by  the  sight  or  by  any 
other  sense,  then,  as  we  were  saying  in  the  case  of 
the  finger,  there  would  be  nothing  to  attract  towards 
being;  but  when  there  is  some  contradiction  always 
present,  and  one  is  the  reverse  of  one  and  involves 
the  conception  of  plurality,  then  thought  begins  to 
be  aroused  within  us,  and  the  soul  perplexed  and 
wanting  to  arrive  at  a decision  asks  “ What  is  abso- 
lute unity?  ” This  is  the  way  in  which  the  study  of 
the  one  has  a power  of  drawing  and  converting  the 
mind  to  the  contemplation  of  true  being. 

And  surely,  he  said,  this  occurs  notably  in  the  case 
of  one ; for  we  see  the  same  thing  to  be  both  one  and 
infinite  in  multitude? 

Yes,  I said;  and  this  being  true  of  one  must  be 
equally  true  of  all  number? 

Certainly. 

And  all  arithmetic  and  calculation  have  to  do  with 
number? 

Yes. 

And  they  appear  to  lead  the  mind  towards  truth? 

Yes,  in  a very  remarkable  manner. 

Then  this  is  knowledge  of  the  kind  for  which  we  are 
seeking,  having  a double  use,  military  and  philosoph- 
ical; for  the  man  of  war  must  learn  the  art  of  number 
or  he  will  not  know  how  to  array  his  troops,  and  the 


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philosopher  also,  because  he  has  to  rise  out  of  the  sea 
of  change  and  lay  hold  of  true  being,  and  therefore  he 
must  be  an  arithmetician. 

That  is  true. 

And  our  guardian  is  both  warrior  and  philosopher? 

Certainly. 

vThen  this  is  a kind  jof  knowledge  which  legislation 
may  fitly  prescribe;  ^and  we  must  endeavor  to  per- 
suade those  who  are  to  be  the  principal  men  of  our 
State  to  go  and  learn  arithmetic,  not  as  amateurs,  but 
they  must  carry  on  the  study  until  they  see  the  nature 
of  numbers  with  the  mind  only;  nor  again,  like  mer- 
chants or  retail-traders,  with  a view  to  buying  or  sell- 
ing, but  for  the  sake  of  their  military  use,  and  of  the 
soul  herself ; and  because  this  will  be  the  easiest  way 
for  her  to  pass  from  becoming  to  truth  and  being) 

That  is  excellent,  he  said. 

Yes,  I said,  and  now  having  spoken  of  it,  I must 
add  how  charming  the  science  is!  and  in  how  many 
ways  it  conduces  to  our  desired  end,  if  pursued  in  the 
spirit  of  a philosopher,  and  not  of  a shopkeeper! 

How  do  you  mean? 

T mean,  as  I was  saying,  that  arithmetic  has  a very 
great  and  elevating  effect,  compelling  the  soul  to  rea- 
son about  abstract  number,  and  rebelling  against  the 
introduction  of  visible  or  tangible  objects  into  the 
argmnent.  You  know  how  steadily  the  masters  of  the 
art  repel  and  ridicule  any  one  who  attempts  to  divide 
absolute  unity  when  he  is  calculating,  and  if  you 
divide,  they  multiply,*  taking  care  that  one  shall  con- 
tinue one  and  not  become  lost  in  fractions. 

That  is  very  true. 

Now,  suppose  a person  were  to  say  to  them:  O my 

1 Meaning  either  (1)  that  they  integrate  the  number  because  they  deny 
the  possibility  of  fractions ; or  (2)  that  division  is  regarded  by  them  as  a 
process  of  multiplication,  for  the  fractions  of  one  continue  to  be  units. 


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friends,  what  are  these  wonderful  numbers  about 
which  you  are  reasoning,  in  which,  as  you  say,  there 
is  a unity  such  as  you  demand,  and  each  unit  is  equal, 
invariable,  indivisible,  — what  would  they  answer? 

They  would  answer,  as  I should  conceive,  that  they 
were  speaking  of  those  numbers  which  can  only  be 
realized  in  thought. 

Then  you  see  that  this  knowledge  may  be  truly 
called  necessary,  necessitating  as  it  clearly  does  the 
use  of  the  pure  intelligence  in  the  attainment  of  pure 
truth  ? 

Yes;  that  is  a marked  characteristic  of  it. 

^nd  have  you  further  observed,  that  those  who 
have  a natural  talent  for  calculation  are  generally 
quick  at  every  other  kind  of  knowledge ; and  even  the 
dull,  if  they  have  had  an  arithmetical  training,  al- 
though they  may  derive  no  other  advantage  from  it, 
always  become  much  quicker  than  they  would  other- 
wise have  been. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  indeed,  you  will  not  easily  find  a more  difficult 
study,  and  not  many  as  difficult. 

You  will  not. 

And,  for  all  these  reasons/  arithmetic  is  a kind  of 
knowledge  in  which  the  best  natures  should  be  trained, 
and  which  must  not  be  given  up. 

I agree. 

Let  this  then  be  made  one  of  our  subjects  of  educa- 
tion. And  next,  shall  we  inquire  whether  the  kindred 
science  also  concerns  us? 

You  mean  geometry? 

Exactly  so. 

Clearly,  he  said,  we  are  concerned  with  that  part  of 
geometry  which  relates  to  war;  for  in  pitching  a 
camp,  or  taking  up  a position,  or  closing  or  extending 
the  fines  of  an  army,  or  any  other  military  manoeuvre, 


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283 


whether  in  actual  battle  or  on  a march,  it  will  make 
all  the  difference  whether  a general  is  or  is  not  a 
geometrician. 

Yes,  I said,  but  for  that  purpose  a very  little  of 
either  geometry  or  calculation  will  be  enough;  the 
question  relates  rather  to  the  greater  and  more  ad- 
vanced part  of  geometry  — whether  that  tends  in  any 
degree  to  make  more  easy  the  vision  of  the  idea  of 
good;  and  thither,  as  I was  saying,  all  things  tend 
which  compel  the  soul  to  turn  her  gaze  towards  that 
place,  where  is  the  full  perfection  of  being,  which  she 
ought,  by  all  means,  to  behold. 

True,  he  said. 

Then  if  geometry  compels  us  to  view  being,  it  con- 
cerns us;  if  becoming  only,  it  does  not  concern  us? 

Yes,  that  is  what  we  assert. 

Yet  anybody  who  has  the  least  acquaintance  with 
geometry  will  not  deny  that  such  a conception  of  the 
science  is  in  flat  contradiction  to  the  ordinary  lan- 
guage of  geometricians. 

How  so? 

They  have  in  view  practice  only,  and  are  always 
speaking,  in  a narrow  and  ridiculous  manner,  of 
squaring  and  extending  and  applying  and  the  like  — 
they  confuse  the  necessities  of  geometry  with  those 
of  daily  life;  whereas  knowledge  is  the  real  object 
of  the  whole  science. 

Certainly,  he  said. 

Then  must  not  a further  admission  be  made? 

What  admission? 

That  the  knowledge  at  which  geometry  aims  is 
knowledge  of  the  eternal,  and  not  of  aught  perishing 
and  transient. 

That,  he  replied,  may  be  readily  allowed,  and  is 
true. 

Then,  my  noble  friend,  geometry  will  draw  the  soul 


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towards  truth,  and  create  the  spirit  of  philosophy, 
and  raise  up  that  which  is  now  unhappily  allowed  to 
fall  down. 

J^othing  will  be  more  likely  to  have  such  an  effect. 

Tlien  nothing  should  be  more  sternly  laid  down 
than  that  the  inhabitants  of  your  fair  city  should  by 
all  means  learn  geometry^:  Moreover  the  science  has 
indirect  effects,  which  ar6  not  small. 

Of  what  kind?  he  said. 

There  are  the  military  advantages  of  which  you 
spoke,  I said;  and  in  aU  departments  of  knowledge, 
as  experience  proves,  any  one  who  has  studied  geom- 
etry is  infinitely  quicker  of  apprehension  than  one 
who  has  not. 

Yes  indeed,  he  said,  there  is  an  infinite  difference 
between  them. 

Then  shall  we  propose  this  as  a second  branch  of 
knowledge  which  our  youth  will  study? 

Let  us  do  so,  he  replied. 

And  suppose  we  make  astronomy  the  third  — what 
do  you  say? 

I am  strongly  inclined  to  it,  he  said;  the  observa- 
tion of  the  seasons  and  of  months  and  years  is  as  es- 
sential to  the  general  as  it  is  to  the  farmer  or  sailor. 

I am  amused,  I said,  at  your  fear  of  the  world, 
which  makes  you  guard  against  the  appearance  of 
insisting  upon  useless  studies;  and  I quite  admit  the 
difficulty  of  believing  that  in  every  man  there  is  an 
eye  of  the  soul  which,  when  by  other  pursuits  lost  and 
dimmed,  is  by  these  purified  and  re-illumined;  and 
is  more  precious  far  than  ten  thousand  bodily  eyes, 
for  by  it  alone  is  truth  seen.  Now  there  are  two 
classes  of  persons:  one  class  of  those  who  will  agree 
with  you  and  will  take  your  words  as  a revelation; 
another  class  to  whom  they  will  be  utterly  unmean- 
ing, and  who  will  natqrally  deem  them  to  be  idle  tales. 


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285 


for  they  see  no  sort  of  profit  which  is  to  be  obtained 
from  them.  And  therefore  you  had  better  decide  at 
once  with  which  of  the  two  you  are  proposing  to 
argue.  You  will  very  likely  say  with  neither,  and 
that  your  chief  aim  in  carrying  on  the  argument  is 
your  own  improvement;  at  the  same  time  you  do 
not  grudge  to  others  any  benefit  which  they  may 
receive. 

I think  that  I should  prefer  to  carry  on  the  argu- 
ment mainly  on  my  own  behalf. 

Then  take  a step  backward,  for  we  have  gone  wrong 
in  the  order  of  the  sciences. 

What  was  the  mistake?  he  said. 

After  plane  geometry,  I said,  we  proceeded  at  once 
to  solids  in  revolution,  instead  of  taking  solids  in  them- 
selves; whereas  after  the  second  dimension  the  third, 
which  is  concerned  with  cubes  and  dimensions  of 
depth,  ought  to  have  followed. 

That  is  true,  Socrates;  but  so  little  seems  to  be 
known  as  yet  about  these  subjects. 

Why,  yes,  I said,  and  for  two  reasons : — in  the  first 
place,  no  government  patronizes  them;  this  leads  to  a 
want  of  energy  in  the  pursuit  of  them,  and  they  are 
difficult;  in  the  second  place,  students  can  not  learn 
them  unless  they  have  a director.  But  then  a director 
can  hardly  be  found,  and  even  if  he  could,  as  matters 
now  stand,  the  students,  who  are  very  conceited, 
would  not  attend  to  him.  That,  however,  would  be 
otherwise  if  the  whole  State  became  the  director  of 
these  studies  and  gave  honor  to  them;  then  disciples 
would  want  to  come,  and  there  would  be  continuous 
and  earnest  search,  and  discoveries  would  be  made; 
since  even  now,  disregarded  as  they  are  by  the  world, 
and  maimed  of  their  fair  proportions,  and  although 
none  of  their  votaries  can  tell  the  use  of  them,  still 
these  studies  force  their  way  by  their  natural  charm. 


286 


THE  REPUBLIC 


and  very  likely,  if  they  had  the  help  of  the  State,  they 
would  some  day  emerge  into  light. 

Yes,  he  said,  there  is  a remarkable  charm  in  them. 
But  I do  not  clearly  understand  the  change  in  the 
order.  First  you  began  with  a geometry  of  plane 
surfaces? 

Yes,  I said. 

And  you  placed  astronomy  next,  and  then  you  made 
a step  backward? 

Yes,  and  I have  delayed  you  by  my  hurry;  the 
ludicrous  state  of  solid  geometry,  which  in  natural 
order,  should  have  followed,  made  me  pass  over  this 
branch  and  go  on  to  astronomy,  or  motion  of  solid^ 

True,  he  said. 

Then  assuming  that  the  science  now  omitted  would 
come  into  existence  if  encouraged  by  the  State,  let  us 
go  on  to  astronomy,  which  will  be  fourth. 

The  right  order,  he  replied.  And  now,  Socrates,  as 
you  rebuked  the  vulgar  manner  in  which  I praised 
astronomy  before,  my  praise  shall  be  given  in  your 
own  spirit.  For  every  one,  as  I think,  must  see  that 
astronomy  compels  the  soul  to  look  upwards  and  leads 
us  from  this  world  to  another. 

Every  one  but  myself,  I said ; to  every  one  else  this 
may  be  clear,  but  not  to  me. 

And  what  then  would  you  say? 

I should  rather  say  that  those  who'  elevate 
astronomy  into  philosophy  appear  to  me  to  make  us 
look  downwards  and  not  upwards. 

What  do  you  mean?  he  asked. 

You,  I replied,  have  in  your  mind  a truly  sublime 
conception  of  our  knowledge  of  the  things  above. 
And  I dare  say  that  if  a person  were  to  throw 
his  head  back  and  study  the  fretted  ceiling,  you  would 
still  think  that  his  mind  was  the  percipient,  and  not 
his  eyes.  And  you  are  very  likely  right,  and  I may  be 


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287 


a simpleton : but,  in  my  opinion,  that  knowledge  only 
which  is  of  being  and  of  the  unseen  can  make  the  soul 
look  upwards,  and  whether  a man  gapes  at  the  heavens 
or  blinks  on  the  ground,  seeking  to  learn  some  par- 
ticular of  sense,  I would  deny  that  he  can  learn,  for 
nothing  of  that  sort  is  matter  of  science;  his  soul  is 
looking  downwards,  not  upwards,  whether  his  way  to 
knowledge  is  by  water  or  by  land,  whether  he  floats, 
or  only  lies  on  his  back. 

I acknowledge,  he  said,  the  justice  of  your  rebuke. 
StiU,  I should  like  to  ascertain  how  astronomy  can  be 
learned  in  any  manner  more  conducive  to  that  knowl- 
edge of  which  w'e  are  speaking? 

I will  tell  you,  I said : The  starry  heaven  which  we 
behold  is  wrought  upon  a visible  ground,  and  there- 
fore, although  the  fairest  and  most  perfect  of  visible 
things,  must  necessarily  be  deemed  inferior  far  to  the 
true  motions  of  absolute  swiftness  and  absolute  slow- 
ness, which  are  relative  to  each  other,  and  carry  with 
them  that  which  is  contained  in  them,  in  the  true  num- 
ber and  in  every  true  figure.  Now,  these  are  to  be  ap- 
prehended by  reason  and  intelligence,  but  not  by 
sight. 

True,  he  replied. 

The  spangled  heavens  should  be  used  as  a pattern 
and  with  a view  to  that  higher  knowledge ; their  beauty 
is  like  the  beauty  of  figures  or  pictures  excellently 
wrought  by  the  hand  of  Daedalus,  or  some  other  great 
artist,  which  we  may  chance  to  behold;  any  geometri- 
cian who  saw  them  would  appreciate  the  exquisiteness 
of  their  workmanship,  but  he  would  never  dream  of 
thinking  that  in  them  he  could  find  the  true  equal  or 
the  true  double,  or  the  truth  of  any  other  proportion. 

No,  he  replied,  such  an  idea  would  be  ridiculous. 

And  will  not  a true  astronomer  have  the  same  feel- 
ing when  he  looks  at  the  movements  of  the  stars? 


288 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Will  he  not  think  that  heaven  and  the  things  in  heaven 
are  framed  by  the  Creator  of  them  in  the  most  perfect 
manner?  But  he  will  never  imagine  that  the  propor- 
tions of  night  and  day,  or  of  both  to  the  month,  or  of 
the  month  to  the  year,  or  of  the  stars  to  these  and  to 
one  another,  and  any  other  things  that  are  material 
and  visible  can  also  be  eternal  and  subject  to  no 
deviation  — that  would  be  absurd ; and  it  is  equally 
absurd  to  take  so  much  pains  in  investigating  their 
exact  truth, 

I quite  agree,  though  I never  thought  of  this 
before. 

Then,  I said,  in  astronomy,  as  in  geometry,  we 
should  employ  problems,  and  let  the  heavens  alone 
if  we  would  approach  the  subject  in  the  right  way 
and  so  make  the  natural  gift  of  reason  to  be  any  of 
real  use. 

That,  he  said,  is  a work  infinitely  beyond  our  pres- 
ent astronomers. 

Yes,  I said;  and  there  are  many  other  things  which 
must  also  have  a similar  extension  given  to  them,  if 
our  legislation  is  to  be  of  any  value.  But  can  you  tell 
me  of  any  other  suitable  study? 

No,  he  said,  not  without  thinking. 

Motion,  I said,  has  many  forms,  and  not  one  only; 
two  of  them  are  obvious  enough  even  to  wits  no  better 
than  ours;  and  there  are  others,  as  I imagine,  which 
may  be  left  to  wiser  persons. 

But  where  are  the  two? 

There  is  a second,  I said,  which  is  the  counterpart 
of  the  one  already  named. 

And  what  may  that  be? 

The  second,  I said,  would  seem  relatively  to  the  ears 
to  be  what  the  first  is  to  the  eyes ; for  I conceive  that  as 
the  eyes  are  designed  to  look  up  at  the  stars,  so  are 
the  .ears  to  hear  harmonious  motions;  and  these  are 


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289 


sister  sciences  — as  the  Pythagoreans  say,  and  we, 
Glaucon,  agree  with  them? 

Yes,  he  replied. 

But  this,  I said,  is  a laborious  study,  and  therefore 
we  had  better  go  and  learn  of  them ; and  they  will  tell 
us  whether  there  are  any  other  applications  of  these 
sciences.  At  the  same  time,  we  must  not  lose  sight  of 
our  own  higher  object. 

What  is  that? 

There  is  a perfection  which  all  knowledge  ought  to 
reach,  and  which  our  pupils  ought  also  to  attain,  and 
not  to  fall  short  of,  as  I was  saying  that  they  did  in 
astronomy.  For  in  the  science  of  harmony,  as  you 
probably  know,  the  same  thing  happens.  The  teachers 
of  harmony  compare  the  sounds  and  consonances 
which  are  heard  only,  and  their  labor,  like  that  of 
the  astronomers,  is  in  vain. 

Yes,  by  heaven!  he  said;  and  ’tis  as  good  as  a play 
to  hear  them  talking  about  their  condensed  notes,  as 
they  call  them;  they  put  their  ears  close  alongside  of 
the  strings  like  persons  catching  a sound  from  their 
neighbor’s  wall  ^ — one  set  of  them  declaring  that 
they  distinguish  an  intermediate  note  and  have  found 
the  least  interval  which  should  be  the  unit  of  measure- 
ment; the  others  insisting  that  the  two  sounds  have 
passed  into  the  same  — either  party  setting  their 
ears  before  their  understanding. 

You  mean,  I said,  those  gentlemen  who  tease  and 
torture  the  strings  and  rack  them  on  the  pegs  of  the 
instrument : I might  carry  on  the  metaphor  and  speak 
after  their  manner  of  the  blows  which  the  plectrum 
gives,  and  make  accusations  against  the  strings,  both 
of  backwardness  and  forwardness  to  sound;  but  this 
would  be  tedious,  and  therefore  I will  only  say  that 

^Or,  “close  alongside  of  their  neighbor’s  instruments,  as  if  to  catch  a 
sound  from  them.” 


290 


THE  REPUBLIC 


these  are  not  the  men,  and  that  I am  referring  to  the 
Pythagoreans,  of  whom  I was  just  now  proposing  to 
inquire  about  harmony.  For  they  too  are  in  error,  like 
the  astronomers;  they  investigate  the  numbers  of  the 
harmonies  which  are  heard,  but  they  never  attain  to 
problems  — that  is  to  say,  they  never  reach  the  natural 
harmonies  of  number,  or  reflect  why  some  numbers 
are  harmonious  and  others  not. 

That,  he  said,  is  a thing  of  more  than  mortal  knowl- 
edge. 

A thing,  I replied,  which  I would  rather  call  useful ; 
that  is,  if  sought  after  with  a view  to  the  beautiful 
and  good ; but  if  pursued  in  any  other  spirit,  useless. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Now,  w'hen  all  these  studies  reach  the  point  of  inter- 
communion and  connection  with  one  another,  and 
come  to  be  considered  in  their  mutual  affinities,  then, 
I think,  but  not  till  then,  will  the  pursuit  of  them  have 
a value  for  our  objects;  otherwise  there  is  no  profit  in 
them. 

I suspect  so;  but  you  are  speaking,  Socrates,  of  a 
vast  work. 

What  do  you  mean?  I said;  the  prelude  or  what? 
Do  you  not  know  that  all  this  is  but  the  prelude  to  the 
actual  strain  which  we  have  to  learn?  For  you  surely 
would  not  regard  the  skilled  mathematician  as  a 
dialectician? 

Assuredly  not,  he  said ; I have  hardly  ever  known  a 
mathematician  who  was  capable  of  reasoning. 

But  do  you  imagine  that  men  who  are  unable  to 
give  and  take  a reason  will  have  the  knowledge  which 
we  require  of  them? 

Neither  can  this  be  supposed. 

And  so,  Glaucon,  I said,  we  have  at  last  arrived  at 
the  hymn  of  dialectic.  This  is  that  strain  which  is  of 
the  intellect  only,  but  which  the  faculty  of  sight  will 


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291 


nevertheless  be  found  to  imitate ; for  sight,  as  you  may 
remember,  was  imagined  by  us  after  a while  to  behold 
the  real  animals  and  stars,  and  last  of  all  the  sun  him- 
self. And  so  with  dialectic;  when  a person  starts  on 
the  discovery  of  the  absolute  by  the  light  of  reason 
only,  and  without  any  assistance  of  sense,  and  per- 
severes until  by  pure  intelligence  he  arrives  at  the 
perception  of  the  absolute  good,  he  at  last  finds  him- 
self at  the  end  of  the  intellectual  world,  as  in  the  case 
of  sight  at  the  end  of  the  visible. 

Exactly,  he  said. 

Then  this  is  the  progress  which  you  caU  dialectic? 

True. 

But  the  release  of  the  prisoners  from  chains,  and 
their  translation  from  the  shadows  to  the  images  and 
to  the  light,  and  the  ascent  from  the  underground  den 
to  the  sun,  while  in  his  presence  they  are  vainly  trying 
to  look  on  animals  and  plants  and  the  light  of  the  sun, 
but  are  able  to  perceive  even  with  their  weak  eyes  the 
images^  in  the  water  [which  are  divine],  and  are  the 
shadows  of  true  existence  (not  shadows  of  images  cast 
by  a light  of  fire,  which  compared  with  the  sun  is  only 
an  image)  — this  power  of  elevating  the  highest 
principle  in  the  soul  to  the  contemplation  of  that 
which  is  best  in  existence,  with  which  we  may  compare 
the  raising  of  that  faculty  which  is  the  very  light  of 
the  body  to  the  sight  of  that  which  is  brightest  in  the 
material  and  visible  world  — this  power  is  given,  as  I 
was  saying,  by  all  that  study  and  pursuit  of  the  arts 
which  has  been  described. 

I agree  in  what  you  are  saying,  he  replied,  which 
may  be  hard  to  believe,  yet,  from  another  point  of 
view,  is  harder  still  to  deny.  This  however  is  not  a 
theme  to  be  treated  of  in  passing  only,  but  will  have 

^Omitting  ivravda  di  n^pds  <pavTd<TfjLaTa.  The  word  Beta  is  bracketed  by 
StallbaujQ. 


292  THE  REPUBLIC 

to  be  discussed  again  and  again.  And  so,  whether 
our  conclusion  be  true  or  false,  let  us  assume  all  this, 
and  proceed  at  once  from  the  prelude  or  preamble  to 
the  chief  strain,^  and  describe  that  in  like  manner. 
Say,  then,  what  is  the  nature  and  what  are  the 
divisions  of  dialectic,  and  what  are  the  paths  which 
lead  thither ; for  these  paths  will  also  lead  to  our  final 
rest. 

Dear  Glaucon,  I said,  you  will  not  be  able  to  follow 
me  here,  though  I would  do  my  best,  and  you  should 
behold  not  an  image  only  but  the  absolute  truth,  ac- 
cording to  my  notion.  Whether  what  I told  you 
would  or  would  not  have  been  a reality  I can  not  ven- 
ture to  say;  but  you  would  have  seen  something  like 
reality;  of  that  I am  confident. 

Doubtless,  he  replied. 

But  I must  also  remind  you,  that  the  power  of 
dialectic  alone  can  reveal  this,  and  only  to  one  who  is 
a disciple  of  the  previous  sciences. 

Of  that  assertion  you  may  be  as  confident  as  of  the 
last. 

And  assuredly  no  one  will  argue  that  there  is  any 
other  method  of  comprehending  by  any  regular 
process  all  true  existence  or  of  ascertaining  what  each 
thing  is  in  its  own  nature;  for  the  arts  in  general  are 
concerned  with  the  desires  or  opinions  of  men,  or  are 
cultivated  with  a view  to  production  and  construction, 
or  for  the  preservation  of  such  productions  and  con- 
structions ; and  as  to  the  mathematical  sciences  which, 
as  we  were  saying,  have  some  apprehension  of  true 
being  — geometry  and  the  like  — they  only  dream 
about  being,  but  never  can  they  behold  the  waking 
reality  so  long  as  they  leave  the  hypotheses  which  they 
use  unexamined,  and  are  unable  to  give  an  account  of 
them.  For  when  a man  knows  not  his  own  first  prin- 

1 A play  upon  the  word  which  means  both  “ law  ” and  “ strain.” 


THE  REPUBLIC 


293 


ciple,  and  when  the  conclusion  and  intermediate  steps 
are  also  constructed  out  of  he  knows  not  what,  how 
can  he  imagine  that  such  a fabric  of  convention  can 
ever  become  science? 

Impossible,  he  said. 

Then  dialectic,  and  dialectic  alone,  goes  directly  to 
the  first  principle  and  is  the  only  science  which  does 
away  with  hypotheses  in  order  to  make  her  ground 
secure;  the  eye  of  the  soul,  which  is  literally  buried 
in  an  outlandish  slough,  is  by  her  gentle  aid  lifted 
upwards;  and  she  uses  as  handmaids  and  helpers  in 
the  work  of  conversion,  the  sciences  which  we  have 
been  discussing.  Custom  terms  them  sciences,  hut 
they  ought  to  have  some  other  name,  implying  greater 
clearness  than  opinion  and  less  clearness  than  science : 
and  this,  in  our  previous  sketch,  was  called  under- 
standing. But  why  should  we  dispute  about  names 
when  we  have  realities  of  such  importance  to  consider? 

Why  indeed,  he  said,  when  any  name  will  do  which 
expresses  the  thought  of  the  mind  with  clearness? 

At  any  rate,  we  are  satisfied,  as  before,  to  have  four 
divisions;  two  for  intellect  and  two  for  opinion,  and 
to  call  the  first  division  science,  the  second  under- 
standing, the  third  belief,  and  the  fourth  perception 
of  shadows,  opinion  being  concerned  with  becoming, 
and  intellect  with  being ; and  so  to  make  a proportion : 

As  being  is  to  becoming,  so  is  pure  intellect  to  opinion. 

And  as  intellect  is  to  opinion,  so  is  science  to  belief,  and  under- 
standing to  the  perception  of  shadows.! 

But  let  us  defer  the  further  correlation  and  sub- 
division of  the  subjects  of  opinion  and  of  intellect, 
for  it  will  be  a long  inquiry,  many  times  longer  than 
this  has  been. 

As  far  as  I understand,  he  said,  I agree. 

And  do  you  also  agree,  I said,  in  describing  the 


294 


THE  REPUBLIC 


dialectician  as  one  who  attains  a conception  of  the 
essence  of  each  thing?  And  he  who  does  not  possess 
and  is  therefore  unable  to  impart  this  conception,  in 
whatever  degree  he  fails,  may  in  that  degree  also  be 
said  to  fail  in  intelligence?  Will  you  admit  so  much? 

Yes,  he  said;  how  can  I deny  it? 

And  you  would  say  the  same  of  the  conception  of 
the  good?  Until  the  person  is  able  to  abstract  and 
define  rationally  the  idea  of  good,  and  unless  he  can 
run  the  gauntlet  of  all  objections,  and  is  ready  to  dis- 
prove them,  not  by  appeals  to  opinion,  but  to  absolute 
truth,  never  faltering  at  any  step  of  the  argument  — 
unless  he  can  do  all  this,  you  would  say  that  he 
knows  neither  the  idea  of  good  nor  any  other  good; 
he  apprehends  only  a shadow,  if  anything  at  all,  which 
is  given  by  opinion  and  not  by  science ; — dreaming 
and  slumbering  in  this  life,  before  he  is  well  awake 
here,  he  arrives  at  the  world  below,  and  has  his  final 
quietus. 

In  all  that  I should  most  certainly  agree  with  you. 

And  surely  you  would  not  have  the  children  of  your 
ideal  State,  whom  you  are  nurturing  and  educating 
— if  the  ideal  ever  becomes  a reality  — you  would  not 
allow  the  future  rulers  to  be  like  posts,^  having  no 
reason  in  them,  and  yet  to  be  set  in  authority  over  the 
highest  matters? 

Certainly  not. 

Then  you  will  make  a law  that  they  shall  have  such 
an  education  as  will  enable  them  to  attain  the  greatest 
skill  in  asking  and  answering  questions? 

Yes,  he  said,  you  and  I together  will  make  it. 

Dialectic,  then,  as  you  will  agree,  is  the  coping- 
stone  of  the  sciences,  and  is  set  over  them;  no  other 
science  can  be  placed  higher  — the  nature  of  knowl- 
edge can  no  further  go? 

^ ypafjLfjLds,  literally  “lines,”  probably  the  starting-point  of  a race-ooursa. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


295 


I agree,  he  said. 

But  to  whom  we  are  to  assign  these  studies,  and  in 
what  way  they  are  to  be  assigned,  are  questions  which 
remain  to  be  considered. 

Yes,  clearly. 

You  remember,  I said,  how  the  rulers  were  chosen 
before  ? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

The  same  natures  must  still  be  chosen,  and(the 
preference  again  given  to  the  surest  and  the  bravest, 
and,  if  possible,  to  the  fairest;  and,  having  noble  and 
generous  tempers,  they  should  also  have  the  natural 
gifts  which  will  facilitate  their  education^^ 

^nd  what  are  these? 

CSuch  gifts  as  keenness  and  ready  powers  of  acqui- 
sition;,-for  the  mind  more  often  faints  from  the  severity 
of  study  than  from  the  severity  of  gymnastics:  the 
toil  is  more  entirely  the  mind’s  own,  and  is  not  shared 
with  the  body. 

Yery  true,  he  replied. 

(Further,  he  of  whom  we  are  in  search  should  have  a 
good  memory,  and  be  an  unwearied  solid  man  who  is 
a lover  of  labor  in  any  line;?or  he  will  never  be  able  to 
endure  the  great  amount  of  bodily  exercise  and  to  go 
through  all  the  intellectual  discipline  and  study  which 
we  require  of  him. 

Certainly,  he  said;  he  must  have  natural  gifts. 

The  mistake  at  present  is,  that  those  who  study 
philosophy  have  no  vocation,  and  this,  as  I was  before 
saying,  is  the  reason  why  she  has  fallen  into  disrepute: 
her  true  sons  should  take  her  by  the  hand  and  not 
bastards. 

What  do  you  mean? 

In  the  first  place,  her  votary  should  not  have  a lame 
or  halting  industry  — I mean,  that  he  should  not  be 
half  industrious  and  half  idle:  as,  for  example,  when 


296 


THE  REPUBLIC 


a man  is  a lover  of  gymnastic  and  hunting,  and  all 
other  bodily  exercises,  but  a hater  rather  than  a lover 
of  the  labor  of  learning  or  listening  or  inquiring. 
Or  the  occupation  to  which  he  devotes  himself  may  be 
of  an  opposite  kind,  and  he  may  have  the  other  sort  of 
lameness. 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  as  to  truth,  I said,  is  not  a soul  equally  to  be 
deemed  halt  and  lame  which  hates  voluntary  falsehood 
and  is  extremely  indignant  at  herself  and  others  when 
they  tell  lies,  but  is  patient  of  involuntary  falsehood, 
and  does  not  mind  wallowing  like  a swinish  beast  in 
the  mire  of  ignorance,  and  has  no  shame  at  being 
detected  ? 

To  be  sure. 

And,  again,  in  respect  of  temperance,  courage, 
magnificence,  and  every  other  virtue,  should  we  not 
carefully  distinguish  between  the  true  son  and  the 
bastard?  for  where  there  is  no  discernment  of  such 
qualities  states  and  individuals  unconsciously  err ; and 
the  state  makes  a ruler,  and  the  individual  a friend, 
of  one  who,  being  defective  in  some  part  of  virtue, 
is  in  a figure  lame  or  a bastard. 

That  is  very  true,  he  said. 

All  these  things,  then,  will  have  to  be  carefully 
considered  by  us ; and  if  only  those  whom  we  introduce 
to  this  vast  system  of  education  and  training  are 
sound  in  body  and  mind,  justice  herself  will  have 
nothing  to  say  against  us,  and  we  shall  be  the  saviors 
of  the  constitution  and  of  the  State ; but,  if  our  pupils 
are  men  of  another  stamp,  the  reverse  will  happen, 
and  we  shall  pour  a still  greater  flood  of  ridicule  on 
philosophy  than  she  has  to  endure  at  present. 

That  would  not  be  creditable. 

Certainly  not,  I said;  and  yet  perhaps,  in  thus 
turning  jest  into  earnest  I am  equally  ridiculous. 


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297 


In  what  respect? 

I had  forgotten,  I said,  that  we  were  not  serious 
and  spoke  with  too  much  excitement.  For  when  I 
saw  philosophy  so  undeservedly  trampled  under  foot 
of  men  I could  not  help  feeling  a sort  of  indignation 
at  the  authors  of  her  disgrace:  and  my  anger  made 
me  too  vehement. 

Indeed ! I was  listening,  and  did  not  think  so. 

But  I,  who  am  the  speaker,  felt  that  I was.  And 
now  let  me  remind  you  that,  although  in  our  former 
selection  we  chose  old  men,  we  must  not  do  so  in  this. 
Solon  was  under  a delusion  when  he  said  that  a man 
when  he  grows  old  may  learn  many  things  — for  he 
can  no  more  learn  much  than  he  can  rim  much ; youth 
is  the  time  for  any  extraordinary  toil. 

Of  course. 

And,  therefore,  calculation  and  geometry  and  all 
the  other  elements  of  instruction,  which  are  a prepara- 
tion for  dialectic,  should  be  presented  to  the  mind  in 
childhood ; not,  however,  under  any  notion  of  forcing 
our  system  of  education. 

Why  not? 

Because  a freeman  ought  not  to  be  a slave  in  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge  of  any  kind.  Bodily 
exercise,  when  compulsory,  does  no  harm  to  the  body; 
but  i knowledge  which  is  acquired  under  compulsion 
obtains  no  hold  on  the  mind.  ( 

Very  true. 

Then,  my  good  friend,  I said,  do  not  use  com- 
pulsion, but  let  early  education  be  a sort  of  amuse- 
ment; you  will  then  be  better  able  to  find  out  the 
natural  bent. 

That  is  a very  rational  notion,  he  said. 

Do  you  remember  that  the  children,  too,  were  to  be 
taken  to  see  the  battle  on  horseback ; and  that  if  there 
were  no  danger  they  were  to  be  brought  dose  up  and. 


298  THE  REPUBLIC 

like  young  hounds,  have  a taste  of  blood  given 
them? 

Yes,  I remember. 

The  same  practice  may  be  followed,  I said,  in  all 
these  things  — labors,  lessons,  dangers  — and  he 
who  is  most  at  home  in  all  of  them  ought  to  be  en- 
rolled in  a select  number. 

At  what  age? 

At  the  age  when  the  necessary  gymnastics  are  over : 
the  period  whether  of  two  or  three  years  which  passes 
in  this  sort  of  training  is  useless  for  any  other  pur- 
pose; for  sleep  and  exercise  are  unpropitious  to  learn- 
ing; and  the  trial  of  who  is  first  in  gymnastic  exer- 
cises is  one  of  the  most  important  tests  to  which  our 
youth  are  subjected. 

Certainly,  he  replied. 

After  that  time  those  who  are  selected  from  the 
class  of  twenty  years  old  will  be  promoted  to  higher 
honor,  and  the  sciences  which  they  learned  without 
any  order  in  their  early  education  will  now  be  brought 
together,  and  they  will  be  able  to  see  the  natural 
relationship  of  them  to  one  another  and  to  true  being. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  only  kind  of  knowledge 
which  takes  lasting  root. 

Yes,  I said;  and  the  capacity  for  such  knowledge 
is  the  great  criterion  of  dialectical  talent;  the  com- 
prehensive mind  is  always  the  dialectical. 

I agree  with  you,  he  said. 

These,  I said,  are  the  points  which  you  must  con- 
sider ; and  those  who  have  most  of  this  comprehension, 
and  who  are  most  steadfast  in  their  learning,  and  in 
their  military  and  other  appointed  duties,  when  they 
have  arrived  at  the  age  of  thirty  will  have  to  be  chosen 
by  you  out  of  the  select  class,  and  elevated  to  higher 
honor;  and  you  will  have  to  prove  them  by  the  help 
of  dialectic,  in  order  to  learn  which  of  them  is  able  to 


THE  REPUBLIC 


299 


give  up  the  use  of  sight  and  the  other  senses,  and  in 
company  with  truth  to  attain  absolute  being:  And 
here,  my  friend,  great  caution  is  required. 

Why  great  caution? 

Do  you  not  remark,  I said,  how  great  is  the  evil 
which  dialectic  has  introduced? 

What  evil?  he  said. 

The  students  of  the  art  are  filled  with  lawless- 
ness. 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

Do  you  think  that  there  is  anything  so  very  un- 
natural or  inexcusable  in  their  case  ? or  will  you  make 
allowance  for  them? 

In  what  way  make  allowance? 

I want  you,  I said,  by  way  of  parallel,  to  imagine  a 
supposititious  son  who  is  brought  up  in  great  wealth; 
he  is  one  of  a great  and  numerous  family,  and  has 
many  flatterers.  When  he  grows  up  to  manhood,  he 
learns  that  his  alleged  are  not  his  real  parents;  but 
who  the  real  are  he  is  unable  to  discover.  Can  you 
guess  how  he  will  be  likely  to  behave  towards  his 
flatterers  and  his  supposed  parents,  first  of  all  during 
the  period  when  he  is  ignorant  of  the  false  relation, 
and  then  again  when  he  knows?  Or  shall  I guess  for 
you? 

If  you  please. 

Then  I should  say,  that  while  he  is  ignorant  of  the 
truth  he  will  be  likely  to  honor  his  father  and  his 
mother  and  his  supposed  relations  more  than  the 
flatterers ; he  will  be  less  inclined  to  neglect  them  when 
in  need,  or  to  do  or  say  anything  against  them;  and 
he  will  be  less  willing  to  disobey  them  in  any  impor- 
tant matter. 

He  will. 

But  when  he  has  made  the  discovery,  I should 
imagine  that  he  would  diminish  his  honor  and  regard 


300 


THE  REPUBLIC 


for  them,  and  would  become  more  devoted  to  the  flat- 
terers; their  influence  over  him  woifld  greatly  in- 
crease ; he  would  now  live  after  their  ways,  and  openly 
associate  with  them,  and,  unless  he  were  of  an  un- 
usually good  disposition,  he  would  trouble  himself  no 
more  about  his  supposed  parents  or  other  relations. 

Well,  all  that  is  very  probable.  But  how  is  the 
image  applicable  to  the  disciples  of  philosophy? 

In  this  way:  you  know  that  there  are  certain  prin- 
ciples about  justice  and  honor,  which  were  taught  us 
in  childhood,  and  under  their  parental  authority  w'e 
have  been  brought  up,  obeying  and  honoring  them. 

That  is  true. 

There  are  also  opposite  maxims  and  habits  of 
pleasure  which  flatter  and  attract  the  soul,  but  do  not 
influence  those  of  us  who  have  any  sense  of  right,  and 
they  continue  to  obey  and  honor  the  maxims  of  their 
fathers. 

True. 

Now,  when  a man  is  in  this  state,  and  the  question- 
ing spirit  asks  what  is  fair  or  honorable,  and  he 
answers  as  the  legislator  has  taught  him,  and  then 
arguments  many  and  diverse  refute  his  words,  until 
he  is  driven  into  believing  that  nothing  is  honorable 
any  more  than  dishonorable,  or  just  and  good  any 
more  than  the  reverse,  and  so  of  all  the  notions  which 
he  most  valued,  do  you  think  that  he  will  still  honor 
and  obey  them  as  before? 

Impossible. 

And  when  he  ceases  to  think  them  honorable  and 
natural  as  heretofore,  and  he  fails  to  discover  the  true, 
can  he  be  expected  to  pursue  any  life  other  than  that 
which  flatters  his  desires? 

He  can  not. 

And  from  being  a keeper  of  the  law  he  is  converted 
into  a breaker  of  it? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


301 


Unquestionably. 

Now  all  this  is  very  natural  in  students  of  philos- 
ophy such  as  I have  described,  and  also,  as  I was  just 
now  saying,  most  excusable. 

Yes,  he  said;  and,  I may  add,  pitiable. 

Therefore,  that  your  feelings  may  not  be  moved  to 
pity  about  our  citizens  who  are  now  thirty  years  of 
age,  every  care  must  be  taken  in  introducing  them  to 
dialectic. 

Certainly. 

There  is  a danger  lest  they  should  taste  the  dear 
delight  too  early;  for  youngsters,  as  you  may  have 
obser\^ed,  when  they  first  get  the  taste  in  their  mouths, 
argue  for  amusement,  and  are  always  contradicting 
and  refuting  others  in  imitation  of  those  who  refute 
them;  like  puppy-dogs,  they  rejoice  in  pulling  and 
tearing  at  all  who  come  near  them. 

Yes,  he  said,  there  is  nothing  which  they  like  bet- 
ter. 

And  when  they  have  made  many  conquests  and  re- 
ceived defeats  at  the  hands  of  many,  they  violently 
and  speedily  get  into  a way  of  not  believing  anything 
which  they  believed  before,  and  hence,  not  only  they, 
but  philosophy  and  all  that  relates  to  it  is  apt  to  have 
a bad  name  with  the  rest  of  the  world. 

Too  true,  he  said. 

But  when  a man  begins  to  get  older,  he  will  no 
longer  be  guilty  of  such  insanity;  he  will  imitate  the 
dialectician  who  is  seeking  for  truth,  and  not  the 
eristic,  who  is  contradicting  for  the  sake  of  amuse- 
ment; and  the  greater  moderation  of  his  character 
will  increase  instead  of  diminishing  the  honor  of  the 
pursuit. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  did  we  not  make  special  provision  for  this, 
when  we  said  that  the  disciples  of  philosophy  were 


302 


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to  be  orderly  and  steadfast,  not,  as  now,  any  chance 
aspirant  or  intruder? 

Very  true. 

Suppose,  I said,  the  study  of  philosophy  to  take 
the  place  of  gymnastics  and  to  be  continued  diligently 
and  earnestly  and  exclusively  for  twice  the  number 
of  years  which  were  passed  in  bodily  exercise  — will 
that  be  enough? 

Would  you  say  six  or  four  years?  he  asked. 

Say  five  years,  I replied ; at  the  end  of  the  time  they 
must  be  sent  down  again  into  the  den  and  compelled 
to  hold  any  military  or  other  office  which  young  men 
are  qualified  to  hold:  in  this  way  they  will  get  their 
experience  of  life,  and  there  will  be  an  opportunity  of 
trying  whether,  when  they  are  drawn  all  manner  of 
ways  by  temptation,  they  will  stand  firm  or  flinch. 

And  how  long  is  this  stage  of  their  lives  to  last? 

Fifteen  years,  I answered;  and  when  they  have 
reached  fifty  years  of  age,  then  let  those  who  still 
survive  and  have  distinguished  themselves  in  every 
action  of  their  lives  and  in  every  branch  of  knowledge 
come  at  last  to  their  consummation : the  time  has  now 
arrived  at  which  they  must  raise  the  eye  of  the  soul  to 
the  universal  light  which  lightens  all  things,  and  be- 
hold the  absolute  good;  for  that  is  the  pattern  accord- 
ing to  which  they  are  to  order  the  State  and  the  lives 
of  individuals,  and  the  remainder  of  their  own  lives 
also;  making  philosophy  their  chief  pursuit,  but, 
when  their  turn  comes,  toiling  also  at  politics  and 
ruling  for  the  public  good,  not  as  though  they  were 
performing  some  heroic  action,  but  simply  as  a matter 
of  duty;  and  when  they  have  brought  up  in  each 
generation  others  like  themselves  and  left  them  in 
their  place  to  be  governors  of  the  State,  then  they  will 
depart  to  the  Islands  of  the  Blest  and  dwell  there; 
and  the  city  will  give  them  public  memorials  and 


THE  REPUBLIC 


303 


sacrifices  and  honor  them,  if  the  Pythian  oracle  con- 
sent, as  demigods,  but  if  not,  as  in  any  case  blessed 
and  divine. 

You  are  a sculptor,  Socrates,  and  have  made 
statues  of  our  governors  faultless  in  beauty. 

Yes,  I said,  Glaucon,  and  of  our  governesses  too;  j 
for  you  must  not  suppose  that  what  I have  been  say- 
ing  applies  to  men  only  and  not  to  women  as  far  as[ 
their  natures  can  go. 

There  you  are  right,  he  said,  since  we  have  made 
them  to  share  in  all  things  like  the  men. 

Well,  I said,  and  you  would  agree  (would  you 
not?)  that  what  has  been  said  about  the  State  and 
the  government  is  not  a mere  dream,  and  although 
difficult  not  impossible,  but  only  possible  in  the  way 
which  has  been  supposed ; that  is  to  say,  when  the  true 
philosopher  kings  are  born  in  a State,  one  or  more  of 
them,  despising  the  honors  of  this  present  world 
which  they  deem  mean  and  worthless,  esteeming  above 
all  things  right  and  the  honor  that  springs  from 
right,  and  regarding  justice  as  the  greatest  and  most 
necessary  of  all  things,  whose  ministers  they  are,  and 
whose  principles  will  he  exalted  by  them  when  they 
set  in  order  their  own  city? 

How  will  they  proceed? 

They  will  begin  by  sending  out  into  the  country 
all  the  inhabitants  of  the  city  who  are  more  than  ten 
years  old,  and  will  take  possession  of  their  children, 
who  will  be  unaffected  by  the  habits  of  their  parents ; 
these  they  will  train  in  their  own  habits  and  laws,  I 
mean  in  the  laws  which  we  have  given  them:  and  in 
this  way  the  State  and  constitution  of  which  we  were 
speaking  will  soonest  and  most  easily  attain  hap- 
piness, and  the  nation  which  has  such  a constitution 
will  gain  most. 

Yes,  that  will  be  the  best  way.  And  I think. 


304 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Socrates,  that  you  have  very  well  described  how,  if 
ever,  such  a constitution  might  come  into  being. 

Enough  then  of  the  perfect  State,  and  of  the  man 
who  bears  its  image  — there  is  no  difficulty  in  seeing 
how  we  shall  describe  him. 

There  is  no  difficulty,  he  replied;  and  I agree  with 
you  in  thinking  that  nothing  more  need  be  said. 


r s- 

r 


BOOK  VIII 


And  so,  Glaucon,  we  have  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that  in  the  perfect  State  wives  and  children  are  to  be 
in  common;  and  that  all  education  and  the  pursuits 
of  war  and  peace  are  also  to  be  common,  and  the  best 
philosophers  and  the  bravest  warriors  are  to  be  their 
kings? 

That,  replied  Glaucon,  has  been  acknowledged. 

Yes,  I said ; and  we  have  further  acknowledged  that 
the  governors,  when  appointed  themselves,  will  take 
their  soldiers  and  place  them  in  houses  such  as  we 
were  describing,  which  are  common  to  all,  and  contain 
nothing  private,  or  individual;  and  about  their  prop- 
erty, you  remember  what  we  agreed? 

Yes,  I remember  that  no  one  was  to  have  any  of 
the  ordinary  possessions  of  mankind ; they  were  to  be 
warrior  athletes  and  guardians,  receiving  from  the 
other  citizens,  in  lieu  of  annual  payment,  only  their 
maintenance,  and  they  were  to  take  care  of  them- 
selves and  of  the  whole  State. 

True,  I said ; and  now  that  this  division  of  our  task 
is  concluded,  let  us  find  the  point  at  which  we 
digressed,  that  we  may  return  into  the  old  path. 

There  is  no  difficulty  in  returning;  you  implied, 
then  as  now,  that  you  have  finished  the  description  of 
the  State:  you  said  that  such  a State  was  good,  and 
that  the  man  was  good  who  answered  to  it,  although, 
as  now  appears,  you  had  more  excellent  things  to  re- 
late both  of  State  and  man.  And  you  said  further, 
that  if  this  was  the  true  form,  then  the  others  were 
false ; and  of  the  false  forms,  you  said,  as  I remember, 

806 


306 


THE  REPUBLIC 


that  there  Avere  four  principal  ones,  and  that  their 
defects,  and  the  defects  of  the  individuals  correspond- 
ing to  them,  were  worth  examining.  When  we  had 
seen  all  the  individuals,  and  finally  agreed  as  to  who 
was  the  best  and  who  was  the  worst  of  them,  we  were 
to  consider  whether  the  best  was  not  also  the  hap- 
piest, and  the  worst  the  most  miserable.  I asked 
you  what  were  the  four  forms  of  government  of  which 
you  spoke,  and  then  Polemarchus  and  Adeimantus 
put  in  their  word;  and  you  began  again,  and  have 
found  your  way  to  the  point  at  which  we  have  now 
arrived. 

Your  recollection,  I said,  is  most  exact. 

Then,  like  a wrestler,  he  replied,  you  must  put 
yourself  again  in  the  same  position ; and  let  me  ask  the 
same  questions,  and  do  you  give  me  the  same  answer 
which  you  were  about  to  give  me  then. 

Yes,  if  I can,  I will,  I said. 

I shall  particularly  wish  to  hear  what  were  the  four 
constitutions  of  which  you  were  speaking. 

That  question,  I said,  is  easily  answered:  the  four 
governments  of  which  I spoke,  so  far  as  they  have  dis- 
tinct names,  are,  first,  those  of  Crete  and  Sparta, 
which  are  generally  applauded ; what  is  termed 
oligarchy  comes  next;  this  is  not  equally  approved, 
and  is  a form  of  government  which  teems  with  evils: 
thirdly,  democracy,  which  naturally  follows  oligarchy, 
although  very  different:  and  lastly  comes  tyranny, 
great  and  famous,  which  differs  from  them  all,  and 
is  the  fourth  and  worst  disorder  of  a State.  I do  not 
know,  do  you?  of  any  other  constitution  which  can  be 
said  to  have  a distinct  character.  There  are  lordships 
and  principalities  which  are  bought  and  sold,  and  some 
other  intermediate  forms  of  government.  But  these 
are  nondescripts  and  may  be  found  equally  among 
Hellenes  and  among  barbarians. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


307 


Yes,  he  replied,  we  certainly  hear  of  many  curious 
forms  of  government  which  exist  among  them. 

Do  you  know,  I said,  that  governments  vary  as  the 
dispositions  of  men  vary,  and  that  there  must  be  as 
many  of  the  one  as  there  are  of  the  other?  For  we 
can  not  suppose  that  States  are  made  of  “ oak  and 
rock,”  and  not  out  of  the  human  natures  which  are 
in  them,  and  which  in  a figure  turn  the  scale  and  draw 
other  things  after  them? 

Yes,  he  said,  the  States  are  as  men  are;  they  grow 
out  of  human  characters. 

Then  if  the  constitutions  of  States  are  five,  the 
dispositions  of  individual  minds  will  also  be  five?  i 

Certainly. 

He  who  answers  to  aristocracy,  and  whom  we 
rightly  call  just  and  good,  we  have  already  described. 

We  have. 

Then  let  us  now  proceed  to  describe  the  inferior  sort 
of  natures,  being  the  contentious  and  ambitious,  who 
answer  to  the  Spartan  polity;  also  the  oligarchical, 
democratical,  and  tyrannical.  Let  us  place  the  most 
just  by  the  side  of  the  most  unjust,  and  when  we  see 
them  we  shall  be  able  to  compare  the  relative  happi- 
ness or  unhappiness  of  him  who  leads  a life  of  pure 
justice  or  pure  injustice.  The  inquiry  will  then  be 
completed.  And  we  shall  know  whether  we  ought  to 
pursue  injustice,  as  Thrasymachus  advises,  or  in 
accordance  with  the  conclusions  of  the  argument  to 
prefer  justice. 

Certainly,  he  replied,  we  must  do  as  you  say. 

Shall  we  follow  our  old  plan,  which  we  adopted 
with  a view  to  clearness,  of  taking  the  State  first  and 
then  proceeding  to  the  individual,  and  begin  with  the 
government  of  honor?  — I know  of  no  name  for  such , 
a government  other  than  timocracy,  or  perhaps  * 
timarchy.  We  will  compare  with  this  the  like  char- 


308 


THE  REPUBLIC 


acter  in  the  individual;  and,  after  that,  consider 
oligarchy  and  the  oligarchical  man;  and  then  again 
we  will  turn  our  attention  to  democracy  and  the 
democratical  man;  and  lastly,  we  will  go  and  view 
the  city  of  tyranny,  and  once  more  take  a look  into 
the  tyrant’s  soul,  and  try  to  arrive  at  a satisfactory 
decision. 

That  way  of  viewing  and  judging  of  the  matter 
will  he  very  suitable. 

First,  then,  I said,  let  us  inquire  how  timocracy 
(the  government  of  honor)  arises  out  of  aristocracy 
(the  government  of  the  best).  Clearly,  all  political 
changes  originate  in  divisions  of  the  actual  govern- 
ing power;  a government  which  is  united,  however 
small,  can  not  be  moved. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

In  what  way,  then,  will  our  city  be  moved,  and  in 
what  manner  will  the  two  classes  of  auxiliaries  and 
rulers  disagree  among  themselves  or  with  one  an- 
other? Shall  we,  after  the  manner  of  Homer,  pray 
the  Muses  to  tell  us  “ how  discord  first  arose?  ” Shall 
we  imagine  them  in  solemn  mockery,  to  play  and 
jest  with  us  as  if  we  were  children,  and  to  address 
us  in  a lofty  tragic  vein,  making  believe  to  be  in 
earnest? 

How  would  they  address  us? 

Il  After  this  manner:  — A city  which  is  thus  con- 
I stituted  can  hardly  he  shaken ; but,  seeing  that  every- 
I thing  which  has  a beginning  has  also  an  end,  even 
I a constitution  such  as  yours  will  not  last  forever,  but 
I 'will  in  time  be  dissolved.  And  this  is  the  dissolu- 
tion : — In  plants  that  grow  in  the  earth,  as  well  as 
in  animals  that  move  on  the  earth’s  surface,  fertility 
and  sterility  of  soul  and  body  occur  when  the  circum- 
ferences of  the  circles  of  each  are  completed,  which  in 
short-lived  existences  pass  over  a short  space,  and  in 


THE  REPUBLIC 


3C9 


long-lived  ones  over  a long  space.  But  to  the  knowl- 
edge of  human  fecundity  and  sterility  all  the  wisdom 
and  education  of  your  rulers  will  not  attain ; the  laws 
which  regulate  them  will  not  be  discovered  by  an 
intelligence  which  is  alloyed  with  sense,  but  will  es- 
cape them,  and  they  will  bring  children  into  the  world 
when  they  ought  not.  Now  that  which  is  of  divine 
birth  has  a period  which  is  contained  in  a perfect 
number,^  but  the  period  of  human  birth  is  compre- 
hended in  a number  in  which  first  increments  by  in- 
volution and  evolution  [or  squared  and  cubed]  ob- 
taining three  intervals  and  four  terms  of  like  and  un- 
like, waxing  and  waning  numbers,  make  all  the  terms 
commensurable  and  agreeable  to  one  another.^  The 
base  of  these  (3)  with  a third  added  (4)  when  com- 
bined with  five  (20)  and  raised  to  the  third  power 
furnishes  two  harmonies;  the  first  a square  which  is 
a hundred  times  as  great  (400  = 4 X 100),®  and  the 
other  a figure  having  one  side  equal  to  the  former, 
but  oblong,^  consisting  of  a hundred  numbers  squared 
upon  rational  diameters  of  a square  (i.  e.  omitting 
fractions),  the  side  of  which  is  five  (7  X 7 = 49  X 
100  — 4900) , each  of  them  being  less  by  one  (than  the 
perfect  square  which  includes  the  fractions,  sc.  50) 
or  less  by  ® two  perfect  squares  of  irrational  diameters 
(of  a square  the  side  of  which  is  five  = 50 -|-  50  = 
100);  and  a hundred  cubes  of  three  (27  X 100  = 
2700  4900  -f"  400  = 8000) . Now  this  number 

1 i.  e.  a cyclical  number,  such  as  6,  which  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  its  divi- 
sors 1,  2,  3,  so  that  when  the  circle  or  time  represented  by  6 is  completed, 
the  lesser  times  or  rotations  represented  by  1,  2,  3 are  also  completed. 

2 Probably  the  numbers  3,  4,  5,  6 of  which  the  three  first  = the  sides  of 
the  Pythagorean  triangle.  The  terms  will  then  be  3^,  4^"^,  6^,  which  together 
= 63  = 216. 

3 Or  the  first  a square  which  is  100  X ^ 00  = 10,000.  The  whole  number 
will  then  be  17,500  = a square  of  100,  and  an  oblong  of  100  by  76. 

^ Reading  Trpoix'fjKT)  bL 

5 Or,  “consisting  of  two  numbers  squared  upon  irrational  diameters,” 
etc,  = 100.  For  other  explanations  of  the  passage  see  Introduction, 


310 


THE  REPUBLIC 


represents  a geometrical  figure  which  has  control 
over  the  good  and  evil  of  births.  For  when  your 
guardians  are  ignorant  of  the  law  of  births,  and  unite 
bride  and  bridegroom  out  of  season,  the  children  will 
not  be  goodly  or  fortunate.  And  though  only  the  best 
of  them  will  be  appointed  by  their  predecessors,  still 
they  will  be  unworthy  to  hold  their  fathers’  places, 
and  when  they  come  into  power  as  guardians,  they 
will  soon  be  found  to  fail  in  taking  care  of  us,  the 
Muses,  first  by  undervaluing  music;  which  neglect 
will  soon  extend  to  gymnastic;  and  hence  the  young 
men  of  your  State  will  be  less  cultivated.  In  the  suc- 
ceeding generation  rulers  will  be  appointed  who  have 
lost  the  guardian  power  of  testing  the  metal  of  your 
different  races,  which,  like  Hesiod’s,  are  of  gold  and 
silver  and  brass  and  iron.  And  so  iron  will  be 
mingled  with  silver,  and  brass  with  gold,  and  hence 
there  will  arise  dissimilarity  and  inequality  and  irreg- 
ularity, which  always  and  in  all  places  are  causes  of 
hatred  and  war.  This  the  Muses  affirm  to  be  the 
stock  from  which  discord  has  sprung,  wherever  aris- 
ing; and  this  is  their  answer  to  us. 

Yes,  and  we  may  assume  that  they  answer  truly. 

Why,  yes,  I said,  of  course  they  answer  truly ; how 
can  the  Muses  speak  falsely? 

And  what  do  the  Muses  say  next? 

When  discord  arose,  then  the  two  races  were  drawn 
different  ways:  the  iron  and  brass  fell  to  acquiring 
money  and  land  and  houses  and  gold  and  silver;  but 
the  gold  and  silver  races,  not  wanting  money  but 
having  the  true  riches  in  their  own  nature,  inclined 
towards  virtue  and  the  ancient  order  of  things.  There 
was  a battle  between  them,  and  at  last  they  agreed 
to  distribute  their  land  and  houses  among  individual 
owners;  and  they  enslaved  their  friends  and  main- 
tainers,  whom  they  had  formerly  protected  in  the  con- 


THE  EEPUBLIC 


311 


dition  of  freemen,  and  made  of  them  subjects  and 
servants;  and  they  themselves  were  engaged  in  war 
and  in  keeping  a watch  against  them. 

I believe  that  you  have  rightly  conceived  the  origin 
of  the  change. 

And  the  new  government  which  thus  arises  will  be 
of  a form  intermediate  between  oligarchy  and  aris- 
tocracy? 

Very  true. 

Such  will  be  the  change,  and  after  the  change  has 
been  made,  how  will  they  proceed?  Clearly,  the  new 
State,  being  in  a mean  between  oligarchy  and  the 
perfect  State,  will  partly  follow  one  and  partly  the 
other,  and  will  also  have  some  peculiarities. 

True,  he  said. 

In  the  honor  given  to  rulers,  in  the  abstinence  ofj 
the  warrior  class  from  agriculture,  handicrafts,  and  l 
trade  in  general,  in  the  institution  of  common  meals, 
and  in  the  attention  paid  to  gymnastics  and  military 
training  — in  all  these  respects  this  State  will  re-i 
semble  the  former. 

True. 

But  in  the  fear  of  admitting  philosophers  to  power, p 
because  they  are  no  longer  to  he  had  simple  and 
earnest,  but  are  made  up  of  mixed  elements;  and  ini 
turning  from  them  to  passionate  and  less  complex 
characters,  who  are  by  nature  fitted  for  war  rather 
than  peace;  and  in  the  value  set  by  them  upon  mili- 
tary stratagems  and  contrivances,  and  in  the  waging 
of  everlasting  wars  — this  State  will  be  for  the  most 
part  peculiar. 

Yes. 

Yes,  I said;  and  men  of  this  stamp  will  he  covetous 
of  money,  like  those  who  live  in  oligarchies;  they 
will  have  a fierce  secret  longing  after  gold  and  silver, 
which  they  will  hoard  in  dark  places,  having  maga- 


312 


THE  REPUBLIC 


zines  and  treasuries  of  their  own  for  the  deposit  and 
concealment  of  them;  also  castles  which  are  just  nests 
for  their  eggs,  and  in  which  they  will  spend  large 
sums  on  their  wives,  or  on  any  others  whom  they 
please. 

That  is  most  true,  he  said. 

And  they  are  miserly  because  they  have  no  means 
of  openly  acquiring  the  money  which  they  prize;  they 
will  spend  that  which  is  another  man’s  on  the  grati- 
fication of  their  desires,  stealing  their  pleasures  and 
running  away  like  children  from  the  law,  their 
father:  they  have  been  schooled  not  by  gentle  influ- 
ences but  by  force,  for  they  have  neglected  her 
who  is  the  true  Muse,  the  companion  of  reason  and 
philosophy,  and  have  honored  gymnastic  more  than 
music. 

Undoubtedly,  he  said,  the  form  of  government 
which  you  describe  is  a mixture  of  good  and  evil. 

Why,  there  is  a mixture,  I said;  but  one  thing, 
and  one  thing  only,  is  predominantly  seen,  — the 
spirit  of  contention  and  ambition;  and  these  are  due 
to  the  prevalence  of  the  passionate  or  spirited  ele- 
ment. 

Assuredly,  he  said. 

Such  is  the  origin  and  such  the  character  of  this 
State,  which  has  been  described  in  outline  only;  the 
more  perfect  execution  was  not  required,  for  a sketch 
is  enough  to  show  the  type  of  the  most  perfectly  just 
and  most  perfectly  unjust;  and  to  go  through  all  the 
States  and  all  the  characters  of  men,  omitting  none 
of  them,  would  be  an  interminable  labor. 

Very  true,  he  replied. 

Now  what  man  answers  to  this  form  of  govern- 
ment— how  did  he  come  into  being,  and  what  is  he 
like? 

I think,  said  Adeimantus,  that  in  the  spirit  of  con- 


THE  REPUBLIC  313 

tention  which  characterizes  him,  he  is  not  unlike  our 
friend  Glaucon. 

Perhaps,  I said,  he  may  be  like  him  in  that  one 
point;  but  there  are  other  respects  in  which  he  is  very 
different. 

In  what  respects? 

He  should  have  more  of  self-assertion  and  be  less 
cultivated,  and  yet  a friend  of  culture ; and  he  should^ 
be  a good  listener,  but  no  speaker.  Such  a person  is 
apt  to  be  rough  with  slaves,  unlike  the  educated  man,* 
who  is  too  proud  for  that;  and  he  will  also  be  cour- 
teous to  freemen,  and  remarkably  obedient  to  author- 
ity; he  is  a lover  of  power  and  a lover  of  honor;* 
claiming  to  be  a ruler,  not  because  he  is  eloquent,  or 
on  any  ground  of  that  sort,  but  because  he  is  a soldier! 
and  has  performed  feats  of  arms;  he  is  also  a loverj 
of  gymnastic  exercises  and  of  the  chase. 

Yes,  that  is  the  type  of  character  which  answers  to 
timocracy. 

Such  an  one  will  despise  riches  only  when  he  is 
young;  but  as  he  gets  older  he  will  be  more  and  more 
attracted  to  them,  because  he  has  a piece  of  the  avari- 
cious nature  in  him,  and  is  not  single-minded  towards 
virtue,  having  lost  his  best  guardian. 

Who  was  that?  said  Adeimantus. 

Philosophy,  I said,  tempered  with  music,  who 
comes  and  takes  up  her  abode  in  a man,  and  is  the 
only  savior  of  his  virtue  throughout  life. 

Good,  he  said. 

Such,  I said,  is  the  timocratical  youth,  and  he  is 
like  the  timocratical  State. 

Exactly. 

His  origin  is  as  follows:  — He  is  often  the  young 
son  of  a brave  father,  who  dwells  in  an  ill-governed 
city,  of  which  he  declines  the  honors  and  offices,  and 
will  not  go  to  law,  or  exert  himself  in  any  way,  but 


3J4  THE  REPUBLIC 

is  ready  to  waive  his  rights  in  order  that  he  may  es- 
cape trouble. 

And  how  does  the  son  come  into  being? 

The  character  of  the  son  begins  to  develop  when  he 
hears  his  mother  complaining  that  her  husband  has 
no  place  in  the  government,  of  which  the  consequence 
is  that  she  has  no  precedence  among  other  women. 
Further,  when  she  sees  her  husband  not  very  eager 
about  money,  and  instead  of  battling  and  railing  in 
the  law  courts  or  assembly,  taking  whatever  happens 
to  him  quietly;  and  when  she  observes  that  his 
thoughts  always  centre  in  himself,  while  he  treats  her 
with  very  considerable  indifference,  she  is  annoyed, 
and  says  to  her  son  that  his  father  is  only  half  a man 
and  far  too  easy-going:  adding  all  the  other  com- 
plaints about  her  own  ill-treatment  which  women  are 
so  fond  of  rehearsing. 

Yes,  said  Adeimantus,  they  give  us  plenty  of  them, 
and  their  complaints  are  so  like  themselves. 

And  you  know,  I said,  that  the  old  servants  also, 
who  are  supposed  to  be  attached  to  the  family,  from 
time  to  time  talk  privately  in  the  same  strain  to  the 
son;  and  if  they  see  any  one  who  owes  money  to  his 
father,  or  is  wronging  him  in  any  way,  and  he  fails  to 
prosecute  them,  they  tell  the  youth  that  when  he 
grows  up  he  must  retaliate  upon  people  of  this  sort, 
and  be  more  of  a man  than  his  father.  He  has  only 
to  walk  abroad  and  he  hears  and  sees  the  same  sort 
of  thing : those  who  do  their  own  business  in  the  city 
are  called  simpletons,  and  held  in  no  esteem,  while 
the  busy-bodies  are  honored  and  applauded.  The 
result  is  that  the  young  man,  hearing  and  seeing  all 
these  things  — hearing,  too,  the  words  of  his  father, 
and  having  a nearer  view  of  his  way  of  life,  and 
making  comparisons  of  him  and  others  — is  drawn 
opposite  ways;  while  his  father  is  watering  and 


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315 


nourishing  the  rational  principle  in  his  soul,  the  others 
are  encouraging  the  passionate  and  appetitive;  anal 
he  being  not  originally  of  a bad  nature,  but  having! 
kept  bad  company,  is  at  last  brought  by  their  joint 
influence  to  a middle  point,  and  gives  up  the  king-^ 
dom  which  is  within  him  to  the  middle  principle  of 
contentiousness  and  passion,  and  becomes  arrogant 
and  ambitious. 

You  seem  to  me  to  have  described  his  origin  per- 
fectly. 

Then  we  have  now,  I said,  the  second  form  of 
government  and  the  second  type  of  character? 

We  have. 

Next,  let  us  look  at  another  man  who,  as  .®schy- 
lus  says, 

“ Is  set  over  against  another  State ; ” 

or  rather,  as  our  plan  requires,  begin  with  the  State. 

By  all  means. 

I believe  that  oligarchy  follows  next  in  order.  ^ 

And  what  manner  of  government  do  you  term  \ 
oligarchy? 

A government  resting  on  a valuation  of  property,  / 
in  which  the  rich  have  power  and  the  poor  man  is] 
deprived  of  it. 

I understand,  he  replied. 

Ought  I not  to  begin  by  describing  how  the  change 
from  timocracy  to  oligarchy  arises? 

Yes. 

Well,  I said,  no  eyes  are  required  in  order  to  see 
how  the  one  passes  into  the  other. 

How? 

The  accumulation  of  gold  in  the  treasury  of  private 
individuals  is  the  ruin  of  timocracy;  they  invent 
illegal  modes  of  expenditure;  for  what  do  they  or 
their  wives  care  about  the  law? 


gl6 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Yes,  indeed 

And  then  one,  seeing  another  grow  rich,  seeks  to 
rival  him,  and  thus  the  great  mass  of  the  citizens  be- 
come lovers  of  money. 

Likely  enough. 

And  so  they  grow  richer  and  richer,  and  the  more 
they  think  of  making  a fortune  the  less  they  think  of 
virtue;  for  when  riches  and  virtue  are  placed  together 
in  the  scales  of  the  balance,  the  one  always  rises  as 
the  other  falls. 

True. 

And  in  proportion  as  riches  and  rich  men  are  hon- 
ored in  the  State,  virtue  and  the  virtuous  are  dis- 
honored. 

Clearly. 

And  what  is  honored  is  cultivated,  and  that  which 
has  no  honor  is  neglected. 

That  is  obvious. 

And  so  at  last,  instead  of  loving  contention  and 
glory,  men  become  lovers  of  trade  and  money;  they 
honor  and  look  up  to  the  rich  man,  and  make  a ruler 
of  him,  and  dishonor  the  poor  man. 

They  do  so. 

They  next  proceed  to  make  a law  which  fixes  a sum 
of  money  as  the  qualification  of  citizenship;  the  sum 
is  higher  in  one  place  and  lower  in  another,  as  the 
oligarchy  is  more  or  less  exclusive;  and  they  allow 
no  one  whose  property  falls  below  the  amount 
fixed  to  have  any  share  in  the  government.  These 
changes  in  the  constitution  they  effect  by  force  of 
arms,  if  intimidation  has  not  already  done  their 
work. 

Very  true. 

And  this,  speaking  generally,  is  the  way  in  which 
oligarchy  is  established. 

Yes.  he  said;  but  what  are  the  characteristics  of 


THE  REPUBLIC 


317 


this  form  of  government,  and  what  are  the  defects  of 
which  we  were  speaking?  ^ 

First  of  all,  I said,  consider  the  nature  of  the  quali- 
fication. Just  think  what  would  happen  if  pilots  were 
to  be  chosen  according  to  their  property,  and  a poor 
man  were  refused  permission  to  steer,  even  though 
he  were  a better  pilot? 

You  mean  that  they  would  shipwreck? 

Yes ; and  is  not  this  true  of  the  government  of  any- 
thing? ^ 

I should  imagine  so. 

Except  a city?  — or  would  you  include  a city? 

Nay,  he  said,  the  case  of  a city  is  the  strongest  of 
all,  inasmuch  as  the  rule  of  a city  is  the  greatest  and 
most  difficult  of  all. 

This,  then,  will  be  the  first  great  defect  of  oli- 
garchy? 

Clearly. 

And  here  is  another  defect  which  is  quite  as  bad. 

What  defect? 

The  inevitable  division:  such  a State  is  not  one, 
but  two  States,  the  one  of  poor,  the  other  of  rich  men ; 
and  they  are  living  on  the  same  spot  and  always  con- 
spiring against  one  another. 

That,  surely,  is  at  least  as  bad. 

Another  discreditable  feature  is,  that,  for  a like 
reason,  they  are  incapable  of  carrying  on  any  war. 
Either  they  arm  the  multitude,  and  ilien  they  are 
more  afraid  of  them  than  of  the  enemy;  or,  if  they  do 
not  call  them  out  in  the  hour  of  battle,  they  are  oli- 
garchs indeed,  few  to  fight  as  they  are  few  to  rule. 
And  at  the  same  time  their  fondness  for  money  makes 
them  unwilling  to  pay  taxes. 

How  discreditable! 

And,  as  we  said  before,  under  such  a constitution 

* Cp.  supra,  644  C.  * Omitting  H nvo% 


318 


THE  REPUBLIC 


the  same  persons  have  too  many  callings  — they  are 
husbandmen,  tradesmen,  warriors,  all  in  one.  Does 
that  look  well? 

Anything  but  well. 

There  is  another  evil  which  is,  perhaps,  the  great- 
est of  all,  and  to  which  this  State  first  begins  to  be 
liable. 

What  evil? 

A man  may  sell  all  that  he  has,  and  another  may 
acquire  his  property;  yet  after  the  sale  he  may  dwell 
in  the  city  of  which  he  is  no  longer  a part,  being 
neither  trader,  nor  artisan,  nor  horseman,  nor  hoplite, 
but  only  a poor,  helpless  creature. 

Yes,  that  is  an  evil  which  also  first  begins  in  this 
State. 

The  evil  is  certainly  not  prevented  there;  for 
oligarchies  have  both  the  extremes  of  great  wealth 
and  utter  poverty. 

True. 

But  think  again : In  his  wealthy  days,  while  he  was 
spending  his  money,  was  a man  of  this  sort  a whit 
more  good  to  the  State  for  the  purposes  of  citizen- 
ship? Or  did  he  only  seem  to  be  a member  of  the 
ruling  body,  although  in  truth  he  was  neither  ruler 
nor  subject,  but  just  a spendthrift? 

As  you  say,  he  seemed  to  be  a ruler,  but  was  only 
a spendthrift. 

May  we  not  say  that  this  is  the  drone  in  the  house 
who  is  like  the  drone  in  the  honeycomb,  and  that  the 
one  is  the  plague  of  the  city  as  the  other  is  of  the 
hive? 

Just  so,  Socrates. 

And  God  has  made  the  flying  drones,  Adeimantus, 
all  without  stings,  whereas  of  the  walking  drones  he 
has  made  some  without  stings  but  others  have  dread- 
ful stings ; of  the  stingless  class  are  those  who  in  their 


THE  REPUBLIC 


319 


old  age  end  as  paupers;  of  the  stingers  come  all  the 
criminal  class,  as  they  are  termed. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

Clearly  then,  whenever  you  see  paupers  in  a State, 
somewhere  in  that  neighborhood  there  are  hidden 
away  thieves  and  cut -purses  and  robbers  of  temples, 
and  all  sorts  of  malefactors. 

Clearly. 

Well,  I said,  and  in  oligarchical  States  do  you  not 
find  paupers? 

Yes,  he  said;  nearly  everybody  is  a pauper  who  isi 
not  a ruler. 

And  may  we  be  so  bold  as  to  affirm  that  there  are 
also  many  criminals  to  be  found  in  them,  rogues  who 
have  stings,  and  whom  the  authorities  are  careful  to 
restrain  by  force? 

Certainly,  we  may  be  so  bold. 

The  existence  of  such  persons  is  to  be  attributed 
to  want  of  education,  ill-training,  and  an  evil  consti- 
tution of  the  State? 

True. 

Such,  then,  is  the  form  and  such  are  the  evils  of 
oligarchy;  and  there  may  be  many  other  evils. 

Very  likely. 

Then  oligarchy,  or  the  form  of  government  in 
which  the  rulers  are  elected  for  their  wealth,  may  now 
be  dismissed.  Let  us  next  proceed  to  consider  the 
nature  and  origin  of  the  individual  who  answers  to 
this  State. 

By  all  means. 

Does  not  the  timocratical  man  change  into  the 
oligarchical  on  this  wise? 

How? 

A time  arrives  when  the  representative  of  timoc- 
racy has  a son:  at  first  he  begins  by  emulating  his 
father  and  walking  in  his  footsteps,  but  presently  he 


320 


THE  REPUBLIC 


sees  him  of  a sudden  foundering  against  the  State 
as  upon  a sunken  reef,  and  he  and  all  that  he  has  is 
lost;  he  may  have  been  a general  or  some  other  high 
officer  who  is  brought  to  trial  under  a prejudice 
raised  by  informers,  and  either  put  to  death,  or  exiled, 
or  deprived  of  the  privileges  of  a citizen,  and  aU  his 
property  taken  from  him. 

Nothing  more  likely. 

And  the  son  has  seen  and  known  all  this  — he  is  a 
ruined  man,  and  his  fear  has  taught  him  to  knock 
ambition  and  passion  headforemost  from  his  bosom’s 
throne;  humbled  by  poverty  he  takes  to  money- 
making and  by  mean  and  miserly  savings  and  hard 
work  gets  a fortune  together.  Is  not  such  an  one 
hkely  to  seat  the  concupiscent  and  covetous  element 
on  the  vacant  throne  and  to  suffer  it  to  play  the  great 
king  within  him,  girt  with  tiara  and  chain  and  scimi- 
tar? 

Most  true,  he  replied. 

And  when  he  has  made  reason  and  spirit  sit  down 
on  the  ground  obediently  on  either  side  of  their  sov- 
ereign, and  taught  them  to  know  their  place,  he  com- 
pels the  one  to  think  only  of  how  lesser  sums  may  be 
turned  into  larger  ones,  and  will  not  allow  the  other 
to  worship  and  admire  anything  but  riches  and  rich 
men,  or  to  be  ambitious  of  anything  so  much  as  the 
acquisition  of  wealth  and  the  means  of  acquiring  it. 

Of  all  changes,  he  said,  there  is  none  so  speedy  or 
so  sure  as  the  conversion  of  the  ambitious  youth  into 
the  avaricious  one. 

And  the  avaricious,  I said,  is  the  oligarchical  youth? 

Yes,  he  said;  at  any  rate  the  individual  out  of 
whom  he  came  is  like  the  State  out  of  which  oligarchy 
came. 

Let  us  then  consider  whether  there  is  any  likeness 
between  them. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


321 


Very  good. 

First,  then,  they  resemble  one  another  in  the  value 
which  they  set  upon  wealth? 

Certainly. 

Also  in  their  penurious,  laborious  character;  the  in- 
dividual only  satisfies  his  necessary  appetites,  and 
confines  his  expenditure  to  them;  his  other  desires 
he  subdues,  xmder  the  idea  that  they  are  unprofit- 
able. 

True. 

He  is  a shabby  fellow,  who  saves  something  out  of 
everything  and  makes  a purse  for  himself ; and  this  is 
the  sort  of  man  whom  the  vulgar  applaud.  Is  he  not 
a true  image  of  the  State  which  he  represents? 

He  appears  to  me  to  be  so;  at  any  rate  money  is 
highly  valued  by  him  as  well  as  by  the  State. 

You  see  that  he  is  not  a man  of  cultivation,  I said. 

I imagine  not,  he  said;  had  he  been  educated  he 
would  never  have  made  a blind  god  director  of  his 
chorus,  or  given  him  chief  honor.^ 

Excellent!  I said.  Yet  consider:  Must  we  not 

further  admit  that  owing  to  this  want  of  cultivation 
there  will  be  found  in  him  dronelike  desires  as  of 
pauper  and  rogue,  which  are  forcibly  kept  down  by 
his  general  habit  of  life? 

True. 

Do  you  know  where  you  will  have  to  look  if  you 
want  to  discover  his  rogueries? 

Where  must  I look? 

You  should  see  him  where  he  has  some  great  oppor- 
tunity of  acting  dishonestly,  as  in  the  guardianship 
of  an  orphan. 

Aye. 

It  will  be  clear  enough  then  that  in  his  ordinary 

1 Reading  Kal  irlfia  fidXurra.  E5,  9jv  5*  iych,  according  to  Schneider’s  ex- 
cellent emendation. 


322 


THE  REPUBLIC 


dealings  which  give  him  a reputation  for  honesty  he 
coerces  his  bad  passions  by  an  enforced  virtue;  not 
making  them  see  that  they  are  wrong,  or  taming 
them  by  reason,  but  by  necessity  and  fear  constrain- 
ing them,  and  because  he  trembles  for  his  possessions. 

To  be  sure. 

Yes,  indeed,  my  dear  friend,  but  you  will  find  that 
the  natural  desires  of  the  drone  commonly  exist  in 
him  all  the  same  whenever  he  has  to  spend  what  is  not 
his  own. 

Yes,  and  they  will  be  strong  in  him  too. 

The  man,  then,  will  be  at  war  with  himself;  he 
will  be  two  men,  and  not  one;  but,  in  general,  his 
better  desires  will  be  found  to  prevail  over  his  inferior 
ones. 

True. 

For  these  reasons  such  an  one  will  be  more  respect- 
able than  most  people ; yet  the  true  virtue  of  a unani- 
mous and  harmonious  soul  will  flee  far  away  and 
never  come  near  him. 

I should  expect  so. 

And  surely,  the  miser  individually  will  be  an  ig- 
noble competitor  in  a State  for  any  prize  of  victory, 
or  other  object  of  honorable  ambition;  he  will  not 
spend  his  money  in  the  contest  for  glory;  so  afraid 
is  he  of  awakening  his  expensive  appetites  and  in- 
viting them  to  help  and  join  in  the  struggle;  in  true 
oligarchical  fashion  he  fights  with  a small  party  only 
of  his  resources,  and  the  result  commonly  is  that  he 
loses  the  prize  and  saves  his  money. 

' Very  true. 

Can  we  any  longer  doubt,  then,  that  the  miser  and 
moneymaker  answers  to  the  oligarchical  State? 

' There  can  be  no  doubt. 

Next  comes  democracy;  of  this  the  origin  and 
nature  have  still  to  be  considered  by  us;  and  then  we 


THE  REPUBLIC 


323 


will  inquire  into  the  ways  of  the  democratic  man,  and 
bring  him  up  for  judgment. 

That,  he  said,  is  our  method. 

Well,  I said,  and  how  does  the  change  from 
oligarchy  into  democracy  arise?  Is  it  not  on  this 
wise?  — The  good  at  which  such  a State  aims  is  to 
become  as  rich  as  possible,  a desire  which  is  insatiable  ? 

What  then? 

The  rulers,  being  aware  that  their  power  rests  upon 
their  wealth,  refuse  to  curtail  by  law  the  extravagance 
of  the  spendthrift  youth  because  they  gain  by  their 
ruin;  they  take  interest  from  them  and  buy  up  their 
estates  and  thus  increase  their  own  wealth  and  im- 
portance? 

To  be  sure. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  love  of  wealth 
and  the  spirit  of  moderation  can  not  exist  together  in 
citizens  of  the  same  state  to  any  considerable  extent ; 
one  or  the  other  will  be  disregarded. 

That  is  tolerably  clear. 

And  in  oligarchical  States,  from  the  general  spread 
of  carelessness  and  extravagance,  men  of  good  family 
have  often  been  reduced  to  beggary? 

Yes,  often. 

And  still  they  remain  in  the  city;  there  they  are, 
ready  to  sting  and  fully  armed,  and  some  of  them  owe 
money,  some  have  forfeited  their  citizenship;  a third 
class  are  in  both  predicaments ; and  they  hate  and  con- 
spire against  those  who  have  got  their  property,  and 
against  everybody  else,  and  are  eager  for  revolution. 

That  is  true. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  men  of  business,  stooping  as 
they  walk,  and  pretending  not  even  to  see  those  whom 
they  have  already  ruined,  insert  their  sting  — that  is, 
their  money  — into  some  one  else  who  is  not  on  his 
guard  against  them,  and  recover  the  parent  sum  many 


324 


THE  REPUBLIC 


times  over  multiplied  into  a family  of  children:  and 
so  they  make  drone  and  pauper  to  abound  in  the  State. 

Yes,  he  said,  there  are  plenty  of  them  — that  is 
certain. 

The  evil  blazes  up  like  a fire ; and  they  will  not  ex- 
tinguish it,  either  by  restricting  a man’s  use  of  his  own 
property,  or  by  another  remedy: 

What  other? 

One  which  is  the  next  best,  and  has  the  advantage 
of  compelling  the  citizens  to  look  to  their  characters : — 
Let  there  be  a general  rule  that  every  one  shall  enter 
into  voluntary  contracts  at  his  own  risk,  and  there  will 
be  less  of  this  scandalous  money-making,  and  the  evils 
of  which  we  were  speaking  will  be  greatly  lessened 
in  the  State. 

Yes,  they  will  be  greatly  lessened. 

At  present  the  governors,  induced  by  the  motives 
which  I have  named,  treat  their  subjects  badly;  while 
they  and  their  adherents,  especially  the  young  men  of 
(the  governing  class,  are  habituated  to  lead  a life  of 
luxury  and  idleness  both  of  body  and  mind;  they  do 
nothing,  and  are  incapable  of  resisting  either  pleasure 
or  pain. 

. Very  true. 

1 They  themselves  care  only  for  making  money,  and 
I are  as  indifferent  as  the  pauper  to  the  cultivation  of 
virtue. 

Yes,  quite  as  indifferent. 

Such  is  the  state  of  affairs  which  prevails  among 
them.  And  often  rulers  and  their  subjects  may  come 
in  one  another’s  way,  whether  on  a journey  or  on  some 
other  occasion  of  meeting,  on  a pilgrimage  or  a march, 
as  fellow-soldiers  or  fellow-sailors;  aye  and  they  may 
observe  the  behavior  of  each  other  in  the  very  mo- 
ment of  danger  — for  where  danger  is,  there  is  no  fear 
that  the  poor  will  be  despised  by  the  rich  and  very 


THE  REPUBLIC 


325 


likely  the  wiry  sunburnt  poor  man  may  be  placed  in 
battle  at  the  side  of  a wealthy  one  who  has  never 
spoiled  his  complexion  and  has  plenty  of  superfluous 
flesh  — when  he  sees  such  an  one  puffing  and  at  his 
wits’-end,  how  can  he  avoid  drawing  the  conclusion 
that  men  like  him  are  only  rich  because  no  one  has 
the  courage  to  despoil  them?  And  when  they  meet 
in  private  will  not  people  be  saying  to  one  another 
“ Our  warriors  are  not  good  for  much  ” ? 

Yes,  he  said,  I am  quite  aware  that  this  is  their  way 
of  talking. 

And,  as  in  a body  which  is  diseased  the  addition  of 
a touch  from  without  may  bring  on  illness,  and  some- 
times even  when  there  is  no  external  provocation  a 
commotion  may  arise  within  — in  the  same  way 
wherever  there  is  weakness  in  the  State  there  is  also 
likely  to  be  illness,  of  which  the  occasion  may  be  very 
slight,  the  one  party  introducing  from  without  their 
oligarchical,  the  other  their  democratical  allies,  and 
then  the  State  falls  sick,  and  is  at  war  with  herself; 
and  may  be  at  times  distracted,  even  when  there  is  no 
external  cause. 

Yes,  surely. 

And  then  democracy  comes  into  being  after  the  poor 
have  conquered  their  opponents,  slaughtering  some 
and  banishing  some,  while  to  the  remainder  they  give 
an  equal  share  of  freedom  and  power;  and  this  is  the 
form  of  government  in  which  the  magistrates  are 
commonly  elected  by  lot. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  nature  of  democracy, 
whether  the  revolution  has  been  effected  by  arms,  or 
whether  fear  has  caused  the  opposite  party  to  with- 
draw. 

And  now  what  is  their  manner  of  life,  and  what 
sort  of  a government  have  they?  for  as  the  govern- 
ment is,  such  will  be  the  man. 


326 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Clearly,  he  said. 

In  the  first  place,  are  they  not  free;  and  is  not  the 
city  full  of  freedom  and  frankness  — a man  may  say 
and  do  what  he  likes? 

’Tis  said  so,  he  replied. 

And  where  freedom  is,  the  individual  is  clearly  able 
to  order  for  himself  his  own  life  as  he  pleases? 

Clearly. 

Then  in  this  kind  of  State  there  will  be  the  greatest 
variety  of  human  natures? 

There  will. 

This,  then,  seems  likely  to  be  the  fairest  of  States, 
being  like  an  embroidered  robe  which  is  spangled  with 
every  sort  of  flower.^  And  just  as  women  and  chil- 
dren think  a variety  of  colors  to  be  of  all  things  most 
charming,  so  there  are  many  men  to  whom  this  State, 
which  is  spangled  with  the  manners  and  characters  of 
mankind,  will  appear  to  be  the  fairest  of  States. 

Yes. 

Yes,  my  good  Sir,  and  there  will  be  no  better  in 
which  to  look  for  a government. 

Why? 

Because  of  the  liberty  which  reigns  there  — they 
have  a complete  assortment  of  constitutions;  and  he 
who  has  a mind  to  establish  a State,  as  we  have  been 
doing,  must  go  to  a democracy  as  he  would  go  to  a 
bazaar  at  which  they  sell  them,  and  pick  out  the  one 
that  suits  him ; then,  when  he  has  made  his  choice, 
[j  he  may  found  his  State. 

He  will  be  sure  to  have  patterns  enough. 

And  there  being  no  necessity,  I said,  for  you  to 
govern  in  this  State,  even  if  you  have  the  capacity, 
or  to  be  governed,  unless  you  like,  or  to  go  to  war 
when  the  rest  go  to  war,  or  to  be  at  peace  when 
others  are  at  peace,  unless  you  are  so  disposed  — 

1 Omitting  tI  ix'fjv  ; 


THE  REPUBLIC 


327 


there  being  no  necessity  also,  because  some  law  forbids 
you  to  hold  office  or  be  a dicast,  that  you  should  not 
hold  office  or  be  a dicast,  if  you  have  a fancy  — is  not 
this  a way  of  life  which  for  the  moment  is 
supremely  delightful? 

For  the  moment,  yes. 

And  is  not  their  humanity  to  the  condemned  ^ in 
some  cases  quite  charming?  Have  you  not  observed 
how,  in  a democracy,  many  persons,  although  they 
have  been  sentenced  to  death  or  exile,  just  stay  where 
they  are  and  walk  about  the  world  — the  gentleman 
parades  like  a hero,  and  nobody  sees  or  cares? 

Yes,  he  replied,  many  and  many  a one. 

See  too,  I said,  the  forgiving  spirit  of  democracy, 
and  the  “ don’t  care  ” about  trifles,  and  the  disregard 
which  she  shows  of  all  the  fine  principles  which  we 
solemnly  laid  down  at  the  foundation  of  the  city  — as 
when  we  said  that,  except  in  the  case  of  some  rarely 
gifted  nature,  there  never  will  be  a good  man  who 
has  not  from  his  childhood  been  used  to  play  amid 
things  of  beauty  and  make  of  them  a joy  and  a study 
— how  grandly  does  she  trample  all  these  fine  notions 
of  ours  under  her  feet,  never  giving  a thought  to  the 
pursuits  which  make  a statesman,  and  promoting  to 
honor  any  one  who  professes  to  be  the  people’s 
friend. 

Yes,  she  is  of  a noble  spirit. 

These  and  other  kindred  characteristics  are  proper 
to  democracy,  which  is  a charming  form  of  govern- 
ment, full  of  variety  and  disorder,  and  dispensing  a 
sort  of  equality  to  equals  and  unequals  alike. 

We  know  her  well. 

Consider  now,  I said,  what  manner  of  man  the 
individual  is,  or  rather  consider,  as  is  the  case  of  the 
State,  how  he  comes  into  being. 

1 Or,  “the  philosophical  temper  of  the  condemned. “ 


328 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Very  good,  he  said. 

Is  not  this  the  way  — he  is  the  son  of  the  miserly 
and  oligarchical  father  who  has  trained  him  in  his  own 
habits? 

Exactly. 

And,  like  his  father,  he  keeps  under  by  force  the 
pleasures  which  are  of  the  spending  and  not  of  the 
getting  sort,  being  those  which  are  called  unnecessary? 

Obviously. 

Would  you  like,  for  the  sake  of  clearness,  to  dis- 
tinguish which  are  the  necessary  and  which  are  the  un- 
necessary pleasures? 

I should. 

Are  not  necessary  pleasures  those  of  which  we  can 
not  get  rid,  and  of  which  the  satisfaction  is  a benefit 
to  us  ? And  they  are  rightly  called  so,  because  we  are 
framed  by  nature  to  desire  both  what  is  beneficial  and 
what  is  necessary,  and  can  not  help  it. 

True. 

We  are  not  wrong  therefore  in  calling  them  neces- 
sary? 

We  are  not. 

And  the  desires  of  which  a man  may  get  rid,  if  he 
takes  pains  from  his  youth  upwards  — of  which 
the  presence,  moreover,  does  no  good,  and  in  some 
cases  the  reverse  of  good  — shall  we  not  be  right  in 
saying  that  all  these  are  unnecessary? 

Yes,  certainly. 

Suppose  we  select  an  example  of  either  kind,  in 
order  that  we  may  have  a general  notion  of  them? 

Very  good. 

Will  not  the  desire  of  eating,  that  is,  of  simple  food 
and  condiments,  in  so  far  as  they  are  required  for 
health  and  strength,  be  of  the  necessary  class? 

That  is  what  I should  suppose. 

The  pleasure  of  eating  is  necessary  in  two  ways;  it 


THE  REPUBLIC 


329 


does  us  good  and  it  is  essential  to  the  continuance  of 
life? 

Yes. 

But  the  condiments  are  only  necessary  in  so  far  as 
they  are  good  for  health? 

Certainly. 

And  the  desire  which  goes  beyond  this,  of  more 
delicate  food,  or  other  luxuries,  which  might  generally 
be  got  rid  of,  if  controlled  and  trained  in  youth,  and  is 
hurtful  to  the  body,  and  hurtful  to  the  soul  in  the 
pursuit  of  wisdom  and  virtue,  may  be  rightly  called 
unnecessary? 

Very  true. 

May  we  not  say  that  these  desires  spend,  and  that 
the  others  make  money  because  they  conduce  to  pro- 
duction? 

Certainly. 

And  of  the  pleasures  of  love,  and  all  other  pleasures, 
the  same  holds  good? 

True. 

And  the  drone  of  whom  we  spoke  was  he  who  was 
surfeited  in  pleasures  and  desires  of  this  sort,  and  was 
the  slave  of  the  unnecessary  desires,  whereas  he  who 
was  subject  to  the  necessary  only  was  miserly  and 
oligarchical? 

Very  true. 

Again,  let  us  see  how  the  democratical  man  grows 
out  of  the  oligarchical:  the  following,  as  I suspect,  is 
commonly  the  process. 

What  is  the  process? 

When  a young  man  who  has  been  brought  up  as  we 
were  just  now  describing,  in  a vulgar  and  miserly 
way,  has  tasted  drones’  honey  and  has  come  to  as- 
sociate with  fierce  and  crafty  natures  who  are  able  to 
provide  for  him  all  sorts  of  refinements  and  varieties 
of  pleasure  — then,  as  you  may  imagine,  the  change 


330 


THE  REPUBLIC 


will  begin  of  the  oligarchical  principle  within  him 
into  the  democratical? 

Inevitably. 

And  as  in  the  city  like  was  helping  like,  and  the 
change  was  effected  by  an  alliance  from  without 
assisting  one  division  of  the  citizens,  so  too  the  young 
man  is  changed  by  a class  of  desires  coming  from 
without  to  assist  the  desires  within  him,  that  which 
is  akin  and  alike  again  helping  that  which  is  akin  and 
alike  ? 

Certainly. 

And  if  there  be  any  ally  which  aids  the  oligarchical 
principle  within  him,  whether  the  influence  of  a father 
or  of  kindred,  advising  or  rebuking  him,  then  there 
arises  in  his  soul  a faction  and  an  opposite  faction, 
and  he  goes  to  war  with  himself. 

It  must  be  so. 

And  there  are  times  when  the  democratical  prin- 
ciple gives  way  to  the  oligarchical,  and  some  of  his 
desires  die,  and  others  are  banished;  a spirit  of  rever- 
ence enters  into  the  young  man’s  soul  and  order  is 
restored. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  sometimes  happens. 

And  then,  again,  after  the  old  desires  have  been 
driven  out,  fresh  ones  spring  up,  which  are  akin  to 
them,  and  because  he  their  father  does  not  know  how 
to  educate  them,  wax  fierce  and  numerous. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  apt  to  be  the  way. 

They  draw  him  to  his  old  associates,  and  holding 
secret  intercourse  with  them,  breed  and  multiply  in 
him. 

Very  true. 

At  length  they  seize  upon  the  citadel  of  the  young 
man’s  soul,  which  they  perceive  to  be  void  of  all  ac- 
complishments and  fair  pursuits  and  true  words, 
which  make  their  abode  in  the  minds  of  men  who  are 


THE  REPUBLIC 


331 


dear  to  the  gods,  and  are  their  best  guardians  and 
sentinels. 

None  better. 

False  and  boastful  conceits  and  phrases  mount  up- 
wards and  take  their  place. 

They  are  certain  to  do  so. 

.^nd  so  the  young  man  returns  into  the  country  of 
the  lotus-eaters,  and  takes  up  his  dwelling  there  in  the 
face  of  all  men;  and  if  any  help  be  sent  by  his  friends 
to  the  oligarchical  part  of  him,  the  aforesaid  vain 
conceits  shut  the  gate  of  the  king’s  fastness;  and  they 
will  neither  allow  the  embassy  itself  to  enter,  nor  if 
private  advisers  offer  the  fatherly  counsel  of  the  aged 
will  they  listen  to  them  or  receive  them.  There  is  a 
battle  and  they  gain  the  day,  and  then  modesty,  which 
they  call  silliness,  is  ignominiously  thrust  into  exile 
by  them,  and  temperance,  which  they  nickname  un- 
manliness, is  trampled  in  the  mire  and  cast  forth; 
they  persuade  men  that  moderation  and  orderly  ex- 
penditure are  vulgarity  and  meanness,  and  so,  by  the 
help  of  a rabble  of  evil  appetites,  they  drive  them 
beyond  the  border. 

Yes,  with  a will. 

And  when  they  have  emptied  and  swept  clean  the 
soul  of  him  who  is  now  in  their  power  and  who  is  being 
initiated  by  them  in  great  mysteries,  the  next  thing 
is  to  bring  back  to  their  house  insolence  and  anarchy 
and  waste  and  impudence  in  bright  array  having 
garlands  on  their  heads,  and  a great  company  with 
them,  hymning  their  praises  and  calling  them  by 
sweet  names ; insolence  they  term  breeding,  and 
anarchy  liberty,  and  waste  magnificence,  and  im- 
pudence courage.  And  so  the  young  man  passes  out 
of  his  original  nature,  which  was  trained  in  the  school 
of  necessity,  into  the  freedom  and  libertinism  of  use- 
less and  unnecessary  pleasures. 


332 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Yes,  he  said,  the  change  in  him  is  visible  enough. 

After  this  he  lives  on,  spending  his  money  and 
labor  and  time  on  unnecessary  pleasures  quite  as 
much  as  on  necessary  ones ; but  if  he  be  fortunate,  and 
is  not  too  much  disordered  in  his  wits,  when  years  have 
elapsed,  and  the  heyday  of  passion  is  over  — sup- 
posing that  he  then  re-admits  into  the  city  some  part 
of  the  exiled  virtues,  and  does  not  wholly  give  himself 
up  to  their  successors  — in  that  case  he  balances  his 
pleasures  and  lives  in  a sort  of  equilibrium,  putting  the 
government  of  himself  into  the  hands  of  the  one  which 
comes  first  and  wins  the  turn;  and  when  he  has  had 
enough  of  that,  then  into  the  hands  of  another; 
he  despises  none  of  them  but  encourages  them  all 
equally. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Neither  does  he  receive  or  let  pass  into  the  fortress 
any  true  word  of  advice ; if  any  one  says  to  him  that 
some  pleasures  are  the  satisfactions  of  good  and  noble 
desires,  and  others  of  evil  desires,  and  that  he  ought 
to  use  and  honor  some  and  chastise  and  master  the 
others  — whenever  this  is  repeated  to  him  he  shakes 
j his  head  and  says  that  they  are  all  alike,  and  that  one 
is  as  good  as  another. 

Yes,  he  said;  that  is  the  way  with  him. 

Yes,  I said,  he  lives  from  day  to  day  indulging  the 
appetite  of  the  hour;  and  sometimes  he  is  lapped  in 
drink  and  strains  of  the  flute;  then  he  becomes  a 
water-drinker,  and  tries  to  get  thin;  then  he  takes  a 
turn  at  gymnastics;  sometimes  idling  and  neglecting 
everything,  then  once  more  living  the  life  of  a phi- 
losopher; often  he  is  busy  with  politics,  and  starts  to 
his  feet  and  says  and  does  whatever  comes  into  his 
head ; and,  if  he  is  emulous  of  any  one  who  is  a war- 
rior, off  he  is  in  that  direction,  or  of  men  of  business, 
once  more  in  that.  His  life  has  neither  law  nor  order; 


THE  REPUBLIC 


333 


and  this  distracted  existence  he  terms  joy  and  bliss 
and  freedom;  and  so  he  goes  on. 

Yes,  he  replied,  he  is  all  liberty  and  equality. 

Yes,  I said;  his  life  is  motley  and  manifold  and  an 
epitome  of  the  lives  of  many ; — he  answers  to  the 
State  which  we  described  as  fair  and  spangled.  And 
many  a man  and  many  a woman  will  take  him  for 
their  pattern,  and  many  a constitution  and  many  an 
example  of  manners  is  contained  in  him. 

Just  so. 

Let  him  then  he  set  over  against  democracy;  he 
may  truly  be  called  the  democratic  man. 

Let  that  be  his  place,  he  said. 

Last  of  all  comes  the  most  beautiful  of  all,  man 
and  State  alike,  tyranny  and  the  tyrant;  these  we 
have  now  to  consider. 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

Say  then,  my  friend.  In  what  manner  does  tyr- 
anny arise?  — that  it  has  a democratic  origin  is  evi- 
dent. 

Clearly. 

And  does  not  tyranny  spring  from  democracy  in 
the  same  manner  as  democracy  from  oligarchy  — I 
mean,  after  a sort? 

How? 

The  good  which  oligarchy  proposed  to  itself  and 
the  means  by  which  it  was  maintained  was  excess  of 
wealth  — am  I not  right  ? 

Yes. 

And  the  insatiable  desire  of  wealth  and  the  neglect 
of  all  other  things  for  the  sake  of  money-getting  was 
also  the  ruin  of  oligarchy? 

True. 

And  democracy  has  her  own  good,  of  which  the 
insatiable  desire  brings  her  to  dissolution? 

What  good? 


334 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Freedom,  I replied;  which,  as  they  tell  you  in  a 
democracy,  is  the  glory  of  the  State  — and  that 
therefore  in  a democracy  alone  will  the  freeman  of 
nature  deign  to  dwell. 

Yes;  the  saying  is  in  everybody’s  mouth. 

I was  going  to  observe,  that  the  insatiable  desire 
of  this  and  the  neglect  of  other  things  introduces  the 
change  in  democracy,  which  occasions  a demand  for 
tyranny. 

How  so? 

When  a democracy  which  is  thirsting  for  freedom 
has  evil  cup-bearers  presiding  over  the  feast,  and  has 
drunk  too  deeply  of  the  strong  wine  of  freedom,  then, 
unless  her  rulers  are  very  amenable  and  give  a plenti- 
ful draught,  she  calls  them  to  account  and  punishes 
them,  and  says  that  they  are  cursed  oligarchs. 

Yes,  he  replied,  a very  common  occurrence. 

Yes,  I said;  and  loyal  citizens  are  insultingly 
termed  by  her  slaves  who  hug  their  chains  and  men 
of  naught;  she  would  have  subjects  who  are  like 
rulers,  and  rulers  who  are  like  subjects:  these  are 
men  after  her  own  heart,  whom  she  praises  and  honors 
both  in  private  and  public.  Now,  in  such  a State,  can 
liberty  have  any  limit? 

Certainly  not. 

By  degrees  the  anarchy  finds  a way  into  private 
houses,  and  ends  by  getting  among  the  animals  and 
infecting  them. 

How  do  you  mean? 

I mean  that  the  father  grows  accustomed  to  de- 
scend to  the  level  of  his  sons  and  to  fear  them,  and 
ithe  son  is  on  a level  with  his  father,  he  having  no 
1 respect  or  reverence  for  either  of  his  parents;  and  this 
lis  his  freedom,  and  the  metic  is  equal  with  the  citizen 
land  the  citizen  with  the  metic,  and  the  stranger  is 
quite  as  good  as  either. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


335 


Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  way. 

And  these  are  not  the  only  evils,  I said  — there 
are  several  lesser  ones:  In  such  a state  of  society  the 
master  fears  and  flatters  his  scholars,  and  the  scholars 
despise  their  masters  and  tutors;  yoimg  and  old  are 
all  alike;  and  the  young  man  is  on  a level  with  the 
old,  and  is  ready  to  compete  with  him  in  word  or  deed ; 
and  old  men  condescend  to  the  young  and  are  full  of 
pleasantry  and  gaiety;  they  are  loth  to  be  thought 
morose  and  authoritative,  and  therefore  they  adopt 
the  manners  of  the  young. 

Quite  true,  he  said. 

The  last  extreme  of  popular  liberty  is  when  the 
slave  bought  with  money,  whether  male  or  female, 
is  just  as  free  as  his  or  her  purchaser;  nor  must  I 
forget  to  tell  of  the  liberty  and  equality  of  the  two 
sexes  in  relation  to  each  other. 

Why  not,  as  .^schylus  says,  utter  the  word  which 
rises  to  our  lips  ? 

That  is  what  I am  doing,  I replied;  and  I must 
add  that  no  one  who  does  not  know  would  believe, 
how  much  greater  is  the  liberty  which  the  animals 
who  are  under  the  dominion  of  man  have  in  a democ- 
racy than  in  any  other  State:  for  truly,  the  she-dogs, 
as  the  proverb  says,  are  as  good  as  their  she-mistresses, 
and  the  horses  and  asses  have  a way  of  marching 
along  with  all  the  rights  and  dignities  of  freemen; 
and  they  will  run  at  anybody  who  comes  in  their 
way  if  he  does  not  leave  the  road  clear  for  them: 
and  all  things  are  just  ready  to  burst  with  lib- 
erty. 

When  I take  a country  walk,  he  said,  I often  ex- 
perience what  you  describe.  You  and  I have  dreamed 
the  same  thing. 

And  above  all,  I said,  and  as  the  result  of  all,  see 
how  sensitive  the  citizens  become;  they  chafe  im- 


336 


THE  REPUBLIC 


patiently  at  the  least  touch  of  authority,  and  at  length, 
as  you  know,  they  cease  to  care  even  for  the  laws, 
written  or  unwritten;  they  will  have  no  one  over 
them. 

Yes,  he  said,  I know  it  too  well. 

Such,  my  friend,  I said,  is  the  fair  and  glorious  be- 
ginning out  of  which  springs  tyranny. 

Glorious  indeed,  he  said.  But  what  is  the  next 
step? 

The  ruin  of  oligarchy  is  the  ruin  of  democracy; 
the  same  disease  magnified  and  intensified  by  liberty 
overmasters  democracy  — the  truth  being  that  the 
excessive  increase  of  anything  often  causes  a reaction 
in  the  opposite  direction ; and  this  is  the  case  not  only 
in  the  seasons  and  in  vegetable  and  animal  life,  but 
above  all  in  forms  of  government. 

True. 

The  excess  of  liberty,  whether  in  States  or  indi- 
viduals, seems  only  to  pass  into  excess  of  slavery. 

Yes,  the  natural  order. 

And  so  tyranny  naturally  arises  out  of  democracy, 
and  the  most  aggravated  form  of  tyranny  and  slavery 
out  of  the  most  extreme  form  of  liberty? 

As  we  might  expect. 

That,  however,  was  not,  as  I believe,  your  ques- 
tion— you  rather  desired  to  know  what  is  that  dis- 
order which  is  generated  alike  in  oligarchy  and  de- 
mocracy, and  is  the  ruin  of  both? 

Just  so,  he  replied. 

Well,  I said,  I meant  to  refer  to  the  class  of  idle 
spendthrifts,  of  whom  the  more  courageous  are  the 
leaders  and  the  more  timid  the  followers,  the  same 
whom  we  were  comparing  to  drones,  some  stingless, 
and  others  having  stings. 

A very  just  comparison. 

These  two  classes  are  the  plagues  of  every  city  in 


THE  REPUBLIC 


337 


which  they  are  generated,  being  what  phlegm  and 
bile  are  to  the  body.  And  the  good  physician  and  law- 
giver of  the  State  ought,  like  the  wise  bee-master,  to 
keep  them  at  a distance  and  prevent,  if  possible,  their 
ever  coming  in;  and  if  they  have  anyhow  found  a 
way  in,  then  he  should  have  them  and  their  cells  cut 
out  as  speedily  as  possible. 

Yes,  by  aU  means,  he  said. 

Then,  in  order  that  we  may  see  clearly  what  we 
are  doing,  let  us  imagine  democracy  to  be  divided,  as 
indeed  it  is,  into  three  classes;  for  in  the  first  place 
freedom  creates  rather  more  drones  in  the  democratic 
than  there  were  in  the  oligarchical  State. 

That  is  true. 

And  in  the  democracy  they  are  certainly  more  in- 
tensified. 

How  so? 

Because  in  the  oligarchical  State  they  are  disquali- 
fied and  driven  from  ofiice,  and  therefore  they  can  not 
train  or  gather  strength;  whereas  in  a democracy 
they  are  almost  the  entire  ruling  power,  and  while 
the  keener  sort  speak  and  act,  the  rest  keep  buzzing 
about  the  bema  and  do  not  suffer  a word  to  be  said 
on  the  other  side ; hence  in  democracies  almost  every- 
thing is  managed  by  the  drones. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Then  there  is  another  class  which  is  always  being 
severed  from  the  mass. 

What  is  that? 

They  are  the  orderly  class,  which  in  a nation  of 
traders  is  sure  to  be  the  richest. 

Naturally  so. 

They  are  the  most  squeezable  persons  and  yield  the 
largest  amount  of  honey  to  the  drones. 

Why,  he  said,  there  is  little  to  be  squeezed  out  of 
people  who  have  little. 


338 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  this  is  called  the  wealthy  class,  and  the  drones 
feed  upon  them. 

That  is  pretty  much  the  case,  he  said. 

The  people  are  a third  class,  consisting  of  those 
who  work  with  their  own  hands;  they  are  not  poli- 
ticians, and  have  not  much  to  live  upon.  This,  when 
assembled,  is  the  largest  and  most  powerful  class  in 
a democracy. 

True,  he  said ; but  then  the  multitude  is  sel- 
dom willing  to  congregate  unless  they  get  a little 
honey. 

And  do  they  not  share?  I said.  Do  not  their 
leaders  deprive  the  rich  of  their  estates  and  distribute 
them  among  the  people ; at  the  same  time  taking  care 
to  reserve  the  larger  part  for  themselves? 

Why,  yes,  he  said,  to  that  extent  the  people  do 
share. 

And  the  persons  whose  property  is  taken  from  them 
are  compelled  to  defend  themselves  before  the  people 
as  they  best  can? 

What  else  can  they  do? 

And  then,  although  they  may  have  no  desire  of 
change,  the  others  charge  them  with  plotting  against 
the  people  and  being  friends  of  oligarchy? 

True. 

And  the  end  is  that  when  they  see  the  people,  not 
of  their  own  accord,  but  through  ignorance,  and  be- 
cause they  are  deceived  by  informers,  seeking  to  do 
them  wrong,  then  at  last  they  are  forced  to  become 
oligarchs  in  reality;  they  do  not  wish  to  be,  but  the 
sting  of  the  drones  torments  them  and  breeds  revolu- 
tion in  them. 

That  is  exactly  the  truth. 

Then  come  impeachments  and  judgments  and 
trials  of  one  another. 

True. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


339 


The  people  have  always  some  champion  whom  they 
set  over  them  and  nurse  into  greatness. 

Yes,  that  is  their  way. 

This  and  no  other  is  the  root  from  which  a tyrant 
springs;  when  he  first  appears  above  ground  he  is  a 
protector. 

Yes,  that  is  quite  clear. 

How  then  does  a protector  begin  to  change  into  a 
tyrant?  Clearly  when  he  does  what  the  man  is  said 
to  do  in  the  tale  of  the  Arcadian  temple  of  Lycjean 
Zeus. 

What  tale? 

The  tale  is  that  he  who  has  tasted  the  entrails  of  a 
single  human  victim  minced  up  with  the  entrails  of 
other  victims  is  destined  to  become  a wolf.  Did  you 
never  hear  it? 

O yes. 

And  the  protector  of  the  people  is  like  him;  having 
a mob  entirely  at  his  disposal,  he  is  not  restrained 
from  shedding  the  blood  of  kinsmen;  by  the  favorite 
method  of  false  accusation  he  brings  them  into  court 
and  murders  them,  making  the  life  of  man  to  dis- 
appear, and  with  unholy  tongue  and  lips  tasting  the 
blood  of  his  fellow  citizens;  some  he  kills  and  others 
he  banishes,  at  the  same  time  hinting  at  the  abolition 
of  debts  and  partition  of  lands:  and  after  this,  what 
will  be  his  destiny?  Must  he  not  either  perish  at  the 
hands  of  his  enemies,  or  from  being  a man  become  a 
wolf  — that  is,  a tyrant? 

Inevitably. 

This,  I said,  is  he  who  begins  to  make  a party 
against  the  rich? 

The  same. 

After  a while  he  is  driven  out,  but  comes  back,  in 
spite  of  his  enemies,  a tyrant  full  grown. 

That  is  clear. 


340 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  if  they  are  unable  to  expel  him,  or  to  get  him 
condemned  to  death  by  a public  accusation,  they  con- 
spire to  assassinate  him. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  their  usual  way. 

Then  comes  the  famous  request  for  a body-guard, 
which  is  the  device  of  all  those  who  have  got  thus  far 
in  their  tyrannical  career  — “ Let  not  the  people’s 
friend,”  as  they  say,  “ be  lost  to  them.” 

Exactly. 

The  people  readily  assent;  all  their  fears  are  for 
him  — they  have  none  for  themselves. 

Very  true. 

And  when  a man  who  is  wealthy  and  is  also  accused 
of  being  an  enemy  of  the  people  sees  this,  then,  my 
friend,  as  the  oracle  said  to  Croesus, 

“ By  pebbly  Hermus’  shore  he  flees  and  rests  not,  and  is  not 
ashamed  to  be  a coward/'  ^ 

And  quite  right  too,  said  he,  for  if  he  were,  he  would 
never  be  ashamed  again. 

But  if  he  is  caught  he  dies. 

Of  course. 

And  he,  the  protector  of  whom  we  spoke,  is  to  be 
seen,  not  “ larding  the  plain  ” with  his  bulk,  but  him- 
self the  overthrower  of  many,  standing  up  in  the 
chariot  of  State  with  the  reins  in  his  hand,  no  longer 
protector,  but  tyrant  absolute. 

No  doubt,  he  said. 

And  now  let  us  consider  the  happiness  of  the  man, 
and  also  of  the  State  in  which  a creature  like  him  is 
generated. 

Yes,  he  said,  let  us  consider  that. 

At  first,  in  the  early  days  of  his  power,  he  is  full 
of  smiles,  and  he  salutes  every  one  whom  he  meets ; — 
he  to  be  called  a tyrant,  who  is  making  promises  in 

1 Herod,  i.  56. 


,THE  REPUBLIC 


341 


public  and  also  in  private!  liberating  debtors,  and 
distributing  land  to  the  people  and  his  followers,  and 
wanting  to  he  so  kind  and  good  to  every  one  I 

Of  course,  he  said. 

But  when  he  has  disposed  of  foreign  enemies  by 
conquest  or  treaty,  and  there  is  nothing  to  fear  from 
them,  then  he  is  always  stirring  up  some  war  or  other, 
in  order  that  the  people  may  require  a leader. 

To  be  sure. 

Has  he  not  also  another  object,  which  is  that  they 
may  be  impoverished  by  payment  of  taxes,  and 
thus  compelled  to  devote  themselves  to  their  daily 
wants  and  therefore  less  likely  to  conspire  against 
him? 

Clearly. 

And  if  any  of  them  are  suspected  by  him  of  having  ^ 
notions  of  freedom,  and  of  resistance  to  his  authority, 
he  will  have  a good  pretext  for  destroying  them  by 
placing  them  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy  ; and  for  all 
these  reasons  the  tyrant  must  be  always  getting  up  a 
war. 

He  must. 

Now  he  begins  to  grow  unpopular. 

A necessary  result. 

Then  some  of  those  who  joined  in  setting  him  up, 
and  who  are  in  power,  speak  their  minds  to  him  and 
to  one  another,  and  the  more  courageous  of  them  cast 
in  his  teeth  what  is  being  done. 

Yes,  that  may  be  expected. 

And  the  tyrant,  if  he  means  to  rule,  must  get  rid 
of  them ; he  can  not  stop  while  he  has  a friend  or  an 
enemy  who  is  good  for  anything. 

He  can  not. 

And  therefore  he  must  look  about  him  and  see  who 
is  valiant,  who  is  high-minded,  who  is  wise,  who  is 
wealthy;  happy  man,  he  is  the  enemy  of  them  all,  and 


342 


THE  REPUBLIC 


jmust  seek  occasion  against  them  whether  he  will  or 
no,  until  he  has  made  a purgation  of  the  State. 

Yes,  he  said,  and  a rare  purgation. 

Yes,  I said,  not  the  sort  of  purgation  which  the 
physicians  make  of  the  body;  for  they  take  away  the 
worse  and  leave  the  better  part,  but  he  does  the  re- 
verse. 

If  he  is  to  rule,  I suppose  that  he  can  not  help 
himself. 

What  a blessed  alternative,  I said : — to  be  com- 
pelled to  dwell  only  with  the  many  bad,  and  to  be  by 
them  hated,  or  not  to  live  at  all  I 

Yes,  that  is  the  alternative. 

And  the  more  detestable  his  actions  are  to  the  citi- 
zens the  more  satellites  and  the  greater  devotion  in 
them  will  he  require  ? 

Certainly. 

And  who  are  the  devoted  band,  and  where  will  he 
procure  them? 

They  will  flock  to  him,  he  said,  of  their  own  accord, 
if  he  pays  them. 

By  the  dog!  I said,  here  are  more  drones,  of  every 
sort  and  from  every  land. 

Yes,  he  said,  there  are. 

But  will  he  not  desire  to  get  them  on  the  spot? 

How  do  you  mean? 

He  will  rob  the  citizens  of  their  slaves;  he  will 
then  set  them  free  and  enroll  them  in  his  body- 
guard. 

To  be  sure,  he  said;  and  he  will  he  able  to  trust 
them  best  of  all. 

What  a blessed  creature,  I said,  must  this  tyrant 
be ; he  has  put  to  death  the  others  and  has  these  for  his 
trusted  friends. 

Yes,  he  said;  they  are  quite  of  his  sort. 

Yes,  I said,  and  these  are  the  new  citizens  whom 


THE  REPUBLIC 


343 


he  has  called  into  existence,  who  admire  him  and 
are  his  companions,  while  the  good  hate  and  avoid 
him. 

Of  course. 

Verily,  then,  tragedy  is  a wise  thing  and  Euripides 
a great  tragedian. 

Why  so? 

Why,  because  he  is  the  author  of  the  pregnant  say- 
ing, 

“ Tyrants  are  wise  by  living  with  the  wise ; ” 


and  he  clearly  meant  to  say  that  they  are  the  wise 
whom  the  tyrant  makes  his  companions. 

Yes,  he  said,  and  he  also  praises  tyranny  as  god- 
like ; and  many  other  things  of  the  same  kind  are  said 
by  him  and  by  the  other  poets. 

And  therefore,  I said,  the  tragic  poets  being  wise 
men  will  forgive  us  and  any  others  who  live  after  our 
manner  if  we  do  not  receive  them  into  our  State,  be- 
cause they  are  the  eulogists  of  tyranny. 

Yes,  he  said,  those  who  have  the  wit  will  doubtless 
forgive  us. 

But  they  will  continue  to  go  to  other  cities  and  at- 
tract mobs,  and  hire  voices  fair  and  loud  and  per- 
suasive, and  draw  the  cities  over  to  tyrannies  and 
democracies. 

Very  true. 

Moreover,  they  are  paid  for  this  and  receive 
honor  — the  greatest  honor,  as  might  be  expected, 
from  tyrants,  and  the  next  greatest  from  democracies; 
but  the  higher  they  ascend  our  constitution  hill,  the 
more  their  reputation  fails,  and  seems  unable  from 
shortness  of  breath  to  proceed  further. 

True. 

But  we  are  wandering  from  the  subject:  Let  us 
therefore  return  and  inquire  how  the  tyrant  will  main- 


344 


THE  REPUBLIC 


tain  that  fair  and  numerous  and  various  and  ever- 
changing  army  of  his. 

If,  he  said,  there  are  sacred  treasures  in  the  city,  he 
will  confiscate  and  spend  them;  and  in  so  far  as  the 
fortunes  of  attainted  persons  may  suffice,  he  will  be 
able  to  diminish  the  taxes  which  he  would  otherwise 
have  to  impose  upon  the  people. 

And  when  these  fail? 

Why,  clearly,  he  said,  then  he  and  his  boon  com- 
panions, whether  male  or  female,  will  be  maintained 
out  of  his  father’s  estate.  ' 

You  mean  to  say  that  the  people,  from  whom  he 
has  derived  his  being,  will  maintain  him  and  his  com- 
panions ? 

Yes,  he  said;  they  can  not  help  themselves. 

But  what  if  the  people  fly  into  a passion,  and  aver 
that  a grown-up  son  ought  not  to  be  supported  by  his 
father,  but  that  the  father  should  be  supported  by  the 
son?  The  father  did  not  bring  him  into  being,  or 
settle  him  in  life,  in  order  that  when  his  son  became  a 
man  he  should  himself  be  the  servant  of  his  own  serv- 
ants and  should  support  him  and  his  rabble  of  slaves 
and  companions ; but  that  his  son  should  protect  him, 
and  that  by  his  help  he  might  be  emancipated  from 
the  government  of  the  rich  and  aristocratic,  as  they 
are  termed.  And  so  he  bids  him  and  his  companions 
depart,  just  as  any  other  father  might  drive  out  of  the 
house  a riotous  son  and  his  undesirable  associates. 

By  heaven,  he  said,  then  the  parent  will  discover 
what  a monster  he  has  been  fostering  in  his  bosom; 
and,  when  he  wants  to  drive  him  out,  he  will  find  that 
he  is  weak  and  his  son  strong. 

Why,  you  do  not  mean  to  say  that  the  tyrant  w'ill 
use  violence?  What!  beat  his  father  if  he  opposes 
him? 

Yes,  he  will,  having  first  disarmed  him. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


345 


Then  he  is  a parrieide,  and  a cruel  guardian  of  an 
aged  parent;  and  this  is  real  tyranny,  about  which 
there  can  be  no  longer  a mistake:  as  the  saying  is, 
the  people  who  would  escape  the  smoke  which  is  the 
slavery  of  freemen,  has  fallen  into  the  fire  which  is 
the  tyranny  of  slaves.  Thus  liberty,  getting  out  of  all 
order  and  reason,  passes  into  the  harshest  and  bitter- 
est form  of  slavery. 

True,  he  said. 

Very  well;  and  may  we  not  rightly  say  that  we 
have  sufficiently  discussed  the  nature  of  tyranny,  and 
the  manner  of  the  transition  from  democracy  to 
tyranny? 

Yes,  quite  enough,  he  said. 


1, 


7 


't~<  f / 


BOOK  IX 


Last  of  all  comes  the  tyrannical  man ; about  whom 
we  have  once  more  to  ask,  how  is  he  formed  out  of  the 
democratical?  and  how  does  he  live,  in  happiness  or 
in  misery? 

Yes,  he  said,  he  is  the  only  one  remaining. 

There  is,  however,  I said,  a previous  question  which 
remains  unanswered. 

What  question? 

I do  not  think  that  we  have  adequately  determined 
the  nature  and  number  of  the  appetites,  and  until 
this  is  accomplished  the  inquiry  will  always  be  con- 
fused. 

Well,  he  said,  it  is  not  too  late  to  supply  the  omis- 
sion. 

Very  true,  I said;  and  observe  the  point  which  I 
want  to  understand : Certain  of  the  unnecessary 

pleasures  and  appetites  I conceive  to  be  unlawful; 
every  one  appears  to  have  them,  but  in  some  persons 
they  are  controlled  by  the  laws  and  by  reason,  and  the 
better  desires  prevail  over  them  — either  they  are 
wholly  banished  or  they  become  few  and  weak ; while 
in  the  case  of  others  they  are  stronger,  and  there  are 
more  of  them. 

Which  appetites  do  you  mean? 

I mean  those  which  are  awake  when  the  reasoning 
and  human  and  ruling  power  is  asleep  ; then  the  wild 
beast  within  us,  gorged  with  meat  or  drink,  starts  up 
and  having  shaken  off  sleep,  goes  forth  to  satisfy 
his  desires;  and  there  is  no  conceivable  folly  or 
crime  — not  excepting  incest  or  any  other  unnatural 

349 


THE  REPUBLIC 


347 


union,  or  parricide,  or  the  eating  of  forbidden  food  — 
which  at  such  a time,  when  he  has  parted  company 
with  all  shame  and  sense,  a man  may  not  be  ready  to 
commit. 

Most  true,  he  said. 

But  when  a man’s  pulse  is  healthy  and  temperate, 
and  when  before  going  to  sleep  he  has  awakened  his 
rational  powers,  and  fed  them  on  noble  thoughts  and  j 
inquiries,  collecting  himself  in  meditation ; after  hav-  ! 
ing  first  indulged  his  appetites  neither  too  much  nor  ; 
too  little,  but  just  enough  to  lay  them  to  sleep,  and  ■ 
prevent  them  and  their  judgments  and  pains  from  ; 
interfering  with  the  higher  principle  — which  he  ; 
leaves  in  the  solitude  of  pure  abstraction,  free  to  con- 1 
template  and  aspire  to  the  knowledge  of  the  unknown,  I 
whether  in  past,  present,  or  future : when  again  he  has  ! 
allayed  the  passionate  element,  if  he  has  a quarrel  j 
against  any  one  — I say,  when,  after  pacifying  the  | 
two  irrational  principles,  he  rouses  up  the  third,  which  | 
is  reason,  before  he  takes  his  rest,  then,  as  you  know,  i 
he  attains  truth  most  nearly,  and  is  least  likely  to  be 
the  sport  of  fantastic  and  lawless  visions. 

I quite  agree. 

In  saying  this  I have  been  running  into  a digres- 
sion; but  the  point  which  I desire  to  note  is  that  in 
all  of  us,  even  in  good  men,  there  is  a lawless  wild- 
beast  nature,  which  peers  out  in  sleep.  Pray,  con- 
sider whether  I am  right,  and  you  agree  with  me. 

Yes,  I agree. 

And  now  remember  the  character  which  we  attrib- 
uted to  the  democratic  man.  He  was  supposed  from 
his  youth  upwards  to  have  been  trained  under  a 
miserly  parent,  who  encouraged  the  saving  appetites 
in  him,  but  discountenanced  the  unnecessary,  which 
aim  only  at  amusement  and  ornament? 

True. 


348 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  then  he  got  into  the  company  of  a more  refined, 
licentious  sort  of  people,  and  taking  to  all  their  wan- 
ton ways  rushed  into  the  opposite  extreme  from  an 
abhorrence  of  his  father’s  meanness.  At  last,  being 
a better  man  than  his  corruptors,  he  was  drawn  in 
both  directions  until  he  halted  midway  and  led  a life, 
not  of  vulgar  and  slavish  passion,  but  of  what  he 
deemed  moderate  indulgence  in  various  pleasures. 
After  this  manner  the  democrat  was  generated  out  of 
the  oligarch? 

Yes,  he  said;  that  was  our  view  of  him,  and  is  so 
still. 

And  now,  I said,  years  will  have  passed  away,  and 
you  must  conceive  this  man,  such  as  he  is,  to  have  a 
son,  who  is  brought  up  in  his  father’s  principles. 

I can  imagine  him. 

Then  you  must  further  imagine  the  same  thing  to 
happen  to  the  son  which  has  already  happened  to  the 
father:  — he  is  drawn  into  a perfectly  lawless  life, 
which  by  his  seducers  is  termed  perfect  liberty;  and 
his  father  and  friends  take  part  with  his  moderate 
desires,  and  the  opposite  party  assist  the  opposite 
ones.  As  soon  as  these  dire  magicians  and  tyrant- 
makers  find  that  they  are  losing  their  hold  on  him, 
they  contrive  to  implant  in  him  a master  passion,  to 
be  lord  over  his  idle  and  spendthrift  lusts  — a sort  of 
monstrous  winged  drone  — that  is  the  only  image 
which  will  adequately  describe  him. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  only  adequate  image  of  him. 

And  when  his  other  lusts,  amid  clouds  of  incense 
and  perfumes  and  garlands  and  wines,  and  all  the 
pleasures  of  a dissolute  life,  now  let  loose,  come  buzz- 
ing around  him,  nourishing  to  the  utmost  the  sting  of 
desire  which  they  implant  in  his  drone-like  nature, 
then  at  last  this  lord  of  the  soul,  having  Madness  for 
the  captain  of  his  guard,  breaks  out  into  a frenzy ; and 


THE  REPUBLIC 


349 


if  he  finds  in  himself  any  good  opinions  or  appetites 
in  process  of  formation/  and  there  is  in  him  any  sense 
of  shame  remaining,  to  these  better  principles  he  puts 
an  end,  and  casts  them  forth  until  he  has  purged  away 
temperance  and  brought  in  madness  to  the  full. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  way  in  which  the  tyrannical 
man  is  generated. 

And  is  not  this  the  reason  why  of  old  love  has  been 
called  a tyrant  ? 

I should  not  wonder. 

Further,  I said,  has  not  a drunken  man  also  the 
spirit  of  a tyrant? 

He  has. 

And  you  know  that  a man  who  is  deranged  and  not 
right  in  his  mind,  will  fancy  that  he  is  able  to  rule, 
not  only  over  men,  but  also  over  the  gods? 

That  he  will. 

And  the  tyrannical  man  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
word  comes  into  being  when,  either  under  the  influ- 
ence of  nature,  or  habit,  or  both,  he  becomes  drunken, 
lustful,  passionate?  O my  friend,  is  not  that  so? 

Assuredly. 

Such  is  the  man  and  such  is  his  origin.  And  next, 
how  does  he  live? 

Suppose,  as  people  facetiously  say,  you  were  to  tell 
me. 

I imagine,  I said,  at  the  next  step  in  his  progress, 
that  there  will  be  feasts  and  carousals  and  revellings 
and  courtezans,  and  all  that  sort  of  thing ; Love  is  the 
lord  of  the  house  within  him,  and  orders  all  the  con- 
cerns of  his  soul. 

That  is  certain. 

Yes;  and  every  day  and  every  night  desires  grow: 
up  many  and  formidable,  and  their  demands  are 
many. 

1 Or  ‘‘  opinions  or  appetites  such  as  are  deemed  to  be  good.” 


350 


THE  REPUBLIC 


They  are  indeed,  he  said. 

His  revenues,  if  he  has  any,  are  soon  spent. 

True. 

Then  conies  debt  and  the  cutting  down  of  his  prop- 
erty. 

Of  course. 

When  he  has  nothing  left,  must  not  his  desires, 
crowding  in  the  nest  like  young  ravens,  be  crying 
aloud  for  food;  and  he,  goaded  on  by  them,  and  es- 
pecially by  love  himself,  who  is  in  a manner  the  cap- 
tain of  them,  is  in  a frenzy,  and  would  fain  discover 
whom  he  can  defraud  or  despoil  of  his  property,  in 
order  that  he  may  gratify  them? 

Yes,  that  is  sure  to  be  the  case. 

He  must  have  money,  no  matter  how,  if  he  is  to 
escape  horrid  pains  and  pangs. 

He  must. 

And  as  in  himself  there  was  a succession  of  pleas- 
ures, and  the  new  got  the  better  of  the  old  and  took 
away  their  rights,  so  he  being  younger  will  claim  to 
have  more  than  his  father  and  his  mother,  and  if  he 
has  spent  his  own  share  of  the  property,  he  will  take 
a slice  of  theirs. 

No  doubt  he  will. 

And  if  his  parents  will  not  give  way,  then  he  will 
try  first  of  all  to  cheat  and  deceive  them. 

Very  true. 

And  if  he  fails,  then  he  will  use  force  and  plunder 
them. 

Yes,  probably. 

And  if  the  old  man  and  woman  fight  for  their  own, 
what  then,  my  friend?  Will  the  creature  feel  any 
compunction  at  tyrannizing  over  them? 

Nay,  he  said,  I should  not  feel  at  all  comfortable 
about  his  parents. 

But,  O heavens!  Adeimantus,  on  account  of  some 


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351 


new-fangled  love  of  a harlot,  who  is  anything  but  a 
necessary  connection,  can  you  believe  that  he  would 
strike  the  mother  who  is  his  ancient  friend  and  neces- 
sary to  his  very  existence,  and  would  place  her  under 
the  authority  of  the  other,  when  she  is  brought  under 
the  same  roof  with  her;  or  that,  under  like  circum- 
stances, he  would  do  the  same  to  his  withered  old 
father,  first  and  most  indispensable  of  friends,  for  the 
sake  of  some  newly-found  blooming  youth  who  is  the 
reverse  of  indispensable? 

Yes,  indeed,  he  said;  I believe  that  he  would. 

Truly,  then,  I said,  a tyrannical  son  is  a blessing 
to  his  father  and  mother. 

He  is  indeed,  he  replied. 

He  first  takes  their  property,  and  when  that  fails, 
and  pleasures  are  beginning  to  swarm  in  the  hive  of 
his  soul,  then  he  breaks  into  a house,  or  steals  the  gar- 
ments of  some  nightly  wayfarer ; next  he  proceeds  to 
clear  a temple.  Meanwhile  the  old  opinions  which  he 
had  when  a child,  and  which  gave  judgment  about 
good  and  evil,  are  overthrown  by  those  others  which 
have  just  been  emancipated,  and  are  now  the  body- 
guard of  love  and  share  his  empire.  These  in  his  dem- 
ocratic days,  when  he  was  still  subject  to  the  laws  and 
to  his  father,  were  only  let  loose  in  the  dreams  of  sleep. 
But  now  that  he  is  under  the  dominion  of  Love,  he 
becomes  always  and  in  waking  reality  what  he  was 
then  very  rarely  and  in  a dream  only ; he  will  commit 
the  foulest  murder,  or  eat  forbidden  food,  or  be  guilty 
of  any  other  horrid  act.  Love  is  his  tyrant,  and  lives 
lordly  in  him  and  lawlessly,  and  being  himself  a king, 
leads  him  on,  as  a tyrant  leads  a State,  to  the  per- 
formance of  any  reckless  deed  by  which  he  can  main- 
tain himself  and  the  rabble  of  his  associates,  whether 
those  whom  evil  communications  have  brought  in  from 
without,  or  those  whom  he  himself  has  allowed  to 


352 


THE  REPUBLIC 


break  loose  within  him  by  reason  of  a similar  evil 
nature  in  himself.  Have  we  not  here  a picture  of  his 
way  of  life? 

Yes,  indeed,  he  said. 

And  if  there  are  only  a few  of  them  in  the  State, 
and  the  rest  of  the  people  are  well  disposed,  they  go 
away  and  become  the  body-guard  or  mercenary  sol- 
diers of  some  other  tyrant  who  may  probably  want 
them  for  a war;  and  if  there  is  no  war,  they  stay  at 
home  and  do  many  little  pieces  of  mischief  in  the  city. 

What  sort  of  mischief? 

For  example,  they  are  the  thieves,  burglars,  cut- 
purses,  foot-pads,  robbers  of  temples,  man-stealers  of 
the  community ; or  if  they  are  able  to  speak  they  turn 
informers,  and  bear  false  witness,  and  take  bribes. 

A small  catalogue  of  evils,  even  if  the  perpetrators 
of  them  are  few  in  number. 

Yes,  I said;  but  small  and  great  are  comparative 
terms,  and  all  these  things,  in  the  misery  and  evil 
which  they  inflict  upon  a State,  do  not  come  within  a 
thousand  miles  of  the  tyrant;  when  this  noxious  class 
and  their  followers  grow  numerous  and  become  con- 
scious of  their  strength,  assisted  by  the  infatuation 
of  the  people,  they  choose  from  among  themselves  the 
one  who  has  most  of  the  tyrant  in  his  own  soul,  and 
him  they  create  their  tyrant. 

Yes,  he  said,  and  he  will  be  the  most  fit  to  be  a 
tyrant. 

If  the  people  yield,  well  and  good;  but  if  they  re- 
sist him,  as  he  began  by  beating  his  own  father  and 
mother,  so  now,  if  he  has  the  power,  he  beats  them, 
and  will  keep  his  dear  old  fatherland  or  motherland, 
as  the  Cretans  say,  in  subjection  to  his  young  re- 
tainers whom  he  has  introduced  to  be  their  rulers  and 
masters.  This  is  the  end  of  his  passions  and  desires. 

Exactly. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


353 


When  such  men  are  only  private  individuals  and 
before  they  get  power,  this  is  their  character;  they 
associate  entirely  with  their  own  flatterers  or  ready 
tools;  or  if  they  want  anything  from  anybody,  they 
in  their  turn  are  equally  ready  to  bow  down  before 
them:  they  profess  every  sort  of  affection  for  them; 
but  when  they  have  gained  their  point  they  know  them 
no  more. 

Yes,  truly. 

They  are  always  either  the  masters  or  servants  and 
never  the  friends  of  anybody;  the  tyrant  never  tastes 
of  true  freedom  or  friendship. 

Certainly  not. 

And  may  we  not  rightly  call  such  men  treacherous? 

No  question. 

Also  they  are  utterly  unjust,  if  we  were  right  in 
our  notion  of  justice? 

Yes,  he  said,  and  we  were  perfectly  right. 

Let  us  then  sum  up  in  a word,  I said,  the  character 
of  the  worst  man:  he  is  the  waking  reality  of  what 
we  dreamed. 

Most  true. 

And  this  is  he  who  being  by  nature  most  of  a tyrant 
bears  rule,  and  the  longer  he  lives  the  more  of  a 
tyrant  he  becomes. 

That  is  certain,  said  Glaucon,  taking  his  turn  to 
answer. 

And  will  not  he  who  has  been  shown  to  be  the  wick- 
edest, be  also  the  most  miserable?  and  he  who  has 
tyrannized  longest  and  most,  most  continually  and 
truly  miserable ; although  this  may  not  be  the  opinion 
of  men  in  general? 

Yes,  he  said,  inevitably. 

And  must  not  the  tyrannical  man  be  like  the  tyran- 
nical State,  and  the  democratical  man  like  the  demo- 
cratical  State;  and  the  same  of  the  others? 


354 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Certainly. 

And  as  State  is  to  State  in  virtue  and  happiness, 
so  is  man  in  relation  to  man? 

To  be  sure. 

Then  comparing  our  original  city,  which  was  under 
a king,  and  the  city  which  is  under  a tyrant,  how  do 
they  stand  as  to  virtue? 

They  are  the  opposite  extremes,  he  said,  for  one  is 
the  very  best  and  the  other  is  the  very  worst. 

There  can  be  no  mistake,  I said,  as  to  which  is 
which,  and  therefore  I will  at  once  inquire  whether 
you  would  arrive  at  a similar  deeision  about  their  rela- 
tive happiness  and  misery.  And  here  we  must  not 
allow  ourselves  to  be  panic-strieken  at  the  apparition 
of  the  tyrant,  who  is  only  a unit  and  may  perhaps 
have  a few  retainers  about  him;  but  let  us  go  as  we 
ought  into  every  corner  of  the  city  and  look  all  about, 
and  then  we  will  give  our  opinion. 

A fair  invitation,  he  replied;  and  I see,  as  every 
one  must,  that  a tyranny  is  the  wretchedest  form  of 
government,  and  the  rule  of  a king  the  happiest. 

And  in  estimating  the  men  too,  may  I not  fairly 
make  a like  request,  that  I should  have  a judge  whose 
mind  can  enter  into  and  see  through  human  nature? 
he  must  not  be  like  a ehild  who  looks  at  the  outside 
and  is  dazzled  at  the  pompous  aspect  which  the  tyran- 
nical nature  assumes  to  the  beholder,  but  let  him  be 
one  who  has  a clear  insight.  May  I suppose  that  the 
judgment  is  given  in  the  hearing  of  us  all  by  one  who 
is  able  to  judge,  and  has  dwelt  in  the  same  place  with 
him,  and  been  present  at  his  daily  life  and  known  him 
in  his  family  relations,  where  he  may  be  seen  stripped 
of  his  tragedy  attire,  and  again  in  the  hour  of  public 
danger  — he  shall  tell  us  about  the  happiness  and 
misery  of  the  tyrant  when  compared  with  other  men? 

That  again,  he  said,  is  a very  fair  proposal. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


355 


Shall  I assume  that  we  ourselves  are  able  arid  ex- 
perienced judges  and  have  before  now  met  with  such  a 
person?  We  shall  then  have  some  one  who  will 
answer  our  inquiries. 

By  all  means. 

Let  me  ask  you  not  to  forget  the  parallel  of  the  in-| 
dividual  and  the  State;  bearing  this  in  mind,  and' 
glancing  in  turn  from  one  to  the  other  of  them,  will 
you  tell  me  their  respective  conditions? 

What  do  you  mean?  he  asked. 

Beginning  with  the  State,  I replied,  would  you  say 
that  a city  which  is  governed  by  a tyrant  is  free  or  en- 
slaved? 

No  city,  he  said,  can  be  more  completely  enslaved. 

And  yet,  as  you  see,  there  are  freemen  as  well  as 
masters  in  such  a State? 

Yes,  he  said,  I see  that  there  are  — a few;  hut  the 
people,  speaking  generally,  and  the  best  of  them  are 
miserably  degraded  and  enslaved. 

Then  if  the  man  is  like  the  State,  I said,  must  not 
the  same  rule  prevail?  his  soul  is  full  of  meanness  and 
vulgarity  — the  best  elements  in  him  are  enslaved; 
and  there  is  a small  ruling  part,  which  is  also  the  worst 
and  maddest. 

Inevitably. 

And  would  you  say  that  the  soul  of  such  an  one  is 
the  soul  of  a freeman,  or  of  a slave? 

He  has  the  soul  of  a slave,  in  my  opinion. 

And  the  State  which  is  enslaved  under  a tyrant  is 
utterly  incapable  of  acting  voluntarily? 

Utterly  incapable. 

And  also  the  soul  which  is  under  a tyrant  (I  am 
speaking  of  the  soul  taken  as  a whole)  is  least  capable 
of  doing  what  she  desires;  there  is  a gadfly  which 
goads  her,  and  she  is  full  of  trouble  and  remorse? 

Certainly. 


356 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  is  the  city  which  is  under  a tyrant  rich  or 
poor? 

Poor. 

And  the  tyrannical  soul  must  be  always  poor  and 
insatiable  ? 

True. 

And  must  not  such  a State  and  such  a man  be 
always  full  of  fear? 

Yes,  indeed. 

Is  there  any  State  in  which  you  will  find  more  of 
lamentation  and  sorrow  and  groaning  and  pain? 

Certainly  not. 

And  is  there  any  man  in  whom  you  will  find  more 
of  this  sort  of  misery  than  in  the  tyrannical  man,  who 
is  in  a fury  of  passions  and  desires? 

Impossible. 

Reflecting  upon  these  and  similar  evils,  you  held  the 
tyrannical  State  to  be  the  most  miserable  of  States? 

And  I was  right,  he  said. 

Certainly,  I said.  And  when  you  see  the  same 
evils  in  the  tyrannical  man,  what  do  you  say  of  him? 

I say  that  he  is  by  far  the  most  miserable  of  all  men. 

There,  I said,  I think  that  you  are  beginning  to  go 
wrong. 

What  do  you  mean? 

I do  not  think  that  he  has  as  yet  reached  the  utmost 
extreme  of  misery. 

Then  who  is  more  miserable? 

One  of  whom  I am  about  to  speak. 

Who  is  that? 

He  who  is  of  a tyrannical  nature,  and  instead  of 
leading  a private  life  has  been  cursed  with  the  further 
misfortune  of  being  a public  tyrant. 

From  what  has  been  said,  I gather  that  you  are 
right. 

Yes,  I replied,  but  in  this  high  argument  you  should 


THE  REPUBLIC 


357 


be  a little  more  certain,  and  should  not  conjecture 
only;  for  of  all  questions,  this  respecting  good  and 
evil  is  the  greatest. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Let  me  then  offer  you  an  illustration,  which  may,  I 
think,  throw  a light  upon  this  subject. 

What  is  your  illustration? 

The  case  of  rich  individuals  in  cities  who  possess 
many  slaves:  from  them  you  may  form  an  idea  of  the 
tyrant’s  condition,  for  they  both  have  slaves ; the  only 
difference  is  that  he  has  more  slaves. 

Yes,  that  is  the  difference. 

You  know  that  they  live  securely  and  have  nothing 
to  apprehend  from  their  servants? 

What  should  they  fear? 

Nothing.  But  do  you  observe  the  reason  of  this? 

Yes;  the  reason  is,  that  the  whole  city  is  leagued 
together  for  the  protection  of  each  individual. 

Very  true,  I said.  But  imagine  one  of  these 
owners,  the  master  say  of  some  fifty  slaves,  together 
with  his  family  and  property  and  slaves,  carried  off 
by  a god  into  the  wilderness,  where  there  are  no  free- 
men to  help  him  — will  he  not  be  in  an  agony  of  fear 
lest  he  and  his  wife  and  children  should  be  put  to 
death  by  his  slaves? 

Yes,  he  said,  he  will  be  in  the  utmost  fear. 

The  time  has  arrived  when  he  will  be  compelled  to 
flatter  divers  of  his  slaves,  and  make  many  promises 
to  them  of  freedom  and  other  things,  much  against 
his  will  — he  will  have  to  cajole  his  own  servants. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  will  be  the  only  way  of  saving 
himself. 

And  suppose  the  same  god,  who  carried  him  away, 
to  surround  him  with  neighbors  who  will  not  suffer 
one  man  to  be  the  master  of  another,  and  who,  if  they 
could  catch  the  offender,  would  take  his  life? 


358 


THE  REPUBLIC 


His  case  will  be  still  worse,  if  you  suppose  him 
to  be  everywhere  surrounded  and  watched  by  ene- 
mies. 

And  is  not  this  the  sort  of  prison  in  which  the  tyrant 
will  be  bound  — he  who  being  by  nature  such  as  we 
have  described,  is  full  of  all  sorts  of  fears  and  lusts? 
His  soul  is  dainty  and  greedy,  and  yet  alone,  of  all 
men  in  the  city,  he  is  never  allowed  to  go  on  a journey, 
or  to  see  the  things  which  other  freemen  desire  to  see, 
but  he  lives  in  his  hole  like  a woman  hidden  in  the 
house,  and  is  jealous  of  any  other  citizen  who  goes 
into  foreign  parts  and  sees  anything  of  interest. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

And  amid  evils  such  as  these  will  not  he  who  is  ill- 
governed  in  his  own  person  — the  tyrannical  man,  I 
mean  — whom  you  just  now  decided  to  be  the  most 
miserable  of  all  — w ill  not  he  be  yet  more  miserable 
when,  instead  of  leading  a private  life,  he  is  con- 
strained by  fortune  to  be  a public  tyrant?  He  has  to 
be  master  of  others  when  he  is  not  master  of  himself : 
he  is  like  a diseased  or  paralytic  man  who  is  compelled 
to  pass  his  life,  not  in  retirement,  but  fighting  and 
combating  with  other  men. 

Yes,  he  said,  the  similitude  is  most  exact. 

Is  not  his  case  utterly  miserable?  and  does  not  the 
actual  tyrant  lead  a worse  life  than  he  whose  life  you 
determined  to  be  the  worst? 

Certainly. 

He  who  is  the  real  tyrant,  whatever  men  may  think, 
is  the  real  slave,  and  is  obliged  to  practise  the  greatest 
adulation  and  servility,  and  to  be  the  flatterer  of  the 
vilest  of  mankind.  He  has  desires  which  he  is  utterly 
unable  to  satisfy,  and  has  more  wants  than  any  one, 
and  is  truly  poor,  if  you  know  how  to  inspect  the 
whole  soul  of  him:  all  his  life  long  he  is  beset  with 
fear  and  is  full  of  convulsions  and  distractions,  even 


THE  REPUBLIC  359 

^ as  the  State  which  he  resembles : and  surely  the  resem- 
i^blance  holds? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Moreover,  as  we  were  saying  before,  he  grows 
worse  from  having  power : he  becomes  and  is  of  neces- 
sity more  jealous,  more  faithless,  more  unjust,  more 
friendless,  more  impious,  than  he  was  at  first;  he  is 
the  purveyor  and  cherisher  of  every  sort  of  vice,  and 
the  consequence  is  that  he  is  supremely  miserable,  and 
that  he  makes  everybody  else  as  miserable  as  himself. 

No  man  of  any  sense  will  dispute  your  words. 

Come  then,  I said,  and  as  the  general  umpire  in 
theatrical  contests  proclaims  the  result,  do  you  also 
decide  who  in  your  opinion  is  first  in  the  scale  of  hap- 
piness, and  who  second,  and  in  what  order  the  others 
follow:  there  are  five  of  them  in  all  — they  are  the 
royal,  timocratical,  oligarchical,  democratical,  tyran- 
nical. 

The  decision  will  be  easily  given,  he  replied;  they 
shall  be  choruses  coming  on  the  stage,  and  I must 
judge  them  in  the  order  in  which  they  enter,  by  the 
criterion  of  virtue  and  vice,  happiness  and  misery. 

Need  we  hire  a herald,  or  shall  I announce,  that  the 
son  of  Ariston  [the  best]  has  decided  that  the  best  andl 
justest  is  also  the  happiest,  and  that  this  is  he  who  is  1 
the  most  royal  man  and  king  over  himself ; and  that 
the  worst  and  most  unjust  man  is  also  the  most  miser- 
able, and  that  this  is  he  who  being  the  greatest  tyrant 
of  himself  is  also  the  greatest  tyrant  of  his  State? 

Make  the  proclamation  yourself,  he  said. 

And  shall  I add,  “ whether  seen  or  unseen  by  gods 
and  men  ” ? 

Let  the  words  be  added. 

Then  this,  I said,  will  be  our  first  proof ; and  there 
is  another,  which  may  also  have  some  weight. 

iWhat  is  that? 


360 


THE  REPUBLIC 


The  second  proof  is  derived  from  the  nature  of  the 
soul:  seeing  that  the  individual  soul,  like  the  State, 
has  been  divided  by  us  into  three  principles,  the  divi- 
sion may,  I think,  furnish  a new  demonstration. 

Of  what  nature? 

It  seems  to  me  that  to  these  three  principles  three 
pleasures  correspond;  also  three  desires  and  govern- 
ing powers. 

How  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

There  is  one  principle  with  which,  as  we  were  say- 
ing, a man  learns,  another  with  which  he  is  angry; 
the  third,  having  many  forms,  has  no  special  name, 
but  is  denoted  by  the  general  term  appetitive,  from 
the  extraordinary  strength  and  vehemence  of  the  de- 
sires of  eating  and  drinking  and  the  other  sensual 
appetites  which  are  the  main  elements  of  it;  also 
money-loving,  because  such  desires  are  generally  sat- 
isfied by  the  help  of  money. 

That  is  true,  he  said. 

If  we  were  to  say  that  the  loves  and  pleasures  of 
this  third  part  were  concerned  with  gain,  we  should 
then  be  able  to  fall  back  on  a single  notion;  and  might 
truly  and  intelligibly  describe  this  part  of  the  soul  as 
loving  gain  or  money. 

I agree  with  you. 

Again,  is  not  the  passionate  element  wholly  set  on 
ruling  and  conquering  and  getting  fame? 

True. 

Suppose  we  call  it  the  contentious  or  ambitious  — 
would  the  term  be  suitable? 

Extremely  suitable. 

On  the  other  hand,  every  one  sees  that  the  principle 
of  knowledge  is  wholly  directed  to  the  truth,  and  cares 
less  than  either  of  the  others  for  gain  or  fame. 

Far  less. 

“ Lover  of  wisdom,”  “ lover  of  knowledge,”  are 


THE  REPUBLIC 


361 


titles  which  we  may  fitly  apply  to  that  part  of  the 
soul? 

Certainly. 

One  principle  prevails  in  the  souls  of  one  class  of 
men,  another  in  others,  as  may  happen? 

Yes. 

Then  we  may  begin  by  assuming  that  there  are 
three  classes  of  men  — lovers  of  wisdom,  lovers  of 
honor,  lovers  of  gain? 

Exactly. 

And  there  are  three  kinds  of  pleasure,  which  are 
their  several  objects? 

Very  true. 

Now,  if  you  examine  the  three  classes  of  men,  and 
ask  of  them  in  turn  which  of  their  lives  is  pleasantest, 
each  will  be  found  praising  his  own  and  depreciating 
that  of  others:  the  money-maker  will  contrast  the 
vanity  of  honor  or  of  learning  if  they  bring  no  money 
with  the  solid  advantages  of  gold  and  silver? 

True,  he  said. 

And  the  lover  of  honor  — what  will  be  his  opinion? 
Will  he  not  think  that  the  pleasure  of  riches  is  vul- 
gar, while  the  pleasure  of  learning,  if  it  brings  no 
distinction,  is  all  smoke  and  nonsense  to  him? 

Very  true. 

And  are  we  to  suppose,*  I said,  that  the  philosopher 
sets  any  value  on  other  pleasures  in  comparison  with 
the  pleasure  of  knowing  the  truth,  and  in  that  pursuit 
abiding,  ever  learning,  not  so  far  indeed  from  the 
heaven  of  pleasure?  Does  he  not  call  the  other  pleas- 
ures necessary,  under  the  idea  that  if  there  were  no 
necessity  for  them,  he  would  rather  not  have  them? 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  that,  he  replied. 

Since,  then,  the  pleasures  of  each  class  and  the  life 

' Reading  with  Grasere  and  Hermann  tL  ol(t>fA€$a,  and  omitting 
which  is  not  found  in  the  best  MSS. 


362 


THE  REPUBLIC 


of  each  are  in  dispute,  and  the  question  is  not  which 
life  is  more  or  less  honorable,  or  better  or  worse,  but 
which  is  the  more  pleasant  or  painless  — how  shall  we 
know  who  speaks  truly? 

I can  not  myself  tell,  he  said. 

Well,  but  what  ought  to  be  the  criterion?  Is  any 
better  than  experience  and  wisdom  and  reason? 

There  can  not  be  a better,  he  said. 

Then,  I said,  reflect.  Of  the  three  individuals, 
which  has  the  greatest  experience  of  all  the  pleasures 
which  we  enumerated?  Has  the  lover  of  gain,  in 
learning  the  nature  of  essential  truth,  greater  experi- 
ence of  the  pleasure  of  knowledge  than  the  philos- 
opher has  of  the  pleasure  of  gain? 

The  philosopher,  he  replied,  has  greatly  the  ad- 
vantage; for  he  has  of  necessity  always  known  the 
taste  of  the  other  pleasures  from  his  childhood  up- 
wards : but  the  lover  of  gain  in  all  his  experience  has 
not  of  necessity  tasted  — or,  I should  rather  say,  even 
1 had  he  desired,  could  hardly  have  tasted  — the  sweet- 
ness of  learning  and  knowing  truth. 

Then  the  lover  of  wisdom  has  a great  advantage 
over  the  lover  of  gain,  for  he  has  a double  experience? 

Yes,  very  great. 

Again,  has  he  greater  experience  of  the  pleasures  of 
honor,  or  the  lover  of  honor  of  the  pleasures  of  wis- 
dom? 

Nay,  he  said,  all  three  are  honored  in  proportion  as 
they  attain  their  object;  for  the  rich  man  and  the 
brave  man  and  the  wise  man  alike  have  their  crowd 
of  admirers,  and  as  they  all  receive  honor  they  all  have 
experience  of  the  pleasures  of  honor;  but  the  delight 
which  is  to  be  found  in  the  knowledge  of  true  being 
is  known  to  the  philosopher  only. 

His  experience,  then,  will  enable  him  to  judge  bet- 
ter than  any  one? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


363 


Far  better. 

And  he  is  the  only  one  who  has  wisdom  as  well  as 
experience? 

Certainly. 

Further,  the  very  faculty  which  is  the  instrument  of 
judgment  is  not  possessed  by  the  covetous  or  amhi-. 
tious  man,  but  only  by  the  philosopher?  j 

What  faculty?  \ 

Reason,  with  whom,  as  we  were  saying,  the  decision 
ought  to  rest. 

Yes. 

And  reasoning  is  peculiarly  his  instrument?  i 

Certainly. 

If  wealth  and  gain  were  the  criterion,  then  the 
praise  or  blame  of  the  lover  of  gain  would  surely  be 
the  most  trustworthy? 

Assuredly. 

Or  if  honor  or  victory  or  courage,  in  that  case  the 
judgment  of  the  ambitious  or  pugnacious  would  be 
the  truest? 

Clearly. 

But  since  experience  and  wisdom  and  reason  are 
the  judges  — 

The  only  inference  possible,  he  replied,  is  that  pleas- 
ures which  are  approved  by  the  lover  of  wisdom  and 
reason  are  the  truest. 

And  so  we  arrive  at  the  result,  that  the  pleasure  of  j 
the  intelligent  part  of  the  soul  is  the  pleasantest  of  the 
three,  and  that  he  of  us  in  whom  this  is  the  ruling, 
principle  has  the  pleasantest  life. 

Unquestionably,  he  said,  the  wise  man  speaks  with 
authority  when  he  approves  of  his  own  life. 

And  what  does  the  judge  affirm  to  be  the  life  which 
is  next,  and  the  pleasure  which  is  next? 

Clearly  that  of  the  soldier  and  lover  of  honor;  who 
is  nearer  to  himself  than  the  money-maker. 


364 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Last  comes  the  lover  of  gain? 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Twice  in  suecession,  then,  has  the  just  man  over- 
thrown the  unjust  in  this  conflict;  and  now  comes  the 
third  trial,  wdiich  is  dedicated  to  Olympian  Zeus  the 
savior:  a sage  whispers  in  my  ear  that  no  pleasure 
except  that  of  the  wise  is  quite  true  and  pure  — all 
others  are  a shadow  only;  and  surely  this  will  prove 
the  greatest  and  most  decisive  of  falls? 

Yes,  the  greatest;  but  will  you  explain  yourself? 

I will  work  out  the  subject  and  you  shall  answer 
my  questions. 

Proceed. 

Say,  then,  is  not  pleasure  opposed  to  pain? 

True. 

And  there  is  a neutral  state  which  is  neither  pleas- 
ure nor  pain? 

There  is. 

A state  which  is  intermediate,  and  a sort  of  repose 
of  the  soul  about  either  — that  is  what  you  mean? 

Yes. 

You  remember  what  people  say  when  they  are 
sick? 

What  do  they  say? 

That  after  all  nothing  is  pleasanter  than  health. 
But  then  they  never  knew  this  to  be  the  greatest  of 
pleasures  until  they  were  ill. 

Yes,  I know,  he  said. 

And  when  persons  are  suffering  from  acute  pain, 
you  must  have  heard  them  say  that  there  is  nothing 
pleasanter  than  to  get  rid  of  their  pain? 

I have. 

And  there  are  many  other  cases  of  suffering  in 
which  the  mere  rest  and  cessation  of  pain,  and  not  any 
positive  enjoyment,  is  extolled  by  them  as  the  greatest 
pleasure? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


365 


Yes,  he  said;  at  the  time  they  are  pleased  and  well 
content  to  be  at  rest. 

Again,  when  pleasure  ceases,  that  sort  of  rest  or 
cessation  will  be  painful? 

Doubtless,  he  said. 

Then  the  intermediate  state  of  rest  will  be  pleasure 
and  will  also  be  pain? 

So  it  would  seem. 

But  can  that  which  is  neither  become  both? 

I should  say  not. 

And  both  pleasure  and  pain  are  motions  of  the  soul, 
are  they  not? 

Yes. 

But  that  which  is  neither  was  just  now  shown  to  be 
rest  and  not  motion,  and  in  a mean  between  them? 

Yes. 

How,  then,  can  we  be  right  in  supposing  that  the 
absence  of  pain  is  pleasure,  or  that  the  absence  of 
pleasure  is  pain? 

Impossible. 

This  then  is  an  appearance  only  and  not  a reality ; 
that  is  to  say,  the  rest  is  pleasure  at  the  moment  and 
in  comparison  of  what  is  painful,  and  painful  in  com- 
parison of  what  is  pleasant;  but  all  these  representa- 
tions, when  tried  by  the  test  of  true  pleasure,  are  not 
real  but  a sort  of  imposition? 

That  is  the  inference. 

Look  at  the  other  class  of  pleasures  which  have  no 
antecedent  pains  and  you  will  no  longer  suppose,  as 
you  perhaps  may  at  present,  that  pleasure  is  only  the 
cessation  of  pain,  or  pain  of  pleasure. 

What  are  they,  he  said,  and  where  shall  I find  them? 

There  are  many  of  them:  take  as  an  example  the 
pleasures  of  smell,  which  are  very  great  and  have  no 
antecedent  pains;  they  come  in  a moment,  and  v/hen 
they  depart  leave  no  pain  behind  them. 


36(5 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Most  true,  he  said. 

Let  us  not,  then,  be  induced  to  believe  that  pure 
pleasure  is  the  cessation  of  pain,  or  pain  of  pleasure. 

No. 

Still,  the  more  numerous  and  violent  pleasures 
which  reach  the  soul  through  the  body  are  generally 
of  this  sort  — they  are  reliefs  of  pain. 

That  is  true. 

And  the  anticipations  of  future  pleasures  and  pains 
are  of  a like  nature? 

Yes. 

Shall  I give  you  an  illustration  of  them? 

Let  me  hear. 

You  would  allow,  I said,  that  there  is  in  nature  an 
upper  and  lower  and  middle  region? 

I should. 

And  if  a person  were  to  go  from  the  lower  to  the 
middle  region,  would  he  not  imagine  that  he  is  going 
up;  and  he  who  is  standing  in  the  middle  and  sees 
whence  he  has  come,  would  imagine  that  he  is  already 
in  the  upper  region,  if  he  has  never  seen  the  true 
upper  world? 

To  be  sure,  he  said ; how  can  he  think  otherwise  ? 

But  if  he  were  taken  back  again  he  would  imagine, 
and  truly  imagine,  that  he  was  descending? 

No  doubt. 

All  that  would  arise  out  of  his  ignorance  of  the  true 
upper  and  middle  and  lower  regions? 

Yes. 

Then  can  you  wonder  that  persons  who  are  inex- 
perienced in  the  truth,  as  they  have  wrong  ideas  about 
many  other  things,  should  also  have  wrong  ideas 
about  pleasure  and  pain  and  the  intermediate  state; 
so  that  when  they  are  only  being  drawn  towards  the 
painful  they  feel  pain  and  think  the  pain  which  they 
experience  to  be  real,  and  in  like  manner,  when  drawn 


THE  REPUBLIC 


367 


away  from  pain  to  the  neutral  or  intermediate  state, 
they  firmly  believe  that  they  have  reaehed  the  goal  of 
satiety  and  pleasure ; they,  not  knowing  pleasure,  err 
in  contrasting  pain  with  the  absence  of  pain,  which  is 
like  contrasting  black  with  gray  instead  of  white  — 
can  you  wonder,  I say,  at  this? 

No,  indeed;  I should  be  much  more  disposed  to 
wonder  at  the  opposite. 

Look  at  the  matter  thus : — Hunger,  thirst,  and  the 
like,  are  inanitions  of  the  bodily  state? 

Yes. 

And  ignorance  and  folly  are  inanitions  of  the  soul? 

True. 

And  food  and  wisdom  are  the  corresponding  satis- 
factions of  either? 

Certainly. 

And  is  the  satisfaction  derived  from  that  which  has 
less  or  from  that  which  has  more  existence  the  truer? 

Clearly,  from  that  which  has  more. 

What  classes  of  things  have  a greater  share  of  pure 
existence  in  your  judgment  — those  of  which  food 
and  drink  and  condiments  and  all  kinds  of  sustenance 
are  examples,  or  the  class  which  contains  true  opinion<i^ 
and  knowledge  and  mind  and  all  the  different  kinds 
of  virtue?  Put  the  question  in  this  way:  — Which 
has  a more  pure  being  — that  which  is  concerned  with  • 
the  invariable,  the  immortal,  and  the  true,  and  is  of  \ 
such  a nature,  and  is  found  in  such  natures;  or  that 
which  is  concerned  with  and  found  in  the  variable  and 
mortal,  and  is  itself  variable  and  mortal? 

Far  purer,  he  replied,  is  the  being  of  that  which  is 
concerned  with  the  invariable. 

And  does  the  essence  of  the  invariable  partake  of 
knowledge  in  the  same  degree  as  of  essence  ? 

Yes,  of  knowledge  in  the  same  degree. 

And  of  truth  in  the  same  degree?. 


368 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Yes. 

And,  conversely,  that  which  has  less  of  truth  will 
also  have  less  of  essence? 

Necessarily. 

Then,  in  general,  those  kinds  of  things  which  are 
in  the  service  of  the  body  have  less  of  truth  and  essence 
than  those  which  are  in  the  service  of  the  soul? 

Far  less. 

And  has  not  the  body  itself  less  of  truth  and  essence 
than  the  soul? 

I Yes. 

I What  is  filled  with  more  real  existence,  and  actu- 
ally has  a more  real  existence,  is  more  really  filled  than 
{that  which  is  filled  with  less  real  existence  and  is  less 
real? 

Of  course. 

And  if  there  he  a pleasure  in  being  filled  with  that 
which  is  according  to  nature,  that  which  is  more  really 
filled  with  more  real  being  will  more  really  and  truly 
enjoy  true  pleasure;  whereas  that  which  participates 
in  less  real  being  will  be  less  truly  and  surely  satisfied, 
and  will  participate  in  an  illusory  and  less  real  pleas- 
•ure? 

Unquestionably. 

Those  then  who  know  not  wisdom  and  virtue,  and 
are  always  busy  with  gluttony  and  sensuality,  go 
down  and  up  again  as  far  as  the  mean;  and  in  this 
region  they  move  at  random  throughout  life,  but  they 
never  pass  into  the  true  upper  world;  thither  they 
neither  look,  nor  do  they  ever  find  their  way,  neither 
are  they  truly  filled  with  true  being,  nor  do  they  taste 
of  pure  and  abiding  pleasure.  Like  cattle,  with  their 
eyes  always  looking  down  and  their  heads  stooping 
to  the  earth,  that  is,  to  the  dining  table,  they  fatten 
and  feed  and  breed,  and,  in  their  excessive  love  of 
these  delights,  they  kick  and  butt  at  one  another  with 


THE  REPUBLIC 


369 


horns  and  hoofs  which  are  made  of  iron ; and  they  kill 
one  another  by  reason  of  their  insatiable  lust.  For 
they  fill  themselves  with  that  which  is  not  substantial, 
and  the  part  of  themselves  which  they  fill  is  also  un- 
substantial and  incontinent. 

Verily,  Socrates,  said  Glaucon,  you  describe  the 
life  of  the  many  like  an  oracle. 

Their  pleasures  are  mixed  with  pains  — how  can 
they  be  otherwise?  For  they  are  mere  shadows  and 
pictures  of  the  true,  and  are  colored  by  contrast,  which 
exaggerates  both  light  and  shade,  and  so  they  im- 
plant in  the  minds  of  fools  insane  desires  of  them- 
selves ; and  they  are  fought  about  as  Stesichorus  says 
that  the  Greeks  fought  about  the  shadow  of  Helen 
at  Troy  in  ignorance  of  the  truth. 

Something  of  that  sort  must  inevitably  happen. 

And  must  not  the  like  happen  with  the  spirited  or 
passionate  element  of  the  soul?  Will  not  the  passion- 
ate man  who  carries  his  passion  into  action,  be  in  the 
like  case,  whether  he  is  envious  and  ambitious,  or  vio- 
lent and  contentious,  or  angry  and  discontented,  if 
he  be  seeking  to  attain  honor  and  victory  and  the  satis- 
faction of  his  anger  without  reason  or  sense? 

Yes,  he  said,  the  same  wiU  happen  with  the  spirited 
element  also. 

Then  may  we  not  confidently  assert  that  the  lovers 
of  money  and  honor,  when  they  seek  their  pleasures 
under  the  guidance  and  in  the  company  of  reason  and 
knowledge,  and  pursue  after  and  win  the  pleasures 
which  wisdom  shows  them,  will  also  have  the  truest 
pleasures  in  the  highest  degree  which  is  attainable  to 
them,  inasmuch  as  they  follow  truth;  and  they  will 
have  the  pleasures  which  are  natural  to  them,  if  that 
which  is  best  for  each  one  is  also  most  natural  to  him? 

Yes,  certainly;  the  best  is  the  most  natural. 

And  when  the  whole  soul  follows  the  philosophical 


370 


THE  REPUBLIC 


principle,  and  there  is  no  division,  the  several  parts  are 
just,  and  do  each  of  them  their  own  business,  and  en- 
joy severally  the  best  and  truest  pleasures  of  which 
they  are  capable? 

Exactly. 

But  when  either  of  the  two  other  principles  prevails, 
it  fails  in  attaining  its  own  pleasure,  and  compels  the 
rest  to  pursue  after  a pleasure  which  is  a shadow  only 
and  which  is  not  their  own? 

True. 

And  the  greater  the  interval  which  separates  them 
from  philosophy  and  reason,  the  more  strange  and 
illusive  will  be  the  pleasure? 

Yes.  _ 

And  is  not  that  farthest  from  reason  which  is  at 
the  greatest  distance  from  law  and  order? 

Clearly. 

And  the  lustful  and  tyrannical  desires  are,  as  we 
saw,  at  the  greatest  distance? 

Yes. 

And  the  royal  and  orderly  desires  are  nearest? 

Yes. 

Then  the  tyrant  will  live  at  the  greatest  distance 
from  true  or  natural  pleasure,  and  the  king  at  the 
least  ? 

Certainly. 

But  if  so,  the  tyrant  will  live  most  unpleasantly, 
and  the  king  most  pleasantly? 

Inevitably. 

Would  you  know  the  measure  of  the  interval  which 
separates  them? 

Will  you  tell  me? 

There  appear  to  be  three  pleasures,  one  genuine 
and  two  spurious : now  the  transgression  of  the  tyrant 
reaches  a point  beyond  the  spurious ; he  has  run  away 
from  the  region  of  law  and  reason,  and  taken  up  his 


THE  REPUBLIC 


371 


abode  with  certain  slave  pleasures  which  are  his  satel- 
lites, and  the  measure  of  his  inferiority  can  only  be 
expressed  in  a figure. 

How  do  you  mean? 

I assume,  I said,  that  the  tyrant  is  in  the  third  place 
from  the  oligarch;  the  democrat  was  in  the  middle? 
Yes. 

And  if  there  is  truth  in  what  has  preceded,  he  will 
be  wedded  to  an  image  of  pleasure  which  is  thrice 
removed  as  to  truth  from  the  pleasure  of  the  oligarch? 

He  will. 

And  the  oligarch  is  third  from  the  royal;  since  we 
count  as  one  royal  and  aristocratical? 

Yes,  he  is  third. 

Then  the  tyrant  is  removed  from  true  pleasure  by 
the  space  of  a number  which  is  three  times  three? 

Manifestly. 

The  shadow  then  of  tyrannical  pleasure  determined 
by  the  number  of  length  will  be  a plane  figure. 

Certainly. 

And  if  you  raise  the  power  and  make  the  plane  a 
solid,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  seeing  how  vast  is  the 
interval  by  which  the  tyrant  is  parted  from  the 
king. 

Yes;  the  arithmetician  will  easily  do  the  sum. 

Or  if  some  person  begins  at  the  other  end  arid 
measures  the  interval  by  which  the  king  is  parted  from 
the  tyrant  in  truth  of  pleasure,  he  will  find  him,  when 
the  multiplication  is  completed,  living  729  times  more 
pleasantly,  and  the  tyrant  more  painfully  by  this 
same  interval. 

What  a wonderful  calculation!  And  how  enor- 
mous is  the  distance  which  separates  the  just  from  the 
unjust  in  regard  to  pleasure  and  pain! 

Yet  a true  calculation,  I said,  and  a number  which 
pearly  concerns  human  life,  if  human  beings  are 


372 


THE  REPUBLIC 


concerned  with  days  and  nights  and  months  and 
years.^ 

Yes,  he  said,  human  life  is  certainly  concerned  with 
them. 

Then  if  the  good  and  just  man  be  thus  superior  in 
pleasure  to  the  evil  and  unjust,  his  superiority  will  he 
infinitely  greater  in  propriety  of  life  and  in  beauty 
and  virtue? 

Immeasurably  greater. 

Well,  I said,  and  now  having  arrived  at  this  stage 
of  the  argument,  we  may  revert  to  the  words  which 
brought  us  hither:  Was  not  some  one  saying  that  in- 
justice was  a gain  to  the  perfectly  unjust  who  was  re- 
puted to  be  just? 

Yes,  that  was  said. 

Now  then,  having  determined  the  power  and 
quality  of  justice  and  injustice,  let  us  have  a little 
conversation  with  him. 

What  shall  we  say  to  him? 

Let  us  make  an  image  of  the  soul,  that  he  may  have 
his  own  words  presented  before  his  eyes. 

Of  what  sort? 

An  ideal  image  of  the  soul,  like  the  composite 
creations  of  ancient  mythology,  such  as  the  Chimera 
or  Scylla  or  Cerberus,  and  there  are  many  others  in 
which  two  or  more  different  natures  are  said  to  grow 
into  one. 

There  are  said  to  have  been  such  unions. 

Then  do  you  now  model  the  form  of  a multitu- 
dinous, many-headed  monster,  having  a ring  of  heads 
of  all  manner  of  beasts,  tame  and  wild,  which  he  is 
able  to  generate  and  metamorphose  at  will. 

You  suppose  marvellous  powers  in  the  artist;  but, 
as  language  is  more  pliable  than  wax  or  any  similar 
substance,  let  there  be  such  a model  as  you  propose. 

1 729  nearly  equals  the  number  of  days  and  nights  in  the  year. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


373 


Suppose  now  that  you  make  a second  form  as  of  a 
lion,  and  a third  of  a man,  the  second  smaller  than  the 
first,  and  the  third  smaller  than  the  second. 

That,  he  said,  is  an  easier  task;  and  I have  made 
them  as  you  say. 

And  now  join  them,  and  let  the  three  go  into  one. 

That  has  been  accomplished. 

Next  fashion  the  outside  of  them  into  a single 
image,  as  of  a man,  so  that  he  who  is  not  able  to  look 
within,  and  sees  only  the  outer  hull,  may  believe  the 
beast  to  be  a single  human  creature. 

I lipwe  done  so,  he  said. 

And  now,  to  him  who  maintains  that  it  is  profitable 
for  the  human  creature  to  he  unjust,  and  unprofitable 
to  be  just,  let  us  reply  that,  if  he  be  right,  it  is  profit- 
able for  this  creature  to  feast  the  multitudinous 
monster  and  strengthen  the  lion  and  the  lion-like 
qualities,  but  to  starve  and  weaken  the  man,  vdio  is 
consequently  liable  to  be  dragged  about  at  the  mercy 
of  either  of  the  other  two;  and  he  is  not  to  attempt  to 
familiarize  or  harmonize  them  with  one  another  — he 
ought  rather  to  suffer  them  to  fight  and  bite  and 
devour  one  another. 

Certainly,  he  said ; that  is  what  the  approver  of  in- 
justice says. 

To  him  the  supporter  of  justice  makes  answer  that 
he  should  ever  so  speak  and  act  as  to  give  the  man 
within  him  in  some  way  or  other  the  most  complete 
mastery  over  the  entire  human  creature.  He  should 
watch  over  the  many -headed  monster  like  a goodj 
husbandman,  fostering  and  cultivating  the  gentle! 
qualities,  and  preventing  the  wild  ones  from  grow- 
ing; he  should  be  making  the  lion-heart  his  ally, 
and  in  common  care  of  them  all  should  be  unit-i 
ing  the  several  parts  with  one  another  and  with  him-j 
self. 


374 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Yes,  he  said,  that  is  quite  what  the  maintainer  of 
justiee  will  say. 

And  so  from  every  point  of  view,  whether  of 
pleasure,  honor,  or  advantage,  the  approver  of  justice 
is  right  and  speaks  the  truth,  and  the  disapprover  is 
wrong  and  false  and  ignorant? 

Yes,  from  every  point  of  view. 

Come,  now,  and  let  us  gently  reason  with  the  un- 
just, v/ho  is  not  intentionally  in  error.  “ Sweet  Sir,” 
w'e  will  say  to  him,  “ what  think  you  of  things  es- 
teemed noble  and  ignoble?  Is  not  the  noble  that 
which  subjects  the  beast  to  the  man,  or  rather  to  the 
god  in  man;  and  the  ignoble  that  which  subjects  the 
man  to  the  beast?  ” He  can  hardly  avoid  saying 
Yes  — can  he  now? 

Not  if  he  has  any  regard  for  my  opinion. 

But,  if  he  agrees  so  far,  we  may  ask  him  to  answer 
another  question:  “ Then  how  would  a man  profit  if 
he  received  gold  and  silver  on  the  condition  that  he 
was  to  enslave  the  noblest  part  of  him  to  the  worst? 
Who  can  imagine  that  a man  who  sold  his  son  or 
daughter  into  slavery  for  money,  especially  if  he  sold 
them  into  the  hands  of  fierce  and  evil  men,  would  be 
the  gainer,  however  large  might  be  the  sum  which  he 
received  ? And  will  any  one  say  that  he  is  not  a miser- 
able caitiff  who  remorselessly  sells  his  own  divine 
being  to  that  which  is  most  godless  and  detestable? 
Eriphyle  took  the  necklace  as  the  price  of  her  hus- 
band’s life,  but  he  is  taking  a bribe  in  order  to  compass 
a worse  ruin.” 

Yes,  said  Glaucon,  far  worse  — I will  answer  for 
him. 

Has  not  the  intemperate  been  censured  of  old,  be- 
cause in  him  the  huge  multiform  monster  is  allowed  to 
be  too  much  at  large? 

Clearly. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


m 


And  men  are  blamed  for  pride  and  bad  temper 
when  the  lion  and  serpent  element  in  them  dispro- 
portionately grows  and  gains  strength? 

Yes. 

And  luxury  and  softness  are  blamed,  because  they 
relax  and  weaken  this  same  creature,  and  make  a 
coward  of  him? 

Very  true. 

And  is  not  a man  reproached  for  flattery  and  mean- 
ness who  subordinates  the  spirited  animal  to  the  un- 
ruly monster,  and,  for  the  sake  of  money,  of  which  he 
can  never  have  enough,  habituates  him  in  the  days  of 
his  youth  to  be  trampled  in  the  mire,  and  from  being  a 
lion  to  become  a monkey  ? 

True,  he  said. 

And  why  are  mean  employments  and  manual  arts  a 
reproach?  Only  because  they  imply  a natural  weak- 
ness of  the  higher  principle;  the  individual  is  unable 
to  control  the  creatures  within  him,  but  has  to  court 
them,  and  his  great  study  is  how  to  flatter  them. 

Such  appears  to  be  the  reason. 

And  therefore,  being  desirous  of  placing  him  under 
a rule  like  that  of  the  best,  we  say  that  he  ought  to  be 
the  servant  of  the  best,  in  whom  the  Divine  rules ; not 
as  Thrasymachus  supposed,  to  the  injury  of  the  ser- 
vant, but  because  every  one  had  better  be  ruled  by 
divine  wisdom  dwelling  within  him;  or,  if  this  be  im- 
possible, then  by  an  external  authority,  in  order  that 
we  may  he  all,  as  far  as  possible,  under  the  same 
government,  friends  and  equals. 

True,  he  said. 

And  this  is  clearly  seen  to  be  the  intention  of  the 
law,  which  is  the  ally  of  the  whole  city;  and  is  seen 
also  in  the  authority  which  we  exercise  over  children, 
and  the  refusal  to  let  them  be  free  until  we  have  estab- 
lished in  them  a principle  analogous  to  the  constitu- 


376 


THE  REPUBLIC 


tion  of  a state,  and  by  cultivation  of  this  higher 
element  have  set  up  in  their  hearts  a guardian  and 
ruler  like  our  own,  and  when  this  is  done  they  may 
go  their  ways. 

Y es,  he  said,  the  purpose  of  the  law  is  manifest. 

From  what  point  of  view,  then,  and  on  what  ground 
can  we  say  that  a man  is  profited  by  injustice  or  in- 
temperance or  other  baseness,  which  will  make  him  a 
worse  man,  even  though  he  acquire  money  or  power 
by  his  wickedness? 

From  no  point  of  view  at  all. 

What  shall  he  profit,  if  his  injustice  be  undetected 
and  unpunished?  He  who  is  undetected  only  gets 
worse,  whereas  he  who  is  detected  and  punished  has 
the  brutal  part  of  his  nature  silenced  and  humanized ; 
the  gentler  element  in  him  is  liberated,  and  his  whole 
soul  is  perfected  and  ennobled  by  the  acquirement  of 
justice  and  temperance  and  wisdom,  more  than  the 
body  ever  is  by  receiving  gifts  of  beauty,  strength  and 
health,  in  proportion  as  the  soul  is  more  honorable 
than  the  body. 

Certainly,  he  said. 

To  this  nobler  purpose  the  man  of  understanding 
will  devote  the  energies  of  his  life.  And  in  the  first 
place,  he  will  honor  studies  which  impress  these 
qualities  on  his  soul,  and  will  disregard  others? 

Clearly,  he  said. 

In  the  next  place,  he  will  regulate  his  bodily  habit 
and  training,  and  so  far  will  he  be  from  yielding  to 
brutal  and  irrational  pleasures,  that  he  will  regard 
even  health  as  quite  a secondary  matter;  his  first  ob- 
ject will  be  not  that  he  may  be  fair  or  strong  or  well, 
unless  he  is  likely  thereby  to  gain  temperance,  but  he 
will  always  desire  so  to  attemper  the  body  as  to  pre- 
serve the  harmony  of  the  soul? 

Certainly  he  will,  if  he  has  true  music  in  him. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


377 


And  in  the  acquisition  of  wealth  there  is  a principle 
of  order  and  harmony  which  he  will  also  observe;  he 
will  not  allow  himself  to  be  dazzled  by  the  foolish 
applause  of  the  world,  and  heap  up  riches  to  his  own 
infinite  harm? 

Certainly  not,  he  said. 

He  will  look  at  the  city  which  is  within  him,  and 
take  heed  that  no  disorder  occur  in  it,  such  as  might 
arise  either  from  superfluity  or  from  want;  and  upon 
this  principle  he  will  regulate  his  property  and  gain 
or  spend  according  to  his  means. 

Very  true. 

And,  for  the  same  reason,  he  will  gladly  accept  and 
enjoy  such  honors  as  he  deems  likely  to  make  him  a 
better  man;  but  those,  whether  private  or  public, 
which  are  likely  to  disorder  his  life,  he  will  avoid? 

Then,  if  that  is  his  motive,  he  will  not  be  a states- 
man. 

By  the  dog  of  Egypt,  he  will!  in  the  city  which  is 
his  own  he  certainly  will,  though  in  the  land  of  his 
birth  perhaps  not,  unless  he  have  a divine  call. 

I understand ; you  mean  that  he  v/ill  be  a ruler  in 
the  city  of  which  we  are  the  founders,  and  which  exists 
in  idea  only ; for  I do  not  believe  that  there  is  such  ari 
one  anywhere  on  earth  ? 

In  heaven,  I replied,  there  is  laid  up  a pattern  of 
it,  methinks,  which  he  who  desires  may  behold,  and 
beholding,  may  set  his  own  house  in  order.^  But 
whether  such  an  one  exists,  or  ever  will  exist  in  fact 
is  no  matter;  for  he  will  live  after  the  manner  of  that 
pity,  having  nothing  to  do  with  any  qtl^er. 

I think  so,  he  said.  .5  .o'-*' 

.(T*  t 

lOr  “take  up  his  abode  there.’’  v A 

.A 


BOOKX 


Of  the  many  excellences  which  I perceive  in  the 
order  of  our  State,  there  is  none  whieh  upon  reflection 
pleases  me  better  than  the  rule  about  poetry. 

To  what  do  you  refer? 

To  the  rejection  of  imitative  poetry,  which  certainly 
ought  not  to  be  received;  as  I see  far  more  clearly  now 
that  the  parts  of  the  soul  have  been  distinguished. 

What  do  you  mean? 

Speaking  in  confidence,  for  I should  not  like  to 
have  my  words  repeated  to  the  tragedians  and  the  rest 
of  the  imitative  tribe  — but  I do  not  mind  saying  to 
you,  that  all  poetical  imitations  are  ruinous  to  the 
understanding  of  the  hearers,  and  that  the  knowl- 
edge of  their  true  nature  is  the  only  antidote  to  them. 

Explain  the  purport  of  your  remark. 

Well,  I will  tell  you,  although  I have  always  from 
my  earliest  youth  had  an  awe  and  love  of  Homer, 
which  even  now  makes  the  words  falter  on  my  lips,  for 
he  is  the  great  captain  and  teacher  of  the  whole  of  that 
charming  tragic  company;  but  a man  is  not  to  be 
reverenced  more  than  the  truth,  and  therefore  I will 
speak  out. 

Very  good,  he  said. 

Listen  to  me  then,  or  rather,  answer  me. 

Put  your  question. 

Can  you  tell  me  what  imitation  is?  for  I really  do 
not  know. 

A likely  thing,  then,  that  I should  know. 

Why  not?  for  the  duller  eye  may  often  see  a thing 
sooner  than  the  keener. 


878 


THE  REPUBLIC 


379 


Very  true,  he  said;  but  in  your  presence,  even  if  I 
had  any  faint  notion,  I could  not  muster  courage  to 
utter  it.  Will  you  inquire  yourself? 

Well  then,  shall  we  begin  the  inquiry  in  our  usual 
manner:  Whenever  a number  of  individuals  have  a 
common  name,  we  assume  them  to  have  also  a cor- 
responding idea  or  form:  — do  you  understand  me? 

I do. 

Let  us  take  any  common  instance;  there  are  beds 
and  tables  in  the  world  — plenty  of  them,  are  there 
not? 

Yes. 

But  there  are  only  two  ideas  or  forms  of  them  — 
one  the  idea  of  a bed,  the  other  of  a table. 

True. 

And  the  maker  of  either  of  them  makes  a bed  or  he 
makes  a table  for  our  use,  in  accordance  with  the  idea  i 
— that  is  our  way  of  speaking  in  this  and  similar  in- ; 
stances  — but  no  artificer  makes  the  ideas  themselves : j 
how  could  he? 

Impossible. 

And  there  is  another  artist,  — I should  like  to  know 
what  you  would  say  of  him. 

Who  is  he? 

One  who  is  the  maker  of  all  the  works  of  all  other 
workmen. 

What  an  extraordinary  man ! 

Wait  a little,  and  there  will  be  more  reason  for  your 
saying  so.  For  this  is  he  who  is  able  to  make  not  only 
vessels  of  every  kind,  but  plants  and  animals,  himself 
and  all  other  things  — the  earth  and  heaven,  and  the 
things  which  are  in  heaven  or  under  the  earth;  he 
makes  the  gods  also. 

He  must  be  a wizard  and  no  mistake. 

Oh!  you  are  incredulous,  are  you?  Do  you  mean 
that  there  is  no  such  maker  or  creator,  or  that  in  one 


380 


THE  REPUBLIC 


sense  there  might  be  a maker  of  all  these  things  but 
in  another  not?  Do  you  see  that  theie  is  a way  in 
which  you  could  make  them  all  yourself? 

What  way? 

An  easy  way  enough;  or  rather,  there  are  many 
w^ays  in  vdiich  the  feat  might  be  quickly  and  easily  ac- 
complished, none  quicker  than  that  of  turning  a mirror 
round  and  round  — you  would  soon  enough  make  the 
sun  and  the  heavens,  and  the  earth  and  yourself, 
and  other  animals  and  plants,  and  all  the  other 
things  of  which  we  were  just  now  speaking,  in  the 
mirror. 

Yes,  he  said;  but  they  would  be  appearances  only. 

Very  good,  I said,  you  are  coming  to  the  point  now. 
And  the  painter  too  is,  as  I conceive,  just  such  another 
— a creator  of  appearances,  is  he  not  ? 

Of  course. 

But  then  I suppose  you  will  say  that  what  he  creates 
is  untrue.  And  yet  there  is  a sense  in  which  the 
painter  also  creates  a bed? 

Yes,  he  said,  but  not  a real  bed. 

And  v/hat  of  the  maker  of  the  bed?  were  you  not 
saying  that  he  too  makes,  not  the  idea  which,  accord- 
ing to  our  view,  is  the  essence  of  the  bed,  but  only  a 
particular  bed? 

Yes,  I did. 

Then  if  he  does  not  make  that  which  exists  he  can 
not  make  true  existence,  but  only  some  semblance  of 
existence;  and  if  any  one  were  to  say  that  the  work 
of  the  maker  of  the  bed,  or  of  any  other  workman, 
has  real  existence,  he  could  hardly  he  supposed  to  be 
speaking  the  truth. 

At  any  rate,  he  replied,  philosophers  would  say 
that  he  was  not  speaking  the  truth. 

No  wonder,  then,  that  his  work  too  is  an  indistinct 
expression  of  truth. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


381 


No  wonder. 

Suppose  now  that  by  the  light  of  the  examples  just 
offered  we  inquire  who  this  imitator  is? 

If  you  please. 

Well  then,  here  are  three  beds:  one  existing  in 
nature,  which  is  made  by  God,  as  I think  that  we  may 
say  — for  no  one  else  can  be  the  maker? 

No. 

There  is  another  which  is  the  work  of  the  carpenter? 

Yes. 

And  the  work  of  the  painter  is  a third? 

Yes. 

Beds,  then,  are  of  three  kinds,  and  there  are  three 
artists  who  superintend  them:  God,  the  maker  of  the  t 
bed,  and  the  painter? 

Yes,  there  are  three  of  them. 

God,  whether  from  choice  or  from  necessity,  made , 
one  bed  in  nature  and  one  only;  two  or  more  such  ^ 
ideal  beds  neither  ever  have  been  nor  ever  will  be  made 
by  God. 

Why  is  that? 

Because  even  if  He  had  made  but  two,  a third  would 
still  appear  behind!  them  which  both  of  them  would 
have  for  their  idea,  and  that  would  be  the  ideal  bed 
and  not  the  two  others. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

God  knew  this,  and  He  desired  to  be  the  real  maker 
of  a real  bed,  not  a particular  maker  of  a particular 
bed,  and  therefore  He  created  a bed  which  is  essen- 
tially and  by  nature  one  only. 

So  we  believe. 

Shall  we,  then,  speak  of  Him  as  the  natural  author 
or  maker  of  the  bed  ? 

Yes,  he  replied;  inasmuch  as  by  the  natural  process 
of  creation  He  is  the  author  of  this  and  of  all  other 
things. 


382 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  what  shall  we  say  of  the  carpenter  — is  not  he 
also  the  maker  of  the  bed? 

Yes. 

But  would  you  call  the  painter  a creator  and  maker? 

Certainly  not. 

Yet  if  he  is  not  the  maker,  what  is  he  in  relation  to 
the  bed? 

I think,  he  said,  that  we  may  fairly  designate  him 
as  the  imitator  of  that  which  the  others  make. 

Good,  I said ; then  you  call  him  who  is  third  in  the 
descent  from  nature  an  imitator? 

Certainly,  he  said. 

And  the  tragic  poet  is  an  imitator,  and  therefore, 
like  all  other  imitators,  he  is  thrice  removed  from  the 
king  and  from  the  truth? 

That  appears  to  be  so. 

Then  about  the  imitator  we  are  agreed.  And  what 
about  the  painter?  — I would  like  to  know  whether  he 
may  be  thought  to  imitate  that  which  originally  exists 
in  nature,  or  only  the  creations  of  artists  ? 

The  latter. 

As  they  are  or  as  they  appear?  you  have  still  to 
determine  this. 

What  do  you  mean? 

I mean,  that  you  may  look  at  a bed  from  different 
points  of  view,  obliquely  or  directly  or  from  any  other 
point  of  view,  and  the  bed  will  appear  different,  but 
there  is  no  difference  in  reality.  And  the  same  of  all 
things. 

Yes,  he  said,  the  difference  is  only  apparent. 

Now  let  me  ask  you  another  question:  Which  is  the 
art  of  painting  designed  to  be  — an  imitation  of  things 
as  they  are,  or  as  they  appear  — of  appearance  or  of 
reality? 

Of  appearance. 

Then  the  imitator,  I said,  is  a long  way  off  the  truth, 


THE  REPUBLIC 


383 


and  can  do  all  things  because  he  lightly  touches  on  a 
small  part  of  them,  and  that  part  an  image.  For 
example:  A painter  will  paint  a cobbler,  carpenter, 
or  any  other  artist,  though  he  knows  nothing  of  their 
arts ; and,  if  he  is  a good  artist,  he  may  deceive  children 
or  simple  persons,  when  he  shows  them  his  picture  of  a 
carpenter  from  a distance,  and  they  will  fancy  that 
they  are  looking  at  a real  carpenter. 

Certainly. 

And  whenever  any  one  informs  us  that  he  has  found 
a man  who  knows  aU  the  arts,  and  all  things  else  that 
anybody  knows,  and  every  single  thing  with  a higher 
degree  of  accuracy  than  any  other  man  — whoever 
tells  us  this,  I think  that  we  can  only  imagine  him  to 
be  a simple  creature  who  is  likely  to  have  been  deceived 
by  some  wizard  or  actor  whom  he  met,  and  whom  he 
thought  all-knowing,  because  he  himself  was  unable 
to  analyze  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  ignorance  and 
imitation. 

Most  true. 

And  so,  when  we  hear  persons  saying  that  the 
tragedians,  and  Homer,  who  is  at  their  head,  know  all 
the  arts  and  all  things  hrnnan,  virtue  as  well  as  vice, 
and  divine  things  too,  for  that  the  good  poet  can  not 
compose  well  unless  he  knows  his  subject,  and  that  he 
who  has  not  this  knowledge  can  never  be  a poet,  we 
ought  to  consider  whether  here  also  there  may  not  be 
a similar  illusion.  Perhaps  they  may  have  come  across 
imitators  and  been  deceived  by  them;  they  may  not 
have  remembered  when  they  saw  their  works  that  these 
were  but  imitations  thrice  removed  from  the  truth, 
and  could  easily  be  made  without  any  knowledge  of 
the  truth,  because  they  are  appearances  only  and  not 
realities?  Or,  after  all,  they  may  be  in  the  right,  and 
poets  do  really  know  the  things  about  which  they  seem 
to  the  many  to  speak  so  well? 


384 


THE  REPUBLIC 


The  question,  he  said,  should  by  all  means  be  con- 
sidered. 

Now  do  you  suppose  that  if  a person  were  able  to 
make  the  original  as  well  as  the  image,  he  would 
seriously  devote  himself  to  the  image-making  branch? 
Would  he  allow  imitation  to  be  the  ruling  principle 
of  his  life,  as  if  he  had  nothing  higher  in  him? 

I should  say  not. 

The  real  artist,  who  knew  what  he  was  imitating, 
would  be  interested  in  realities  and  not  in  imitations; 
and  would  desire  to  leave  as  memorials  of  himself 
works  many  and  fair ; and,  instead  of  being  the  author 
of  encomiums,  he  would  prefer  to  be  the  theme  of 
them. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  would  be  to  him  a source  of  much 
greater  honor  and  profit. 

Then,  I said,  we  must  put  a question  to  Homer ; not 
about  medicine,  or  any  of  the  arts  to  which  his  poems 
only  incidentally  refer:  we  are  not  going  to  ask  him, 
or  any  other  poet,  whether  he  has  cured  patients  like 
Asclepius,  or  left  behind  him  a school  of  medicine  such 
as  the  Asclepiads  were,  or  whether  he  only  talks  about 
medicine  and  other  arts  at  second-hand;  but  we  have 
a right  to  know  respecting  military  tactics,  politics, 
education,  which  are  the  chief est  and  noblest  subjects 
of  his  poems,  and  we  may  fairly  ask  him  about  them. 
“ Friend  Homer,”  then  we  say  to  him,  “ if  you  are 
only  in  the  second  remove  from  truth  in  what  you  say 
of  virtue,  and  not  in  the  third  — not  an  image  maker 
or  imitator  — and  if  you  are  able  to  discern  what  pur- 
suits make  men  better  or  worse  in  private  or  public 
life,  tell  us  what  State  was  ever  better  governed  by 
your  help?  The  good  order  of  Lacedaemon  is  due  to 
Lycurgus,  and  many  other  cities  great  and  small  have 
been  similarly  benefited  by  others;  but  who  says  that 
you  have  been  a good  legislator  to  them  and  have  done 


THE  REPUBLIC 


385 


them  any  good  ? Italy  and  Sicily  boast  of  Charondas-, 
and  there  is  Solon  who  is  renowned  among  us;  but 
what  city  has  anything  to  say  about  you?  ” Is  there 
any  city  which  he  might  name? 

I think  not,  said  Glaucon;  not  even  the  Homerids 
themselves  pretend  that  he  was  a legislator. 

Well,  but  is  there  any  war  on  record  which  was 
carried  on  successfully  by  him,  or  aided  by  his  coun- 
sels, when  he  was  alive  ? 

There  is  not. 

Or  is  there  any  invention  ^ of  his,  applicable  to  the 
arts  or  to  human  life,  such  as  Thales  the  Milesian  or 
Anacharsis  the  Scythian,  and  other  ingenious  men 
have  conceived,  which  is  attributed  to  him? 

There  is  absolutely  nothing  of  the  kind. 

But,  if  Homer  never  did  any  public  service,  was  he 
privately  a guide  or  teacher  of  any?  Had  he  in  his 
lifetime  friends  v^ho  loved  to  associate  with  him,  and 
who  handed  down  to  posterity  an  Homeric  way  of 
life,  such  as  was  established  by  Pythagoras  who  was 
so  greatly  beloved  for  his  wisdom,  and  whose  followers 
are  to  this  day  quite  celebrated  for  the  order  which 
was  named  after  him? 

Nothing  of  the  kind  is  recorded  of  him.  For  surely, 
Socrates,  Creophylus,  the  companion  of  Homer,  that 
child  of  flesh,  whose  name  always  makes  us  laugh, 
might  be  more  justly  ridiculed  for  his  stupidity,  if,  as 
is  said,  Homer  was  greatly  neglected  by  him  and 
others  in  his  own  day  when  he  w'as  alive? 

Yes,  I replied,  that  is  the  tradition.  But  can  you 
imagine,  Glaucon,  that  if  Homer  had  really  been  able 
to  educate  and  improve  mankind  — if  he  had  pos- 
sessed knowledge  and  not  been  a mere  imitator  — can 
you  imagine,  I say,  that  he  would  not  have  had  many 
followers,  and  been  honored  and  loved  by  them? 

1 Omitting  els. 


386 


THE  REPUBLIC 


Protagoras  of  Abdera,  and  Prodicus  of  Ceos,  and  a 
host  of  others,  have  only  to  whisper  to  their  contem- 
poraries : “ You  will  never  be  able  to  manage  either 
your  own  house  or  your  own  State  until  you  appoint 
us  to  be  your  ministers  of  education  ” — and  this  in- 
genious device  of  theirs  has  such  an  effect  in  making 
men  love  them  that  their  companions  all  but  carry 
them  about  on  their  shoulders.  And  is  it  conceivable 
that  the  contemporaries  of  Homer,  or  again  of  Hesiod, 
would  have  allowed  either  of  them  to  go  abdiit  as 
rhapsodists,  if  they  had  really  been  able  to  make  man- 
kind virtuous?  Would  they  not  have  been  as  unwill- 
ing to  part  with  them  as  with  gold,  and  have  com- 
pelled them  to  stay  at  home  with  them?  Or,  if  the 
master  would  not  stay,  then  the  disciples  would  have 
followed  him  about  everywhere,  until  they  had  got 
education  enough? 

Yes,  Socrates,  that,  I think,  is  quite  true. 

Then  must  we  not  infer  that  aU  these  poetical  in- 
dividuals, beginning  with  Homer,  are  only  imitators; 
they  copy  images  of  virtue  and  the  like,  but  the  truth 
they  never  reach?  The  poet  is  like  a painter  who,  as 
we  have  already  observed,  will  make  a likeness  of  a 
cobbler  though  he  understands  nothing  of  cobbling; 
and  his  picture  is  good  enough  for  those  who  know 
no  more  than  he  does,  and  judge  only  by  colors  and 
figures. 

Quite  so. 

In  like  manner  the  poet  with  his  words  and  phrases  * 
may  be  said  to  lay  on  the  colors  of  the  several  arts, 
himself  understanding  their  nature  only  enough  to 
imitate  them;  and  other  people,  who  are  as  ignorant 
as  he  is,  and  judge  only  from  his  words,  imagine  that 
if  he  speaks  of  cobbling,  or  of  military  tactics,  or  of 
anything  else,  in  metre  and  harmony  and  rhythm,  he 

1 Or,  “ with  his  nouns  and  verbs.” 


THE  REPUBLIC 


387 


speaks  very  well  — such  is  the  sweet  influence  which 
melody  and  rhythm  by  nature  have.  And  I think 
that  you  must  have  observed  again  and  again  what  a 
poor  appearance  the  tales  of  poets  make  when  stripped 
of  the  colors  which  music  puts  upon  them,  and  recited 
in  simple  prose. 

Yes,  he  said. 

They  are  like  faces  which  were  never  really 
beautiful,  but  only  blooming;  and  now  the  bloom  of 
youth  has  passed  away  from  them? 

Exactly. 

Here  is  another  point:  The  imitator  or  maker  of  the 
image  knows  nothing  of  true  existence ; he  knows  ap- 
pearances only.  Am  I not  right? 

Yes. 

Then  let  us  have  a clear  understanding,  and  not  be 
satisfied  with  half  an  explanation. 

Proceed. 

Of  the  painter  we  say  that  he  will  paint  reins,  and 
he  will  paint  a bit? 

Yes. 

And  the  worker  in  leather  and  brass  will  make 
them? 

Certainly. 

But  does  the  painter  know  the  right  form  of  the  bit 
and  reins?  Nay,  hardly  even  the  workers  in  brass  and 
leather  who  make  them;  only  the  horseman  who  knows 
how  to  use  them  — he  knows  their  right  form. 

Most  true. 

And  may  we  not  say  the  same  of  all  things? 

What? 

That  there  are  three  arts  which  are  concerned  with 
all  things:  one  which  uses,  another  which  makes,  a 
third  which  imitates  them? 

Yes. 

And  the  excellence  or  beauty  or  truth  of  every 


388 


THE  REPUBLIC 


structure,  animate  or  inanimate,  and  of  every  action 
of  man,  is  relative  to  the  use  for  which  nature  or  the 
artist  has  intended  them. 

True. 

Then  the  user  of  them  must  have  the  greatest  ex- 
perience of  them,  and  he  must  indicate  to  the  maker 
the  good  or  bad  qualities  which  develop  themselves  in 
use;  for  example,  the  flute-player  will  tell  the  flute- 
maker  which  of  his  flutes  is  satisfactory  to  the  per- 
former; he  will  tell  him  how  he  ought  to  make  them, 
and  the  other  will  attend  to  his  instructions? 

Of  course. 

The  one  knows  and  therefore  speaks  with  authority 
about  the  goodness  and  badness  of  flutes,  while  the 
other,  confiding  in  him,  will  do  what  he  is  told  by 
him? 

True. 

The  instrument  is  the  same,  but  about  the  excel- 
lence or  badness  of  it  the  maker  will  only  attain 
to  a correct  belief;  and  this  he  will  gain  from  him 
who  knows,  by  talking  to  him  and  being  compelled  to 
hear  what  he  has  to  say,  whereas  the  user  will  have 
knowledge? 

True. 

But  will  the  imitator  have  either?  Will  he  know 
from  use  whether  or  no  his  drawing  is  correct  or 
beautiful?  or  will  he  have  right  opinion  from  being 
compelled  to  associate  with  another  who  knows  and 
gives  him  instructions  about  what  he  should  draw? 

Neither. 

Then  he  will  no  more  have  true  opinion  than  he  will 
have  knowledge  about  the  goodness  or  badness  of  his 
imitations? 

I suppose  not. 

The  imitative  artist  will  be  in  a brilliant  state  of 
intelligence  about  his  own  creations? 


THE  REPUBLIC 


389 


Nay,  very  much  the  reverse. 

And  still  he  will  go  on  imitating  without  knowing 
what  makes  a thing  good  or  bad,  and  may  be  expected 
therefore  to  imitate  only  that  which  appears  to  be 
good  to  the  ignorant  multitude? 

Just  so. 

Thus  far  then  we  are  pretty  well  agreed  that  the 
imitator  has  no  knowledge  worth  mentioning  of  what 
he  imitates.  Imitation  is  only  a kind  of  play  or  sport, 
and  the  tragic  poets,  whether  they  write  in  lambic 
or  in  Heroic  verse,  are  imitators  in  the  highest 
degree? 

Very  true. 

And  now  tell  me,  I conjure  you,  has  not  imitation 
been  shown  by  us  to  be  concerned  with  that  which  is 
thrice  removed  from  the  truth? 

Certainly. 

And  what  is  the  faculty  in  man  to  which  imitation 
is  addressed? 

What  do  you  mean? 

I will  explain:  The  body  which  is  large  when  seen 
near,  appears  small  when  seen  at  a distance? 

True. 

And  the  same  objects  appear  straight  when  looked 
at  out  of  the  water,  and  crooked  when  in  the  water; 
and  the  concave  becomes  convex,  owing  to  the  illusion 
about  colors  to  which  the  sight  is  liable.  Thus  every 
sort  of  confusion  is  revealed  within  us ; and  this  is  that 
weakness  of  the  human  mind  on  which  the  art  of  con- 
juring and  of  deceiving  by  light  and  shadow  and 
other  ingenious  devices  imposes,  having  an  effect  upon 
us  like  magic. 

True. 

And  the  arts  of  measuring  and  numbering  and 
weighing  come  to  the  rescue  of  the  human  understand- 
ing — there  is  the  beauty  of  them  — and  the  apparent 


390 


THE  REPUBLIC 


greater  or  less,  or  more  or  heavier,  no  longer  have  the 
mastery  over  us,  but  give  way  before  calculation  and 
measure  and  weight? 

Most  true. 

And  this,  surely,  must  be  the  work  of  the  calcula- 
ting and  rational  principle  in  the  soul? 

To  be  sure. 

And  when  this  principle  measures  and  certifies  that 
some  things  are  equal,  or  that  some  are  greater  or 
less  than  others,  there  occurs  an  apparent  contradic- 
tion? 

True. 

But  were  we  not  saying  that  such  a contradiction  is 
impossible  — the  same  faculty  can  not  have  contrary 
opinions  at  the  same  time  about  the  same  thing? 

Very  true. 

Then  that  part  of  the  soul  which  has  an  opinion  con- 
trary to  measure  is  not  the  same  with  that  which  has 
an  opinion  in  accordance  with  measure? 

True. 

And  the  better  part  of  the  soul  is  likely  to  be  that 
which  trusts  to  measure  and  calculation? 

Certainly. 

And  that  which  is  opposed  to  them  is  one  of  the 
inferior  principles  of  the  soul? 

No  doubt. 

This  was  the  conclusion  at  which  I was  seeking  to 
arrive  when  I said  that  painting  or  drawing,  and 
imitation  in  general,  when  doing  their  own  proper 
work,  are  far  removed  from  truth,  and  the  companions 
and  friends  and  associates  of  a principle  within  us 
which  is  equally  removed  from  reason,  and  that  they 
have  no  true  or  healthy  aim. 

Exactly. 

The  imitative  art  is  an  inferior  who  marries  an  in- 
ifcrior,  and  has  inferior  offspring. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


391 


Very  true. 

And  is  this  confined  to  the  sight  only,  or  does  it 
extend  to  the  hearing  also,  relating  in  fact  to  what  we 
term  poetry? 

Probably  the  same  would  be  true  of  poetry. 

Do  not  rely,  I said,  on  a probability  derived  from 
the  analogy  of  painting;  but  let  us  examine  further 
and  see  whether  the  faculty  with  which  poetical  imita- 
tion is  concerned  is  good  or  bad. 

By  all  means. 

We  may  state  the  question  thus;  — Imitation 
imitates  the  actions  of  men,  whether  voluntary  or 
involuntary,  on  which,  as  they  imagine,  a good  or  bad 
result  has  ensued,  and  they  rejoice  or  sorrow  accord- 
ingly. Is  there  anything  more  ? 

No,  there  is  nothing  else. 

But  in  all  this  variety  of  circumstances  is  the  man 
at  unity  with  himself  — or  rather,  as  in  the  instance  of 
sight  there  was  confusion  and  opposition  in  his 
opinions  about  the  same  things,  so  here  also  is  there 
not  strife  and  inconsistency  in  his  life?  Though  I 
need  hardly  raise  the  question  again,  for  I remember 
that  all  this  has  been  already  admitted;  and  the  soul 
has  been  acknowledged  by  us  to  be  full  of  these  and 
ten  thousand  similar  oppositions  occurring  at  the  same 
moment? 

And  we  were  right,  he  said. 

Yes,  I said,  thus  far  we  were  right;  but  there  was 
an  omission  which  must  now  be  supplied. 

What  was  the  omission? 

Were  we  not  saying  that  a good  man,  who  has  the 
misfortune  to  lose  his  son  or  anything  else  which  is 
most  dear  to  him,  will  bear  the  loss  with  more 
equanimity  than  another? 

Yes. 

But  will  he  have  no  sorrow,  or  shall  we  say  that 


392  THE  REPUBLIC 

although  he  can  not  help  sorrowing,  he  will  moderate 
his  sorrow  ? 

The  latter,  he  said,  is  the  truer  statement. 

Tell  me : will  he  be  more  likely  to  struggle  and  hold 
out  against  his  sorrow  when  he  is  seen  by  his  equals, 
or  when  he  is  alone  ? 

It  will  make  a great  difference  whether  he  is  seen 
or  not. 

When  he  is  by  himself  he  will  not  mind  saying  or 
doing  many  things  which  he  would  be  ashamed  of  any 
one  hearing  or  seeing  him  do? 

True. 

There  is  a principle  of  law  and  reason  in  him  which 
bids  him  resist,  as  well  as  a feeling  of  his  misfortune 
which  is  forcing  him  to  indulge  his  sorrow? 

True. 

But  when  a man  is  drawn  in  two  opposite  directions, 
to  and  from  the  same  object,  this,  as  we  affirm,  neces- 
sarily implies  two  distinct  principles  in  him? 

Certainly. 

One  of  them  is  ready  to  follow  the  guidance  of  the 
law? 

How  do  you  mean? 

The  law  would  say  that  to  be  patient  under  suffer- 
ing is  best,  and  that  we  should  not  give  way  to  im- 
patience, as  there  is  no  knowing  whether  such  things 
are  good  or  evil ; and  nothing  is  gained  by  impatience ; 
also,  because  no  human  thing  is  of  serious  importance, 
and  grief  stands  in  the  way  of  that  which  at  the  mo- 
ment is  most  required. 

What  is  most  required?  he  asked. 

That  we  should  take  counsel  about  what  has  hap- 
pened, and  when  the  dice  have  been  thrown  order 
our  affairs  in  the  way  which  reason  deems  best;  not, 
like  children  who  have  had  a fall,  keeping  hold  of  the 
part  struck  and  wasting  time  in  setting  up  a howl,  but 


THE  REPUBLIC 


393 


always  accustoming  the  soul  forthwith  to  apply  a 
remedy,  raising  up  that  which  is  sickly  and  fallen, 
banishing  the  cry  of  sorrow  by  the  healing  art. 

Yes,  he  said,  that  is  the  true  way  of  meeting  the 
attacks  of  fortune. 

Yes,  I said;  and  the  higher  principle  is  ready  to 
follow  this  suggestion  of  reason? 

Clearly. 

And  the  other  principle,  which  inclines  us  to  recol- 
lection of  our  troubles  and  to  lamentation,  and  can 
never  have  enough  of  them,  we  may  call  irrational, 
useless,  and  cowardly? 

Indeed,  we  may. 

And  does  not  the  latter  — I mean  the  rebellious 
principle  — furnish  a great  variety  of  materials  for 
imitation?  Whereas  the  wise  and  calm  temperament, 
being  always  nearly  equable,  is  not  easy  to  imitate 
or  to  appreciate  when  imitated,  especially  at  a public 
festival  when  a promiscuous  crowd  is  assembled  in  a 
theatre.  For  the  feeling  represented  is  one  to  which 
they  are  strangers. 

Certainly. 

Then  the  imitative  poet  who  aims  at  being  popular 
is  not  by  nature  made,  nor  is  his  art  intended,  to  please 
or  to  affect  the  rational  principle  in  the  soul ; but  he 
will  prefer  the  passionate  and  fitful  temper,  which  is 
easily  imitated? 

Clearly. 

And  now  we  may  fairly  take  him  and  place  him  by 
the  side  of  the  painter,  for  he  is  like  him  in  two  ways : 
first,  inasmuch  as  his  creations  have  an  inferior  degree 
of  truth  — in  this,  I say,  he  is  like  him ; and  he  is  also 
like  him  in  being  concerned  with  an  inferior  part  of 
the  soul;  and  therefore  we  shall  be  right  in  refusing 
to  admit  him  into  a well-ordered  State,  because  he 
awakens  and  nourishes  and  strengthens  the  feelings 


394 


THE  REPUBLIC 


and  impairs  the  reason.  As  in  a city  when  the  evil 
are  permitted  to  have  authority  and  the  good  are  put 
out  of  the  way,  so  in  the  soul  of  man,  as  we  maintain, 
the  imitative  poet  implants  an  evil  constitution,  for 
he  indulges  the  irrational  nature  which  has  no  discern- 
ment of  greater  and  less,  but  thinks  the  same  thing  at 
one  time  great  and  at  another  small  — he  is  a manu- 
facturer of  images  and  is  very  far  removed  from  the 
truth.^ 

Exactly. 

But  we  have  not  yet  brought  forward  the  heaviest 
count  in  our  accusation : — the  power  which  poetry 
has  of  harming  even  the  good  (and  there  are  very  few 
who  are  not  harmed),  is  surely  an  awful  thing? 

Yes,  certainly,  if  the  effect  is  what  you  say. 

Hear  and  judge:  The  best  of  us,  as  I conceive, 
when  we  listen  to  a passage  of  Homer,  or  one  of  the 
tragedians,  in  which  he  represents  some  pitiful  hero 
who  is  drawling  out  his  sorrows  in  a long  oration,  or 
weeping,  and  smiting  his  breast  — the  best  of  us,  you 
know,  delight  in  giving  way  to  sympathy,  and  are  in 
raptures  at  the  excellence  of  the  poet  who  stirs  our 
feelings  most. 

Yes,  of  course  I know. 

But  when  any  sorrow  of  our  own  happens  to  us, 
then  you  may  observe  that  we  pride  ourselves  on  the 
opposite  quality  — we  would  fain  be  quiet  and  patient ; 
this  is  the  manly  part,  and  the  other  which  delighted 
us  in  the  recitation  is  now  deemed  to  be  the  part  of  a 
woman. 

Very  true,  he  said. 

Now  can  we  be  right  in  praising  and  admiring  an- 
other who  is  doing  that  which  any  one  of  us  would 
abominate  and  be  ashamed  of  in  his  own  person? 

No,  he  said,  that  is  certainly  not  reasonable. 

> Reading 


THE  REPUBLIC 


^395 


Nay,  I said,  quite  reasonable  from  one  point  of 
view. 

What  point  of  view? 

If  you  consider,  I said,  that  when  in  misfortune  we 
feel  a natural  hunger  and  desire  to  relieve  our  sorrow 
by  weeping  and  lamentation,  and  that  this  feeling 
which  is  kept  under  control  in  our  own  calamities  is 
satisfied  and  delighted  by  the  poets;  — the  better 
nature  in  each  of  us,  not  having  been  sufficiently 
trained  by  reason  or  habit,  allows  the  sympathetic  ele- 
ment to  break  loose  because  the  sorrow  is  another’s; 
and  the  speetator  fancies  that  there  can  be  no  disgrace 
to  himself  in  praising  and  pitying  any  one  who  comes 
telling  him  what  a good  man  he  is,  and  making  a fuss 
about  his  troubles;  he  thinks  that  the  pleasure  is  a 
gain,  and  why  should  he  be  supercilious  and  lose  this 
and  the  poem  too?  Few  persons  ever  reflect,  as  I 
should  imagine,  that  from  the  evil  of  other  men  some- 
thing of  evil  is  eommunicated  to  themselves.  And  so 
the  feeling  of  sorrow  which  has  gathered  strength  at 
the  sight  of  the  misfortunes  of  others  is  with  difficulty 
repressed  in  our  own. 

How  very  true ! 

And  does  not  the  same  hold  also  of  the  ridiculous? 
There  are  jests  which  you  would  be  ashamed  to  make 
yourself,  and  yet  on  the  comic  stage,  or  indeed  in 
private,  when  you  hear  them,  you  are  greatly  amused 
by  them,  and  are  not  at  all  disgusted  at  their  un- 
seemliness;— the  case  of  pity  is  repeated;  — there  is: 
a principle  in  human  nature  which  is  disposed  to  raise 
a laugh,  and  this  which  you  once  restrained  by  reason, 
because  you  were  afraid  of  being  thought  a buffoon, 
is  now  let  out  again ; and  having  stimulated  the  risible 
faculty  at  the  theatre,  you  are  betrayed  unconsciously 
to  yourself  into  playing  the  comic  poet  at  home. 

Quite  true,  he  said. 


396 


THE  REPUBLIC 


And  the  same  may  be  said  of  lust  and  anger  and  all 
the  other  affections,  of  desire  and  pain  and  pleasure, 
which  are  held  to  be  inseparable  from  every  action  — 
in  all  of  them  poetry  feeds  and  waters  the  passions 
instead  of  drying  them  up;  she  lets  them  rule,  al- 
though they  ought  to  be  controlled,  if  mankind  are 
ever  to  increase  in  happiness  and  virtue. 

I can  not  deny  it. 

Therefore,  Glaucon,  I said,  whenever  you  meet 
with  any  of  the  eulogists  of  Homer  declaring  that  he 
has  been  the  educator  of  Hellas,  and  that  he  is  profit- 
able for  education  and  for  the  ordering  of  human 
things,  and  that  you  should  take  him  up  again  and 
again  and  get  to  know  him  and  regulate  your  whole 
life  according  to  him,  we  may  love  and  honor  those 
who  say  these  things  — they  are  excellent  people,  as 
far  as  their  lights  extend;  and  we  are  ready  to  ac- 
knowledge that  Homer  is  the  greatest  of  poets  and 
first  of  tragedy  writers ; but  we  must  remain  firm  in 
our  conviction  that  hymns  to  the  gods  and  praises  of 
famous  men  are  the  only  poetry  which  ought  to  be  ad- 
mitted into  our  State.  For  if  you  go  beyond  this  and 
allow  the  honeyed  muse  to  enter,  either  in  epic  or  lyric 
verse,  not  law  and  the  reason  of  mankind,  which  by 
common  consent  have  ever  been  deemed  best,  but 
pleasure  and  pain  will  be  the  rulers  in  our  State. 

That  is  most  true,  he  said. 

And  now  since  we  have  reverted  to  the  subject  of 
poetry,  let  this  our  defence  serve  to  show  the  reason- 
ableness of  our  former  judgment  in  sending  away  out 
of  our  State  an  art  having  the  tendencies  which  we 
have  described;  for  reason  constrained  us.  But  that 
she  may  not  impute  to  us  any  harshness  or  want  of 
politeness,  let  us  tell  her  that  there  is  an  ancient  quar- 
rel between  philosophy  and  poetry;  of  which  there 
are  many  proofs,  such  as  the  saying  of  “ the  yelping 


THE  REPUBLIC 


397 


hound  howling  at  her  lord,”  or  of  one  “ mighty  in  the 
vain  talk  of  fools,”  and  “ the  mob  of  sages  circumvent- 
ing Zeus,”  and  the  “ subtle  thinkers  who  are  beggars 
after  all ; ” and  there  are  innumerable  other  signs  of 
ancient  enmity  between  them.  Notwithstanding  this, 
let  us  assure  our  sweet  friend  and  the  sister  arts  of 
imitation,  that  if  she  will  only  prove  her  title  to  exist 
in  a well-ordered  State  we  shall  be  delighted  to  receive 
her  — we  are  very  conscious  of  her  charms;  but  we 
may  not  on  that  account  betray  the  truth.  I dare  say, 
Glaucon,  that  you  are  as  much  charmed  by  her  as  I 
am,  especially  when  she  appears  in  Homer? 

Yes,  indeed,  I am  greatly  charmed. 

Shall  I propose,  then,  that  she  be  allowed  to  return 
from  exile,  but  upon  this  condition  only  — that  she 
make  a defence  of  herself  in  lyrical  or  some  other 
metre? 

Certainly. 

And  we  may  further  grant  to  those  of  her  defenders 
who  are  lovers  of  poetry  and  yet  not  poets  the  per- 
mission to  speak  in  prose  on  her  behalf : let  them  show 
not  only  that  she  is  pleasant  but  also  useful  to  States 
and  to  human  life,  and  we  will  listen  in  a kindly 
spirit ; for  if  this  can  be  proved  we  shall  surely  be  thej 
gainers  — I mean,  if  there  is  a use  in  poetry  as  wellj 
as  a delight?  ' 

Certainly,  he  said,  we  shall  be  the  gainers. 

If  her  defence  fails,  then,  my  dear  friend,  like  other 
persons  who  are  enamored  of  something,  but  put  a 
restraint  upon  themselves  when  they  think  their  de- 
sires are  opposed  to  their  interests,  so  too  must  we 
after  the  manner  of  lovers  give  her  up,  though  not 
without  a struggle.  We  too  are  inspired  by  that  love 
of  poetry  which  the  education  of  noble  States  has  im- 
planted in  us,  and  therefore  we  would  have  her  appear 
at  her  best  and  truest;  but  so  long  as  she  is  unable 


398 


THE  REPUBLIC 


to  make  good  her  defence,  this  argument  of  ours  shall 
be  a charm  to  us,  which  we  will  repeat  to  ourselves 
while  we  listen  to  her  strains;  that  we  may  not  fall 
away  into  the  childish  love  of  her  which  captivates  the 
many.  At  all  events  we  are  well  aware  ^ that  poetry 
being  such  as  we  have  described  is  not  to  be  regarded 
seriously  as  attaining  to  the  truth ; and  he  who  listens 
to  her,  fearing  for  the  safety  of  the  city  which  is  within 
him,  should  be  on  his  guard  against  her  seductions 
and  make  our  words  his  law. 

Yes,  he  said,  I quite  agree  with  you. 

Yes,  I said,  my  dear  Glaucon,  for  great  is  the  issue 
at  stake,  greater  than  appears,  whether  a man  is  to  be 
good  or  bad.  And  what  will  any  one  be  profited  if 
under  the  influence  of  honor  or  money  or  power,  aye, 
or  under  the  excitement  of  poetry,  he  neglect  justice 
and  virtue  ? 

Yes,  he  said;  I have  been  convinced  by  the  argu- 
ment, as  I believe  that  any  one  else  would  have 
been. 

And  yet  no  mention  has  been  made  of  the  greatest 
prizes  and  rewards  which  await  virtue. 

What,  are  there  any  greater  still?  If  there  are,  they 
must  be  of  an  inconceivable  greatness. 

Why,  I said,  what  was  ever  great  in  a short  time? 
The  whole  period  of  three  scure  years  and  ten  is  surely 
but  a little  thing  in  comparison  with  eternity? 

Say  rather  “ nothing,”  he  replied. 

And  should  an  immortal  being  seriously  think  of 
this  little  space  rather  than  of  the  whole? 

Of  the  whole,  certainly.  But  why  do  you  ask? 

Are  you  not  aware,  I said,  that  the  soul  of  man  is 
immortal  and  imperishable? 

He  looked  at  me  in  astonishment,  and  said:  No,  by 

1 if  we  accept  Madvig’s  ingenious  but  unnecessary  emendation 
At  events  we  will  sing,  that”  etc. 


THE  REPUBLIC  399 

heaven:  And  are  you  really  prepared  to  maintain 
this? 

Yes,  I said,  I ought  to  be,  and  you  too  — there  is 
no  difficulty  in  proving  it. 

I see  a great  difficulty^  but  I should  like  to  hear 
you  state  this  argument  of  which  you  make  so  light. 

Listen  then. 

I am  attending. 

There  is  a thing  which  you  call  good  and  another 
which  you  call  evil? 

Yes,  he  replied. 

Would  you  agree  with  me  in  thinking  that  the  cor- 
rupting and  destroying  element  is  the  evil,  and  the 
saving  and  improving  element  the  good? 

Yes. 

And  you  admit  that  everything  has  a good  and  also 
an  evil;  as  ophthalmia  is  the  evil  of  the  eyes  and  dis- 
ease of  the  whole  body ; as  mildew  is  of  corn,  and  rot 
of  timber,  or  rust  of  copper  and  iron:  in  everything, 
or  in  almost  everything,  there  is  an  inherent  evil  and 
disease  ? 

Yes,  he  said. 

And  anything  which  is  infected  by  any  of  these 
evils  is  made  evil,  and  at  last  wholly  dissolves  and 
dies? 

True. 

The  vice  and  evil  which  is  inherent  in  each  is  the 
destruction  of  each ; and  if  this  does  not  destroy  them 
there  is  nothing  else  that  will;  for  good  certainly  will 
not  destroy  them,  nor  again,  that  which  is  neither  good 
nor  evil. 

Certainly  not. 

If,  then,  we  find  any  nature  which  having  this  in- 
herent corruption  can  not  be  dissolved  or  destroyed, 
we  may  be  certain  that  of  such  a nature  there  is  no 
destruction? 


400 


THE  REPUBLIC 


That  may  be  assumed. 

Well,  I said,  and  is  there  no  evil  which  corrupts 
the  soul? 

Yes,  he  said,  there  are  all  the  evils  which  we  were 
just  now  passing  in  review:  unrighteousness,  intem- 
perance, cowardice,  ignorance. 

But  does  any  of  these  dissolve  or  destroy  her?  — 
and  here  do  not  let  us  fall  into  the  error  of  supposing 
that  the  unjust  and  foolish  man,  when  he  is  detected, 
perishes  through  his  own  injustice,  which  is  an  evil  of 
the  soul.  Take  the  analogy  of  the  body:  The  evil  of 
the  body  is  a disease  which  wastes  and  reduces  and 
annihilates  the  body;  and  all  the  things  of  which  we 
were  just  now  speaking  come  to  annihilation  through 
their  own  corruption  attaching  to  them  and  inhering 
in  them  and  so  destroying  them.  Is  not  this  true? 

Yes. 

Consider  the  soul  in  like  manner.  Does  the  injus- 
tice or  other  evil  which  exists  in  the  soul  waste  and 
consmne  her?  do  they  by  attaching  to  the  soul  and 
inhering  in  her  at  last  bring  her  to  death,  and  so  sepa- 
rate her  from  the  body? 

Certainly  not. 

And  yet,  I said,  it  is  unreasonable  to  suppose  that 
anything  can  perish  from  without  through  affection 
of  external  evil  which  could  not  be  destroyed  from 
within  by  a corruption  of  its  own? 

It  is,  he  replied. 

Consider,  I said,  Glaucon,  that  even  the  badness  of 
food,  whether  staleness,  decomposition,  or  any  other 
bad  quality,  when  confined  to  the  actual  food,  is  not 
supposed  to  destroy  the  body;  although,  if  the  bad- 
ness of  food  communicates  corruption  to  the  body, 
then  we  should  say  that  the  body  has  been  destroyed 
by  a corruption  of  itself,  which  is  disease,  brought  on 
by  this;  but  that  the  body,  being  one  thing,  can  be 


THE  REPUBLIC 


401 


destroyed  by  the  badness  of  food,  which  is  another, 
and  which  does  not  engender  any  natural  infection  — 
this  we  shall  absolutely  deny? 

Very  true. 

And,  on  the  same  principle,  unless  some  bodily  evil 
can  produce  an  evil  of  the  soul,  we  must  not  suppose 
that  the  soul,  which  is  one  thing,  can  be  dissolved  by 
any  merely  external  evil  which  belongs  to  another? 

Yes,  he  said,  there  is  reason  in  that. 

Either,  then,  let  us  refute  this  Conclusion,  or,  while 
it  remains  unrefuted,  let  us  never  say  that  fever,  or 
any  other  disease,  or  the  knife  put  to  the  throat,  or 
even  the  cutting  up  of  the  whole  body  into  the  minut- 
est pieces,  can  destroy  the  soul,  until  she  herself  is 
proved  to  become  more  unholy  or  unrighteous  in  con- 
sequence of  these  things  being  done  to  the  body;  hut 
that  the  soul,  or  anything  else  if  not  destroyed  by  an 
internal  evil,  can  be  destroyed  by  an  external  one,  is 
not  to  be  affirmed  by  any  man. 

And  surely,  he  replied,  no  one  wiU  ever  prove  that 
the  souls  of  men  become  more  unjust  in  eonsequence 
of  death. 

But  if  some  one  who  would  rather  not  admit  the 
immortality  of  the  soul  boldly  denies  this,  and  says 
that  the  dying  do  really  become  more  evil  and  un- 
righteous, then,  if  the  speaker  is  right,  I suppose  that 
injustice,  like  disease,  must  be  assumed  to  be  fatal  to 
the  unjust,  and  that  those  who  take  this  disorder  die 
by  the  natural  inherent  power  of  destruction  which 
evil  has,  and  which  kills  them  sooner  or  later,  but  in 
quite  another  way  from  that  in  which,  at  present,  the 
wicked  receive  death  at  the  hands  of  others  as  the 
penalty  of  their  deeds? 

Nay,  he  said,  in  that  case  injustice,  if  fatal  to  the 
unjust,  will  not  be  so  very  terrible  to  him,  for  he  will 
be  delivered  from  evil.  But  I rather  suspect  the  op- 


402 


THE  REPUBLIC 


posite  to  be  the  truth,  and  that  injustice  which,  if  it 
have  the  power,  will  murder  others,  keeps  the  mur- 
derer alive  — aye,  and  well  awake  too ; so  far  re- 
moved is  her  dwelling-place  from  being  a house  of 
death. 

True,  I said ; if  the  inherent  natural  vice  or  evil  of 
the  soul  is  unable  to  kill  or  destroy  her,  hardly  will 
that  which  is  appointed  to  be  the  destruction  of  some 
other  body,  destroy  a soul  or  anything  else  except 
that  of  which  it  was  appointed  to  be  the  destruction. 

Yes,  that  can  hardly  be. 

But  the  soul  which  can  not  be  destroyed  by  an  evil, 
I whether  inherent  or  external,  must  exist  forever,  and 
jif  existing  forever,  must  be  immortal? 

Certainly. 

That  is  the  conclusion,  I said;  and,  if  a true  con- 
clusion, then  the  souls  must  always  be  the  same,  for 
if  none  be  destroyed  they  will  not  diminish  in  munber. 
Neither  will  they  increase,  for  the  increase  of  the  im- 
mortal natures  must  come  from  something  mortal, 
and  all  things  would  thus  end  in  immortality. 

Very  true. 

But  this  we  can  not  believe  — reason  will  not  allow 
us  — any  more  than  we  can  believe  the  soul,  in  her 
truest  nature,  to  be  full  of  variety  and  difference  and 
dissimilarity. 

What  do  you  mean?  he  said. 

The  soul,  I said,  being,  as  is  now  proven,  immortal, 
must  be  the  fairest  of  compositions  and  can  not  be 
compounded  of  many  elements? 

Certainly  not. 

Her  immortality  is  demonstrated  by  the  previous 
argument,  and  there  are  many  other  proofs;  but  to 
see  her  as  she  really  is,  not  as  we  now  behold  her, 
marred  by  communion  with  the  body  and  other  mis- 
eries, you  must  contemplate  her  with  the  eye  of  rea- 


THE  REPUBLIC 


403 


son,  in  her  original  purity;  and  then  her  beauty  will 
be  revealed,  and  justice  and  injustice  and  all  the 
things  which  we  have  described  will  be  manifested 
more  clearly.  Thus  far,  we  have  spoken  the  truth 
concerning  her  as  she  appears  at  present,  but  we  must 
remember  also  that  we  have  seen  her  only  in  a condi- 
tion which  may  be  compared  to  that  of  the  sea-god 
Glaucus,  whose  original  image  can  hardly  be  dis- 
cerned because  his  natural  members  are  broken  off 
and  crushed  and  damaged  by  the  waves  in  all  sorts 
of  ways,  and  incrustations  have  grown  over  them  of 
seaweed  and  shells  and  stones,  so  that  he  is  more  like 
some  monster  than  he  is  to  his  own  natural  form. 
And  the  soul  which  we  behold  is  in  a similar  condition, 
disfigured  by  ten  thousand  ills.  But  not  there, 
Glaucon,  not  there  must  we  look. 

Where  then? 

At  her  love  of  wisdom.  Let  us  see  whom  she  affects, 
and  what  society  and  converse  she  seeks  in  virtue  of 
her  near  kindred  with  the  immortal  and  eternal  and 
divine ; also  how  different  she  would  become  if  wholly 
following  this  superior  principle,  and  borne  by  a 
divine  impulse  out  of  the  ocean  in  which  she  now  is, 
and  disengaged  from  the  stones  and  shells  and  things 
of  earth  and  rock  which  in  wild  variety  spring  up 
around  her  because  she  feeds  upon  earth,  and  is  over- 
grown by  the  good  things  of  this  life  as  they  are 
termed:  then  you  would  see  her  as  she  is,  and  know 
whether  she  have  one  shape  only  or  many,  or  what  her 
nature  is.  Of  her  affections  and  of  the  forms  which 
she  takes  in  this  present  life  I think  that  we  have  now 
said  enough. 

True,  he  replied. 

And  thus,  I said,  we  have  fulfilled  the  conditions 
of  the  argument;  ^ we  have  not  introduced  the  rewards 

1 Reading  dveXvadfieda* 


404 


THE  REPUBLIC 


and  glories  of  justice,  which,  as  you  were  saying,  are 
to  be  found  in  Homer  and  Hesiod;  but  justice  in  her 
.own  nature  has  been  shown  to  be  best  for  the  soul  in 
1 1 her  own  nature.  Let  a man  do  what  is  just,  whether 
I he  have  the  ring  of  Gyges  or  not,  and  even  if  in  addi- 
I tion  to  the  ring  of  Gyges  he  put  on  the  helmet  of 
J Hades. 

Very  true. 

And  now,  Glaucon,  there  will  he  no  harm  in  further 
enumerating  how  many  and  how  great  are  the  re- 
wards which  justice  and  the  other  virtues  procure  to 
the  soul  from  gods  and  men,  both  in  life  and  after 
death. 

Certainly  not,  he  said. 

Will  you  repay  me,  then,  what  you  borrowed  in  the 
argument? 

What  did  I borrow? 

The  assumption  that  the  just  man  should  appear 
unjust  and  the  unjust  just:  for  you  were  of  opinion 
that  even  if  the  true  state  of  the  case  could  not  possibly 
escape  the  eyes  of  gods  and  men,  still  this  admission 
ought  to  he  made  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  in 
order  that  pure  justice  might  be  weighed  against  pure 
injustice.  Do  you  remember? 

I should  be  much  to  blame  if  I had  forgotten. 

Then,  as  the  cause  is  decided,  I demand  on  behalf 
of  justice  that  the  estimation  in  which  she  is  held  by 
gods  and  men  and  which  we  acknowledge  to  be  her 
due  should  now  he  restored  to  her  by  us ; ^ since  she 
has  been  shown  to  confer  reality,  and  not  to  deceive 
those  who  truly  possess  her,  let  what  has  been  taken 
from  her  be  given  back,  that  so  she  may  win  that  palm 
of  appearance  which  is  hers  also,  and  which  she  gives 
to  her  own. 

The  demand,  he  said,  is  just, 

^ Reading  ijfjLwp. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


405 


In  the  first  place,  I said  — and  this  is  the  first  thing 
which  yon  will  have  to  give  back  — the  nature  both 
of  the  just  and  unjust  is  truly  known  to  the  gods. 

Granted. 

And  if  they  are  both  known  to  them,  one  must  be 
the  friend  and  the  other  the  enemy  of  the  gods,  as  we 
admitted  from  the  beginning? 

True. 

And  the  friend  of  the  gods  may  be  supposed  to 
receive  from  them  all  things  at  their  best,  excepting 
only  such  evil  as  is  the  necessary  consequence  of  former 
sins? 

Certainly. 

Then  this  must  be  our  notion  of  the  just  man,  that 
even  when  he  is  in  poverty  or  sickness,  or  any  other 
seeming  misfortune,  all  things  will  in  the  end  work 
together  for  good  to  him  in  life  and  death:  for  the 
gods  have  a care  of  any  one  whose  desire  is  to  become 
just  and  to  be  like  God,  as  far  as  man  can  attain  the 
divine  likeness,  by  the  pursuit  of  virtue? 

Yes,  he  said;  if  he  is  hke  God  he  will  surely  not  be 
neglected  by  him. 

And  of  the  unjust  may  not  the  opposite  be  sup- 
posed ? 

Certainly. 

Such,  then,  are  the  palms  of  victory  which  the  gods 
give  the  just? 

That  is  my  conviction. 

And  what  do  they  receive  of  men?  Look  at  things 
as  they  really  are,  and  you  will  see  that  the  clever  un- 
just are  in  the  case  of  runners,  who  run  well  from 
the  starting-place  to  the  goal  but  not  back  again  from 
the  goal:  they  go  olf  at  a great  pace,  but  in  the  end 
only  look  foolish,  slinking,  away  with  their  ears  drag- 
gling on  their  shoulders,  and  without  a crown;  but 
the  true  runner  com.es  to  the  finish  and  receives  the 


406 


THE  REPUBLIC 


prize  and  is  crowned.  And  this  is  the  way  with  the 
just;  he  who  endures  to  the  end  of  every  action  and 
occasion  of  his  entire  life  has  a good  report  and  car- 
ries off  the  prize  which  men  have  to  bestow. 

True. 

And  now  you  must  allow  me  to  repeat  of  the  just 
the  blessings  which  you  were  attributing  to  the  for- 
tunate unjust.  I shall  say  of  them,  what  you  were 
saying  of  the  others,  that  as  they  grow  older,  they  be- 
come rulers  in  their  own  city  if  they  care  to  be ; they 
marry  whom  they  like  and  give  in  marriage  to  whom 
they  will ; all  that  you  said  of  the  others  I now  say  of 
these.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  of  the  unjust  I say 
that  the  greater  number,  even  though  they  escape  in 
their  youth,  are  found  out  at  last  and  look  foolish  at 
the  end  of  their  course,  and  when  they  come  to  be  old 
and  miserable  are  flouted  alike  by  stranger  and  citi- 
zen ; they  are  beaten  and  then  come  those  things  unfit 
for  ears  polite,  as  you  truly  term  them;  they  will  be 
racked  and  have  their  eyes  burned  out,  as  you  were 
saying.  And  you  may  suppose  that  I have  repeated 
the  remainder  of  your  tale  of  horrors.  But  will  you 
let  me  assume,  without  reciting  them,  that  these  things 
are  true? 

^rtainly,  he  said,  what  you  say  is  true. 

^ese,  then,  are  the  prizes  and  rewards  and  gifts 
which  are  bestowed  upon  the  just  by  gods  and  men 
in  this  present  life,  in  addition  to  the  other  good  things 
which  justice  of  herself  provides. 

Yes,  he  said;  and  they  are  fair  and  lasting. 

And  yet,  I said,  all  these  are  as  nothing  either  in 
number  or  greatness  in  comparison  with  those  other 
recompenses  which  await  both  just  and  unjust  after 
death.  And  you  ought  to  hear  them,  and  then  both 
just  and  unjust  will  have  received  from  us  a full  pay- 
ment of  the  debt  which  the  argument  owes  to  them. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


407 


Speak,  he  said ; there  are  few  things  whieh  I would 
more  gladly  hear. 

W ell,  I said,  I will  tell  you  a tale ; not  one  of  the 
tales  which  Odysseus  tells  to  the  hero  Alcinous,  yet 
this  too  is  a tale  of  a hero,  Er  the  son  of  Armenius,  a 
Pamphylian  by  birth.  He  was  slain  in  battle,  and 
ten  days  afterwards,  when  the  bodies  of  the  dead  were 
taken  up  already  in  a state  of  corruption,  his  body 
was  found  unaffected  by  decay,  and  carried  away 
home  to  be  buried.  And  on  the  twelfth  day,  as  he  was 
lying  on  the  funeral  pile,  he  returned  to  life  and  told 
them  what  he  had  seen  in  the  other  world.  He  said 
that  when  his  soul  left  the  body  he  went  on  a journey 
with  a great  company,  and  that  they  came  to  a mys- 
terious place  at  which  there  were  two  openings  in  the 
earth;  they  were  near  together,  and  over  against  them 
were  two  other  openings  in  the  heaven  above.  ( In  the 
intermediate  space  there  were  judges  seated,'  who 
commanded  the  just,  after  they  had  given  judgment 
on  them  and  had  bound  their  sentences  in  front  of 
them,  to  ascend  by  the  heavenly  way  on  the  right 
hand;  and  in  like  manner  the  unjust  were  bidden  by 
them  to  descend  by  the  lower  way  on  the  left  hand; 
these  also  bore  the  symbols  of  their  deeds,  but  fastened 
on  their  backs.^  He  drew  near,  and  they  told  him 
that  he  was  to  be  the  messenger  who  would  carry  the 
report  of  the  other  world  to  men,  and  they  bade  him 
hear  and  see  all  that  was  to  be  heard  and  seen  in  that 
place.  Then  he  beheld  and  saw  on  one  side  the  souls 
departing  at  either  opening  of  heaven  and  earth  when 
sentence  had  been  given  on  them ; and  at  the  two  other 
openings  other  souls,  some  ascending  out  of  the  earth 
dusty  and  worn  with  travel,  some  descending  out  of 
heaven  clean  and  bright.  And  arriving  ever  and  anon 
they  seemed  to  have  come  from  a long  journey,  and 
they  went  forth  with  gladness  into  the  meadow,  where 


4C8 


THE  REPUBLIC 


they  encamped  as  at  a festival;  and  those  who  knew 
one  another  embraced  and  conversed,  the  souls  which 
came  from  earth  curiously  inquiring  about  the  things 
above,  and  the  souls  which  came  from  heaven  about 
the  things  beneath.  /And  they  told  one  another  of 
w’hat  had  happened  Dy  the  way,  those  from  below 
weeping  and  sorrowing  at  the  remembrance  of  the 
things  which  they  had  endured  and  seen  in  their  jour- 
ney beneath  the  earth  (now  the  journey  lasted  a thou- 
sand years),  while  those  from  above  were  describing 
heavenly  delights  and  visions  of  inconceivable  beauty^ 
The  story,  Glaucon,  would  take  too  long  to  tell;  but 
the  sum  was  this : — {^He  said  that  for  every  wrong 
which  they  had  done  to  any  one  they  suffered  tenfold;^ 
or  once  in  a hundred  years  — such  being  reckoned  to 
be  the  length  of  man’s  life,  and  the  penalty  being  thus 
paid  ten  times  in  a thousand  years.  If,  for  example, 
there  were  any  who  had  been  the  cause  of  many  deaths, 
or  had  betrayed  or  enslaved  cities  or  armies,  or  been 
guilty  of  any  other  evil  behavior,  for  each  and  all  of 
their  offences  they  received  punishment  ten  times 
over,  and  the  rewards  of  beneficence  and  justice  and 
holiness  were  in  the  same  proportion.  I need  hardly 
repeat  w^hat  he  said  concerning  young  children  dying 
almost  as  soon  as  they  were  born.  Of  piety  and  im- 
piety to  gods  and  parents,  and  of  murderers,^  there 
were  retributions  other  and  greater  far  which  he  de- 
scribed. He  mentioned  that  he  was  present  when  one 
of  the  spirits  asked  another,  “ Where  is  Ardiaeus  the 
Great?  ” (Now  this  Ardiaeus  lived  a thousand  years 
before  the  time  of  Er:  he  had  been  the  tyrant  of  some 
city  of  Pamphylia,  and  had  murdered  his  aged  father 
and  his  elder  brother,  and  was  said  to  have  committed 
many  other  abominable  crimes.)  The  answer  of  the 
other  spirit  was:  “ He  comes  not  hither  and  will  never 

1 Reading  aifrbx^tpas. 


THE  REPUBLIC 


409 


come.  And  this,”  said  he,  “ was  one  of  the  dreadful 
sights  which  we  ourselves  witnessed.  We  were  at  the 
mouth  of  the  cavern,  and,  having  completed  all  our 
experiences,  were  about  to  reascend,  when  of  a sudden 
Ardiaeus  appeared  and  several  others,  most  of  whom 
were  tyrants ; and  there  were  also  besides  the  tyrants 
private  individuals  who  had  been  great  criminals: 
they  were  just,  as  they  fancied,  about  to  return  into 
the  upper  world,  but  the  mouth,  instead  of  admitting 
them,  gave  a roar,  whenever  any  of  these  incurable 
sinners  or  some  one  who  had  not  been  sufficiently  pun- 
ished tried  to  ascend ; and  then  wild  men  of  fiery  as- 
pect, who  were  standing  by  and  heard  the  sound, 
seized  and  carried  them  off ; and  Ardiaeus  and  others 
they  bound  head  and  foot  and  hand,  and  threw  them 
down  and  flayed  them  with  scourges,  and  dragged 
them  along  the  road  at  the  side,  carding  them  on 
thorns  like  wool,  and  declaring  to  the  passers-by  what 
were  their  crimes,  and  that  ^ they  were  being  taken 
away  to  be  cast  into  hell.”  And  of  all  the  many  ter- 
rors which  they  had  endured,  he  said  that  there  was 
none  like  the  terror  which  each  of  them  felt  at  that 
moment,  lest  they  should  hear  the  voice;  and  when 
there  was  silence,  one  by  one  they  ascended  with  ex- 
ceeding joy.  These,  said  Er,  were  the  penalties  and 
retributions,  and  there  were  blessings  as  great. 

Now  when  the  spirits  which  were  in  the  meadow  had 
tarried  seven  days,  on  the  eighth  they  were  obliged  to 
proceed  on  their  journey,  and,  on  the  fourth  day  after, 
he  said  that  they  came  to  a place  where  they  could  see 
from  above  a line  of  light,  straight  as  a column,  ex- 
tending right  through  the  whole  heaven  and  through 
the  earth,  in  color  resembling  the  rainbow,  only 
brighter  and  purer;  another  day’s  journey  brought 
them  to  the  place,  and  there,  in  the  midst  of  the  light, 

1 Heading  Kai  oti. 


410 


THE  REPUBLIC 


they  saw  the  ends  of  the  chains  of  heaven  let  down 
from  above:  for  this  light  is  the  belt  of  heaven,  and 
holds  together  the  circle  of  the  universe,  like  the  under- 
girders of  a trireme.  From  these  ends  is  extended  the 
spindle  of  Necessity,  on  which  all  the  revolutions  turn. 
The  shaft  and  hook  of  this  spindle  are  made  of  steel, 
and  the  whorl  is  made  partly  of  steel  and  also  partly 
of  other  materials.  Now  the  whorl  is  in  form  like  the 
whorl  used  on  earth ; and  the  description  of  it  implied 
that  there  is  one  large  hollow  whorl  which  is  quite 
scooped  out,  and  into  this  is  fitted  another  lesser  one, 
and  another,  and  another,  and  four  others,  making 
eight  in  all,  like  vessels  which  fit  into  one  another ; the 
whorls  show  their  edges  on  the  upper  side,  and  on 
their  lower  side  all  together  form  one  continuous 
whorl.  This  is  pierced  by  the  spindle,  which  is  driven 
home  through  the  centre  of  the  eighth.  The  first  and 
outermost  whorl  has  the  rim  broadest,  and  the  seven 
inner  whorls  are  narrower,  in  the  following  propor- 
tions — the  sixth  is  next  to  the  first  in  size,  the  fourth 
next  to  the  sixth ; then  comes  the  eighth ; the  seventh 
is  fifth,  the  fifth  is  sixth,  the  third  is  seventh,  last  and 
eighth  comes  the  second.  The  largest  [or  fixed  stars] 
is  spangled,  and  the  seventh  [or  sun]  is  brightest;  the 
eighth  [or  moon]  colored  by  the  reflected  light  of  the 
seventh;  the  second  and  fifth  [Saturn  and  Mercury] 
are  in  color  like  one  another,  and  yellower  than  the 
preceding;  the  third  [Venus]  has  the  whitest  light; 
the  fourth  [Mars]  is  reddish;  the  sixth  [Jupiter]  is 
in  whiteness  second.  Now  the  whole  spindle  has  the 
same  motion ; but,  as  the  whole  revolves  in  one  direc- 
tion, the  seven  inner  circles  move  slowly  in  the  other, 
and  of  these  the  swiftest  is  the  eighth ; next  in  swift- 
ness are  the  seventh,  sixth,  and  fifth,  which  move  to- 
gether; third  in  swiftness  appeared  to  move  accord- 
ing to  the  law  of  this  reversed  motion  the  fourth ; the 


THE  REPUBLIC 


411 


third  appeared  fourth  and  the  second  fifth.  The 
spindle  turns  on  the  knees  of  Necessity;  and  on  the 
upper  surface  of  each  circle  is  a siren,  who  goes  round 
with  them,  hymning  a single  tone  or  note.  The  eight 
together  form  one  harmony;  and  round  about,  at 
equal  intervals,  there  is  another  band,  three  in  num- 
ber, each  sitting  upon  her  throne;  these  are  the  Fates, 
daughters  of  Necessity,  who  are  clothed  in  white  robes 
and  have  chaplets  upon  their  heads,  Lachesis  and 
Clotho  and  Atropos,  who  accompany  with  their  voices 
the  harmony  of  the  sirens  — Lachesis  singing  of  the 
past,  Clotho  of  the  present,  Atropos  of  the  future; 
Clotho  from  time  to  time  assisting  with  a touch  of  her 
right  hand  the  revolution  of  the  outer  circle  of  the 
whorl  or  spindle,  and  Atropos  with  her  left  hand 
touching  and  guiding  the  inner  ones,  and  Lachesis 
laying  hold  of  either  in  turn,  first  with  one  hand  and 
then  with  the  other. 

When  Er  and  the  spirits  arrived,  their  duty  was  to 
go  at  once  to  Lachesis;  but  first  of  all  there  came  a 
prophet  who  arranged  them  in  order;  then  he  took 
from  the  knees  of  Lachesis  lots  and  samples  of  lives, 
and  having  mounted  a high  pulpit,  spoke  as  follows : 
“ Hear  the  word  of  Lachesis,  the  daughter  of  Neces- 
sity. Mortal  souls,  behold  a new  cycle  of  life  and 
mortality.  Your  genius  will  not  be  allotted  to  you, 
but  you  will  choose  your  genius;  and  let  him  who 
draws  the  first  lot  have  the  first  choice,  and  the  life 
which  he  chooses  shall  be  his  destiny.  Virtue  is  free, 
and  as  a man  honors  or  dishonors  her  he  will  have 
more  or  less  of  her;  the  responsibility  is  with  the 
chooser  — God  is  justified.”  When  the  Interpreter 
had  thus  spoken  he  scattered  lots  indifferently  among 
them  all,  and  each  of  them  took  up  the  lot  which  fell 
near  him,  all  but  Er  bimself  (he  was  not  allowed), 
and  each  as  he  took  his  lot  perceived  the  number  which 


412 


THE  REPUBLIC 


he  had  obtained.  Then  the  Interpreter  placed  on  the 
ground  before  them  the  samples  of  lives;  and  there 
were  many  more  lives  than  the  souls  present,  and  they 
were  of  all  sorts.  There  were  lives  of  every  animal 
and  of  man  in  every  condition.  And  there  were  tyran- 
nies among  them,  some  lasting  out  the  tyrant’s  life, 
others  which  broke  off  in  the  middle  and  came  to  an 
end  in  poverty  and  exile  and  beggary ; and  there  were 
lives  of  famous  men,  some  who  were  famous  for  their 
form  and  beauty  as  well  as  for  their  strength  and  suc- 
cess in  games,  or,  again,  for  their  birth  and  the  quali- 
ties of  their  ancestors ; and  some  who  were  the  reverse 
of  famous  for  the  opposite  qualities.  And  of  women 
likewise ; there  was  not,  however,  any  definite  char- 
acter in  them,  because  the  soul,  when  choosing  a new 
life,  must  of  necessity  become  different.  But  there 
was  every  other  quality,  and  they  all  mingled  with 
one  another,  and  also  with  elements  of  wealth  and 
poverty,  and  disease  and  health ; and  there  were  mean 
states  also.  And  here,  my  dear  Glaucon,  is  the  su- 
preme peril  of  our  human  state;  and  therefore  the 
utmost  care  should  be  taken.  Let  each  one  of  us  leave 
every  other  kind  of  knowledge  and  seek  and  follow 
one  thing  only,  if  peradventure  he  may  be  able  to 
learn  and  may  find  some  one  who  will  make  him  able 
to  learn  and  discern  between  good  and  evil,  and  so  to 
choose  always  and  everywhere  the  better  life  as  he 
has  opportunity.  He  should  consider  the  bearing  of 
all  these  things  which  have  been  mentioned  severally 
and  collectively  upon  virtue;  he  should  know  what 
the  effect  of  beauty  is  when  combined  with  poverty 
or  wealth  in  a particular  soul,  and  what  are  the  good 
and  evil  consequences  of  noble  and  humble  birth,  of 
private  and  public  station,  of  strength  and  weakness, 
of  cleverness  and  dullness,  and  of  all  the  natural  and 
acquired  gifts  of  the  soul,  and  the  operation  of  them 


THE  REPUBLIC 


413 


when  conjoined;  he  .will  then  look  at  the  nature  of 
the  soul,  and  from  the  consideration  of  all  these  quali- 
ties he  will  be  able  to  determine  which  is  the  better 
and  which  is  the  worse ; and  so  he  will  choose,  giving 
the  name  of  evil  to  the  life  which  will  make  his  soul 
more  unjust,  and  good  to  the  life  which  will  make  his 
soul  more  just;  all  else  he  will  disregard.  For  we 
have  seen  and  know  that  this  is  the  best  choice  both  in 
life  and  after  death.  man  must  take  with  him  into 
the  world  below  an  adamantine  faith  in  truth  and 
right,  that  there  too  he  may  be  undazzled  by  the  desire 
of  wealth  or  the  other  allurements  of  evil,  lest,  coming 
upon  tyrannies  and  similar  villainies,  he  do  irremedi- 
able wrongs  to  others  and  suffer  yet  worse  himself ; 
but  let  him  know  how  to  choose  the  mean  and  avoid 
the  extremes  on  either  side,  as  far  as  possible,  not  only 
in  this  life  but  in  all  that  which  is  to  come.  For  this 
is  the  way  of  happiness.^ 

And  according  to  th^  report  of  the  messenger  from 
the  other  world  this  was  what  the  prophet  said  at  the 
time:  “ Even  for  the  last  comer,  if  he  chooses  wisely 
and  will  live  diligently,  there  is  appointed  a happy 
and  not  undesirable  existence.  Let  not  him  who 
chooses  first  be  careless,  and  let  not  the  last  despair.” 
And  when  he  had  spoken,  he  who  had  the  first  choice 
came  forward  and  in  a moment  chose  the  greatest 
tyranny ; his  mind  having  been  darkened  by  folly  and 
sensuality,  he  had  not  thought  out  the  whole  matter 
before  he  chose,  and  did  not  at  first  sight  perceive  that 
he  was  fated,  among  other  evils,  to  devour  his  own 
children.  But  when  he  had  time  to  reflect,  and  saw 
what  was  in  the  lot,  he  began  to  beat  his  breast  and 
lament  over  his  choice,  forgetting  the  proclamation 
of  the  prophet;  for,  instead  of  throwing  the  blame  of 
his  misfortune  on  himself,  he  accused  chance  and  the 
gods,  and  everything  rather  than  himself.  Now  he 


414 


THE  REPUBLIC 


was  one  of  those  who  came  from  heaven,  and  in  a 
former  life  had  dwelt  in  a well-ordered  State,  but  his 
virtue  was  a matter  of  habit  only,  and  he  had  no  phi- 
losophy. And  it  was  true  of  others  who  were  simi- 
larly overtaken,  that  the  greater  number  of  them  came 
from  heaven  and  therefore  they  had  never  been 
schooled  by  trial,  whereas  the  pilgrims  who  came  from 
earth  having  themselves  suffered  and  seen  others  suf- 
fer were  not  in  a hurry  to  choose.  And  owing  to  this 
inexperience  of  theirs,  and  also  because  the  lot  was  a 
chance,  many  of  the  souls  exchanged  a good  destiny 
for  an  evil  or  an  evil  for  a good.  For  if  a man  had 
always  on  his  arrival  in  this  world  dedicated  himself 
from  the  first  to  sound  philosophy,  and  had  been  mod- 
erately fortunate  in  the  number  of  the  lot,  he  might, 
as  the  messenger  reported,  be  happy  here,  and  also 
his  journey  to  another  life  and  return  to  this,  instead 
of  being  rough  and  underground,  would  be  smooth 
and  heavenly.  Most  curious,  he  said,  was  the  spec- 
tacle — sad  and  laughable  and  strange ; for  the  choice 
of  the  souls  was  in  most  cases  based  on  their  experi- 
ence of  a previous  life.  There  he  saw  the  soul  which 
had  once  been  Orpheus  choosing  the  life  of  a swan 
out  of  enmity  to  the  race  of  women,  hating  to  be  born 
of  a woman  because  they  had  been  his  murderers ; he 
beheld  also  the  soul  of  Thamyras  choosing  the  life  of 
a nightingale ; birds,  on  the  other  hand,  like  the  swan 
and  other  musicians,  wanting  to  be  men.  The  soul 
which  obtained  the  twentieth  ^ lot  chose  the  life  of  a 
lion,  and  this  was  the  soul  of  Ajax  the  son  of  Tela- 
mon, who  would  not  be  a man,  remembering  the  in- 
justice which  was  done  him  in  the  judgment  about  the 
arms.  The  next  was  Agamemnon,  who  took  the  life 
of  an  eagle,  because, ""like  Ajax,  he  hated  human 
nature  by  reason  of  his  sufferings.  About  the  middle 

1 Reading 


THE  REPUBLIC 


415 


came  the  lot  of  Atalanta;  she,  seeing  the  great  fame 
of  an  athlete,  was  unable  to  resist  the  temptation : and 
after  her  there  followed  the  soul  of  Epeus  the  son  of 
Panopeus  passing  into  the  nature  of  a woman  cunning 
in  the  arts;  and  far  away  among  the  last  who  chose, 
the  soul  of  the  jester  Tbersites  was  putting  on  the 
form  of  a monkey.  There  came  also  the  soul  of 
Odysseus  having  yet  to  make  a choice,  and  his  lot  hap- 
pened to  be  the  last  of  them  all.  Now  the  recollection 
of  former  toils  had  disenchanted  him  of  ambition,  and 
he  went  about  for  a considerable  time  in  search  of  the 
life  of  a private  man  who  had  no  cares  ; he  had  some 
difficulty  in  finding  this,  which  was  lying  about  and 
had  been  neglected  by  everybody  else;  and  when  be 
saw  it,  he  said  that  he  would  have  done  the  same  had 
his  lot  been  first  instead  of  last,  and  that  be  was  de- 
lighted to  have  it.  And  not  only  did  men  pass  into 
animals,  but  I must  also  mention  that  there  were 
animals  tame  and  wild  who  changed  into  one  another 
and  into  corresponding  human  natures  — the  good 
into  the  gentle  and  the  evil  into  the  savage,  in  all  sorts 
of  combinations. 

All  the  souls  had  now  chosen  their  lives,  and  they 
went  in  the  order  of  their  choice  to  Lachesis,  who  sent 
with  them  the  genius  whom  they  had  severally  chosen, 
to  be  the  guardian  of  their  lives  and  the  fulfiller  of  the 
choice:  this  genius  led  the  souls  first  to  Clotho,  and 
drew  them  within  the  revolution  of  the  spindle  im- 
pelled by  her  hand,  thus  ratifying  the  destiny  of  each ; 
and  then,  when  they  were  fastened  to  this,  carried 
them  to  Atropos,  who  spun  the  threads  and  made 
them  irreversible,  whence  without  turning  roimd  they 
passed  beneath  the  throne  of  Necessity;  and  when 
they  had  all  passed,  they  marched  on  in  a scorching 
heat  to  the  plain  of  Forgetfulness,  which  was  a barren 
waste  destitute  of  trees  and  verdure;  and  then  towards 


416 


THE  REPUBLIC 


evening  they  encamped  by  the  river  of  Unmindful- 
ness, whose  water  no  vessel  can  hold;  of  this  they 
were  all  obliged  to  drink  a certain  quantity,  and  those 
who  were  not  saved  by  wisdom  drank  more  than  was 
necessary;  and  each  one  as  he  drank  forgot  all  things. 
Now  after  they  had  gone  to  rest,  about  the  middle  of 
the  night  there  was  a thvmderstorm  and  earthquake, 
and  then  in  an  instant  they  were  driven  upwards  in 
all  manner  of  ways  to  their  birth,  like  stars  shooting. 
He  himself  was  hindered  from  drinking  the  water. 
But  in  what  manner  or  by  what  means  he  returned 
to  the  body  he  could  not  say;  only,  in  the  morning, 
awakening  suddenly,  he  found  himself  lying  on  the 
pyre. 

And  thus,  Glaucon,  the  tale  has  been  saved  and  has 
not  perished,  and  will  save  us  if  we  are  obedient  to  the 
■word  spoken;  and  we  shall  pass  safely  over  the  river 
of  Forgetfulness  and  our  soul  will  not  be  defiled. 
Wherefore  my  ^counsel  is,  that  we  hold  fast  ever  to  the 
heavenly  way  and  follow  after  justice  and  virtue  al- 
ways, considering  that  the  soul  is  immortal  and  able  to 
endure  every  sort  of  good  and  every  sort  of  evil. 
Thus  shall  we  live  dear  to  one  another  and  to  the  gods, 
both  while  remaining  here  and  when,  like  conquerors 
in  the  games  who  go  roimd  to  gather  gifts,  we  receive 
our  reward.  And  it  shall  be  well  with  us  both  in  this 
life  and  in  the  pilgrimage  of  a thousand  years  which 
we  have  been  describing. 


